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The  particular  issue  in  the  philosophy  of  science  I  propose  to  treat  along 
Thomistic  lines  is  the  realism  vs.  anti-realism  debate,  or  what  I  will  call 
the  realist  dispute  in  science.  The  dispute  centres  on  the  precise 
interpretation  that  should  be  given  to  scientific  theoiIes  in  general. 
Closely  associated  with  this  dispute  is  that  regarding  the  widely 
divergent  understandings  of  the  nature  and  aims  of  the  scientific 
enterprise  as  a  whole.  In  the  past  participants  in  this  discussion  have 
tended  to  champion  either  a  form  of  realism  or  a  form  of  anti-realism.  I 
reject  this  traditional  either/or,  convinced  that  neither  position  can  do 
justice  to  all  scientific  theoiries.  I  show  that  both  positions  have  some 
merit  and  that  a  melding  of  the  two  into  one  coherent  position  is 
necessary.  This  project  of  synthesising  an  inclusive  position  out  of  two 
more  narrow  views  is  made  easier  if  one  is  acquainted  with  Thomas 
Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science. 
Part  I  is  entirely  devoted  to  current  issues  in  the  philosophy  of 
language,  logic  and  science.  The  burden  of  the  Introduction  is  to 
famillarise  ourselves  with  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  scientific 
realism  and  scientific  anti-realism,  and  to  show  that  a  synthesis  of 
realist  and  anti-realist  tendencies  is  desirable.  Chapters  Two  and  Three 
deal  with  a  challenge  stemming  from  semantic  anti-realists  concerning 
the  proper  understanding  of  the  nature  of  truth.  The  remainder  of  Part 
I  is  devoted  to  the  problem  of  demarcation.  In  Chapter  6,  which  deals 
with  Quine's  thesis  concerning  the  indeterminacy  of  radical  translation, 
I  offer  a  method  of  distinguishing  areas  of  discourse  capable  of  bearing 
a  realist  interpretation  from  those  demanding  treatment  along  anti- 
realistic  lines. 
Part  Il  begins  our  study  of  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science.  Aquinas  is 
presented  as  offering  an  intellectual  system  consistent  with  conclusions 
drawn  in  Part  I.  Moreover,  his  attempt  to  make  theology  a  science  on 
the  Aristotelian  model  is  seen  to  be  analogous  to  our  attempt  to 
reconcile  realist  and  anti-realist  tendencies  in  the  realist  dispute  in 
science. 3 
In  Part  III  I  return  to  issues  raised  in  the  Introduction  to  Part  1,  and 
show  how  the  inclusive  position  developed  in  Parts  I  and  II  can  be  used 
to  treat  two  modem  scientific  theories,  Darwin's  theory  of  Natural 
Selection  and  Newton's  Laws  of  Motion  and  Gravity. Contents 
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The  natural  sciences  in  the  twentieth  century  have  become  to 
philosophers  and  society  generally  what  theology  was  to  the  scholastics. 
Previously  it  was  embarrassing  for  a  philosopher  to  be  in  conflict  with 
orthodox  theology.  Now  philosophers  working  in  areas  connected  to  the 
sciences  ignore  the  Church  and  keep  a  watchful  eye  on  the  received 
scientific  theories  of  the  day  in  order  to  avoid  being  in  conflict  with 
current  orthodoxy.  This  is  as  it  should  be.  The  Church  has  no  claim 
on  the  philosopher,  and  philosophers  quite  properly  defer  to  scientists 
on  scientific  matters. 
But  it  is  precisely  because  the  natural  sciences  enjoy  such  prestige  that 
its  aims,  function  and  limitations  must  be  clearly  understood.  However, 
when  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  these  matters,  and  make  inquiries 
concerning  the  cognitive  status  of  scientific  theories,  we  cannot  expect 
authoritative  answers  from  the  scientist  qua  scientist,  for  these  are  not 
scientific  questions.  In  point  of  fact,  our  views  on  these  specifically 
philosophical,  or  meta-scientific  matters  determine  how  we  interpret  the 
dictates  of  the  scientist.  But  as  any  casual  survey  of  the  available 
literature  will  show,  no  single  philosophy  of  science  addressing  these 
issues  has  been  able  to  command  the  assent  of  all  interested  parties. 
This  lack  of  consensus  may  or  may  not  be  inherently  unsatisfactory  in 
itself.  Yet  despite  the  fact  that  no  consensus  has  emerged,  appeals  to 
science  are  constantly  made,  both  in  academic  circles  and  in  the  public 
arena  at  large,  without  any  acknowledgement  that  these  appeals  are  in 
any  way  problematic.  This  unsophisticated  use  of  science  is 
philosophically  intolerable,  and  is  arguably  more  serious  than  our 
ignorance  of  the  latest  scientific  theories  and  discoveries.  Indeed,  our 
woeful  scientific  illiteracy  is  never  more  in  evidence  than  when  we 
confidently  defer  to  authority  of  scientists  while  failing  to  understanding 
the  cognitive  status  of  the  theories  they  have  produced. 
It  is  with  these  thoughts  in  mind  that  the  following  study  has  been 
undertaken.  It  seems  to  me  that  a  hermeneutics  of  scientific  theories  is 
needed,  and  one  with  the  possibility  of  attracting  widespread  assent. 
But  if  one  wishes  to  engage  in  current  debates  in  the  philosophy  of 
science,  a  degree  of  surprise  is  to  be  expected  if  it  is  stated  overtly  that 
one's  principal  source  of  inspiration  in  these  matters  is  the  work  of  a 
thirteenth  century  Dominican  monk  and  leading  figure  of  a  d6pass6 7 
authoritarian  institution.  For  despite  the  fact  that  we  are  now  living  in 
what  is  vaguely  called  a  "post-modem"'  age,  we  remain  enamoured  by 
the  idea  of  progress,  both  intellectual  and  social.  It  is  therefore  not 
surprising  that  to  contemporary  thinkers  concerned  with  things 
scientific  the  mention  of  Thomas  Aquinas  will  appear  retrograde  in  the 
extreme.  His  religious  affiliations  aside,  Aquinas  had  no  knowledge  of 
modem  science,  nor  was  he  privy  to  our  latest  intellectual 
achievements.  It  is  therefore  quite  reasonable  in  today's  intellectual 
climate  to  doubt  that  Aquinas  has  any  contribution  to  make  to  debates 
in  twentieth  century  philosophy  of  science.  In  fact  it  is  only  if  Aquinas 
is  seen  against  the  background  of  modem  debates  in  the  philosophy  of 
science,  logic  and  language  that  the  modem  philosopher  is  likely  to  be 
able  to  appreciate  Aquinas'  potential  contribution.  And  I  believe  that  it 
will  be  only  too  apparent  why  Aquinas  deserves  our  attention  once  the 
results  of  a  series  of  investigations  into  these  matters  have  been  made 
clear.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  work  ostensibly  inspired  by  and  about 
the  work  of  Aquinas  must  devote  much  space  to  the  work  of  modem 
thinkers. 
The  particular  issue  in  the  philosophy  of  science  I  propose  eventually  to 
treat  along  Thomistic  lines  is  the  realism  vs.  anti-realism  debate,  or 
what  I  will  call  the  realist  dispute  in  science.  Some  space  will  be 
devoted  to  the  characterisation  of  these  positions  and  the  particular 
points  of  dispute.  These  terms  are  not  being  used  here  in  any 
idiosyncratic  fashion,  but  for  now  let  it  suffice  to  say  that  the 
disagreement  centres  on  the  precise  interpretation  that  should  be  given 
to  scientific  theories  in  general.  Closely  associated  with  this  dispute  is 
that  regarding  the  widely  divergent  understandings  of  the  nature  and 
aims  of  the  scientific  enterprise  as  a  whole. 
The  modem  debate  starts  most  clearly  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  when  the  common  sense  realism  of  most  philosophers  of 
science  was  challenged  by  the  replacement  of  the  classical  physics  of 
Newton  by  the  new  physics  of  Einstein.  Developments  in  Quantum 
Mechanics  have  only  exacerbated  matters.  Work  in  the  anti-realist  vein 
furthered  by  such  writers  as  Mach,  Poincar&,  Duhem,  Eddington,  and 
most  recently  by  Bas  van  Fraassen  and  Nancy  Cartwright  gains  a 
hearing  among  those  whose  confidence  in  common  sense  realism  has 8 
been  shaken.  Anti-realism  in  science  also  appears  to  receive  support 
from  Thomas  Kuhn  and  other  historians  of  science.  It  would  be  absurd 
to  suggest  that  all  these  writers  agree  on  the  nature  of  science  in  all 
details;  but  as  Ian  Hacking  has  pointed  out  in  Representing  and 
Intervening,  scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti-realism  are  positions 
more  correctly  characterised  by  their  general  attitudes  rather  than  by 
particular  points  of  doctrine.  1  It  is  therefore  quite  proper  that  they  be 
grouped  together  at  least  in  terms  of  this  particular  debate. 
It  would  be  a  colossal  task  indeed  to  consider  each  of  these  thinkers  in 
turn,  taking  time  to  analyse  the  merits  of  each  position  and  the  realist 
responses.  lbankfully  this  is  not  what  I  propose.  The  reason  for 
refusing  this  type  of  approach  is  that  it  is  misguided.  Past  realism  vs. 
anti-realism  debates  have  been  conducted  along  the  lines  of  a  rigid 
either/or,  although  Cartwright  and  Harr6  are  notable  exceptions.  2 
Parties  to  this  dispute  have  traditionally  been  strongly  in  favour  of  one 
position  or  the  other.  I  reject  this  traditional  either/or  because  I  am 
convinced  that  neither  position  is  entirely  satisfactory  on  its  own. 
However,  the  fact  that  this  debate  has  been  with  us  intermittently  since 
as  least  the  days  of  the  ancient  Greeks3,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  both 
sides  in  this  dispute  can  claim  the  allegiance  of  scientific  luminaries 
and  respected  philosophers,  suggests  that  both  sides  in  the  dispute 
have  some  valuable  contribution  to  offer  to  the  philosophy  of  science.  it 
seems  reasonable,  therefore,  to  suggest  a  different  line  of  enquiry. 
Although  the  role  of  mediator  is  notoriously  an  uncomfortable  one,  we 
should  not  be  deterred  from  attempting  to  do  justice  to  both  positions 
by  combining  their  respective  strengths  into  one  coherent  position  in 
the  realist  dispute  in  science.  I  intend  to  show  that  this  project  of 
synthesis  is  both  desirable  and  manageable  before  entering  into  any 
detailed  considerations  of  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science.  As  intimated 
earlier,  arriving  at  such  a  position  requires  acquaintance  with  much 
twentieth  century  thought  in  the  philosophy  of  science,  logic  and 
language.  The  work  of  Duhem,  van  Fraassen,  Quine,  Putnam  and 
Dummett  in  particular  will  be  front  and  centre. 
Our  first  task  is  to  focus  on  the  particular  strengths  and  deficiencies  of 
both  scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti-realism.  This  involves 
perusing  the  old  debates  where  the  traditional  problems  with  both 
positions  have  surfaced.  What  emerges  from  this  study  is  that  neither 9 
position  is  entirely  satisfactory  as  it  stands,  but  that  each  contains 
something  of  value. 
The  second  problem  demanding  attention  is  a  particular  argument 
emerging  from  comparatively  recent  debates  in  the  philosophy  of 
language.  Problems  in  the  theory  of  meaning,  reference  and  truth 
associated  most  closely  with  the  likes  of  Quine,  Putnam  and  Dummett 
will  occupy  us  here.  The  argument  in  question,  forwarded  by  semantic 
anti-realists,  invites  the  conclusion  that  any  view  of  scientific  theories  is 
bound  to  be  incoherent  and  untenable  if  it  is  wedded  to  the  view  that 
truth  is  properly  understood  to  be  a  possibly  verification  transcendent 
property  of  sentences.  Since  scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti- 
realism  (in  the  form  they  will  be  given  here)  are  both  open  to  this 
allegation,  some  common  defence  must  be  offered. 
The  third  difficulty  to  be  faced  before  attention  can  be  paid  to  Aquinas 
is  the  problem  of  demarcation.  Given  my  intention  to  combine  realism 
and  anti-realism  into  one  coherent  position,  some  means  of 
distinguishing  that  area  of  discourse  about  which  we  take  a  realist 
attitude  from  that  demanding  an  anti-realist  approach  is  required.  It 
might  be  expected  that  help  in  this  area  would  be  forthcoming  from 
scientific  anti-realists  who  are  not  anti-realists  with  respect  to  every 
area  of  discourse.  Unfortunately  no  satisfactory  solution  can  be  found 
in  their  writings.  However,  discussions  in  the  philosophy  of  language 
provide  an  indication  of  how  this  demarcation  problem  can  be  resolved. 
A  disproportionate  amount  of  space  will  be  devoted  to  the  conservation 
of  scientific  realism  since  it  is  the  more  difficult  of  the  two  positions  to 
defend.  But  as  is  often  the  case  in  philosophy,  it  is  the  seemingly 
obvious  position  that  proves  difficult  to  maintain  while  the  counter- 
intuitive  position  forces  itself  upon  us  even  against  our  wishes.  In  this 
study  we  will  be  confronted  with  two  counter-intuitive  conclusions: 
First,  that  we  must  go  to  extraordinary  lengths  to  save  a  form  of 
scientific  realism;  second,  and  perhaps  even  more  odd,  that  a  thirteenth 
century  Dominican  monk  will  help  us  in  this  endeavour. 
This  thesis  falls  into  three  sections,  Part  I  being  entirely  devoted  to  the 
work  of  twentieth  century  thinkers,  Part  II  to  an  analysis  of  Aquinas' 
philosophy  of  science,  and  Part  III  to  the  presentation  of  conclusions.  I 10 
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Chapter  I 
An  Introduction  to  the  Realist  Dispute  in  Science 
Let  us  adopt  the  phrase  'the  realist  dispute  in  science'  as  a  convenient 
label  for  all  the  arguments  and  issues  raised  in  the  ongoing  debate 
between  scientific  realists  and  scientific  anti-realists.  At  the  heart  of 
this  dispute  is  the  disagreement  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
scientific  theories  are  to  be  interpreted.  Are  mature  scientific  theories 
to  be  taken  as  accurate  representations  of  the  world,  as  the  realists 
maintain?  Or  are  the  anti-realists  right  to  insist  that  mature  theories 
are  not  to  be  taken  literally?  Can  it  be  that  mature  theories  are  'merely' 
intellectual  instruments  which  facilitate  the  inference  of  observation 
statements  from  other  observation  statements?  It  is  this  question 
concerning  the  cognitive  status  of  mature  scientific  theories  which  most 
clearly  divides  the  realists  from  the  anti-realists.  1  And  one's  response 
to  this  initial  question  naturally  informs  one's  understanding  of 
scientific  activity  in  general.  2 
In  this  opening  chapter  we  will  outline  the  central  claims  of  both 
scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti-realism,  as  well  as  the  major 
objections  which  have  been  brought  against  them.  But  as  mentioned  in 
the  Preface,  I  have  no  intention  of  joining  this  debate  as  a  proponent  of 
either  side.  It  is  my  view  that  both  interpretative  traditions  have  their 
merits  and  their  deficiencies.  Consequently,  the  purpose  of  this  chapter 
is  not  to  give  the  laurel  to  either  side,  but  simply  to  familiarise  ourselves 
with  the  issues  at  the  heart  of  this  dispute.  To  get  our  intellectual 
bearings,  as  it  were,  it  is  best  to  begin  with  an  examination  of  scientific 
realism. 
Waive'  Scientific  Realism 
in  a  wonderfully  frank  and  succinct  passage  Charles  Peirce  manages  to 
state  the  central  doctrines  of  scientific  realism  and  at  the  same  time  to 
convey  a  sense  of  its  intellectual  'flavour'  or  spirit.  After  having 12 
considered  a  number  of  methods  human  beings  have  employed  in  the 
pursuit  of  knowledge  (or  as  he  would  prefer,  in  our  attempt  to  relieve 
the  'irritation  of  doubt')  he  writes  that: 
It  is  necessary  that  a  method  should  be  found  by  which  our 
beliefs  may  be  determined  by  nothing  human,  but  by  some 
external  permanency  -  by  something  upon  which  our  thinking 
has  no  effect....  It  must  be  something  which  affects,  or  might 
affect  every  man.  And  though  these  affections  are  necessarily 
as  various  as  are  individual  conditions,  yet  the  method  must 
be  such  that  the  ultimate  conclusion  of  every  man  shall  be  the 
same.  Such  is  the  method  of  science.  Its  fundamental 
hypothesis,  restated  in  more  familiar  language,  is  this:  There 
are  Real  [sic]  things,  whose  characters  are  entirely 
independent  of  our  opinions  about  them;  those  Reals  affect 
our  senses  according  to  regular  laws,  and,  though  our 
sensations  are  as  different  as  are  our  relations  to  the  objects, 
yet,  by  taking  advantage  of  the  laws  of  perception,  we  can 
ascertain  by  reasoning  how  things  really  and  truly  are;  and 
any  man,  if  he  have  sufficient  experience  and  he  reason 
enough  about  it,  will  be  led  to  the  one  True  [sic]  conclusion. 
The  new  conception  here  involved  is  that  of  Reality  fsicj.  3 
There  are  a  number  of  specific  claims  in  this  passage  which  need  to  be 
drawn  out  explicitly.  Some  are  clearly  stated;  other  equally  interesting 
claims  are  hinted  at  or  there  by  implication.  Some  of  these  claims  are 
no  doubt  crucial  to  any  form  of  scientific  realism-,  others  might  arguably 
have  the  flavour  of  scientific  realism  without  commanding  the  assent  of 
all  scientific  realists.  But  as  Hacking  has  judiciously  pointed  out  in 
Representing  and  Intervening,  the  two  interpretative  traditions  we  will  be 
considering  express  or  embody  a  general  attitude  or  approach  to 
science,  not  simply  a  list  of  doctrines.  4  Consequently  it  is  important  to 
stress  that  scientific  realists  need  not  accept  all  of  the  following  theses. 
With  these  qualifications  in  mind  one  can  say  that  scientific  realism  is 
typically  characterised  in  the  literature  by  the  following  claims: 
a)  77-te  world  (Peirce's  'external  permanency)  exists  independently  of  our 
representation  of  it.  In  Peirce's  terminology,  there  is  something  upon 
which  our  thinking  has  no  effect  and  which  e2dsts  before  we  come  to 13 
know  it  in  any  way.  We  can  refer  to  this  thesis  as  'ontological  realism'. 
b)  All  hunian  beings  in  fitll  possession  of  their  cognitive  faculties  are 
capable  of  ascertaining  the  nature  of  this  independently  existing  world. 
We  can  refer  to  this  thesis  as  'epistemological  realism'. 
c)  Human  beings  becomefamiliar  with  the  world  principally  by  means  of 
the  senses.  This  can  be  taken  to  be  a  commitment  to  some  form  of 
empiricism.  The  role  of  creative  imagination  is  not  denied  an  important 
place  in  the  scientific  method,  being  indispensable  to  the  development 
of  new  scientific  hypotheses.  But  the  senses  remain  the  touchstone  of 
the  scientist  insofar  as  no  product  of  the  creative  imagination  is 
acceptable  as  it  stands  if  it  Is  contradicted  by  observation. 
d)  77-te  ultimate  aim  of  scientific  activibj  in  general  is  to  discover  the  one 
true  representation  of  the  totality  offacts  about  this  independent  world. 
To  employ  a  phrase  of  Peirce,  science  is  the  pursuit  of  that  theory  which 
tells  us  'how  things  really  and  truly  are.  ' 
e)  7he  acceptance  of  a  scientific  theory  is  the  acceptance  of  that  theory  as 
true,  or  'approximately'  true,  where  'truth'  is  understood  to  be  a  possibly 
veriftcation  transcendent  property  of  sentences.  This  latter  phrase 
implies  two  distinct  claims:  first,  a  sentence  is  said  to  be  true  or  false  in 
virtue  of  states  of  affairs  in  the  world;  second,  a  sentence  may  be  true  or 
false  without  our  being  able  to  establish  its  actual  truth  value. 
Moreover,  acceptance  of  a  theory  as  true  implies  an  ontological 
commitment  to  the  entities  named  by  the  terms  in  the  theory. 
0  When  this  one  true  theory  is  discovered  it  will  comnumd  assentfrorn  all 
competent  human  beings.  A  person  is  said  to  be  'competent'  in  this 
context  if  he  or  she,  i)  is  in  full  possession  of  their  cognitive  faculties,  ii) 
has  complete  access  to  all  the  relevant  data,  iii)  has  diligently  applied 
themselves  to  this  data,  and  iv)  delivers  a  sincere  verdict  on  the  basis  of 
the  available  evidence.  Competence  entails  a  combination  of  material 
conditions  in  addition  to  intellectual  and  moral  virtues  or 
characteristics. 14 
g)  Accompanying  theses  a-f  one  usually  finds  a  compatible  view  of  the 
nature  of  scientific  progress.  The  traditional  view  which  is  most  in 
agreement  with  the  general  tone  struck  by  scientific  realism  has  two 
features  worth  distinguishing.  First,  the  history  of  science  is  presented 
as  the  history  of  our  progressing  towards  the  one  true  theory,  each 
theory  on  the  way  being  an  ever  closer  and  closer  approximation  of  the 
truth.  Progress  is  usually  made  through  a  process  of  'reduction'  or 
'convergence'.  A  theory  (TI)  is  'reduced'  when  a  successor  theory  (72)  in 
some  sense  incorporates  or  conserves  the  truths  discovered  by  (Tl)  while 
avoiding  its  errors  and  adding  new  information.  (T1)  is  usually  seen  as 
a  special  case  recognised  by  =).  Convergence,  on  the  other  hand, 
occurs  when  two  or  more  disparate  lines  of  investigation  appear  to 
reach  similar  conclusions.  5  The  second  feature  of  this  theory  of 
scientific  progress  is  the  claim  that  when  the  scientific  community 
decides  to  replace  a  previously  accepted  theory  by  another,  this  is 
achieved  by  the  application  of  methodological  rules  and  standards 
accepted  by  the  community  as  a  whole.  (Usually  the  rules  governing 
the  replacement  of  one  theory  by  another  have  largely  to  do  with  the 
process  of  'falsification'.  )  The  point  to  emphasise  is  that  the 
replacement  of  one  theory  by  another  is  not  achieved  on  the  basis  of  the 
idiosyncratic  tendencies  of  any  one  individual  or  group  of  individuals, 
but  on  the  basis  of  standards  accepted  by  the  scientific  community  as  a 
whole. 
Many  scientific  realists  will  blush  after  perusing  this  list  of  theses,  or 
perhaps  hotly  deny  that  he  or  she  Is  committed  to  any  number  of  them. 
Indeed  when  these  claims  are  set  out  this  starkly  one  gets  the 
unavoidable  impression  of  naive,  if  noble,  optimism.  But  they  have  not 
always  seemed  so  naive.  Peirce  was  certainly  not  unfamiliar  with 
scientific  practice  and  thought  when  writing  this  passage  in  his  famous 
essay.  Indeed,  part  of  the  usefulness  of  Peirce's  description  of  science  is 
that  the  real  spirit  of  scientific  realism  comes  through  in  all  its 
unabashed  sincerity.  Scientific  realists  nowadays  put  forward  their 
claims  with  much  greater  circumspection  (as  we  shall  see);  but  I  would 
hazard  the  guess  that  the  spirit  expressed  in  the  above  passage  still 
quickens  their  blood.  Nevertheless,  the  history  of  the  philosophy  of 15 
science  in  our  century  might  reasonably  be  described  as  a  continual 
falling  away  from  this  simplest  and  perhaps  most  natural  of 
interpretative  traditions.  Of  course,  this  realist  picture  of  science  has 
been  challenged  at  various  times  throughout  history,  either  in  Its 
entirety,  or  in  bits  and  pieces  which  can  stand  or  fall  on  their  own.  But 
certainly  in  our  own  time  it  has  become  increasingly  difficult  to  defend 
these  theses  en  masse,  theses  d-g  being  particularly  vulnerable  to 
attack.  The  most  pressing  objections  are  now  common  places  in  the 
literature.  Nevertheless,  it  is  still  worth  our  while  to  have  them  clearly 
before  us. 
Problems  of  Consistent  Interpretation 
Perhaps  the  most  basic  problem  facing  the  scientific  realist  is  that 
scientific  theories  and  statements  often  contradict  other  scientific 
theories  and  statements  when  taken  realistically.  For  example,  it  is  not 
uncommon  for  there  to  be  two  conflicting  theories  of  one  and  the  same 
phenomenon.  A  good  example  of  this  problem  is  found  in  the 
conflicting  descriptions  of  the  nature  of  light.  It  is  said  that  light 
behaves  sometimes  like  a  wave,  and  sometimes  like  a  particle.  Now,  in 
practice  the  scientist  tends  to  employ  the  description  best  suited  to  the 
particular  circumstances  he  is  faced  with,  without  committing  himself 
exclusively  to  one  view  or  the  other.  But  it  is  difficult  for  the  realist  to 
reconcile  these  descriptions  of  light  if  the  terms  'wave'  and  'particle'  are 
taken  literally,  i.  e.,  according  to  the  original  or  focal  sense  of  these 
terms.  Wave'  and  'particle'  when  taken  in  their  focal  sense  refer  to 
ontologically  distinct  entities:  waves  occur  in  a  medium,  and  are 
inseparable  from  that  medium-,  particles,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
discrete  bodies,  or  quantities  of  energy.  It  seems  reasonable  enough  to 
assume,  goes  the  objection,  that  if  the  terms  'wave'  and  'particle'  are  to 
be  taken  literally,  then  light  can  be  either  a  wave  or  a  particle,  but  not 
both  at  once,  nor  'wave-like'  at  one  moment  and  'particle-like'  the  next. 
But  if  the  terms  are  taken  only  metaphorically,  then  it  is  far  from 
evident  that  they  can  bear  a  realist  interpretation.  6 
But  more  serious  and  thorough-going  contradictions  exist  between  the 16 
two  principle  theories  in  physics,  namely  relativity  and  quantum 
mechanics.  ý  As  we  know,  quantum  mechanics  has  proved  highly 
successful  dealing  with  phenomena  at  the  micro  level,  while  the  theory 
of  relativity  has  enjoyed  similar  success  at  the  macro  level;  yet  the 
pictures  they  present  of  the  natural  world  are  notoriously  difficult  to 
reconcile.  One  difficulty  for  those  trying  to  combine  relativity  and 
quantum  mechanics  is  discussed  by  Smolin  in  his  article  What  is 
TimeT.  He  focuses  on  the  incompatible  notions  of  time  employed  by 
these  two  theories.  It  is  worth  quoting  an  extended  passage  to  get  a 
sense  of  the  difficulties  involved: 
...  in  theoretical  physics,  we  have  at  present  not  one  theory 
of  nature  but  two  theories:  relativity  and  quantum  mechanics, 
and  they  are  based  on  two  different  notions  of  time.  The  key 
problem  of  theoretical  physics  at  the  present  moment  is  to 
combine  general  relativity  and  quantum  mechanics  into  one 
single  theory  of  nature  that  can  finally  replace  the  Newtonian 
theory  overthrown  at  the  beginning  of  the  century.  And 
indeed,  the  key  obstacle  to  doing  this  is  that  the  two  theories 
describe  the  world  in  terms  of  different  notions  of  time.  ... 
Unless  one  wants  to  go  backward  and  base  this  unification  on 
the  old,  Newtonian  notion  of  time,  it  is  clear  that  the  problem 
is  to  bring  the  Leibnizian,  relational  notion  of  time  into  the 
quantum  theory.  This  is,  unfortunately,  not  so  easy.  The 
problem  is  that  quantum  mechanics  allows  many  different, 
and  apparently  contradictory,  situations  to  exist 
simultaneously,  as  long  as  they  exist  in  a  kind  of  shadow  or 
potential  reality.  ...  This  applies  to  clocks  as  well,  in  the 
same  way  that  a  cat  in  quantum  theory  can  exist  in  a  state 
that  is  at  the  same  time  potentially  living  and  potentially  dead, 
a  clock  can  exist  in  a  state  in  which  it  is  simultaneously 
running  the  usual  way  and  running  backward.  So,  if  there 
were  a  quantum  theory  of  time,  it  would  have  to  deal  not  only 
with  freedom  to  choose  different  physical  clocks  to  measure 
time,  but  with  the  simultaneous  existence,  at  least  potentially, 
of  many  different  clocks.  The  first,  we  have  learned  from 
Einstein  how  to  do;  the  second  has,  so  far,  been  too  much  for 
our  imaginations.  7 
The  particulars  of  this  debate  need  not  detain  us.  But  what  is  clearly  of 
importance  to  our  realist  dispute  in  science  is  the  incompatibility  (as 
yet)  of  two  highly  successful  theories  of  nature. 17 
A  further  example  of  the  conflict  at  the  heart  of  theoretical  physics  is 
worth  mentioning  since  it  brings  out  the  conflict  between  relativity  and 
quantum  mechanics,  as  well  as  the  conflict  between  quantum 
mechanics  and  basic  assumptions  of  the  scientific  realist  position. 
Mermin  presents  an  nice  account  of  certain  experimental  results 
discovered  following  reflections  on  a  thought  experiment  of  Einstein, 
Podolsky  and  Rosen.  8  To  account  for  the  behaviour  of  certain  particles 
scientists  were  forced  to  -postulate  the  etxistence  of  certain  'strange' 
causal  connections  between  particles,  connections  deemed  impossible 
by  Einstein's  Relativity  theory  (these  processes  seem  to  occur  at  speeds 
faster  than  the  speed  of  light).  But  the  interpretation  of  the  results  also 
falls  afoul  of  the  central  thesis  of  ontological  realism,  Le.,  that  the  Real 
does  in  fact  exist  independently  of  our  representation  of  it.  After 
consideration  of  certain  peculiar  experimental  results  Mermin 
concludes  that: 
[Certain]  measurements,  far  from  revealing  the  value  of  a 
preeidsting  property,  had  to  be  regarded  as  an  inseparable 
part  of  the  very  attribute  they  were  designed  to  measure. 
Properties  of  this  kind  have  no  independent  reality  outside  the 
context  of  a  specific  experiment  arranged  to  observe  them:  the 
moon  is  not  there  when  nobody  looks.  ýI 
These  and  other  contradictions  on  their  own  cannot  force  realists  to 
abandon  scientific  realism;  for,  there  is  always  the  hope  that  they  will 
prove  to  be  merely  apparent  contradictions.  Nevertheless,  the  realist 
cannot  be  surprised  if  the  anti-realist  does  not  share  this  optimism  and 
refuses  to  wait  for  the  realist  to  come  good  on  what  is  little  more  than  a 
promissory  note.  But  the  main  point  we  need  to  draw  out  for  our 
purposes  is  that  it  is  unlikely  that  a  realist  interpretation  of  all  scientific 
theories  is  feasible. 
Deftning  Iheoretical  Tenns 
Terms  for  observable  entities,  events  and  processes  get  their  meaning 
(at  least  in  part)  by  ostention.  By  drawing  attention  to  an  object  within 18 
a  field  of  view,  by  pointing  or  gesturing,  it  is  possible  to  fix  the  reference 
(if  not  the  sense)  of  a  term.  For  example,  one  can  say,  '"Mis  is  an 
apple",  while  holding  one  up,  or,  'That  is  a  tree",  while  pointing  at  one. 
This  method  of  fixing  the  reference  of  a  term  makes  use  of  a 
combination  of  verbal  and  non-verbal  signals,  and,  crucially,  ties  the 
meaning  of  the  term  to  an  aspect  of  the  real  world,  i.  e.  the  real  object 
referred  to.  Now  it  is  clear  that  theoretical  terms  like  'mass'.  'electron', 
gravitational  field',  etc.,  cannot  be  defined  in  this  way:  One  cannot  point 
to,  or  hold  up  an  electron  or  a  gravitational  field.  But  the  scientific 
realist  claims  that  unobservable  entities,  events  and  processes  named 
in  scientific  theories  are  just  as  real  as  observable  entities.  So  how  do 
theoretical  terms  get  their  meaning?  And  are  these  semantic  accounts 
consistent  with  a  realist  interpretation  of  these  terms?  It  Is  far  from 
evident  that  we  can  answer  the  latter  question  in  the  affirmative. 
A  number  of  semantic  theories  have  been  forwarded  to  explain  how 
theoretical  terms  get  defined.  Holists  take  the  bull  by  the  horns  and 
claim  that  the  meaning  of  a  theoretical  term  is  determined  by  the  role  it 
plays  within  the  theory  in  which  it  is  found.  If  one  wants  to  know  what 
the  term  'mass'  means  in  relativity  theory,  for  example,  one  must  look 
at  the  role  the  term  is  assigned  in  the  various  mathematical  formulae  in 
which  it  appears.  On  this  view  the  meaning  of  a  theoretical  term  is 
fixed  by  the  theory  in  which  the  term  is  found,  and  not  by  reference  to 
some  extra-linguistic  reality.  In  the  semantic  theories  forwarded  by  the 
Logical  Positivists  and  other  reductionists,  theoretical  terms  are  still 
construed  to  be  in  some  way  about  observable  phenomena.  The  desire 
to  remain  true  to  strict  empiricism  forces  them  to  adopt  the  project  of 
translating  all  sentences  containing  terms  referring  to  unobservable 
entities,  events  or  processes  into  sentences  containing  no  terms 
referring  to  such  things.  Russell  considered  theoretical  terms  to  be 
logically  equivalent  to  the  data  from  which  the  existence  of  the 
theoretical  entity  was  inferred.  The  set  of  data  could  then  be 
substituted  for  the  theoretical  term  in  the  original  sentence,  thereby 
eliminating  the  theoretical  embarrassment  but  conserving  its  logical 
consequences.  Bridgeman's  project  of  reducing  theoretical  terms  to 
operations  performed  with  scientific  instruments  or  formulae  is  another 
well  known  example  of  this  attempt  at  reduction. 19 
But  both  the  holist  and  reductionist  accounts  conflict  with  a  strong 
realist  reading  of  theoretical  terms,  i.  e.,  the  view  that  these  terms  refer 
to  entities,  events  or  processes  which  actually  exist  in  extra-linguistic 
reality.  If  theoretical  terms  like  'mass'  or  'electron'  get  their  meaning 
from  their  role  as  variables  in  mathematical  equations,  or  from  serving 
as  a  convenient  short-hand  symbol  used  to  refer  to  a  range  of 
phenomena,  or  from  particular  operations  a  scientist  performs  with  his 
paraphernalia,  then  the  meaning  of  these  terms  shifts  each  time  the 
equations  employed,  the  phenomena  refer-red  to,  or  operations 
performed,  change.  But  the  extra-linguistic  reality  to  which  these  terms 
allegedly  refer  presumably  does  not.  Consequently  it  appears  that  the 
meaning  of  a  theoretical  term  is  fixed  not  so  much  in  terms  of  some 
objective  reality  as  it  is  in  a  set  of  human  practices.  It  is  more 
plausible,  therefore,  to  see  theoretical  terms  not  as  names  for  real 
things,  but  as  theoretical  constructs  or  intellectual  tools. 
The  problem  of  providing  a  semantic  account  of  theoretical  terms  which 
is  consistent  with  a  realist  interpretation  does  not  get  any  easier  if  one 
drops  semantic  holism  or  the  commitment  to  explaining  all  theoretical 
terms  in  terms  of  observable  phenomena.  One  might  be  tempted  to  say 
that  the  meaning  of  terms  for  unobservable  entities,  events  and 
processes  are  derived  from  the  meaning  of  terms  used  to  refer  to 
observable  entities.  On  this  reading  the  difference  between  theoretical 
terms  and  terms  for  observables  is  not  that  the  latter  are  defined  by 
ostention  and  the  former  are  not,  but  simply  that  they  refer  to  objects  of 
significantly  different  scale.  (Unobservable  events  and  processes  are 
said  to  be  just  like  observable  events  and  processes  except  that  they  are 
too  small  to  be  seen,  or  too  far  away,  or  moving  too  quickly  or  slowly, 
etc.  )  For  example,  the  meaning  of  the  theoretical  term  'particle'  could  be 
gained  by  transferring  a  meaning  associated  with  a  term  for  an 
observable  entity,  say  a  solid  body  like  a  stone  or  billiard  ball,  onto  the 
theoretical  term  'particle'.  So  one  might  say  that  unobservable 
'particles'  are  little  solids  which  behave  like  little  stones  or  billiard  balls. 
However,  it  is  usually  the  case  that  certain  properties  of  observable 
solids  are  not  applicable  to  unobservable  'particles'.  and  vice  versa.  To 20 
continue  with  our  example,  observable  solids  are  said  to  have  secondary 
qualities  like  colour,  texture,  taste,  etc.,  while  these  are  denied  to  their 
unobservable  counter-parts.  This  implies  that  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
for  observables  are  not  transferred  onto  unobservables  with  precisely 
the  same  meaning.  This  in  turn  suggests  that  the  term  is  applied  in 
one  sense  (the  literal  or  focal  sense)  to  observable  solids,  and  in  another 
(analogical  or  metaphorical)  to  unobservable  solids.  But  if  the  term  is 
used  metaphorically  in  the  context  of  scientific  theory  one  is  surely 
justified  to  question  whether  anything  in  extra-linguistic  reality  answers 
precisely  to  this  term. 
The  reason  for  this  suspicion  is  the  following.  There  is  nothing 
objectionable  per  se  about  the  metaphorical  use  of  a  term.  What  is 
problematic  is  that  the  term  will  require  clarification.  How  are  we  to 
interpret  the  metaphor?  Just  what  features  of  the  observable  object  on 
which  the  metaphorical  sense  is  based  are  transferTed  onto  the 
theoretical  term,  and  which  are  not?  If  one  is  able  to  -say  that  the 
theoretical  term  'particle'  shares  precisely  this  set  of  features  with 
observable  solid  bodies  while  excluding  the  remaining  features  which 
play  no  part  in  the  theory  itself,  then  the  meaning  of  the  term  ought  to 
be  clear  enough.  But  it  is  apparent  already  that  the  new  meaning  of  the 
term  is  dependent  upon  the  theory  in  which  it  is  found.  For  the 
determining  factors  in  the  decision  as  to  which  features  are  transferred 
and  which  are  not  are  the  requirements  of  the  theory  in  which  the  term 
is  found.  But  this  lands  us  back  into  the  problem  encountered  in 
semantic  holism  and  reductionism:  The  new  meaning  of  the  term  is 
grounded  not  so  much  in  an  extra-linguistic  reality  as  in  a  set  of  human 
practices.  Consequently  there  is  a  tension  at  the  heart  of  scientific 
realism:  We  may  have  an  idea  of  how  theoretical  terms  get  defined,  but 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  there  is  any  'Real'  corresponding  to  them. 
The  Blun-ing  of  the  TheoTy/Observation  Dichotomy 
Traditionally  easy  use  has  been  made  of  the  distinction  in  natural 
languages  between  observation  sentences  and  sentences  containing 
terms  referring  to  theoretical  entities.  The  assumption  that  this 21 
distinction  is  unproblematic  allowed  scientists  and  realists  to  claim 
access  to  a  'theory-free'  observation  language,  i.  e.,  an  objective 
standard,  to  which  they  could  appeal  in  order  to  test  scientific  theories. 
Indeed,  the  crucial  property  of  an  observation  sentence  is  that  it  is 
taken  to  be  a  member  of  that  set  of  sentences  in  the  language  to  which 
all  competent  language  users  in  similar  conditions  would  either  assent 
or  dissent  together.  This  confidence  in  the  objectivity  of  observation 
sentences  or  reports  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  an  extra- 
linguistic  reality  affects  biologically  similar  entities  in  much  the  same 
way  (affecting  our  senses  according  to  regular  laws'). 
Yet  it  is  now  universally  accepted  that  the  theory/observation 
distinction  is,  anything  but  unproblematic.  What  one  observes  appears 
to  be  largely  dependent  upon  the  theoretical  assumptions  and 
conceptual  scheme  of  the  observer.  10  This  threat  to  the 
theory/observation  dichotomy  has  led  some  to  claim  that  the  distinction 
has  collapsed  entirely,  and  that  terms  refen-ing  to  observable  entities 
are  as  'theoretical'  as  those  referring  to  atomic  particles  and  force 
fields.  11  Others  still  insist  that  all  human  beings  do  'see'  much  the 
same  things,  but  that  the  interpretation  placed  on  what  is  seen  varies 
greatly  depending  on  the  conceptual  scheme  of  the  observer  (the 
distinction  between  'seeing'  and  'seeing  that').  12  In  any  case  it  is  now 
common  currency  that  no  department  of  a  natural  language  is  totally 
'theory-free':  All  language  is  'theory-laden'  or  'theory-infected'. 
The  collapse  of  this  distinction  can  be  taken  two  ways.  If  there  is  no 
clear  cut  distinction  between  terms  for  'observable'  entities  and  terms 
for  'theoretical'  or  'unobservable'  entities,  then  one  may  feel  justified  in 
extending  one's  realism  to  include  the  set  of  theoretical  terms  which 
previously  had  been  in  some  doubt.  13  Conversely,  one  may  judge  it 
more  prudent  to  see  that  all  terms,  observational  or  otherwise,  come 
under  a  cloud  of  uncertainty  formerly  reserved  for  terms  referring  to 
'theoretical'  entities.  This  is  not  the  place  to  decide  which  of  these 
attitudes  is  the  better.  Nevertheless,  a  number  of  important  points  can 
be  made  which  directly  affect  our  particular  dispute:  If  the 
theory/observation  dichotomy  is  abandoned,  then  observation 
sentences  can  no  longer  be  taken  as  an  unproblematic  standard  by 22 
which  to  test  competing  scientific  theories.  Observation  sentences  are 
'just  more  theory,  telling  us  more  about  the  conceptual  scheme  of  the 
observer  than  of  the  observed.  A  further  consequence  of  the  theory- 
ladenness  of  observation  is  that  it  is  more  than  likely  that  the 
proponents  of  competing  theories  will  interpret  the  results  of 
experimentation  differently.  This  rules  out,  or  at  least  weakens,  the 
possibility  of  firiding  'crucial  experiments'  which  can  be  run  to  decide 
conclusively  between  two  competing  theories.  For  an  experiment  to  be 
'crucial',  i.  e.,  for  an  experiment  to  be  accepted  as  deciding  between  two 
theories  once  and  for  all,  the  proponents  of  the  theories  must  agree  on 
the  interpretation  of  the  experimental  results.  This  agreement  in  turn 
will  only  be  possible  if  there  is  already  a  significant  over-lap  (if  not 
complete  identity)  of  the  conceptual  schemes  of  the  two  proponents.  If 
this  agreement  can  be  secured,  then  it  is  probable  that  the  differences 
between  the  two  competing  theories  are  over  matters  of  detail  rather 
than  fundamental  principles.  But  if  the  two  proponents  differ  as  widely 
as,  say,  Galileo  and  the  defenders  of  Ptolemy,  the  disagreement  would 
be  significant  enough  to  preclude  agreement  on  the  results  of  the 
experiment.  14  Ironically,  it  is  only  when  the  proponents  agree  on  the 
fundamentals  that  they  can  agree  on  the  interpretation  of  the 
experimental  results;  while  it  is  precisely  when  the  proponents  disagree 
on  fundamentals  that  experimental  evidence  is  impotent  to  move  either 
to  abandon  their  position  in  favour  of  the  other.  One  further  point 
worth  mentioning  concerns  realist  thesis  (0.  If  there  are  no  crucial 
experiments,  if  no  experimental  evidence  can  be  produced  which  will 
force  one  to  abandon  one's  theory  in  favour  of  the  other,  what 
justification  is  there  for  the  expectation  that  all  competent  human 
beings  will  assent  to  the  one  true  theory  should  such  a  theory  ever 
come  to  light? 
'Truth-TaIW  and  the  Under  determination  o  Meory  by  Data  )f 
The  ultimate  aim  of  science  according  to  the  naive  scientific  realist  is  to 
find  the  one  true  representation  of  how  things  'really  and  truly  are'.  But 
studies  in  the  logic  of  verification  and  falsification  suggest  that  this 
focus  on  the  truth-value  of  theories  is  misguided.  To  insist  that  the  aim 23 
of  science  is  to  fmd  the  one  true  theory  makes  sense  only  if  it  is  possible 
to  determine  that  a  theory  is  true  when  in  fact  it  is  true,  and  that  a 
theory  is  false  when  in  fact  it  is  false.  But  arguably  the  most  important 
event  in  the  philosophy  of  science  in  the  twentieth  century  has  been  the 
realisation  that  it  is  impossible  in  principle  to  conclusively  establish  the 
truth-value  of  any  given  scientific  theory  or  hypothesis.  That  no  theory 
can  be  verified  has  long  been  established.  For  despite  the  fact  that  a 
given  theory  may  succeed  in  'saving  the  phenomena',  no  amount  of 
experimental  confirmation  warrants  the  belief  that  the  theory  is  true. 
To  believe  in  the  truth  of  the  theory  on  the  basis  of  past  confirmations  is 
to  accept  the  validity  of  inductive  arguments,  or  to  commit  the  fallacy  of 
affirming  the  consequent.  15  It  has  also  been  made  clear  that  we  cannot 
assign  varying  degrees  of  probability  to  scientific  theories  because, 
according  to  the  logic  of  probability,  all  theories  are  equally  improbable 
whatever  the  experimental  evidence  might  be.  16  Similar  difficulties 
confound  our  attempts  to  falsify  theories.  As  Popper  points  out, 
scientific  theories  are  not  'falsified'  by  a  single  recalcitrant  observation 
report,  but  by  what  he  has  called  an  observation  law,  i.  e.,  a  law  to  the 
effect  that  a  particular  observation  report  is  always  to  be  expected  given 
certain  initial  conditions.  But  as  Edwards  points  out,  ". 
.  our 
justification  in  rejecting  [a]  theory  as  false  can  be  no  stronger  than  our 
justification  in  accepting  the  observation  law  as  true.  But  the  only 
justification  we  could  have  for  accepting  the  observation  law  as  true 
would  be  [an]  inductive  argument.  "17  What  is  more,  the  Duhemian 
thesis  establishes  that  we  cannot  conclusively  falsify  any  given  scientific 
theory,  even  if  the  difficulties  of  inductive  arguments  could  be  avoided, 
since  no  theory  ever  confronts  experience  alone.  18  These  results,  re- 
reinforced  by  the  preceding  remarks  concerning  the  theory-ladenness  of 
observation,  have  led  many  to  reject  'truth-talk',  at  least  with  respect  to 
scientific  theories,  as  unwarranted  metaphysical  speculation. 
Consequently  it  makes  little  sense  to  insist  that  acceptance  of  a 
scientific  theory  implies  acceptance  of  that  theory  as  true.  But  if  truth- 
talk  is  deemed  inadmissible  with  respect  to  scientific  theories,  then  the 
ultimate  aim  of  the  scientific  realist  must  be  rejected  as  well. 
Our  inability  to  establish  the  truth  value  of  a  given  theory  by  appealing 
to  the  available  empirical  evidence  (what  I  will  refer  to  as  the  under 24 
determination  of  theory  by  data)  is  illustrated  nicely  by  a  rather  strildng 
theoretical  possibility.  It  would  seem  that  for  any  given  finite  set  of 
observations  it  is  theoretically  possible  to  construct  two  'ideal'  yet 
mutually  incompatible  theories.  19  A  theory  is  said  to  be  'ideal'  if  it  has 
the  set  of  attributes  one  would  desire  in  a  theory  short  of  its  being 
established  as  'true'.  Usually  such  attributes  include  the  theory's 
conformity  with  the  experimental  evidence,  its  simplicity  and  elegance, 
the  ease  with  which  observation  sentences  are  derived  from  it,  etc.  But 
this  standard  of  'ideal'  can  be  relaxed  without  depriving  our  theoretical 
possibility  of  its  force.  For  if  ever  one  is  presented  with  two 
incompatible  theories  both  of  which  succeed  in  'saving  the  phenomena', 
i.  e.,  if  one  is  unable  to  decide  between  two  theories  on  empirical 
grounds  alone,  then  one  is  forced  to  adopt  other  criteria  to  justify  a 
preference  for  one  theory  over  the  other.  20  Yet  the  other  criteria  do 
nothing  to  establish  that  one  theory  is  closer  to  the  truth  than  the 
other.  Simplicity,  elegance,  the  ease  with  which  one  derives  observation 
sentences,  etc.,  certainly  make  a  theory  'user-friendly',  and  this  feature 
is  enough  to  justify  using  one  theory  rather  than  another.  But  it  does 
not  justify  the  claim  that  the  user-friendly  theory  Is  closer  to  the  truth 
than  the  complicated,  clumsy  theory. 
Nor  does  this  problem  disappear  if  at  any  given  moment  only  one  ideal 
theory  happens  to  be  available.  21  A  theory's  being  alone  in  the  field 
does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  another  ideal  theory  can  and  will 
be  constructed  in  the  future.  It  is  on  these  grounds  that  the  argument 
in  favour  of  the  adoption  of  that  theory  which  provides  the  'best 
explanation'  cannot  be  admitted  as  decisive  in  the  realist  dispute  in 
science.  That  a  theory  provides  the  best  available  explanation  certainly 
justifies  its  adoption  as  part  of  a  research  programme;  but  not  the 
inference  that  the  theory  is  true.  What  we  deem  the  'best  explanation' 
tells  us  more  about  our  state  of  knowledge  than  it  does  about  the  truth 
value  of  the  theory. 
The  under  determination  of  theory  by  data  has  other  repercussions  as 
well,  in  particular  with  respect  to  our  standards  of  competency.  As 
mentioned  above,  the  competency  of  a  scientist  is  a  function  of  both 
intellectual  and  moral  qualities.  A  scientist's  moral  qualities  in 25 
particular  are  in  part  displayed  by  his  willingness  to  abandon 
assumptions  and  pet  hypotheses  should  the  experimental  evidence 
demand  this.  This  willingness  is  taken  as  a  sign  of  intellectual  honesty. 
However,  such  standards  have  had  to  be  progressively  relaxed  in  the 
face  of  the  difficulty  of  establishing  the  truth  value  of  theories.  22  At 
first  it  was  deemed  intellectually  honest  to  "desist  from  unproved 
utterances  and  minimise,  even  in  thought,  the  gap  between  speculation 
and  established  knowledge.  "  This  criterion  had  to  be  relaxed  in  the  face 
of  the  impossibility  of  conclusive  verification.  Intellectual  honesty  was 
then  construed  in  terms  of  confining  oneself  to  the  assertion  of  only 
those  propositions  one  knew  to  be  probable.  This  criterion  too  was 
eventually  rejected.  Finally,  it  was  deemed  intellectually  honest  to 
assert  only  theories  that  one  knew  had  yet  to  be  falsified  by  experience, 
or  to  state  precisely  under  what  conditions  one  would  be  willing  to  give 
up  a  theory.  Now  it  seems  there  are  no  experimental  results  which  can 
force  one  to  give  up  a  position  should  one  be  willing  to  preserve  it.  It  is 
now  unclear  just  what  standard  of  intellectual  honesty  scientists  ought 
to  hold  themselves  to. 
Two  significant  points  have  emerged  from  this  discussion.  First,  there 
is  the  charge  that  truth-talk  with  respect  to  scientific  theories  is 
metaphysical  speculation  at  best,  a  charge  that  scientists  of  all  stripes 
have  prided  themselves  on  avoiding.  Indeed  it  is  in  opposition  to 
metaphysical  speculation  that  the  natural  sciences  have  understood 
themselves.  Secondly,  we  have  further  grounds  for  doubting  that  all 
competent  human  beings  will  inevitably  recognise  the  one  true  theory 
as  true  even  if  such  a  theory  were  presented  to  us.  All  the  evidence 
suggests  that  two  fully  rational,  diligent,  and  sincere  human  beings  can 
fundamentally  disagree  with  respect  to  their  theoretical  interpretation  of 
the  world,  without  either  one  being  open  to  the  charge  of  irrationality  or 
incompetence.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the  continued  indulgence  in  truth- 
talk  that  is  open  to  this  most  unsavoury  of  charges.  23 
Yhe  Results  ofHistorical  Research 
With  the  last  objection  in  mind  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that 26 
historians  of  science  have  found  fault  with  the  theory  of  scientific 
progress  outlined  in  (g).  Kuhn  has  argued  persuasively  that  scientific 
development  is  rarely  an  uncontrovercial  process  of  incorporation  and 
evolution  achieved  in  accordance  with  methodological  rules  and 
assumptions  accepted  by  the  scientific  community  as  a  whole.  Great 
scientific  advancements  in  particular  seem  to  be  marked  by 
factionalism  and  conflict  within  the  scientific  community,  and 
revolution  rather  than  evolution.  24  Feyerabend  has'supported  this 
thesis  both  by  his  studies  of  Galileo's  defence  of  the  Copernican 
hypothesis  against  the  Aristotelians  and  Catholic  Church  and  his  own 
form  of  the  incommensurability  thesis.  This  view  of  scientific 
development  as  revolutionary  rather  than  evolutionary  now  stands 
virtually  unchallenged,  and  proponents  of  this  view  apparently  no 
longer  feel  the  need  to  argue  for  it  explicitly  in  the  course  of  their 
historical  works.  25  The  implications  of  this  challenge  to  the  traditional 
view  have  been  twofold.  First,  there  is  corroborating  evidence  of  what 
was  hinted  at  in  the  last  objection,  viz.,  that  science  and  scientific 
development  is  not  an  entirely  rational  process  achieved  according  to 
accepted  rules,  methods  and  assumptions.  26  Second,  the  dental  of  the 
evolutionary  view  of  scientific  change  suggests  that  science  is  not 
necessarily  an  accumulative  process  either,  but  one  where  theoretical 
entities  and  entire  theoretical  systems  may  be  dropped  completely  by 
the  scientific  community. 
Scientiftc  Realism  and  the  wider  Intellectual  Community 
There  are  politically  motivated  objections  brought  against  naive 
scientific  realism  which  we  ought  to  note.  Although  our  primary 
interest  is  not  with  the  moral  and  political  aspects  of  science,  we  cannot 
fail  to  notice  that  science  has  an  impact  beyond  its  borders,  and  that 
this  impact  is  not  always  entirely  positive.  Indeed,  there  is  a  growing 
segment  of  society  convinced  that  science  generally,  and  naive  scientific 
realism  in  particular,  can  have  undesirable  social  effects.  Feyerabend  is 
perhaps  the  most  noted  proponent  of  this  view.  27  arguing  that  the 
dogmatism  which  a  simplistic  scientific  realism  can  promote  is  as 
harmful  to  the  interests  of  a  'multi-cultural'  society  as  that  of  a 27 
dogmatic  theologian  or  religious  leader.  Similar  complaints  brought 
forward  by  various  political  interest  groups  who  have  come  to  see 
science  as  less  than  socially  and  environmentally  benign  are 
increasingly  common  place.  z 
In  a  closely  related  problem,  it  is  often  argued  that  a  simplistic  scientific 
realism  can  lead  to  serious  distortions  and  errors  in  debates  in  other 
intellectual  disciplines.  Distortion  can  be  the  result  of  applying  the 
methodology  of  the  natural  sciences  in  inappropriate  areas,  while  errors 
are  unavoidable  if  parties  to  disputes  in  another  intellectual  disciplines 
take  received  scientific  doctrine  as  an  unquestioned  starting  point  for 
their  own  discussions.  An  illustration  of  the  problematic  use  of  received 
scientific  doctrine  by  philosophers  will  serve  to  bring  this  home.  The 
principle  of  causal  closure  -  the  thesis  that  all  physical  events  have 
physical  causes  -  has  been  taken  by  some  to  be  the  rock  on  which 
various  forms  of  dualism  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  meet  their  end.  28 
Dualists  are  meant  to  be  embarrassed  on  the  grounds  that  they  fall 
afoul  of  this  time  honoured  principle  of  the  sciences.  Now  whatever 
one's  views  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  (and  I  certainly  have  no  desire  to 
defend  Cartesian  dualism),  this  argument  cannot  be  taken  as 
conclusive  until  we  can  justify  a  realist  interpretation  of  the  principle  of 
causal  closure.  Is  it  in  fact  the  case  that  all  physical  events  have  only 
physical  causes?  Or  it  is  better  to  say  that  the  assumption  in  favour  of 
the  principle  of  causal  closure  has  hitherto  led  to  fruitful  research? 
Until  we  have  a  sophisticated  hermeneutics  of  scientific  theory  (and  one 
that  achieves  some  level  of  consensus)  the  immediate  application  of 
'received'  scientific  doctrine  in  other  areas  is  problematic. 
Consideration  of  the  objections  to  scientiftc  realism 
The  above  objections  are  serious  indeed.  The  problem  of  providing  a 
consistent  interpretation  of  all  scientific  theory  is,  if  not 
insurmountable,  then  sufficiently  worrying  to  dampen  any  optimism 
one  might  have.  The  two  objections  based  on  semantic  considerations, 
the  difficulty  of  defming  theoretical  terms  and  the  blurring  of  the 
theory/observation  dichotomy,  seem  to  force  the  point  that  we  have  no 28 
theory-free  observation  language.  Precisely  what  we  ought  to  make  of 
this  will  be  considered  in  what  follows.  The  inability  to  conclusively 
verify  or  falsify  any  given  theory  is  also  severely  damaging  to  naive 
scientific  realism  since  it  puts  in  question  the  meaningfulness  of 
continuing  to  indulge  in  truth-talk.  When  to  the  foregoing  objections  we 
add  the  accumulating  historical  evidence  it  seems  impossible  to  defend 
claim  (d)  -  it  Is  unreasonable  to  maintain  that  the  aim  of  science  is  to 
discover  the  one  true  theory  of  the  Real.  The  same  goes  for  the  thesis 
that  once  this  theory  is  found  it  will  command  the  assent  of  all  rational, 
diligent  and  sincere  human  beings.  And  the  rejection  of  (d)  entails  the 
rejection  of  the  first  part  of  (e),  viz.,  the  claim  that  to  accept  a  theory  is 
to  accept  it  as  true,  or  'appro-ximately'  true.  The  results  of  historical 
research  also  make  claim  (g)  concerning  the  evolutionary  and  rule- 
governed  progress  of  science  untenable  without  important 
qualifications. 
And  yet  I  do  not  think  scientific  realism  ought  to  be  given  up  entirely.  I 
have  not  been  persuaded  that  the  realist  has  any  reason  to  give  up  the 
two  founding  theses  of  ontological  and  epistemological  realism,  or  the 
commitment  to  empiricism.  The  latest  results  from  Quantum 
mechanics  cannot  yet  be  considered  safe  enough  to  warrant  the 
rejection  of  ontological  realism  simply  because  the  proper  interpretation 
of  these  results  has  yet  to  be  determined.  But  given  the  'theory- 
ladenness'  of  all  observation,  some  have  suggested  that  a  weaker  form 
of  ontological  realism  is  required.  It  could  be  maintained  that  the  world 
still  exists  independently  of  our  representation  of  it,  but  that  any 
structure  we  fffid  in  it  Is  of  our  own  making.  In  this  case  the  nature  of 
the  world  is  in  some  sense  dependent  upon  our  representation  of  it. 
This  neo-Kantian  suggestion  ought  to  be  resisted.  It  carries  the 
unwelcome,  and  as  yet  unwarranted  implication  that  somehow  we  are 
at  least  partially  responsible  for  the  structure  of  the  Real.  Before  taking 
such  a  step  we  ought  to  hold  out  for  very  substantial  arguments  indeed. 
However,  how  we  perceive  reality  is  undeniably  a  function  of  our 
conceptual  scheme.  But  this  is  an  epistemological  point  rather  than  an 
ontological  one.  The  import  of  theory-ladenness  upon  epistemological 
realism  will  occupy  us  at  some  length  in  what  follows.  But  in 
anticipation  we  can  say  that  the  proper  response  to  these  objections  is 29 
not  to  abandon  scientific  realism  entirely,  but  to  develop  a  more 
moderate,  less  naive  form  of  realism.  This  moderate  realism  ought  to  be 
construed  along  the  following  lines: 
a)  Some  terms  in  our  scientific  theories  actually  refer  to  extra-linguistic 
entities,  i.  e.,  entities  on  which  our  thinking  has  no  effect,  and  which 
exist  before  we  come  to  know  them. 
b)  The  existence  of  these  entities  is  demonstrable. 
c)  Of  these  entities  we  can  form  true  statements. 
Two  problems  immediately  presents  themselves.  First,  some  means  of 
identifying  which  terms  refer  to  such  entities  is  needed,  second,  it 
remains  to  determine  what  is  to  be  made  of  the  other  terms  in  our 
theories.  For  an  answer  to  this  later  question  we  ought  to  examine  the 
other  interpretative  tradition. 
Scientific  Anti-realism  anstrumentalism) 
There  are  several  forms  of  scientific  anti-realism,  including 
phenomenalism,  fictionalism,  or  simply  scepticism  concerning  scientific 
hypotheses;  but  the  account  of  scientific  anti-realism  which  will  serve 
as  our  model  is  that  provided  by  van  Fraassen  in  his  work  Me  Scientific 
Image.  There  is  a  significant  over-lap  with  scientific  realism  for  van 
Fraassen  retains  a  commitment  to  ontological  and  epistemological 
realism,  as  well  as  a  fondness  for  empiricism;  but  he  parts  company 
with  the  scientific  realist  on  the  matter  of  the  aim  of  science  generally, 
and  on  the  matter  of  what  it  means  to  accept  a  theory.  All  the 
modifications  to  scientific  realism  can  be  traced  back  to  this 
fundamental  change  in  doctrine.  He  writes: 
Science  alms  to  give  us  theories  which  are  empirically 
adequate;  and  acceptance  of  a  theory  involves  as  belief  only 
that  it  is  empirically  adequate.  29 
To  accept  a  theory  as  'empirically  adequate',  he  says,  is  to  accept  "that 
what  the  theory  says  about  what  is  observable  (by  us)  is  true.  -30  In 30 
older  terminology,  an  'empirically  adequate'  theory  Is  one  that  'saves  the 
phenomena'.  'Ibis  is  a  significant  modification  of  the  realist  project  in 
that  it  puts  a  strict  limit  on  truth-talk.  The  scientific  realist  understood 
science  to  be  aiming  at  the  discovery  of  the  one  true  theory  of  the  'Real' 
in  its  entirety.  On  the  other  hand,  the  scientific  anti-realist  a  la  van 
Fraassen  confines  his  truth-talk  to  those  sentences  purportedly  about 
the  realm  of  the  Real  which  is  observable  by  us. 
At  first  sight  the  principle  attraction  of  scientific  anti-realism  is  that  it 
avoids  some  of  the  embarrassing  objections  scientific  realism  had  been 
open  to  on  account  of  its  predilection  for  unrestricted  truth-talk. 
Indeed  scientific  anti-realism  could  easily  be  seen  as  that  position 
which  remains  once  scientific  realists  have  rid  themselves  of  their 
penchant  for  unwarranted  metaphysical  speculations.  But  it  is  not 
really  enough  to  see  scientific  anti-realism  as  a  mere  modification  of 
scientific  realism,  for  the  modifications  are  such  as  to  completely 
transform  the  general  understanding  and  tone  of  the  scientific 
enterprise.  In  fact  it  could  be  said  that  by  setting  limits  on  truth-talk 
the  heart  of  scientific  realism  is  cut  out  and  summarily  abandoned,  for 
it  drops  the  idea  that  scientific  theories  tell  us  how  the  totality  of  facts 
about  the  world  'really  and  truly  are'.  And  nowhere  is  this  change  of 
tone  more  in  evidence  than  when  the  anti-realist  forwards  his 
interpretation  of  those  theories  which  purport  to  represent  aspects  of 
the  Real  inaccessible  to  observation  by  us.  All  formulations  of  scientific 
anti-realism  include  the  thesis  that  such  theories  are  merely  useful 
intellectual  tools.  A  good  scientific  theory  on  this  reckoning,  apart  from 
being  simple  and  elegant,  is  one  which  allows  the  scientist  to  make 
accurate  predictions  concerning  observable  phenomena.  Nagel  writes: 
a  theory  is  held  to  be  a  rule  or  a  principle  for  analysing  and 
symbolically  representing  certain  materials  of  gross 
experience,  and  at  the  same  time  as  an  instrument  in  a 
technique  for  inferring  observation  statements  from  other 
such  statements.  31 
Van  Fraassen's  scientific  anti-realism  can  then  be  characterised  by  the 
following  claims: 31 
a)  The  aim  of  science  is  the  provision  of  theories  which  are  'empirically 
adequate'. 
b)  To  accept  a  scientific  theory  is  to  accept  that  what  that  theory  says 
about  what  is  observable  by  us  is  true. 
c)  Theories  ostensibly  about  aspects  of  the  Real  which  are  not  accessible 
to  observation  are  merely  more  or  less  adequate  instruments  for  the 
derivation  of  observation  sentencesfrom  other  observation  sentences. 
Scientific  anti-realism  construed  along  these  lines  is  clearly  a  far  more 
modest  proposal  than  that  forwarded  by  scientific  realism.  For  one,  it 
conspicuously  drops  any  ontological  commitment  to  the  theoretical 
entities  ostensibly  named  in  empirically  adequate  theories.  As  a 
consequence,  the  anti-realist  is  free  to  employ  any  theory  which  suits 
him  as  an  instrument  of  prediction,  even  if  it  conflicts  with  other 
empirically  adequate  theories  when  considered  realistically.  And  while 
the  commitment  to  epistemological  realism  remains,  it  Is  significantly 
modified.  The  scientific  anti-realist  still  maintains  that  we  can  know 
something  of  the  nature  of  the  Real;  but  our  knowledge  is  limited  in 
principle  to  that  realm  of  the  Real  which  is  observable  by  us.  What'is 
more,  the  anti-realist  is  not  committed  to  the  traditional  views  of  the 
development  of  science  outlined  above.  Given  that  theories  are 
instruments  rather  than  representations  of  the  Real,  the  anti-realist 
does  not  think  that  theories  are  ever  closer  and  closer  approximations 
of  the  truth.  Instead  the  anti-realist  sees  the  development  of 
increasingly  empirically  adequate  theories,  increasingly  powerful 
calculi,  accompanied  by  a  more  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  world 
which  is  observable  by  us.  In  this  sense  theories  are  not  just 
instruments  of  prediction  but  heuristic  devices  as  well.  They  can  serve 
this  end  by  focusing  the  scientist's  attention  on  phenomena  hitherto 
unobserved  because  they  had  passed  unnoticed.  To  modify  Eddington 
only  slightly,  the  anti-realist  wants  theories  that  'contain  nothing  that  is 
unobservable,  but  a  great  deal  that  is  unobserved'.  And  by  abandoning 
the  fixation  on  the  truth  value  of  theories,  the  anti-realist  also  gains  a 
measure  of  'psychological'  freedom,  as  it  were,  to  take  on  board  new 
theories  with  greater  ease.  It  is  much  easier  psychologically  to  accept  a 
new  tool  as  part  of  one's  general  conceptual  equipment  than  it  is  to  take 
on  board  a  significantly  different  world  view,  simply  because  so  much less  is  invested  in  tools  than,  in  beliefs. 
32 
In  order  to  further  clarify  the  nature  of  van  Fraassen's  scientific  anti- 
realism  it  is  helpful  to  distinguish  it  from  three  other  forms  of  anti- 
realism.  For  example,  unlike  Dummett  and  other  semantic  anti- 
realists,  van  Fraassen  can  maintain  that  representational  sentences  are 
true  or  false  in  virtue  of  states  of  affairs  in  the  world,  and  that  truth  is  a 
possibly  verification  transcendent  property  of  sentences.  This  view  of 
truth  will  be  examined  in  detail  in  the  following  chapters.  Other  anti- 
realists  can  accept  van  Fraassen's  view  of  truth,  but  are  anti-realists 
about  certain  areas  of  -discourse  because  they  maintain  there  simply  are 
no  facts  these  discourses  can  represent.  Hartry  Field's  anti-realism  in 
mathematics  is  a  good  example  of  this  form  of  anti-realism.  32  Van 
Fraassen  is  not  an  anti-realist  of  this  sort;  he  is  not  a  scientific  anti- 
realist  because  he  thinks  there  are  no  unobservable  facts  to  represent. 
He  states  explicitly  that  his  anti-realism  has  no  ontological  implications 
because  he  does  not  maintain  that  all  that  is  is  observable.  33  The 
phenomenalism  of  Mack  is  decidedly  not  part  of  scientific  anti-realism 
as  understood  by  van  Fraassen.  Indeed  Mack's  position  falls  prey  to  the 
charge  of  unwarranted  metaphysical  speculation  as  surely  as  scientific 
realism.  A  third  type  of  anti-realist  denies  that  sentences  in  an  area  of 
discourse  which  are  ostensibly  representational  are  in  fact 
representational  at  all,  and  as  such  are  neither  true  nor  false.  It  is 
argued  that  some  sentences  may  share  grammatical  similarities  with 
genuinely  representational  sentences  without  their  actually  being 
representational.  This  is  not  van  Fraassen's  position  either.  Van 
Fraassen  can  maintain  that  sentences  ostensibly  about  electrons  or 
force  fields  are  in  fact  statements  about  electrons  and  force  fields. 
Nonetheless,  a  sentence  may  be  representational  without  meriting  a 
realist  interpretation. 
There  are  a  number  of  ob  ections  to  scientific  anti-realism  so  described,  j 
the  most  persistent  of  which  are  the  following: 
Scientific  practice  does  not  conform  to  this  picture  of  science 33 
Nagel  writes  that  "neither  logic  nor  the  facts  of  scientific  practice  nor  the 
frequently  explicit  testimony  of  practising  scientists  supports  the 
dictum  that  there  is  no  valid  alternative  to  construing  theories  simply  as 
techniques  of  inference.,  '34  In  the  same  breath  it  is  often  suggested 
that  scientists  would  not  be  motivated  to  carry  out  their  work  if  they 
adopted  this  view. 
77-te  Existence  of  Theoretical  Entities 
Our  scientific  anti-realist  will  not  accept  any  ontological  commitment  to 
unobservable  entities  named  in  scientific  theories.  This  means  the 
scientific  anti-realist  is  at  odds  with  respectable  science,  a  charge 
deemed  to  be  inherently  embarrassing. 
Yhe  Utimate  Argument' 
If  our  scientific  anti-realist  does  not  accept  that  scientific  theories  are 
approximately  true,  it  becomes  difficult  to  explain  the  obvious  success 
of  science.  Putnam  offers  a  good  account  of  what  van  Fraassen  calls 
this  'Ultimate  Argument': 
The  positive  argument  for  realism  is  that  it  is  the  only 
philosophy  that  doesn't  [sic]  make  the  success  of  science  a 
miracle.  That  terms  in  mature  scientific  theories  typically 
refer,  that  the  theories  accepted  in  a  mature  science  are 
typically  approximately  true,  that  the  same  terms  can  refer  to 
the  same  thing  even  when  it  occurs  in  different  theories  - 
these  statements  are  viewed  by  the  scientific  realist  not  as 
necessary  but  as  part  of  the  only  scientific  explanation  of  the 
success  of  science,  and  hence  as  part  of  any  adequate 
description  of  science  and  its  relations  to  its  objects.,  '35 
7he  Meory/Observation  Dichotomy  Revisited 
Our  scientific  anti-realist  still  relies  on  the  traditional  distinction 34 
between  theory  and  observation.  And  yet  there  has  been  no  answer  to 
the  objection  brought  against  the  scientific  realist  concerning  the 
impossibility  of  a  theory-free  observation  language. 
Problems  arisingfrorn  abandoning  unrestricted  Muth-Talk' 
Our  scientific  anti-realist  faces  the  serious  charge  of  "falling  back  on 
irrationalism.  "36  If  scientists  can  no  longer  appeal  to  the  objective 
truth  or  falsity  of  a  theory  as  a  reason  for  accepting  or  rejecting  it,  how 
is  science  to  retain  the  semblance  of  objectivity  which  is  at  the  heart  of 
its  appeal?  By  refusing  to  speak  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  theories,  the 
scientific  anti-realist  appears  to  open  the  door  to  a  complete  relativism, 
where  all  manner  of  wonderful  possibilities  are  considered  to  be  on  an 
equal  footing,  or  to  a  straightforward  scepticism.  This  objection  is 
expressed  rather  colourfully  by  van  Fraassen  in  these  terms: 
You  [the  anti-realist]  will  have  to  admit  that  there  are 
possibilities  you  cannot  prove  or  disprove  by  experiment,  and 
so  you  will  have  to  say  that  we  just  cannot  know  what  the 
world  is  like.  Worse;  you  will  have  no  reason  to  reject  any 
number  of  outlandish  possibilities;  demons,  witchcraft,  hidden 
powers  collaborating  to  fantastic  ends.  37 
And,  as  was  the  case  with  scientific  realism,  the  impact  of  scientific 
anti-realism  is  not  contained  within  the  confines  of  science  alone. 
'Irrationalism'  in  the  sciences  threatens  to  break  out  into  the 
community  at  large  with  undesirable  politico-moral  results.  Lakatos 
presents  the  political  fallout  of  anti-realist  tendencies  with  all  suitable 
alarm: 
The  clash  between  Popper  and  Kuhn  is  not  about  a  mere 
technical  point  in  epistemology.  It  concerns  our  central 
intellectual  values,  and  has  implications  not  only  for 
theoretical  physics  but  also  for  the  under-developed  social 
sciences  and  even  for  moral  and  political  philosophy.  If  even 
in  science  there  is  no  other  way  of  judging  a  theory  but  by 
assessing  the  number.  faith  and  vocal  energy  of  its 
supporters,  then  this  must  be  even  more  so  in  the  social 
sciences:  truth  lies  in  power.  Thus  Kuhn's  position  would vindicate,  no  doubt  unintentionally,  the  basic  political  credo  of 
contemporary  religious  maniacs.  ..  .- 
38 
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These  consequences  provide  reasonable  grounds  for  regarding  scientific 
anti-realism  with  suspicion.  Popper  and  Lakatos  in  particular  can  be 
seen  as  responding  to  precisely  this  problem  thrown  up  by  scientific 
anti-realism.  But  once  one  digs  beneath  the  bluster  and  protestations 
it  becomes  apparent  that  their  concern  is  not  so  much  to  drive  off 
scientific  anti-realism  per  se  (indeed  both  accept  that  the  Duhem-Quine 
thesis  put  the  final  nail  in  the  coffin  of  objective  'truth-talk'  with  respect 
to  scientific  theories39)  as  it  is  to  preserve  for  science  some  semblance 
of  objectivity  and  rationality  despite  the  fact  that  no  appeal  to  objective 
truth  can  be  made.  Their  particular  dispute  is  between  'methodological 
falsificationism'  and  'irrationalism',  rather  than  between  naive  scientific 
realism  and  a  scientific  anti-realism  as  described  above.  Indeed 
Popper's  'methodological  falsificationism'  and  Lakatos'  refinements 
thereof  provide  no  support  for  scientific  realism.  Popper's 
methodological  falsificationism  employs  'observation'  sentences,  and 
succeeds  in  'falsifying'  theories  only  in  a  technical  sense.  For  what 
counts  as  an  'observation'  sentence,  and  what  hypotheses  are  deemed 
'falsified',  is  decided  by_flat,  by  conventiom  rather  than  by  agreement  or 
disagreement  with  the  'objective  facts',  whatever  they  might  be.  This 
methodological  procedure  comes  at  the  cost  of  abandoning  any  pretence 
of  scientific  realism,  unless  we  are  prepared  to  accept  the  possibility 
that  the  world  is  ontologically  dependent  upon  our  conventions.  No 
realist  will  be  satisfied  with  a  theory  deemed  to  be  'true'  in  only  this 
conventional  sense.  But  Popper  and  Lakatos  do  hope  to  preserve  a 
degree  of  objectivity  and  rationality  for  science  by  providing  agreed  upon 
rules  for  the  'falsification'  of  theories.  If  successful  this  would  make  the 
passage  from  one  paradigm  to,  the  next  more  than  an  'irrational', 
subjective  procedure. 
Consideration  of  the  objections  to  scientiftc  anti-realism 
The  first  two  objections  brought  against  scientific  anti-realism  make 
appeals  to  respectable  scientific  practice  and  theories,  as  well  as  to  the 36 
testimony  of  scientists  themselves.  But  both  objections  are  in  danger  of 
begging  the  question.  One  cannot  reasonably  decide  this  issue  by 
appealing  to  the  authority  of  scientist's  beliefs  and  practices  when  it  is 
precisely  this  authority  which  is  ý  in  question.  The  philosopher  cannot 
enter  this  dispute  in  good  faith  if  he  or  she  has  already  decided  which 
scientific  theories  are  to  be  safeguarded  a  realist  interpretation.  We 
must  insist  that  while  the  actual  practices  of  scientists  are  no  doubt  of 
interest,  as  are  their  views  of  their  work  qua  scientists,  these  cannot  be 
taken  as  decisive  in  the  realm  of  philosophical  argument,  and 
consequently  cannot  be  decisive  arguments  for  or  against  scientific 
realism  or  anti-realism.  In  the  same  way  that  a  sociologist  or 
anthropologist  may  come  to  a  different  understanding  of  their  subject's 
behaviour  than  that  held  by  their  subjects  themselves,  so  too 
philosophers  cannot  be  constrained  by  the  views  of  the  scientists  qua 
scientist.  On  the  other  hand,  the  views  scientists  hold  of  their  work  qua 
philosophers  ought  to  be  listened  to  with  interest;  but  as  such  they 
enter  the  philosophical  debate  on  the  same  level  as  any  other 
philosopher  who  applies  himself  to  these  matters. 
Nor  can  it  be  the  primary  concern  of  the  philosopher  interested  in  the 
realist  dispute  in  science  to  bolster  the  morale  of  the  scientist  in  the 
trenches.  The  philosopher  engaged  in  this  dispute  is  not  first  and 
foremost  a  cheerleader  or  a  detractor  of  scientists  and  their  practices. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  philosophers  ought  not  to  have  any  leanings 
either  way  (an  impossible  and  unreasonable  demand);  but  a  particular 
leaning  cannot  be  made  a  precondition  for  admittance  to  the 
philosophical  debate  without  seriously  affecting  the  objectivity  of  that 
debate  as  a  whole. 
But  this  is  not  to  suggest  that  there  are  no  serious  concerns  the 
scientific  anti-realist  is  bound  to  address.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to 
insist  that  an  explanation  of  the  success  of  scientific  theories  to 
function  as  instruments  of  prediction  is  required.  The  motivation  to 
discover  objectively  true  beliefs  about  the  world  is  largely  explained  by 
our  assumption  that  true  beliefs  about  the  nature  and  structure  of  our 
environment  help  us  to  survive  and  achieve  our  practical  ends  within 
that  environment.  And  the  instrumentality  of  an  idea  is  usually 37 
explained  by  the  fact  that  the  idea  is  taken  to  be  an  accurate,  or 
'adequate',  depiction  of  some  aspect  of  the  external  permanency.  Given 
this  natural  interpretation  of  the  close  link  between  instrumentality  and 
truth,  the  anti-realist  must  explain  how  success  is  possible  without 
positing  some  relationship  of  adequacy  between  the  theory  and  the 
world  in  which  it  is  successfully  employed.  It  is  not  enough  for  the  anti- 
realist  to  say,  as  does  van  Fraassen,  that  scientific  theories  'work' 
because  they  would  not  be  used  if  they  did  not.  Van  Fraassen's 
interpretation  of  the  success  of  certain  theories  relies  heavily  on  the 
analogy  he  draws  between  biologically  successful  organisms  and 
successful  scientific  theories.  The  success  in  both  cases,  he  claims,  is 
explained  in  terms  of  the  principle  of  natural  selection.  He  illustrates 
his  view  by  considering  the  case  of  the  mouse  who  runs  from  its  natural 
enemy,  the  cat.  He  writes: 
St  Augustine  already  remarked  on  this  phenomenon,  and 
provided  an  intentional  explanation:  the  mouse  perceives 
that  the  cat  is  its  enemy,  hence  the  mouse  runs.  What  is 
postulated  here  is  the  'adequacy'  of  the  mouse's  thought 
to  the  order  of  nature:  the  relation  of  emnity  is  correctly 
reflected  in  his  mind.  But  the  Darwinist  says:  Do  not  ask 
why  the  mouse  runs  from  its  enemy.  Species  which  did 
not  cope  with  their  natural  enemies  no  longer  exist.  That 
is  why  there  are  only  ones  who  do.  40 
The  point  of  this  example  is  that  "only  the  successful  theories  survive", 
and  for  precisely  the  same  reasons  that  one  finds  only  mice  which  run 
from  cats,  viz.,  if  they  were  not  successful  they  would  not  be  used  by 
scientists.  41  But  this  analogy  misses  the  point  behind  the  Ultimate 
Argument.  To  continue  with  van  Fraassen's  analogy,  the  question  was 
not:  Why  do  some  members  of  a  species  survive  while  other  die  off?,  but 
rather:  How  can  any  species  or  individual  survive  at  all?  Similarly,  the 
question  was  not:  Why  do  scientists  use  only  successful  theories?,  but 
rather:  How  is  it  that  any  scientific  theory  can  work  as  an  instrument  of 
prediction  and  control  in  the  first  place?  And  van  Fraassen  seems  to 
acknowledge  this  point.  He  says,  "Only  the  successful  theories  survive  - 
the  ones  which  in  fact  latched  on  to  actual  regularities  in  nature.  "42  This 
is  a  significant  concession  to  the  Ultimate  Argument,  since  it 
acknowledges  that  successful  theories  get  something  right.  I 38 
Similarly,  the  related  objections  concerning  the  anti-realist's  relapse 
into  irrationality,  and  the  damage  this  does  to  science's  role  as  a 
liberating  force  for  good  in  the  political  arena  are  also  worth  serious 
consideration.  If  a  rigid  dogmatism  of  any  form  is  undesirable,  so  too  is 
an  unrestrained  relativism.  43  And  this  applies  even  if  one  accepts  that 
Feyerabend  is  right  to  insist  that  a  plurality  of  views  is  necessary  for  the 
successful  continuation  of  science  itself.  Part  of  the  challenge  of  a 
responsible  scientific  anti-realist  position  will  be  to  set  a  non-arbitrary 
limit  on  the  bounds  of  relativism  while  avoiding  any  unwarranted 
dogmatism.  But  if  the  scientific  anti-realist  must  accept  this  challenge 
(which  I  think  he  does)  it  is  not  because  he  ought  to  be  working  to  bring 
about  some  desired  political  effects,  but  because  the  dichotomies 
'rational'/'irrational',  and  'objective'fsubjective'  involve  philosophical 
terms  that  ought  to  be  clarified  by  philosophers. 
But  this  talk  of  dichotomies  brings  us  to  the  most  pressing  concern 
facing  the  anti-realist.  Our  anti-realist  is  still  relying  on  the  problematic 
theory/observation  dichotomy.  But  this  is  a  problem  shared  with  the 
moderate  realist.  Both  the  moderate  realist  and  the  anti-realist  need 
some  way  to  distinguish  between  qualitatively  distinct  terms:  the  realist 
is  looking  to  isolate  those  terms  in  our  scientific  theories  which  refer  to 
entities  whose  existence  is  demonstrable,  and  whose  nature  can  be 
known;  while  the  anti-realist  needs  to  distinguish  between  observable 
and  unobservable  realms  of  the  Real.  But  arguably  both  distinctions 
are  making  the  same  cut.  Both  mean  to  distinguish  between  knowable 
and  unknowable  domains  of  the  Real.  If  there  is  any  doubt  on  this 
point  we  need  only  remember  that  our  anti-realist  maintains  that  to 
accept  a  theory  is  to  accept  that  what  the  theory  says  about  what  is 
observable  by  us  is  tTue.  So  both  the  moderate  realist  and  anti-realist 
accept  that  we  can  make  true  statements  about  some  section  of  the 
Real  (and  not  just  empirically  adequate  statements)  but  that  not  all 
scientific  statements  can  be  taken  as  true.  So  If  we  can  draw  this 
fundamental  distinction  to  the  satisfaction  of  realists  and  anti-realists, 
could  we  not  expect  that  scientific  realism  and  anti-realism  could 
ultimately  be  united  into  one  coherent  position?  And  if  so  united,  could 
we  not  expect  that  the  excesses  of  each  position,  which  have  exposed 39 
them  to  the  objections  discussed  above,  would  be  mitigated  when  each 
is  balanced  and  completed  by  its  opposite  number?  Indeed,  one  begins 
to  wonder  if  the  opposition  between  moderate  realism  and  anti-realism 
has  not  been  born  of  the  fact  that  the  anti-realist  tends  to  focus  on 
those  terms'in  our  scientific  theories  which  refer  to  entities  whose 
e--dstence  and  nature  are  not  demonstrable,  while  the  moderate  realist 
focuses  on  those  entities  we  can  know.  But  these  need  not  be 
incompatible  attitudes;  indeed  what  follows  is  an  attempt  to  combine 
these  two  attitudes  into  one  coherent  position  in  the  realist  dispute  in 
science.  What  remains  to  be  seen  is  how  this  distinction  might  be 
drawn  to  the  satisfaction  of  both,  and  where  the  demarcation  will  lie 
once  the  distinction  is  drawn. 
An  Important  Final  Word 
But  there  is  a  serious  objection  to  both  scientific  realism  and  scientific 
anti-realism  which  must  be  considered  before  there  can  be  any  point  at 
all  in  trying  to  forge  a  synthesis  between  these  two  interpretative 
traditions.  Both  scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti-realism  are  forms 
of  metaphysical  reatisrrL  Objections  to  this  common  ground  of  scientific 
realism  and  anti-realism  must  be  dealt  with  before  there  can  be  any 
point  in  attempting  to  synthesise  these  two  interpretative  traditions. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  study  metaphysical  realism  includes  a 
commitment  to  strong  ontological  realism,  and  to  the  thesis  that  truth 
is  to  be  understood  as  a  possibly  verification  transcendent  property  of 
sentences.  44  The  metaphysical  realist  is  committed  to  the  claim  that 
we  can  utter  a  sentence  which  is  true  or  false  without  our  being  able  to 
determine  its  actual  truth  value.  Another  way  to  express  this  is  to  say 
that  the  metaphysical  realist  is  committed  to  the  Principle  of  Bivalence, 
i.  e.,  that  all  representational  sentences  are  either  true  or  false 
regardless  of  our  ability  to  determine  which  truth  value  any  given 
sentence  happens  to  have.  45  These  claims  have  recently  come  under 
attack  from  semantic  anti-realists.  Consequently  our  first  studies  must 
deal  with  this  particular  charge. 40 
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American  MiiuL  New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster.  1987. 
44  There  is  some  debate  as  to  whether  metaphysical  realism  is  also  committed  to 
epistemological  realism.  Some  contend  that  it  makes  little  sense  to  accept  ontological 
realism  if  one  then  goes  on  to  deny  epistemological  realism  (see  John  Haldane's 
"Ontological  and  Epistemological  Realism  in  Aquinas".  (p.  2)  to  appear  in  Realism  and 
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Putnam  and  the  nature  of  reference 
In  the  Introduction  a  survey  was  made  of  the  traditional  arguments  used 
in  the  on-going  debate  between  scientific  realists  and  scientific  anti- 
realists.  We  now  need  to  examine  a  challenge  to  both  positions  in  the 
realist  dispute  in  science  stemming  from  those  who  insist  that  the  anti- 
realists  have  not  gone  far  enough  in  their  repudiation  of  the  guiding 
assumptions  of  scientific  realism.  It  is  in  the  work  of  Hilary  Putnam 
and  that  of  semantic  anti-realists  like  Michael  Dummett  and  Neil 
Tennant  that  this  historically  recent  challenge  to  instrumentalism  is  to 
be  found.  It  is  to  the  examination  of  their  views  and  the  problems  they 
raise  that  we  now  turn. 
Me  Semantic  Anti-Realist  Challenge 
Implicit  in  scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti-realisin  is  the 
assumption  that  theories  are  'measured'  by  the  world.  lbeories  are  true 
or  false  in  virtue  of  their  success  or  failure  to  adequately  represent  the 
Real.  It  is  the  gap  eýdsting  between  our  theories  and  the  world  which 
creates  the  condition  for  our  theories  being  classically  true  when  an 
adequate  representation  is  achieved,  and  classically  false  when  this 
adequacy  relation  fails  to  obtain.  But  as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter,  it 
is  now  widely  recognised  that  truth-talk  with  respect  to  scientific 
theories  is  misguided  since  we  are  never  in  a  position  to  claim  that  we 
have  actually  verified  or  falsified  any  given  theory  or  hypothesis.  The 
Duhemian  thesis  in  particular  demonstrates  that  it  is  possible  in 
principle  to  construct  empirically  adequate  yet  mutually  inconsistent 
theories  for  the  same  set  of  observations.  Much  has  been  made  of  this 
thesis,  and  it  is  the  cornerstone  of  Quine's  philosophy  of  language  and 
science  as  presented  in  Rvo  Dogmas  of  Empiricism.  But  there  is  an 
immediate  corollary  to  this  thesis  which  demands  attention:  If  it  is 
possible  to  construct  two  empirically  adequate  yet  mutually 
inconsistent  theories  for  the  same  set  of  data,  then  we  can  conclude 
that  an  empirically  adequate  theory  may  be  'classically'false,  given  that 
only  one  but  not  both  empirically  adequate  theories  could  be  true  at  the 
same  time.  This  corollary  is  consistent  with  two  fundamental  theses  of 
metaphysical  realism.  First,  truth  is  thought  to  be  a  possibly 
verification  transcendent  property  of  sentences,  i.  e.,  a  theory  is  said  to 45 
be  true  or  false  in  virtue  of  states  of  affairs  in  the  world  which  might 
happen  to  be  beyond  our  ken;  second,  the  world  is  thought  to  be 
ontologically  independent  of  our  representation  of  it. 
However.  this  corollary,  that  an  empirically  adequate  theory  may  yet  be 
false,  is  considered  by  semantic  anti-realists  to  be  incoherent  and 
untenable.  In  fact  the  corollary  can  be  taken  as  a  reductio  ad  absurdum 
of  the  metaphysical  assumptions  and  the  accompanying  notion  of  truth 
from  which  it  is  derived.  Studies  in  the  philosophy  of  language.  and 
semantics  in  particular,  have  led  some  to  the  view  that  sentence  are 
true  or  false  not  in  virtue  of  states  of  affairs  in  the  world,  but  in  virtue  of 
our  having  evidence  to  warrant  its  assertion  or  its  deniaL  According  to 
semantic  anti-realists  the  truth  value  of  a  sentence  is  not  possibly 
verification  transcendent;  on  the  contrary,  truth  is  taken  to  be 
epistemicaIly  constrained  by  our  ability  to  warrant  it  assertion  or  its 
denial.  Now  on  this  view  of  truth  it  makes  no  sense  to  say  that  an 
empirically  adequate  theory  might  be  false:  If  a  theory  is  empirically 
adequate  it  is  warranted  by  the  available  evidence;  consequently  it  is 
ipsojacto  true  by  definition.  And  presumably  if  the  theory  is  'true'.  it 
warrants  a  realist  interpretation.  Indeed,  the  scientific  anti-realist's 
refusal  to  commit  himself  to  the  eidstence  of  those  entities  named  in 
empirically  adequate  theories  Is  considered  as  at  best  an  empty 
agnosticism,  or,  as  we  will  see,  a  misguided  scepticism  stemming  from 
an  incoherent  theory  of  reference. 
If  the  metaphysical  realist  view  of  truth  proves  to  be  incoherent  there 
will  be  immediate  consequences  for  those  concerned  with  the  realist 
dispute  in  science.  if  we  are  forced  to  adopt  a  view  of  truth  as 
warranted  assertability,  there  will  be  little  reason  to  maintain  an  anti- 
realist  position  in  science.  Indeed,  many  theories  appear  to  be 
warranted  by  the  available  evidence,  and  consequently  many  theories 
will  be  'true'.  But  this  is  hardly  likely  to  please  the  scientific  realist. 
The  scientific  realist  wants  theories  that  are  'true'  in  the  traditional 
sense  of  the  term,  not  just  well  supported  theories;  indeed,  the  number 
of  well-founded  but  eventually  rejected  theories  is  legion.  And  there  are 
other  unpalatable  consequences.  If  the  nature  of  Reality  itself  is 
determined  by  the  evidence  we  happen  to  have  at  any  given  moment  (a 
view  semantic  anti-realists  have  difficulty  avoiding),  it  would  appear 
that  the  commitment  to  ontological  realism  must  be  abandoned  in 46 
favour  of  a  form  of  metaphysical  idealism.  Consequently,  in  order  to 
preserve  a  firm  scientific  realism  as  well  as  a  form  of  scientific  anti- 
realism,  our  first  order  of  business  must  be  to  defend  the  coherence  of 
the  view  of  truth  shared  by  metaphysical  realists. 
PutnarWs  Alleged  Refidation  ofRadical  Scepticism 
A  defence  of  the  coherence  of  metaphysical  realism  would  do  well  to 
consider  the  particular  problems  raised  by  Putnam  concerning  the 
nature  of  reference  before  attempting  to  deal  with  the  semantic  anti- 
realist  challenge  more  closely  associated  with  Dummett.  A  study  of 
Putnam  will  also  bring  into  focus  the  nature  of  the  conflict  between 
metaphysical  realists  and  semantic  anti-realists.  At  the  root  of  the 
conflict  Is  the  dispute  about  the  connection  between  one's  ontological 
and  epistemological  commitments.  The  metaphysical  realist  feels  that. 
while  remaining  a  metaphysical  realist,  he  could  consistently  maintain 
a  commitment  to  ontological  realism  without  committing  himself  to  any 
form  of  epistemological  realism.  That  most  metaphysical  realists 
(including  both  scientific  realists  and  anti-realists)  do  in  fact  hold  some 
form  of  epistemological  realism  is  not  to  the  point.  At  issue  is  the  fact 
that  the  theoretical  possibility  of  radical  scepticism  is  not  ruled  out  by 
metaphysical  realist  commitments.  It  is  precisely  this  theoretical 
possibility  which  is  attacked  by  Putnam  in  the  first  chapter  of  Reason, 
Truth  and  History.  A  the  heart  of  his  attack  is  the  claim  that  the 
metaphysical  realist  is  working  with  an  unacceptable  theory  of 
reference.  Consequently  we  need  to  consider  his  argument  against 
radical  scepticism. 
The  following  is  the  relevant  portion  of  Putnam's  characterisation  of 
metaphysical  realism  as  presented  in  Meaning  and  the  Moral  Sciences: 
THE  WORLD  is  supposed  to  be  independent  of  any  particular 
representation  of  it  -  indeed,  it  is  held  that  we  might  be  unable 
to  represent  the  world  correctly  at  all  (e.  g.  we  might  all  be 
"brains  in  a  vaV,  the  metaphysical  realist  tells  us).  1 
There  is  nothing  here  that  contradicts  metaphysical  realism  as  defined 
in  the  IntroductiorL  Consequently,  we  are  obliged  to  defend  the 
coherence  of  this  admittedly  farfetched  theoretical  possibility.  For  if 47 
truth  is  not  epistemically  constrained,  then  it  is  at  least  possible  in 
theory  that  the  world  bears  no  resemblance  to  our  representations  of  it. 
Putnam  maintains,  however,  that  he  can  show  that  this  possibility  it 
incoherent,  and  that  radical  scepticism  is  not  tenable.  His  argument, 
stemming  from  a  particular  theory  of  reference,  invites  the  conclusion 
that  the  statement.  'I  am  a  brain  in  a  vat',  Is  necessarily  false.  'Me 
specific  question  that  will  occupy  us  is  whether  Putnam  has  laid  radical 
scepticism  to  rest  by  demonstrating  that  it  is  self-refuting.  I  will  be  at 
pains  to  show  that  this  argument  as  it  is  presented  in  Brains  in  a  Vat  is 
compelling  only  if  certain  prior  assumptions  have  been  made.  In 
particular,  I  will  show  that  he  assumes  from  the  outset  that  truth  is 
epistemically  constrained  and  not  possibly  verification-transcendent. 
Indeed  Putnam's  argument  from  the  nature  of  reference  can  be  seen  as 
a  variation  on  a  Dummettian  theme.  An  examination  of  his  argument 
will  then  lead  us  quite  naturally  into  Dummett's  work  where  the  more 
fundamental  problem  of  the  nature  of  truth  is  examined  in  greater 
detail. 
The  main  point  on  which  Putnam  builds  in  Brains  in  a  Vat  is  the  thesis 
that  thoughts,  words,  pictures,  or  mental  images  do  not  intrinsically 
represent  or  refer  to  anything.  Putnam  considers  the  imaginary  case  of 
an  ant  tracing  a  picture  of  Winston  Churchill  in  the  sand,  and  a  person 
uttering  words  in  a  language  he/she  does  not  understand.  Neither  the 
ant  nor  the  speaker  has  successfully  referred  to  anything.  Putnam 
maintains,  although  a  picture  and  words  have  been  present.  Putnam 
also  uses  the  distinction  between  'seeing  and  'seeing  that'  to  bring  out 
the  idea  that  we  can  have  images,  words  or  thoughts  in  the  head  and 
not  be  aware  that  they  might  be  used  to  refer  to  anything.  One  can 
have  an  image  of  a  tree  before  the  mind's  eye,  says  Putnam,  and  yet  not 
refer  to  a  tree.  If  one  does  not  know  what  trees  are,  never  having  seen 
or  heard  of  trees  and  thus  having  no  concept  of  them,  then  one  cannot 
refer  to  trees  even  if  the  appropriate  image  is  present.  In  this  case  the 
image  is  just  an  image  and  not  an  image  of  a  tree.  This  is  the  main 
point  he  wants  to  assert  against  what  he  calls  the  'magical'  theory  of 
reference  employed,  or  tacitly  assumed,  by  metaphysical  realists  who 
suppose  there  is  this  'magical'  or  'necessary'  connection  between  a  sign 
and  its  referent. 48 
After  these  preliminary  remarks  on  the  nature  of  reference  Putnam 
develops  his  well  known  brains-in-a-vat  scenario  and  his  argument  that 
purports  to  show  that  we  can  know  that  we  are  not  brains  in  a  vat. 
Putnam's  strategy  is  to  show  that  the  statement,  "I  am  a  brain  in  a  vat" 
is  necessarily  false  because  it  is  self-refuting.  It  is  important  that  It  be 
clear  why  Putnam  thinks  this  is  the  case. 
The  argument  turns  on  his  theory  of  reference.  Putnam  maintains  that 
successful  reference  depends  on  some  sort  of  causal  interaction 
obtaining  between,  say,  a  real  tree  and  the  speaker  who  employs  an 
image  or  thought  of  a  tree,  or  utters  the  word  "tree"  in  a  sentence.  Now 
'vat-people'.  says  Putnam,  may  believe  they  are  able  to  refer  to  trees, 
but  since,  ex  hypothesL  they  have  no  causal  interaction  with  real  trees, 
they  cannot,  to  Putnam's  way  of  thinking,  really  refer  to  trees,  even 
though  the  mental  content  of  a  vat-person  may  be  Identical  to  the 
mental  content  of  a  person  actually  standing  in  front  of  a  real  tree.  Now 
if  a  representational  sentence  cannot  be  true  without  successfully 
referring  to  something,  then  the  statement  'I  am  standing  in  front  of  a 
tree',  for  example,  can  never  be  true  if  uttered  by  a  vat-person.  It  is  not 
true  on  a  metaphysical  realist  account  of  truth  because,  ex  hypothesi, 
the  vat-person  Is  in  a  vat  and  not  in  front  of  a  tree.  Putnam  also 
maintains  that  this  sentence  is  false,  but  for  a  different  reason.  It  is 
false  on  Putnam's  account  because  the  conditions  of  successful 
reference  on  which  the  truth  of  this  sentence  depends  do  not  obtain. 
M-ie  difference  between  these  two  analyses  comes  out  most  clearly  when 
we  are  faced  with  the  statement,  'I  am  a  brain  in  a  vat'.  If  a  person  is 
not  a  vat-person  then  the  statement  is  obviously  false  regardless  of 
one's  views  of  the  nature  of  reference.  But  if  the  person  is  a  vat-person 
then  on  the  metaphysical  realist  account  the  statement  is  true:  yet  on 
Putnam's  account  the  statement  is  still  false  because  it  "does  not  have 
the  reference  conditions  that  would  make  it  true.  -2  Consequently,  as 
far  as  Putnam  is  concerned,  'I  am  a  brain  in  a  vat'  is  false  when  uttered 
by  a  person  under  normal  conditions,  and  false  when  uttered  by  a  vat- 
person;  and  since  these  are  the  only  options  available,  'I  am  a  brain  in  a 
vat'  Is  deemed  necessarily  false.  and  radical  scepticism  defeated. 
It  is  vital  that  this  last  move  be  understood  clearly  because  it  is  the 
lynch  pin  of  the  whole  argument.  It  is  important  to  recognise  that 
Putnam  Is  not  saying  that  we  cannot  determine  the  truth-value  of 49 
sentences  when  the  required  reference  conditions  for  the  truth  of  a 
given  statement  fail  to  obtain.  The  lack  of  the  'appropriate'  reference 
conditions  actually  entails  the  falsity  of  the  statement  in  question.  If 
this  were  not  the  case  there  would  be  room  for  the  possibility  that  we 
are  actually  brains  in  a  vat  but,  given  our  lamentable  epistemological 
condition,  we  simply  cannot  warrant  an  assertion  to  this  effect.  But 
this  is  a  restatement  of  radical  scepticism,  not  a  refutation  of  it.  Only 
by  insisting  on  the  falsity  of  ,  'I  am  a  brain  in  a  vat',  can  Putnam's 
argument  be  seen  as  a  argument  against  scepticism.  To  achieve  this 
Putnam  must  claim  that  the  truth  of  a  statement  is  dependent  upon 
correct  modes  of  reference  obtaining  between  the  user  or  utterer  of  a 
statement  and  the  referents  of  the  terms  in  that  statement,  and  not 
upon  the  statement's  correct  representation  of  the  facts.  This  is  stated 
explicitly  in  Meaning  and  the  Moral  Sciences:  "...  the  relation  of  reference 
totally  determines  the  extension  of  'true'.  as  applied  to  that  language.  -3 
For  those  who  maintain  an  epistemically  unconstrained  view  of  truth 
and  a  non-causal  theory  of  reference  this  argument  will  appear  a 
nonsense.  In  the  traditional  conceptual  scheme  truth  and  being  are 
convertible,  i.  e.  to  say  something  true  is  to  say  what  is,  and  conversely, 
what  is,  is  what  is  true.  The  metaphysical  realist  will  insist  that  the 
truth  of  a  sentence  depends  on  states  of  affairs,  and  not  on  our  being  in 
any  particular  causal  relationship  with  them.  Surely,  the  metaphysical 
realist  will  say,  if  one  is  a  brain  in  a  vat  and  one  says  as  much,  a  true 
statement  has  been  uttered,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  a  particular 
reference  condition  has  been  satisfied.  Furthermore,  the  metaphysical 
realist  will  want  to  know  how  one  and  the  same  statement  can  be  false 
when  uttered  by  one  person  and  true  when  uttered  by  another.  if 
external  viewers  say  of  some  unfortunate  vat-people,  'They  are  brains  in 
vat".  they  are  said  to  have  uttered  a  true  statement.  Why  should  the 
same  proposition  suddenly  become  false  when  uttered  by  a  vat-person? 
At  issue  for  the  metaphysical  realist  is  the  distinction  between  a  true 
statement  and  a  justified,  or  warranted  statement.  Metaphysical 
realists  will  argue  that  the  vat-people  are  correct  in  their  assertion  that 
they  are  brains  in  a  vat;  but,  given  the  peculiarity  of  their  situation, 
their  assertion  to  this  effect  is  not  warranted.  And  their  failure  to  refer 
on  Putnam's  criterion  merely  underlines  the  fact  that  we  can  have 
mental  images,  thoughts,  or  sense  impressions,  and  not  be  aware  of  the 
#real'  nature  of  the  cause  of  those  images,  which  is,  after  all,  the 50 
sceptic's  position.  Putnam's  aim,  however,  Is  -to  deny  that  there  is 
distinction  between  a  true  statement  and  a  justified,  or  warranted 
statement.  It  would  appear,  on  Putnam's  account  of  the  brains 
argument,  that  a  sentence  cannot  be  true  if  it  is  not  warranted.  Indeed, 
there  is  no  distinction  between  one's  ontology  and  one's  epistemology; 
what  is  the  case  depends  on  what  we  know  is  the  case. 
Let  us  look  at  Putnam's  argument  against  scepticism  more  closely. 
There  are  two  features  to  Putnam's  theory  of  reference  that  require 
attention.  The  first  is  the  insistence  on  a  causal  theory  of  reference;  the 
second  is  the  alleged  dependence  of  the  truth  predicate  upon  the 
conditions  of  this  particular  notion  of  reference  obtaining.  If  reference 
does  require  a  direct  causal  link,  and  the  truth  of  a  statement  is 
dependent  upon  this  type  of  reference  relation  obtaining  between  the 
speaker  and  referent,  then  metaphysical  realists  will  be  forced  to  give 
up  the  idea  that  truth  is  vprification  transcendent  and  the  coherence  of 
radical  scepticism  will  be  shattered.  But  before  accepting  such  a 
conclusion  the  metaphysical  realist  requires  an  answer  to  two 
questions.  Why  tie  truth  to  a  causal  theory  of  reference?  And  what 
reasons  can  be  given  for  accepting  a  causal  theory  of  reference  in  the 
first  place?  Let  us  consider  the  causal-connection  element  of  this 
theory  of  reference  first. 
Reference  and  Causal  Connections 
Does  successful  reference  really  require  a  direct  causal  connection 
between  speaker  and  referent?  It  seems  plain  enough  that  some  sort  of 
link  is  needed,  but  the  nature  of  this  link  is  unclear.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  in  Brains  Putnam  simply  asserts  that  in  the  case  of  the  ant 
and  the  non-Japanese  speaker  reference  has  failed  to  occur  without 
saying  exactly  why  they  failed.  Most  would  agree  that  they  did  fail  to 
refer;  but  various  reasons  for  the  failure  could  be  entertained,  some  of 
which  could  be  accepted  by  metaphysical  realist.  One  need  not  deny 
that  signs  do  not  inherently  refer  to  anything  to  agree  that  the  ant  failed 
to  refer  to  Churchill.  It  could  be  argued  that  the  ant  fails  to  refer 
because,  presumably,  it  had  no  intention  to  use  the  drawing  in  the  sand 
to  refer  to  Churchill.  One  need  not  insist  that  the  failure  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  ant  has  no  causal  connection  to  Churchill.  And  the  non- 51 
Japanese  speaker  uttering  a  sentence  in  Japanese  fails  to  refer  because 
s/he  does  not  know  what  s/he  is  saying,  not  because  the  correct  causal 
relation  between  speaker  and  referent  does  not  obtain.  But  things  are 
less  clear  in  the  case  of  the  vat-people.  The  metaphysical  realist  is  quite 
willing  to  accept  that  the  vat-person  does  refer  when  s/he  utters  the 
statement  'I  am  a  brain  in  a  vat'.  What  argument  does  Putnam  offer 
against  the  metaphysical  realist  on  this  point? 
There  are  four  arguments  to  consider  altogether,  three  of  which  can  be 
treated  in  this  chapter.  First,  there  is  the  suggestion  that  metaphysical 
realists  have  difficulty  explaining  how  one  manages  to  refer  to  entities 
and  situations  to  which  one  has  not  been  causally  related.  In  effect, 
reference  is  a  bit  of  a  mystery  which  the  metaphysical  realist  cannot 
solve.  More  of  this  anon. 
Second,  Putnam  might  appeal  to  the  principle  of  charity  adopted  from 
Quine  and  Davidson  in  order  to  justify  his  particular  reading  of  Vat- 
discourse'.  One  reason  for  rejecting  the  more  natural  metaphysical 
realist  interpretation  of  vat-discourse  is  that  on  this  reading  almost  all 
vat-sentences  must  be  deemed  false.  (In  fact  on  this  reading  one  of  the 
very  few  statements  to  come  out  true  is  precisely  that  they  are  brains  in 
a  vat.  )  This  is  in  direct  violation  of  the  principle  of  charity  championed 
by  Quine  and  Davidson  which  states  that  the  best  translation  or 
interpretation  of  another's  discourse  is  the  one  that  makes  the  largest 
percentage  of  the  target  statements  true.  The  translator's  guiding 
principle  is  to  choose  that  reading  which  puts  the  target  statements  in 
the  best  possible  light,  the  operating  assumption  being  that  the  foreign- 
language-speaker  would  not  assent  to  or  use  sentences  that  are 
manifestly  false.  Now  it  is  true  that  the  metaphysical  realist  reading 
runs  afoul  of  the  letter  of  the  principle  of  charity;  but  Putnam  must 
accept  that  his  version  of  the  vat-discourse  (which  can  make  their 
statements  come  out  as  true)  is  highly  revisionary,  if  not  excessively  so. 
Indeed  it  completely  Ignores  the  intentions  of  the  vat-people,  and 
produces  sentences  the  vat-people  would  not  recognise  as  their  own. 
But  rather  than  reject  the  principle  of  charity,  (a  hasty  and  unwise 
move  given  its  obvious  merits  in  other  more  traditional  situations  where 
interpretation  is  being  attempted),  it  would  make  far  more  sense  to  see 
vat-discourse  as  a  limiting  case  of  the  principle  of  charity.  This 
principle  ought  to  be  applied  in  those  circumstances  where  translator 52 
and  foreign-language  speaker  are  in  roughly  equivalent  epistemological 
conditions.  Quine  and  Davidson  did  not  envisage  this  principle  of 
translation  being  applied  to  the  discourse  of  such  a  clearly 
disadvantaged  people.  It  is  only  misguided  loyalty  to  a  principle  that 
would  lead  one  to  apply  it  to  such  an  atypical  case  as  that  of  the  vat- 
people. 
Third,  Putnam  could  be  following  the  likes  of  Quine  and  Wittgenstein  in 
insisting  that  meanings,  (and  hence  reference,  as  a  component  of 
meaning)  must  be  manifestible  and  accessible  to  public  -scrutiny  and 
not  hidden  away  in  the  head.  (The  speakees  intentions,  for  example, 
cannot  be  appealed  to  to  explain  reference  because  intentionality  is  not 
amenable  to  public  scrutiny.  )  But  it  is  worth  noting  that  Putnam 
himself  is  not  quite  sure  how  to  characterise  this  reference  relation  in 
terms  that  would  suit  Quine  or  Wittgenstein.  In  fact  his  lack  of 
confidence  in  this  area  is  so  deep  that  he  even  admits  that  a  non-causal 
theory  of  reference  might  be  correct  after  all.  Consider  these  lines  from 
Meaning  and  the  Moral  Sciences: 
What  a  speaker  means  when  he  utters  U  could/can  be 
determined  by  seeing  what  belief  standardly  accompanies  U 
(or,  perhaps,  what  belief  one  intends  to  convey  in  uttering  U,  a 
la  Grice  and  Shiffer).  This  looks  like  what  Quine  calls  the 
"museum  myth"  of  meaning  in  psychological  fancy-dress. 
(The  "museum  myth"  is  the  unhelpful  theory  that  there  are 
objects  called  meanings  and  what  a  sentence  means  is 
determined  by  which  of  these  objects  it  is  "attached"  to.  )  But 
perhaps  the  "museum  myth"  is  true.  Perhaps  Quine  just  is 
easy  to  answer.  (This  is  what  Noarn  Chompsky  seems  to 
think.  )  4 
It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  while  reading  this  quote  Putnam's 
declared  views  on  the  nature  of  meaning.  In  particular  one  must 
remember  that  meaning,  for  Putnam,  includes  reference  as  a  integral 
component,  and  that  it  is  precisely  this  "museum  myth"  view  of 
meaning  that  is  maintained  by  metaphysical  realists.  But  there  is  no 
mention  here  of  the  speaker  being  causally  related  to  the  objects 
referred  to  in  U.  Just  how  the  speaker  is  related  to  these  objects  is  left 
unspecified.  In  fact  it  would  appear  that  the  speaker's  intention  may  be 
sufficient  for  successful  reference, 
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consent  to  such  a  complete  capitulation  to  the  metaphysical  realist 
cause.  What,  then,  is  Putnam's  real  view  of  this  reference  relation? 
Again  we  run  into  difficulties  because  Putnam  is  not  entirely  clear  on 
this  matter.  At  times  it  appears  that  Putnam's  argument  demands  that 
this  relation  be  one  of  direct  causal  interaction  between  the  speaker  and 
the  referent.  This  is  the  picture  one  naturally  assumes  while  reading 
Brains  in  a  vat.  Indeed  the  argument  against  scepticism  relies  on  the 
fact  that  the  brains  in  a  vat  do  not  have  any  direct  connection  to  the 
objects  their  discourse  is  ostensibly  about.  It  is  precisely  this  lack  of 
direct  connection  that  is  responsible  for  their  statements  not  having  the 
reference  conditions  to  make  them  true.  This  reading  is  encouraged  by 
lines  like  the  following: 
The...  premise  is  that  one  cannot  refer  to  certain  kinds  of 
things,  e.  g.  trees,  if  one  has  no  causal  interaction  with  them, 
or  with  things  in  terms  of  which  they  can  be  described.  5  (My 
emphasis) 
But  we  (unlike  the  brains)  are  able  to  perceive,  handle,  deal 
with  apples  and  fields.  Our  talk  of  apples  and  fields  is 
intimately  connected  with  our  non-verbal  transactions  with 
apples  and  fields.  6 
..  Nat'  refers  to  vats  in  the  image  in  vat-English,  or 
something  related  (electronic  impulses  or  program  features), 
but  certainly  not  to  real  vats,  since  the  use  of  'vat'  in  vat- 
English  has  no  causal  connection  to  real  vats.  7  (My  emphasis) 
Similar  lines  can  be  found  throughout  this  particular  essay,  and  they 
all  suggest  that  a  direct,  physical  connection  must  obtain  between 
speaker  and  referent. 
However,  Putnam  is  not  entirely  happy  with  this  picture  of  the  nature  of 
reference.  In  fact  he  appears  to  imply  that  it  is  only  acceptable  if 
certain  qualifications  concerning  the  nature  of  the  causal  relation  are 
made.  In  Meaning  and  the  Moral  Sciences,  we  read: 
(b)  indicates  that  reference  cannot,  for  example,  be  defined  by 
W  refers  to  Y  if  and  only  if  X  (a  particular  utterance  of  %Q  is 
connected  to  Y  by  a  causal  chain  of  the  appropriate  type'.  (Of 
course,  phrases  like  'causal  chain  of  the  appropriate  type'  are 
extremely  vague,  so  maybe  the  causal  theories  can  evade  this by  allowing  global  constraints  to  enter  in  detennining  what 
the  'appropriate  t3rpe'  of  causal  chain  is.  )8 
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This  remark  seems  at  odds  with  those  found  in  Brains,  where  it  was 
implied  that  reference  is  dependent  upon  such  physical  actions  like 
'handling'  and  other  'non-verbal  transactions'.  Reference  is,  of  course, 
not  a  physical  activity  itself  (what  it  is  remains  to  be  seen)  but  it  seems 
to  be  dependent  upon  certain  physical  events  having  occurred.  9 
So  what  is  required  for  successful  reference  according  to  Putnam?  In 
particular,  is  a  direct  causal  link  necessary  or  not?  Putnam  is  not 
entirely  clear  on  this  matter.  But  was  is  clear  is  that  the  argument  in 
Brains  goes  through  only  if  reference  is  dependent  upon  a  direct  causal 
connection  between  speaker  and  referent.  Putnam  makes  this  clear  by 
listing  those  translations  of  vat-discourse  he  finds  acceptable.  He 
writes: 
On  some  theories  that  we  shall  discuss  it  [the  vat  discourse] 
might  refer  to  trees  in  the  image,  or  to  electronic  impulses  that 
cause  tree  experiences,  or  the  features  of  the  program  that  are 
responsible  for  those  electronic  impulses.  These  theories  are 
not  ruled  out  ... 
for  there  is  a  close  causal  connection  between 
the  use  of  the  word  'tree'  in  vat-English  and  the  presence  of 
trees  in  the  image,  the  presence  of  electronic  impulses  of  a 
certain  kind,  and  the  presence  of  certain  features  in  the 
machine's  program.  10 
It  would  appear  from  these  lines  that,  in  Brains  at  least,  Putnam  is 
holding  a  very  strong  version  of  the  causal  connection  theory  of 
reference.  Let  us  take  Putnam  at  face  value  and  agree  that  this  is  a 
view  that  he  at  least  seriously  entertains.  We  can  now  ask  whether  this 
theory  of  reference  is  supported  by  the  case  of  the  vat-people,  or 
whether  he  simply  manages  to  use  this  scenario  to  illustrate  in  a 
graphic  manner  the  nature  and  consequences  of  this  particular  theory. 
Because  Putnam  has  given  up  the  museum  myth  of  meanings  inside 
the  head,  he  is  forced  conclude  that  reference  is  not  simply  a  matter  of 
the  speaker's  intention.  Consequently  he  must  find  some  observable 
process  upon  which  to  hang  the  occurrence  of  reference.  This  leads 
directly  to  the  counter-intuitive  suggestion  that  the  vat-  people  could  be 
taken  to  be  referring  to  states  of  machines  (although  they  are  unaware 
of  this).  But  again  we  are  left  wondering  why  this  suggestion  is  to  be 55 
taken  seriously,  let  alone  adopted.  It  is  true  that  according  to  the 
principle  of  charity  the  vat-sentences  might  now  be  construed  as  true. 
But  this  is  achieved  only  by  doing  violence  to  the  speaker's  own  view  of 
their  sentences.  As  mentioned  above,  vat-discourse  ought  to  be  taken 
as  a  limiting  case  of  the  principle  of  charity. 
If  one's  enthusiasm  for  such  a  crude  causal  theory  of  reference  is 
therefore  difficult  to  maintain,  as  indeed  it  was  for  Putnam  himself,  two 
points  immediately  present  themselves  for  consideration.  Firstly,  what 
becomes  of  the  argument  against  scepticism  which  relies  on  this  theory 
of  reference?  If  this  direct  causal  connection  is  not  required  what 
prevents  us  from  attributing  successful  reference  to  the  vat-people? 
Second,  if  the  link  between  refer-rer  and  referent  is  not  a  crudely  causal 
one,  as  some  of  Putnam's  own  work  suggests,  then  what  is  the  nature  of 
the  reference  relation?  Putnam's  answer  to  this  question  leads  us 
directly  into  the  fourth  ob  ection  against  the  metaphysical  realist.  j 
Putnam's  suggestion  in  Reason,  7ýuth  and  History  quickly  takes  us  to 
the  heart  of  his  internal  realism.  '  It  is  in  fact  while  discussing  a  key 
problem  for  the  causal  theory  of  reference,  namely  how  one  manages  to 
refer  to  the  unobservable  entities  postulated  by  modern  science,  that 
Putnam  writes  the  following  lines:  ' 
in  an  internalist  view  ...  signs  do  not  intrinsically  correspond 
to  objects,  independently  of  how  those  signs  are  employed  and 
by  whom.  But  a  sign  that  is  actually  employed  in  a  particular 
way  by  a  particular  community  of  users  can  correspond  to 
particular  objects  within  the  conceptual  scheme  of  those  users. 
'Objects'  do  not  e)dst  independently  of  conceptual  schemes. 
We  cut  up  the  world  into  objects  when  we  introduce  one  or 
another  scheme  of  description.  Since  the  objects  and  the 
signs  are  alike  internal  to  the  scheme  of  description,  it  is 
possible  to  say  what  matches  what.  11 
It  now  becomes  only  too  clear  just  what  price  is  being  paid  for  giving  up 
the  magical  theories  of  reference.  Putnam  is  able  to  avoid  the  particular 
difficulty  concerning  the  'magical'  nature  of  reference  that  besets  us  if 
we  are  wedded  to  a  world  view  in  which  it  is  maintained  that  the  world 
exists  independently  of  our  theoretical  representations  of  it.  In 
particular  the  metaphysical  realists  leave  it  unexplained  as  to  how  we 
can  refer  to  entities  that  we  have  never  encountered.  This  problem  is 
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assumption  and  accept  that  the  world  does  not  exist  independently  of 
our  representation  of  it.  The  'magical'  nature  of  reference  is  eliminated 
because  a  causal  connection  between  speakers  and  their  referents  is 
guaranteed.  We  create  the  very  objects  we  are  referring  to  in  the  first 
place.  What  better  causal  link  could  one  ask  for?  Putnam  also 
eliminates  the  seemingly  insoluble  problem  of  radical  scepticism.  Since 
we  create  our  world  ourselves,  we  are  in  a  very  good  position  to  claim 
that  we  can  have  real  knowledge  of  it.  Our  theories  are  no  longer 
'measured'  by  a  world  we  seek  to  know;  we  know  our  world  because  we 
have  made  it  what  it  is. 
But  is  this  theory  of  reference,  which  seems  to  entail  the  rejection  of  the 
ontological  independence  of  the  world,  an  acceptable  alternative  to  the 
magical  theory  of  metaphysical  realism?  More  importantly,  has  any 
argument  been  presented  that  forces  one  to  adopt  such  a  view?  or  is  it 
merely  the  case  that  an  alternative  approach  has  been  developed  and 
presented  for  our  consideration?  The  latter  appears  to  be  the  case,  for 
significant  problems  arise  for  Putnam's  view  of  reference.  For  one,  are 
language  users  like  ourselves  objects  we  have  created?  And  if  we  have 
not  brought  ourselves  into  being  through  language  (which  seems  self- 
evident)  how  do  we  know  that  we  are  the  only  theory  independent 
entities?  Is  one  forced  to  recognise  two  forms  of  reference,  one,  a  direct 
causal  relationship  between  speaker  and  referent  with  the  direction  of 
causation  flowing  from  objects  to  person,  and  a  second  causal 
relationship  of  creation/reference  with  an  inverted  causal  flow,  from 
person  to  object?  How  would  we  establish  which  mode  of  reference 
holds  in  each  particular  case,  or  would  it  matter?  That  reference  in 
some  cases  is  indeed  a  'mystery'  for  the  metaphysical  realist  Is  one 
reason  why  one  is  quite  naturally  inclined  to  at  least  consider  Putnam's 
internal  realism.  But  is  the  magical  theory  of  reference  any  more 
mysterious  or  magical  than  the  relation  Putnam  suggests  exists 
between  ourselves  and  the  world?  The  cost  of  adopting  an  internal 
realist  perspective  is  high  indeed.  It  is  in  fact  so  high  that  more  than  a 
puzzle  about  reference  is  needed  before  any  metaphysical  realist  is 
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Truth  as  Epistemically  Constrained 
But  there  is  an  argument  for  Putnam's  position  which  never  appears  in 
Brains.  Some  while  back  it  was  said  that  there  are  two  aspects  to 
Putnam's  argument,  one,  the  causal  nature  of  reference,  the  other,  the 
connection  between  reference  and  truth.  The  point  I  want  to  make 
about  this  second  aspect  of  Putnam's  argument  is  the  following. 
Putnam's  views  on  reference  are  consistent  with  a  commitment  to  a 
notion  of  truth  as  epistemically  constrained.  Indeed,  as  intimated 
earlier,  Putnam's  views  on  the  nature  of  reference  make  sense  and  are 
compelling  once  we  have  abandoned  the  metaphysical  realist 
understanding  of  truth.  The  truth  of  a  statement  does  depend  on 
successful  reference  having  been  achieved,  even  within  the  traditional 
conceptual  scheme  where  truth  is  held  to  be  verification  transcendent. 
But  in  the  traditional  scheme  reference  does  not  require  either  a  direct 
causal  link  between  speaker  and  referent,  let  alone  the  creation  of  the 
referent  by  the  introduction  of  a  conceptual  scheme  by  the  speaker. 
But  once  one  has  adopted  a  conception  of  truth  as  epistemically 
constrained  one's  views  on  the  nature  of  reference  must  be  adapted  to 
suit  this  conceptual  framework.  Once  this  is  understood  it  becomes 
clear  that  the  commitment  to  the  view  that  the  truth  of  a  sentence 
depends  on  a  reference  relation  along  Putnam's  lines  is  in  fact  simply 
another  expression  of  that  line  of  thought  which  insists  on  denying  that 
truth  is  a  verification  transcendent  property  of  statements.  With  the 
semantic  anti-realists,  as  we  will  see  shortly,  no  statement  can  be 
deemed  true  if  it  is  not  warranted  by  some  evidence  that  is  at  least  in 
principle  available  for  inspection.  I  would  argue  that  by  making  the 
truth  of  a  statement  dependent  upon  his  particular  notion  of  reference 
Putnam  is  simply  restating  this  demand.  For  both  Dummett  and 
Putnam  a  statement's  truth  value  is  not  determined  by  its 
correspondence  to  the  facts  or  its  failure  to  so  correspond  because  we 
may  never  be  in  a  position  to  decide  effectively  which  of  these 
alternatives  in  fact  obtains.  Instead  a  statement's  truth  value  is 
determined  by  some  other  factor  whose  obtaining  is  always  within  our 
abilities,  at  least  in  principle,  to  establish.  Putnam's  views  on  reference 
are  an  expression  of  precisely  this  demand  for  accessibility.  The  true 
referent  of  a  given  term  must  be  something  that  is  accessible  to  an 
outside  observer  of  the  language  user,  not  something  hidden  away  in 
the  language  user's  head.  By  making  reference  depend  on  a  causal 58 
connection  between  speaker  and  referent  Putnam  ensures  that  the 
referent  at  least  at  some  point  was  accessible  to  public  scrutiny. 
Where  does  this  leave  us?  It  seems  that  in  order  for  Putnam's 
argument  against  scepticism  to  go  through  his  views  on  reference  must 
be  accepted.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  reason  to  be  hesitant  on  this 
score.  More  to  the  point,  we  have  seen  that  these  views  are  compelling 
only  within  a  conceptual  framework  operating  with  an  epistemically 
constrained  notion  of  truth.  But  Putnam  has  not  given  any  particularly 
forceful  argument  for  the  adoption  of  this  initial  point  of  departure, 
although  the  argument  against  the  coherence  of  metaphysical  realism 
clearly  relies  on  it.  Such  an  argument,  however,  can  be  found  in 
Dummett.  It  is  to  this  argument  that  we  must  now  turn. 
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The  Dummettian  Reductio 
I  concluded  the  last  chapter  by  saying  that  Putnam's  argument  against 
radical  scepticism  as  found  in  the  opening  pages  of  Reason,  Truth  and 
History  (which  I  have  taken  as  containing  an  implicit  attack  on  the 
coherence  of  both  scientific  realism  and  anti-realism)  depends  on  a 
particular  understanding  of  the  nature  of  reference.  I  also  argued  that 
this  understanding  is  itself  compelling  only  within  a  conceptual 
framework  the  key  element  of  which  is  an  epistemically  constrained 
notion  of  truth.  However,  while  it  is  true  that  Putnam  has  developed  an 
interesting  and,  to  some,  attractive,  philosophical  position  largely 
predicated  upon  the  commitment  to  such  a  notion  of  truth,  I  did  not 
find  in  his  work  any  particularly  forceful  argument  that  might  persuade 
one  to  abandon  the  metaphysical  realist  notion  of  truth  as  a  possibly 
verification  transcendent  property  of  sentences.  The  object  of  this 
chapter  is  the  examination  of  just  such  an  argument.  As  intimated  at 
the  close  of  the  preceding  chapter,  it  is  in  the  work  of  Dummett  and  the 
semantic  anti-realists  that  this  argument  is  to  be  found.  Our  attention, 
therefore,  will  be  focused  on  what  has  been  called  the  'Dummettian 
Reductio',  or  what  I  will  refer  to  as  the  'manifestation  argument'.  Once 
the  nature  of  this  argument  is  clear  I  will  move  on  to  consider  a  possible 
semantic  realist  response. 
The  examination  of  the  manifestation  argument  will  take  us  ever  deeper 
into  problems  in  the  philosophy  of  language.  This  may  strike  some  as 
leading  us  ever  further  astray  from  the  realist  dispute  in  the  philosophy 
of  science.  However,  those  who  champion  this  branch  of  philosophy, 
and  this  argument  in  particular,  claim  that  its  import  extends  far 
beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  philosophy  of  language.  What  is  more,  it 
should  be  clear  already  that  if  it  can  be  used  to  support  a  position  like 
Putnam's,  its  import  for  the  realist  dispute  in  science  is  only  too  real.  It 
is,  then,  quite  proper  to  continue  our  excursion  into  the  philosophy  of 
language  and  to  give  this  argument  attention  commensurate  with  the 
importance  of  its  alleged  consequences. 
Naturalism  vs.  Mentalism  in  Semantics 
A  brief  digression  into  related  matters  in  the  philosophy  of  language  is 60 
necessary  before  the  manifestation  argument  can  be  intelligibly 
discussed.  In  particular  a  few  words  concerning  the  debate  between 
what  might  be  called  'naturalists'  and  'mentalists'  in  semantics  will 
allow  us  to  place  the  argument  in  its  proper  context.  This  discussion 
will  also  allow  us  to  establish  that  the  manifestation  argument  is  not 
based  on  assumptions  that  are  questionable  from  the  point  of  view  of 
semantic  realists.  'Mis  is,  after  all,  the  principle  attraction  of  the 
manifestation  argument:  the  semantic  principles  on  which  it  is  based 
are  broadly  acceptable  to  both  semantic  realists  and  anti-realists  alike. 
In  twentieth  century  philosophy  of  language  there  seems  to  be  general 
cross  party  agreement  on  certain  fundamental  points  about  language, 
the  process  of  language  acquisition,  and  the  nature  of  meaning. 
Following  the  lead  of  thinkers  as  diverse  in  character  as  Wittgenstein 
and  Dewey,  many  philosophers  of  language  have  been  attracted  to  what 
Quine  refers  to  in  'Ontological  Relativity'  as  'naturalism'  about 
language.  1  This  naturalism  is  favoured  over  past  theories  of  meaning 
that  are  decidedly  'mentalistic'.  The  point  at  issue  in  this  debate 
between  naturalism  and  mentalism  with  respect  to  the  nature  of 
meaning  turns  on  the  question  of 
, 
whether  an  essentially  private 
language  is  possible.  The  details  of  this  debate  need  not  concern  us 
here  as  the  parties  to  our  particular  dispute  are  all  in  agreement 
concerning  the  impossibility  of  such  a  language.  However,  it  is 
important  to  recognise  why  semantic  realists  and  anti-realists  are  in 
concert  on  this  question  because  it  is  this  agreement  which  provides  the 
common  conceptual  framework  in  which  the  manifestation  argument 
arises. 
The  principle  that  both  the  semantic  realist  and  anti-realist  can  accept, 
which  is  also  the  motivation  behind  the  rejection  of  the  possibility  of  an 
essentially  private  language,  is  clearly  expressed  in  the  opening 
paragraphs  of  Quine's  essay  'Ontological  Relativity'.  There  he  quotes 
the  words  of  Dewey:  "Meaning  ...  is  not  a  psychic  existence;  it  is 
primarily  a  property  of  behaviour.  "2  Quine  accepts  this  thesis  as 
following  from  seemingly  undeniable  observations  concerning  the 
conditions  governing  the  possible  communication  of  meanings  from  one 
language  user  to  another.  These  observations  and  reflections  lead  him. 
to  assert  that: 
Language  is  a  social  art  which  we  all  acquire  on  the  evidence solely  of  other  people's  overt  behaviour  under  publicly 
recognisable  circumstances.  3 
and, 
What  the  naturalist  insists  on  is  that,  even  in  the  complex  and 
obscure  parts  of  language  learning,  the  learner  has  no  data  to 
work  with  but  the  overt  behaviour  of  other  speakers.  4 
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The  principal  conclusion  drawn  from  the  recognition  of  the  importance 
of  overt  behaviour  to  communication  Is  that  meanings  must  be 
numifestible  in  the  overt  linguistic  and  behavioural  practices  of 
language  users.  All  meanings  are  gleaned  from  overt,  public  behaviour, 
and  there  is  nothing  more  to  meanings  than  the  behaviour  that 
embodies  those  meanings.  5  Hence  the  dictum:  meaning  is  exhaustively 
determined  by  use.  'Mis  is  the  thinking  behind  the  attack  on  the 
'pernicious'  mentalistic  schools  of  thought  which  situated  meanings  in 
the  hidden  recesses  of  each  individual  mind,  or  identified  them  with 
unobservable  states  of  the  soul.  This  mentalistic  school  allowed  for  the 
possibility  that  some  aspect  of  meaning  might  not  be  amenable  to 
manifestation  in  public  behaviour  and  yet  retain  its  status  as  a 
meaning.  Such  thinking  opens  the  door  to  the  theoretical  possibility  of 
an  essentially  private  language,  i.  e.,  a  language  that  is  not 
communicable  to  other  members  of  one's  community.  This  possibility  is 
unequivocally  rejected  by  modem  semantic  theorists  who  have 
unreservedly  accepted  the  naturalist  approach  to  semantics.  This 
common  attitude  displayed  by  both  semantic  realists  and  anti-realists 
has  been  dubbed  'semantic  externalism': 
Semantic  Externalism:  'no  item  which  is  epistemically  private 
to  the  speaker  -  which  no  one  other  than  he  can  know  the 
nature  of  -  can  be  essential  to  the  meaning  of  any  symbol, 
word  or  phrase  he  uses.  .  ., 
6 
Now  the  importance  of  semantic  externalism,  for  the  purposes  of  our 
debate,  is  that  it  affects  one's  theory  of  what  it  is  to  understand  a 
sentence,  and  additionally,  what  counts  as  manifestation  of  a  speaker's 
grasp  of  a  given  sentence.  It  is  here  that  the  debate  between  the 
semantic  realist  and  anti-realist  begins. 7he  Manifestation  Argument 
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According  to  traditional  realist  semantics,  to  understand  a  sentence  is 
to  understand  its  truth  conditions,  i.  e.  to  understand  what  must  be  the 
case  in  order  for  that  sentence  to  be  true.  The  semantic  anti-realist  also 
thinks  that  knowledge  of  truth  conditions  is  central  to  one's 
understanding  of  a  sentence,  but  with  an  important  difference.  The 
truth  conditions  that  one  knows  when  one  understands  a  sentence 
must  be  ones  whose  obtaining  one  is  capable  of  recognising,  and  whose 
obtaining  justifies  the  assertion  of  the  sentence  in  question.  In  other 
words,  for  the  semantic  anti-realist,  not  just  any  truth  conditions  are 
acceptable;  in  particular,  no  truth  conditions  of  a  given  sentence  that 
are  verification  transcendent  will  be  accepted  in  the  account  of  the 
meaning  of  the  sentence  in  question.  The  truth  conditions  of  a  given 
sentence  that  are  acceptable  by  anti-realist  standards  are  those  that  are 
epistemically  constrained,  ones  that  speakers  are  able  to  recognise  as 
obtaining  when  they  do  obtain. 
This  difference  in  policy  with  respect  to  truth  conditions  has  radical 
implications.  By  accepting  possibly  verification  transcendent  truth 
conditions  in  his  semantics,  the  realist  remains  at  home  with  the 
intuitions  of  the  metaphysical  realist.  Like  the  metaphysical  realist,  the 
semantic  realist  thinks  the  world  is  that  in  virtue  of  which  a  sentence 
has  truth  conditions,  is  that  in  virtue  of  which  a  sentence  is  true  or 
false.  Hence  it  is  a  possible  and  indeed  frequent  occurrence  that  a 
sentence  is  true  (or  false)  without  our  ever  being  able  to  know  it  to  be 
true  (or  false).  A  sentence's  truth  conditions  on  this  line  of  thinking  are 
independent  of  the  possibility  of  our  knowing  whether  those  conditions 
actually  obtain.  The  semantic  anti-realist  by  contrast,  says  that  that  in 
virtue  of  which  a  sentence  is  true  (or  false)  is  a  truth  condition  that  we 
can  recognise  as  obtaining.  In  other  words,  a  sentence  gets  truth 
conditions  when  it  is  possible  (at  least  in  principle)  to  obtain  a  warrant 
to  assert  (or  deny)  it.  A  consequence  of  this  position  is  that  no  sentence 
can  be  true  or  false  if  we  do  not  have  some  sort  of  evidence  available  to 
hand  (or  reasonably  available)  that  justifies  the  assertion  (or  negation) 
of  the  sentence.  This  is  the  thinking  behind  the  rejection  of  the 
principle  of  bivalence  and  the  law  of  excluded  middle  which 
characterises  the  Intuitionist  logic  associated  with  semantic  anti-realist 
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The  important  matter  at  hand,  however,  is  to  understand  the 
connection  between  this  rejection  of  bivalence,  the  rejection  of 
verification  transcendent  truth  conditions  in  semantics,  and  semantic 
externalism,  for  it  is  here  that  we  firid  the  heart  of  the  manifestation 
argument.  Why  do  semantic  anti-realists  reject  verification 
transcendent  truth  conditions?  The  thinking  stems  from  reflections  on 
the  nature  of  language  acquisition,  and  the  communication  of  meanings 
from  one  speaker  to  another.  What  the  semantic  anti-realist  Is 
contending  is  that  when  we  learn  a  sentence  and  come  to  understand 
what  it  means,  we  do  not  learn  just  any  truth  conditions;  what  we  learn 
is  when  it  is  appropriate  to  assert  or  dissent  from  a  given  sentence.  For 
example,  when  we  come  to  understand  the  sentence  "Some  apples  are 
red",  we  do  not  learn  what  must  be  the  case  in  order  for  this  sentence  to 
be  true.  What  we  learn  is  to  recognise  under  what  conditions  one  could 
assert  the  sentence  in  question,  say,  for  example,  some  experience-of 
red  apples.  An  experience  of  red  apples  (or  perhaps  the  testimony  of  a 
reliable  witness)  is  the  requisite  condition  for  the  assertion  of  the 
sentence  "Some  apples  are  red".  What  is  more,  one  manifests  one's 
grasp  of  this  sentence  by  asserting  or  denying  it  as  the  circumstances 
dictate. 
ibis  is  all  very  well,  one  might  say,  but  it  is  unclear  how  this  will  justify 
the  rejection  of  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions  in  semantic 
theory.  The  crux  of  the  matter  is  that  the  semantic  anti-realist  claims 
that  the  semantic  realist  cannot  manifest  his  particular  grasp  of 
sentences  for  which  there  is  no  warrant  in  some  overt  behaviour.  The 
semantic  realist  claims  he  understands  sentences  not  currently  known 
to  be  decidable  by  grasping  their  verification  transcendent  truth 
conditions.  But,  says  the  anti-realist,  he  has  no  way  of  conveying  this 
grasp  in  overt  behaviour,  which,  as  a  naturalist,  the  realist  must  admit 
is  necessary  if  the  sentence  is  to  have  any  meaning.  Hence,  it  is  not 
just  that  learning  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  means  learning 
-its 
epistemically  constrained  truth  conditions  and  not  its  verification 
transcendent  ones,  (the  former  being  manifestible  in  observable 
behaviour  when  one  asserts  or  denies  a  sentence),  but  that  verification 
transcendent  truth  conditions  could  never  be  learned  at  all  because  the 
grasp  of  such  truth  conditions  is  not  manifestible  in  any  overt 
behaviour  of  those  from  whom  we  learn  our  language.  Consequently,  if 
we  agree  that  sentences  not  currently  known  to  be  decidable  are 64 
understood  by  speakers  of  the  language,  the  semantic  realist  seems 
forced  to  admit  that  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions  are  not 
that  in  virtue  of  which  one  understands  a  sentence.  If  the  realist  is 
forced  to  make  this  admission,  he  has  for  all  intents  and  purposes 
abandoned  semantic  realism.  Dummett  expresses  these  key  points  as 
follows: 
Whenever  the  condition  for  the  truth  of  a  sentence  is  one  that 
we  have  no  way  of  bringing  ourselves  to  recognise  as  obtaining 
whenever  it  obtains,  it  seems  plain  that  there  is  no  content  to 
an  ascription  of  an  implicit  knowledge  of  what  that  condition 
is,  since  there  is  no  practical  ability  by  means  of  which  such 
knowledge  may  be  manifested.  7 
The  denial  of  any  'implicit'  knowledge  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  not 
manifestible  is  an  application  of  semantic  externalism,  which  denies 
that  meanings  can  e)dst  that  defy  manifestation  in  some  overt 
behaviour.  Hence  the  semantic  anti-realist  accuses  the  semantic  realist 
of  being  mistaken  if  the  latter  continues  to  think  that  he  understands 
sentences  not  currently  known  to  be  decidable  by  virtue  of  grasping 
their  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions.  The  whole  notion  of 
truth  as  a  possibly  verification  transcendent  property  of  sentences,  that 
has  been  assumed  by  realists  of  all  stripes,  is  therefore  suspect  and 
must  be  rejected. 
Tennant  has  presented  this  argument  very  clearly  in  his  book  Anti- 
Realism  and  Logic.  8  There  he  shows  that  three  separate  commitments 
semantic  realists  are  bound  to  accept  are  inconsistent.  These 
commitments  are  referred  to  as  'Manifestation',  the  claim  that  the 
meaning  of  a  sentence  "should  be  fully  manifestible  in  observable 
exercises  of  recognitional  capacities  concerning  it";  'Realism',  the 
adherence  to  the  principle  of  bivalence;  and  'Fact',  the  claim  that 
currently  undecidable  sentences  are  nevertheless  understood  by 
competent  speakers  of  the  language.  It  is  worth  quoting  an  extended 
passage  of  Tennant: 
To  Dummett  belongs  the  credit  for  showing  that  Manifestation 
plus  Realism  plus  Fact  is  inconsistent.  In  briefest  outline,  his 
argument  is  as  follows:  Accept  Fact:  so  take  any  sentence  S 
that  is  undecidable  but  understood  by  a  speaker  X.  That  is, 
suppose  that  X  grasps  the  meaning  of  S,  but  possesses  no 
means  by  which  he  can  recognise  either  that  S  is  true  or  that S  is  false.  By  Realism,  either  the  condition  for  the  truth  of  S 
obtains,  or  the  condition  for  its  falsity  obtains.  If  the  former, 
X  nevertheless,  e-x  hypothesL  cannot  show  that  he  recognises 
the  fact:  if  the  latter,  likewise.  But  now  this  contradicts 
Manifestation,  which  requires  that  X  should  be  able  to  display 
his  grasp  of  the  meaning  of  the  sentence  X  [sic]  by  the  exercise 
of  such  a  recognitional  capacity  concerning  it. 
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Such  then  is  the  argument  from  manifestation  which  semantic  anti- 
realists  forward  against  semantic  realists.  Such  is  the  challenge  to  the 
coherence  of  all  forms  of  realism,  metaphysical,  scientific,  and 
semantic,  which  rely  on  a  verification  transcendent  notion  of  truth.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  force  of  the  argument  as  presented  by 
Tennant,  if  indeed  it  is  found  to  be  sound,  would  necessitate  the 
dropping  of  one  of  the  three  commitments.  There  is  no  particular 
reason  why  the  commitment  to  the  principle  of  bivalence  in  particular 
need  be  dropped.  But  given  the  realist's  acceptance  of  the  naturalistic 
tendencies  that  underlie  'Manifestation,  and  the  acceptance  of  'Fact', 
the  pressure  of  the  Reductio  is  at  least  initially  on  the  principle  of 
bivalence.  Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  how  the  semantic  realist 
might  respond  to  this  argument  while  remaining  true  to  the  naturalist 
tendencies  which  dominate  modern  semantic  theory. 
Me  Outline  of  a  Possible  Semantic  Realist  Response 
The  problem  semantic  realists  face  is  that  of  demonstrating  how 
speakers  of  a  language  are  able  to  manifest  their  grasp  of  sentences  not 
currently  known  to  be  decidable  (hereafter  referred  to  as  'disputed 
sentences')  in  overt  and  public  behaviour.  The  problem  is  further 
exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  semantic  anti-realists  insist  that  this 
behaviour  must  consist  in  'the  exercise  of  a  recognitional  capacity'  with 
respect  to  the  sentence  in  question.  However,  if  the  recognitional 
capacity  that  is  exercised  in  the  case  of  a  given  sentence  must  be  such 
as  to  effectively  decide  the  truth  value  of  the  sentence.  then  there  is  no 
way,  ew  hypothesý  that  this  will  be  achieved  for  the  class  of  disputed 
sentences.  However,  the  semantic  realist  ought  not  to  accept  that  the 
only  manner  in  which  one  can  manifest  one's  grasp  of  the  meaning  of  a 
sentence  is  by  means  of  some  type  of  effective  decision  procedure. 
Semantic  realists  are  not  committed  to  the  claim  that  all  sentences  are 
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defend  is  that  one's  understanding  of  a  currently  undecidable  sentence 
is  achieved  by  grasping  its  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions, 
and  that  those  conditions  can  be  specified,  or  identified,  by  some  overt, 
manifestible  behaviour,  and  not  necessarily  a  form  of  behaviour  that 
effectively  decides  the  truth  value  of  the  sentence.  If  this  can  be 
achieved  the  realist  will  have  a  good  case  for  claiming  he  has  remained 
true  to  his  naturalist  principles  while  retaining  the  principle  of 
bivalence. 
There  are  a  number  of  defensive  strategies  a  semantic  realist  might 
employ  against  the  manifestation  argument.  The  most  satisfying 
responses  to  my  mind  do  not  rely  solely  on  the  recitation  of  the 
absurdities  to  which  the  rejection  of  bivalence  leads,  although  these 
absurdities  are  decisive  if  the  realist  position  can  be  shown  to  be 
internally  coherent.  One  such  defence  can  be  found  in  Anthony 
Appiah's  For  Truth  in  Semantics.  In  this  work  Appiah  shows  that  the 
manifestation  argument  relies  on  a  problematic  version  of 
verificationism  or  on  scepticism  about  induction  concerning  semantic 
properties  (see  Part  Two  in  particular).  His  method  of  attacking  the 
manifestation  argument  is  to  cut  semantic  anti-realism  off  at  the  legs, 
as  it  were.  I  should  note  my  general  agreement  with  Appiah's  critique, 
although  I  do  not  intend  to  comment  on  it  or  to  rely  on  it  in  what 
follows.  I  propose,  rather,  to  supplement  Appiah's  negative  critique  of 
semantic  anti-realism  by  denying  that  semantic  realism  falls  afoul  of 
the  naturalist  tendencies  that  inspire  modern  semantics.  I  will  also 
argue  that,  ultimately,  the  semantic  anti-realist  is  in  no  better  position 
than  the  semantic  realist  to  give  the  semantics  of  the  disputed 
sentences.  Thus,  rather  than  preventing  the  manifestation  argument 
from  getting  off  the  ground  at  all,  which  is  Appiah's  strategy,  I  am 
content  to  let  it  be  forwarded  and  simply  deny  the  consequences 
claimed  for  it  by  semantic  anti-realists. 
It  will  perhaps  be  useful  at  the  outset  to  outline  the  shape  my  argument 
is  to  take.  Key  to  my  defence  of  semantic  realism  will  be  a  picture  of 
language  based  on  the  work  of  Quine.  The  essential  works  of  Quine  on 
the  philosophy  of  language  are,  of  course,  Two  Dogmas  of  Empiricism, 
Word  and  ObjecL  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Ontological  Relativity  and  Other 
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and  defensible  view  of  how  sentences  get  their  meaning,  and  how  these 
meanings  are  manifested.  What  we  find  in  these  works  is  a  warrant  to 
assert  that  the  meaning  of  certain  sentences  is  determined  by  the 
relations  that  hold  between  those  sentences  and  other  sentences  in  the 
language;  and  that  manifestation  of  one's  grasp  of  the  meaning  of  those 
sentences  is  achieved  by  indicating  what  those  relations  are,  and  not  by 
the  exercise  of  a  recognitional  capacity  concerning  them.  This  reliance 
on  a  holistic  view  of  language  will  allow  semantic  realists  to  assert  that 
truth  remains  a  possibly  verification  transcendent  property  of  sentences 
and  that  meaning  is  nevertheless  exhaustively  determined  by  use,  as  is 
required  by  semantic  externalism. 
The  semantic  anti-realist  can  respond  to  this  use  of  holism  in  three 
ways.  First,  and  most  obvious,  he  can  attempt  to  discredit  the  realist's 
use  of  holism  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  not  a  workable  theory  of 
language.  This  is  a  matter  on  which  Dummett  in  particular  has  had 
much  to  say.  The  second  alternative  open  to  the  anti-realist  is  to  accept 
the  use  of  holism  in  principle  but  claim  that  it  cannot  help  the  realist 
achieve  his  particular  objective.  We  will  consider  two  arguments  in  this 
vein.  Finally,  the  anti-realist  can  attempt  to  give  the  semantics  of  the 
disputed  sentences  without  resorting  to  any  form  of  holism  and  claim 
that  this  gives  them  a  tidier,  more  manageable  theory  of  language.  My 
strategy  is  to  show  that  the  semantic  anti-realist  fails  to  make  good 
these  three  lines  of  attack.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  semantic  anti- 
realists  are  unable  either  to  block  the  realist  reliance  on  a  holistic  view 
of  language,  or  to  give  an  alternative  semantics  of  curTently  undecidable 
sentences,  then,  given  the  well  documented  counter-intuitive 
consequences  of  the  rejection  of  bivalence,  there  will  be  no  reason  to 
accept  the  semantic  anti-realist  programme. 
Quine's  Linguistic  Holism 
A  review  of  Quine's  entire  philosophy  of  language  will  not  be  necessary 
for  our  present  purposes.  All  we  need  focus  on  at  the  moment  is  the 
extent  to  which  Quine's  philosophy  of  language  is  holistic.  A  brief 
account  of  his  views  on  language  as  found  in  'Two  Dogmas'  and  in  Word 
and  Object  will  suffice  to  give  the  needed  appreciation  of  a  significant 
shift  in  his  views  with  respect  to  holism.  The  key  ideas  to  focus  on  are 68 
what  has  been  called  the  'inextricability  thesis',  and  Quine's  views  on 
the  question  of  the  primary  unit  or  bearer  of  meaning  in  a  language. 
In  'Avo  Dogmas'  Quine  introduced  the  now  familiar  picture  of  how 
language  works,  namely,  the  view  that  language  is  an  articulated 
structure  made  up  of  a  network  of  sentences  that  are  inter-related  to  one 
another  and  to  sensory  experiences.  Now,  a  particularly  relevant  aspect 
of  Quine's  views  in  "I"wo  Dogmas'  is  what  Dummett  has  called  the 
'inextricability  thesis',  i.  e.  the  view  that  ultimately  there  is  no  hard  and 
fast  distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic  sentences  in  the 
language.  This  inextricability  thesis  is  really  the  combination  of  two 
other  striking  theses  Quine  proposed  alongside  his  network  theory  of 
language.  Quine  presents  them  as  follows: 
...  it  becomes  folly  to  seek  a  boundary  between  synthetic 
statements,  which  hold  contingently  on  experience,  and 
analytic  statements  which  hold  come  what  may.  Any 
statement  can  be  held  true  come  what  may,  if  we  make  drastic 
enough  adjustments  elsewhere  in  the  system.  Even  a 
statement  very  close  to  the  periphery  can  be  held  true  in  the 
face  of  recalcitrant  experience  by  pleading  hallucination  or  by 
amending  certain  statements  of  the  kind  called  logical  laws. 
Conversely,  by  the  same  token,  no  statement  is  immune  to 
revision.  Revision  even  of  the  logical  law  of  excluded  middle 
has  been  proposed  as  a  means  of  simplifying  quantum 
mechanics  1U  (My  emphasis). 
The  important  feature  of  Quine's  view  of  language,  for  our  present 
purposes,  is  implicit  in  the  inextricability  theses,  namely.  a  claim  about 
the  primary  unit  or  bearer  of  linguistic  meanings.  Frege  had  made  an 
advance  upon  older  semantic  theories  when  he  substituted  the  sentence 
for  the  word  as  the  pr1mary  bearer  of  linguistic  meaning.  But  in  'f\vo 
Dogmas'  Quine  suggests  that  the  primary  unit  of  meaning  in  the 
language  cannot  be  the  individual  sentence  on  its  own  because  the 
meaning  of  an  individual  sentence  is  determined  by  its  connections  with 
other  sentences  in  the  language  taken  as  a  whole.  Indeed,  a  single 
sentence  extricated  from  the  language  has  no  determinate  meaning 
until  it  is  located  within  a  language.  This  has  led  some  to  the 
conclusion  that  it  is  impossible  to  understand  an  individual  sentence 
until  one  understands  the  entire  language  in  which  it  is  found.  The 
implication  of  this  view  is  that  the  meaning  of  each  individual  sentence 
in  the  language  is  not  determined  solely  or  primarily  by  the  meanings  of 69 
its  constituent  parts,  but  by  its  logical  relations  to  the  rest  of  the 
sentences  in  the  language.  It  is  these  two  features  of  Quine's  early 
philosophy  of  language,  the  inextricability  thesis  and  a  commitment  to  a 
thoroughgoing  holism,  that  are  central  to  our  discussion  of  the 
manifestation  argument  and  Dummett's  attack  on  holism.  - 
This  picture  of  language,  however,  is  significantly  altered  in  Quine's 
later  work,  Word  and  Object.  As  Dummett  points  out,  although  the 
network  theory  of  language  is  still  in  evidence,  the  two  controversial 
theses  that  accompanied  it  in  Two  Dogmas'  have  been  'quietly 
dropped'.  11  In  'Two  Dogmas'  Quine  was  at  pains  to  insist  that  there  is 
no  qualitative  difference  in  the  nature  of  sentences  in  the  language,  in 
particular  that  there  is  no  analytic-synthetic  distinction.  Sentences  are 
simply  more  or  less  near  the  'peripheiY  of  the  network,  and  hence  more 
or  less  likely  to  be  dropped  in  the  face  of  recalcitrant  experience. 
However,  in  Word  and  Object,  Quine  introduces  the  distinction  between 
'observation  sentences'  and  'stimulus-analytic'  sentences.  The  former 
are  said  to  have  a  determinate  stimulus  meaning,  while  the  later  are 
said  to  be  such  that  'no  stimulus  will  prompt  dissent  from  them.  '12 
Dummett  has  argued  quite  convincingly  that  by  drawing  this  distinction 
Quine  has  effectively  withdrawn  his  assent  to  the  two  controversial 
theses  of  Two  Dogmas'.  It  seems  quite  clear  that  observation 
sentences,  at  least,  will  not  be  saveable  in  the  face  of  recalcitrant 
experience;  and  it  is  also  clear  that  revisions  in  the  language  which 
were  before  limited  only  by  the  desire  of  the  speaker,  are  now  limited  to 
revisions  that  leave  stimulus-analytic  sentences  untouched. 
'Ibis  is  enough  by  way  of  recapping  the  well  known  history  of  Quine's 
developments  in  the  philosophy  of  language  to  allow  us  to  make  the 
needed  observations  about  the  nature  of  language.  Quine  introduced  a 
radically  holistic  view  of  language  in  Two  Dogmas',  a  view  that  was 
significantly  moderated  in  subsequent  work.  In  Word  and  Object  there 
is  special  emphasis  on  the  distinction  between  observation  sentences, 
which  have  a  determinate  stimulus  meaning,  and  stimulus  analytic 
sentences  which  have  no  direct  stimulus  meaning  but  whose  meaning 
is  determined  by  the  relations  that  obtain  between  them  and  other 
stimulus-analytic  sentences  and  other  observation  sentences.  The 
point  to  take  away  from  this  is  that,  in  Quine,  we  find  two  types  of 
declarative  sentence:  observation  sentences  with  stimulus  meanings, 70 
and  non-observation  sentences  whose  meaning  are  determined  in 
another  fashion.  What  this  distinction  suggests  is  that  there  is  going  to 
be  a  difference  in  the  manner  in  which  one's  grasp  of  sentences  is  to  be 
achieved,  and  in  the  manner  in  which  that  grasp  will  be  manifested.  If 
the  sentence  in  question  is  an  observation  sentence  then  it  seems 
appropriate  to  expect  that  a  speaker  will  manifest  his  understanding  of 
the  sentence  by  assenting  to  it  (or  dissenting  from  it)  under  the 
appropriate  stimulus  conditions.  This  use  of  assent  and  dissent  to 
indicate  one's  understanding  of  a  sentence  will  also  be  appropriate  in 
the  case  of  arithmetical  sentences  (the  speaker  manifests  his 
understanding  by  checking  the  calculation  procedure  for  the  sentence 
in  question)  or  in  theoretical  sentences  of  mathematics  (the  speaker  can 
check  the  proof  offered  in  support  of  the  given  statement).  However,  if 
the  sentence  is  a  theoretical  sentence  in  the  sciences  or  metaphysics 
(i.  e.,  one  for  which  there  is  no  deductive  prooO,  or  an  observation 
sentence  about  a  particular  region  of  space-time  that  is  beyond  the 
limits  of  present  possible  experience,  then  there  can  be  no  deciding 
stimulus  condition  that  would  lead  one  to  assent  or  deny  it.  In  such 
cases  we  must  expect  that  one's  grasp  of  these  sentences  will  be 
manifested  otherwise  than  by  assenting  to  it  or  dissenting  from  it.  In 
fact,  a  speaker's  refusal  to  assert  or  deny  such  sentences  Is  itself  an 
indication  that  they  have  grasped  the  meaning  of  the  sentence.  Now  if 
we  accept  a  holistic  view  of  language,  the  manner  in  which  we  would 
expect  a  speaker  to  manifest  his  grasp  of  these  sentences  is  obvious: 
the  meaning  of  this  particular  type  of  sentence  is  determined  by  its 
relations  to  other  sentences  in  the  language,  and  grasp  of  such 
sentences  will  be  manifested  by  the  speaker's  manifesting  his 
appreciation  of  what  those  relations  are. 
What  is  worth  noticing  is  that  Quine's  view  of  language  in  Word  and 
Object  avoids  the  mistake  of  the  positivists  who  held  that  the  meaning 
of  theoretical  sentences  is  obtained  by  reducing  them  to  observation 
sentences.  And,  at  the  opposite  extreme,  he  avoids  the  problems  one 
encounters  in  radical  holism  which  suggests  that  all  sentences  get  their 
meaning  from  their  location  in  the  network  of  the  language  system.  The 
chief  point  to  be  made,  however,  is  that  in  such  a  picture  of  how 
language  works  the  semantic  realist  can  offer  an  explanation  of  how 
one  ,s  grasp  of  the  meanings  of  currently  disputed  sentences  in  terms  of 
verification  transcendent  truth  conditions  can  be  Manifested  in  some 71 
overt,  public  behaviour.  The  realist  who  accepts  this  moderate  holism 
will  claim  that  he  manifests  his  grasp  of  the  truth  conditions  of  the 
disputed  sentences  by  his  adherence  to  the  rules  of  classical  logic  -  in 
particular  to  the  introduction  and  elimination  rules  of  the  negation  sign 
and  the  principle  of  bivalence.  If  we  can  accept  that  one's  grasp  of  some 
sentences  can  be  manifested  without  resorting  to  a  decision  procedure 
leading  to  assent  or  dissent,  then  the  problem  of  the  manifestation 
argument  as  presented  by  Dummett  and  Tennant  dissolves.  This  being 
the  general  strategy,  we  can  now  move  on  to  consider  the  semantic  anti- 
realist  responses  to  this  use  of  a  moderately  holistic  view  of  language. 
Semantic  Anti-Realist  Responses 
Our  attention  now  shifts  to  the  question  whether  the  semantic  anti- 
realists  have  produced  an  argument  which  prohibits  the  realist  reliance 
on  a  moderate  holism.  The  work  of  Tennant  is  particularly  useful  in 
this  regard  as  he  has  conducted  a  survey  of  Dummett's  writings  to  find 
all  the  arguments  the  later  has  seen  fit  to  throw  at  the  holders  of  a 
holistic  view  of  language.  There  is,  however,  something  particularly 
striking  about  these  arguments,  many  of  which,  if  they  applied,  would 
be  a  serious  blow  to  holistic  hopes.  When  one.  reads  these  arguments 
as  they  are  presented  in  Dummett's  various  works  one  finds  that  what 
Durnmett  is  arguing  against  is  a  thorough  going  holism,  the  radical 
holism  of  "I%vo  Dogmas.  Tennant  implicitly  agrees  that  this  is  the  case, 
as  is  shown  by  his  characterisation  of  Dummett's  understanding  of 
holism.  In  particular  Tennant  quotes  a  long  passage  from  'The 
Philosophical  Basis  of  Intuitionistic  Logic'  which  captures  what 
Dummett  considers  to  be  the  essence  of  holism.  The  holist  maintains 
that: 
it  is  illegitimate  to  ask  after  the  content  of  any  single 
statement  or  even  after  that  of  any  one  theory,  say  of  a 
mathematical  or  physical  theory;  the  significance  of  each 
statement  or  of  each  deductively  systeniatised  body  of 
statements  is  modified  by  the  multiple  connections  which  it 
has,  direct  or  remote,  with  other  statements  in  other  areas  of 
our  language  taken  as  a  whole,  and  so  there  is  no  adequate 
way  of  understanding  the  statement  short  of  knowing  the 
entire  language.  Or,  rather,  even  this  image  is  false  to  the 
facts:  it  is  not  that  a  statement  or  even  a  theory  has,  as  it 
were,  a  primal  meaning  which  then  gets  modified  by  the interconnections  that  are  established  with  other  statements 
and  other  theories;  rather,  the  meaning  simply  consists  in  the 
place  which  it  occupies  in  the  complicated  network  which 
constitutes  the  totality  of  our  linguistic  practices.  13 
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There  is  much  in  this  passage  which  is  repeated  at  the  end  of  the  essay 
'Original  Sinn'14,  and  in  The  Justification  of  Deduction'15,  where  one 
of  the  primary  complaints  against  holism  is  that  one  never  understands 
any  sentence  of  a  language  until  one  knows  the  entire  language,  which 
would  make  one's  learning  of  a  language  seemingly  impossible.  Even 
more  revealing,  however,  is  that  we  find  in  Tennant  that  Durnmett's 
attack  on  holism  is  an  attack  on  a  theory  that  still  embraces  the  two 
controversial  theses  that  Quine  included  in  Two  Dogmas',  in  fact  they 
are  given  pride  of  place  in  the  set  of  aidoms  meant  to  represent 
holism.  16  What  emerges  from  this  understanding  of  what  Dummett  is 
attacking  is  that  the  particular  problems  Dummett  has  with  holism  are 
those  which  are  consequences  of  the  acceptance  of  the  two  controversial 
theses.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  use  of  a  moderate  holism  does  not 
depend  on  one's  continued  acceptance  of  the  two  controversial  theses 
for  all  sentences  of  the  language.  One  might  very  well  defend  these 
theses  for  that  section  of  the  language  made  up  of  strictly  theoretical 
sentences.  In  fact  this  would  result  in  a  position  much  like  that 
described  by  Duhem  in  Me  Aim  and  Structure  of  Physical  Meory.  There 
is,  however,  no  reason  to  assume  that  they  are  applicable  to  any 
sentence  whatsoever.  Indeed,  this  was  the  significance  of  the  new 
distinction  that  Quine  brought  into  play  in  Word  and  Object  between 
observation  sentences  and  stimulus  analytic  sentences.  Now  if  one 
rejects  the  universal  application  of  these  two  theses  it  seems  that  the 
complaints  Dummett  brings  against  holism  no  longer  find  the  mark.  In 
other  words,  Dummett  provides  an  attack  on  radical  holism  (the  merits 
of  which  do  not  concern  us  directly),  but  no  corresponding  attack  on  the 
moderate  holism  Quine  and  others  might  seek  to  employ.  Consequently 
the  first  line  of  attack  is  ineffective. 
That  Dummett's  attacks  are  directed  towards  a  radical  holism  and  not  a 
moderate  holism  is  not  particularly  surprising,  given  that  semantic  anti- 
realists  themselves  employ  holist  principles  in  one  way  or  another.  In  a 
separate  chapter  of  Anti-Realism  and  Logic,  Tennant  openly  declares  his 
intention  to  seek  a  compromise  position  between  a  strict  molecularism 
and  radical  holism.  This  desire  leads  Tennant  to  a  semantic  theory  that 73 
sounds  remarkably  consistent  with  that  I  have  suggested  is  to  be  found 
in  Word  and  Object.  Tennant  rejects  the  strict  adherence  to  an 
exclusively  molecular  theory  and  admits  that  extra-logical  ternis  are 
understood  in  a  holistic  way: 
...  it  Is  quite  plausible  that  non-logical  concepts  or 
expressions  may  be  non-separable:  and  our  theory  of  meaning 
for  such  expressions  would  accordingly  be  a  holistic  one.  'Me 
existence  of  'semantic  fields',  only  within  the  whole  of  which 
can  member-concepts  properly  be  located,  could  turn  a 
significant  field  of  semantics  into  a  preserve  of  the  holist.  17 
He  is  also  sure  that  Dummett  would  have  to  allow  for  this  limited  use  of 
holism,  as  these  lines  from  The  Justification  of  Deduction'  suggest  he 
would: 
Of  course,  even  on  a  molecular  view  of  this  kind,  no  sentence 
can  have  a  meaning  which  is  independent  of  all  the  rest  of  the 
language.  Its  meaning  depends  on  the  meaning  of  the 
constituents  words,  and  these  in  turn  depend  upon  the  use  of 
other  sentences  in  which  they  may  occur,  and  also  of 
expressions  of  a  lower  level  to  which  they  are  logically  related: 
a  grasp  of  the  meaning  of  any  sentence  must,  even  on  a 
molecular  view  of  language,  depend  upon  a  mastery  of  some 
fragment  of  the  language,  a  fragment  which  may,  in  some 
cases,  be  quite  extensive.  Nevertheless,  it  is  essential  to  such 
a  molecular  view  that  there  must  be,  for  each  sentence,  a 
representation  of  its  individual  content  which  is  independent 
of  a  description  of  he  entire  language  to  which  the  sentence 
belongs  .... 
18 
Tellingly  enough,  Tennant  sees  in  this  quotation  the  'Achilles'  heel  in 
Dummett's  characterisation  of  molecularism.  For  as  soon  as  one 
admits  that  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  depends  on  the  relations  that 
obtain  between  it  and  other  sentences,  one  has  accepted  the  essential 
point  of  at  least  the  moderately  holistic  view  of  language.  Tennant  has 
this  to  say  about  the  consequences  of  this  acceptance: 
...  we  then  see  Dummett's  molecularism  diluted  to  a  possible 
blend  of  globally  separable  local  holisms.  19 
And,  as  if  to  make  the  case  for  us,  Tennant  adds: 
Nor  is  this  position,  combining  logical  molecularity  with 
possible  holism  on  extra-logical  primitives,  vulnerable  to  the criticisms  (given  above)  that  Dummett  levelled  against  the 
more  thoroughgoing  brand  of  holism,  from  which  it 
significantly  differs.  2 
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This  is  the  position  Tennant  offers  as  an  acceptable  compromise 
position  between  strict  molecularism  and  radical  holism.  It  seems  clear 
from  this  brief  description  that  the  moderate  holist  of  Quine's  Word  and 
Object  would  have  little  difficulty  in  accepting  such  a  view  at  least  in 
principle.  But  has  this  concession  to  holism  not  given  the  semantic 
realist  what  he  needs  to  make  good  his  claim  that  the  grasp  of  currently 
disputed  sentences  may  be  manifested  in  other  than  assent  and  dissent 
and  other  recognitional  capacities?  It  is  here  that  we  encounter  two 
new  arguments  that  form  the  second  type  of  response  to  the  semantic 
realist's  use  of  holism.  Both  suggest  that  while  a  moderate  holism  is 
acceptable,  it  Is  to  no  avail  in  the  realist's  attempt.  to  escape  the 
manifestation  argument.  Let  us  consider  first  Tennant's  use  of  a 
moderate  holism. 
Tennant's  position  does  indeed  make  use  of  moderate  holist  principles; 
but  he  makes  a  clear  distinction  between  terms  in  the  language 
amenable  to  holistic  interpretation  and  those  which  still  require 
treatment  along  molecularist  lines.  He  restricts  his  use  of  holism  to 
explaining  the  meaning  of  'extra-logical  primitives',  while  insisting  that 
one  remain  a  molecularist  with  respect  to  the  logical  constants.  Since 
the  debate  between  semantic  realists  and  anti-realist  focuses  primarily 
on  the  proper  interpretation  of  the  logical  constants  (in  particular  on  the 
correct  introduction  and  elimination  rules  of  the  negation  sign)  and  not 
on  extra-logical  terms,  the  dispute  remains  alive.  In  effect,  Tennant 
argues  that  he  can  accept  a  moderate  holism  and  still  remain  a 
semantic  anti-realist.  Consequently  the  semantic  realist  who  wishes  to 
use  holist  principles  to  escape  the  manifestation  argument  must  argue 
that  holist  principles  can  be  appropriately  employed  to  explain  the 
meaning,  notjust  of  extra-logical  primitives,  but  of  the  logical  constants 
as  well.  So  why  does  Tennant  feel  that  the  use  of  holist  principles  must 
be  restricted  to  extra-logical  terms?  and  are  his  reasons  compelling?  To 
answer  these  questions  we  need  to  consider  how  logical  constants  get 
their  meaning. 
It  is  accepted  by  semantic  realists  and  anti-realists  ane  that,  although 
precise  meanings  cannot  be  assigned  to  all  terms  in  a  language 75 
(especially  natural  languages),  precise  meanings  can  be  assigned  to  the 
logical  constants.  And  again  there  is  cross-party  agreement  that  the 
meanings  of  the  logical  constants  are  determined  by  their  introduction 
and  elimination  rules.  But  having  said  this,  it  is  clear  that  we  cannot 
assign  just  any  rules  to  a  logical  constant  and  expect  it  to  be  a  useful 
addition  to  a  language.  Ever  since  Prior's  discussion  of  Tonk,  2  1,  a 
hypothetical  logical  constant  with  the  introduction  rule  of  V  and  the 
elimination  rule  of  W,  it  has  become  clear  that,  if  a  logical  constant  is 
to  be  an  acceptable  addition  to  a  language,  it  must  lead  to  a 
conservative  extention  of  the  set  of  sentences  In  the  language  that  the 
speakers  believe  to  be  true.  The  problem  with  Tonk'  is  that  its  addition 
to  a  language  would  allow  any  sentence  to  be  derived  from  any  other 
sentence  in  the  language,  thereby  doing  away  with  the  distinction 
between  sentences  in  the  language  the  speakers  hold  to  be  true  and 
those  they  hold  to  be  false.  With  this  in  mind  we  can  identify  three 
criteria  which  any  acceptable  interpretation  of  a  logical  constant  must 
meet:  a)  the  logical  constant  must  be  assigned  a  precise  meaning  (in 
terms  of  introduction  and  elimination  rules)  which  is  learnable  (i.  e.  no 
radically  holistic  interpretation  of  the  logical  constants  is  permitted;  b) 
one's  grasp  of  the  assigned  meaning  must  be  manifestable  in  use;  and  c) 
the  logical  constant  must  lead  to  a  conservative  extention  of  the  set  of 
sentences  held  to  be  true  by  the  speakers  of  the  language  to  which  it  is 
added. 
With  these  criteria  in  mind  we  can  now  consider  Tennant's  claim  that  a 
moderate  holist  interpretation  of  the  logical  constants  is  not  acceptable. 
When  we  compare  the  semantic  realist's  interpretation  of  the  logical 
constants  (an  interpretation  associated  with  the  rules  of  Classical  Logic) 
with  that  of  the  semantic  anti-realist  (an  interpretation  associated  with 
the  rules  of  Intuitionist  Logic),  we  find  that  both  interpretations  meet 
the  three  criteria  mentioned  above,  albeit  in  different  degrees.  Both 
schools  offer  interpretations  of  the  meanings  of  the  logical  constants 
which  are  learnable,  manifestable  in  use  (if  adherence  to  the  assigned 
rules  is  taken  to  be  adequate  manifestation  of  one's  grasp  of  the 
assigned  meanings)  and  conservative.  However,  there  are  significant 
differences  between  the  two  sets  of  rules.  In  particular,  the,  rules  of 
Intuitionist  logic  are  conservative  in  a  way  the  the  rules  of  Classical 
logic  are  not.  The  logical  constants  of  Classical  logic  are  said  to  be  only 
'globally'  conservative  (i.  e.,  the  logical  constants  of  Classical  logic  are 76 
conservative  only  when  they  are  added  to  a  language  simultaneously), 
while  the  logical  constants  of  Intuitionist  logic  are  individually 
conservative  (i.  e.,  they  are  conservative  even  when  added  to  a  language 
one  at  a  time).  'Ibis  means  that  the  meanings  of  the  Classical  logical 
constants  are  determined  not  by  the  introduction  and  elimination  rules 
of  each  constant  taken  on  its  own  (as  is  the  case  in  Intuitionist  logic), 
but  by  the  introduction  and  elimination  rules  of  all  the  constants  taken 
together.  In  other  words,  the  logical  constants  of  Classical  logical  are 
interpreted  in  a  holist  fashion.  But  since  there  are  only  six  logical 
constants  and  twelve  rules  to  explain  their  use,  the  Classical  logician 
can  claim  that  this  is  a  manageable  holism  in  that  the  meanings  of  the 
logical  constants  are  certainly  learnable. 
But  if  the  interpretation  of  the  logical  constants  offered  by  Classical 
logic  meet  the  above  mentioned  criteria,  why  should  one  opt  for  the 
Intuitionist  logic?  More  to  the  point,  on  what  grounds  does  Tennant 
insist  that  holism  should  be  restricted  to  the  interpretation  of  non- 
logical  terms?  The  Intuitionist  interpretation  of  the  logical  constants 
has  two  features  which  could  recommend  It.  First,  the  logical  constants 
of  Intuitionist  logic  are  more  strongly  conservative  than  those  of 
classical  logic;  but  it  is  far  from  clear  why  this  extra  conservatism  is 
necessary  to  avoid  the  problems  associated  with  Tonk.  What  is  more, 
there  are  no  principles  in  natural  semantics  acceptable  to  semantic 
realists  and  anti-realists  alike  which  would  lead  one  to  prefer  an 
interpretation  of  a  logical  constant  solely  on  the  grounds  that  it  is 
individually  conservative.  Second,  the  Intuitionists  can  claim  to  provide 
a  theory  of  meaning  in  terms  of  recognitional  capacities  and  canonical 
warrants  rather  than  in  terms  of  one's  grasp  of  possibly  verification 
transcendent  truth  conditions  of  a  sentence.  But  the  principles  of 
natural  semantics  place  no  restrictions  on  the  manner  in  which  one's 
grasp  of  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  is  to  be  manifested.  If  the  grasp  of 
the  possibly  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions  of  a  sentence  can 
be  manifested  in  some  overt  behaviour,  then  the  requirements  of 
natural  semantics  have  been  met.  And,  as  yet,  no  argument  has  been 
forthcoming  to  the  effect  that  adherence  to  the  rules  of  Classical  logic 
does  not  constitute  a  genuine  manifestation  of  one's  grasp  of  a  sentence 
in  terms  of  its  possibly  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions.  Now 
if  we  are  not  forced  to  opt  for  the  Intuitionist  interpretation  of  the  logical 
constants,  then  the  fact  that  the  Intuitionist  logic  leads  to  well- 77 
documented  counter-intuitive  results  ought  to  be  grounds  enough  for 
re-ecting,  if  not  the  Intuitionist  project  as  a  whole,  then  at  least 
Tennant's  claim  that  holism  must  be  confined  to  the  interpretation  of 
non-logical  terms.  Consequently,  Tennant  has  not  offered  any 
compelling  reason  to  think  that  the  semantic  realist  cannot  legitimately 
employ  a  moderate  holist  interpretation  of  the  logical  constants. 
But  perhaps  there  is  an  argument  which  can  be  forwarded  to  the  effect 
that  adherence  to  the  rules  of  classical  logic  does  not  constitute  a 
genuine  manifestation  of  one's  grasp  of  a  sentence  in  terms  of  its 
possibly  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions.  The  anti-realist 
might  claim  that  one  can  replace  the  logical  constants  of  Classical  logic 
by  those  of  Intuitionist  logic  without  a  corresponding  loss  of  use  or 
meaning  within  the  language.  If  this  substitution  entails  only  a  loss  of 
'talk'  it  could  be  argued  that  the  logical  constants  were  not  doing  any 
real  work  in  the  language  game,  and  that  the  apparent  understanding 
of  verification  transcendent  truth  conditions  was  illusory. 
There  are  two  responses  the  semantic  realist  can  offer  against  this 
argument.  The  semantic  realist  can  argue  that  there  is  no 
independently  agreed  criterion  available  by  which  to  distinguish  'real 
use'  from  empty'talk'.  In  fact  it  is  not  clear  what  empty  talk  might  be  if 
it  is  accepted  that  all  well  formed  sentences  in  the  language  are 
understood  by  all  competent  speakers  of  the  language.  But  until  an 
explanation  of  what  empty  talk  amounts  to,  and  a  mechanism  to  draw 
the  distinction  is  available,  any  attempt  to  dictate  which  sentences  in 
the  language  fall  into  which  category  will  fail  to  be  decisive.  The  anti- 
realist  argument  fails  as  a  consequence  since  it  depends  on  a 
distinction  that  cannot  yet  be  drawn. 
The  semantic  realist  might  take  a  softer  line,  however,  and  agree  that 
while  there  is  no  hard  and  fast  rule  to  distinguish  real  use  from  empty 
talk,  there  is  a  pre-theoretical  intuition  of  what  constitutes  real  use. 
But  such  a  line  is  attractive  to  the  semantic  realist  because  our 
intuitions  inevitably  support  the  view  that  the  loss  of  logical  constants 
of  Classical  logic  does  incur  a  loss  of  real  use.  Adherence  to  the  rules  of 
Classical  logic  allows  us  to  use  sentences  currently  not  known  to  be 
decidable  (certain  sentences  about  the  past,  other  minds  and  regions  of 
space-time  not  accessible  to  observation)  in  ways  that  seem  to  be  a 78 
natural  extension  of  beliefs  systems  and  theories  expressed  within  the 
language,  and  to  avoid  the  counter-intuitive  results  stemming  from  the 
re'ection  of  the  principle  of  bivalence.  If  the  rules  of  Classical  logic 
allow  such  sentences  to  be  used  within  the  language,  and  such 
sentences  are  not  empty'talk'  (as,  of  course,  the  Intuitionist  would  not 
admit)  then  it  would  seem  that  adherence  to  the  rules  of  Classical  logic 
can  arguably  be  taken  as  a  genuine  manifestation  of  one's  grasp  of 
verification  transcendent  truth  conditions. 
Now  we  said  earlier  that  there  are  three  options  the  semantic  anti- 
realist  might  try  to  employ  against  the  semantic  realist's  use  of 
moderate  holism.  It  appears  as  though  the  first  option,  the  blocking  of 
any  use  of  holism  whatsoever,  has  failed,  since  even  the  anti-realist  by 
their  own  admission  are  forced  to  call  upon  it  for  their  own  semantics. 
The  second  option,  granting  access  to  a  moderate  holism  but  arguing 
that  it  is  to  no  avail  to  the  semantic  realist  in  his  attempt  to  escape  from 
the  manifestation  argument,  has  also  failed.  This  leaves  the.  final 
option.  We  will  recall  that  it  was  suggested  that  the  anti-realist  might 
be  able  to  give  the  semantics  of  the  disputed  sentences  without  having 
to  call  upon  holistic  principles  at  all.  This  would  then  allow  the  anti- 
realists  to  claim  that  they  are  able  to  offer  a  cleaner,  more  manageable 
semantic  theory  that  ought  to  be  preferred  to  the  moderate  holism  of 
the  realists  on  these  grounds  alone.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is 
clear  that  the  anti-realists  will  not  be  able  to  provide  a  semantic  theory 
that  is  entirely  free  of  holistic  elements  given  that  they  admit  that  even  a 
molecular  semantic  theory  must  make  use  of  holistic  principles  in  the 
case  of  extra-logical  terms.  Given  that  the  vocabulary  of  most 
languages  is  made  up  largely  of  such  extra-logical  terms  it  seems 
unlikely  that  anyone,  regardless  of  their  desires  for  a,  simple, 
manageable  semantic  theory,  will  be  able  to  manage  without  some 
elements  of  holism  creeping  in.  But  could  they  provide  a  viable 
semantics  of  the  disputed  sentences  containing  logical  constants  while 
restricting  the  use  of  holist  principles  to  the  interpretation  of  extra- 
logical  terms? 
A  case  study  of  the  anti-realist  attempt  to  give  the  semantics  of 
currently  disputed  sentences  may  be  made  of  Colin  McGinn's  well 
knovm  thought  experiment  concerning  the  tree  people  and  the  correct 
interpretation  of  their  sentences  containing  the  'south  side'  operator.  22 79 
McGinn,  and  eventually  Wier,  provide  the  traditional  realist 
interpretations  of  these  disputed  sentences  while  Tennant  argues  that 
such  an  interpretation  is  not  warranted  and  is  simply  an  application  of 
the  realist  bias.  Whatever  the  merits  of  Tennant's  case  against  the 
interpretation  suggested  by  McGinn,  one  looks  in  vain  among  Tennant's 
writings  for  any  alternative  reading.  This  is  a  particularly  nasty 
problem  for  the  anti-realist.  According  to  their  own  account,  currently 
disputed  sentences  (like  'south  side'  sentences  for  the  tree  people)  are 
understood  by  the  speakers  of  the  language.  If  this  is  the  case,  it  is 
then  incumbent  upon  any  viable  semantic  theory  to  make  plain  in  what 
this  understanding  consists.  If  the  semantic  anti-realists  can  do  no 
more  than  reject  the  interpretation  offered  by  the  realists,  but  put 
nothing  in  its  place,  they  cannot  be  said  to  have  a  viable  semantic 
theory.  But  one  looks  in  vain  for  this  alternative. 
But  quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  no  alternative  reading  is  offered,  there 
is  also  the  problem  of  seeing  just  how  any  reading  of  these  sentences 
could  be  achieved  without  employing  holist  principles  in  order  to  give 
the  semantics  of  the  disputed  sentences.  In  order  for  the  semantic  anti- 
realist  to  provide  the  semantics  of  'south  side'  sentences,  sentences 
which  were  otherwise  unproblematic  save  for  the  presence  of  the  south 
side  operator  prefixed  to  the  sentence,  the  anti-realist  has  to  treat  the 
operator  as  a  logical  constant  whose  meaning  is  determined  by  its 
individual  introduction  and  elimination  rules  in  the  same  way  as  any 
other  logical  constant  of  the  Intuitionist  variety.  However,  there  has  yet 
to  be  an  account  given  by  anti-realists  of  how  this  is  to  be  possible 
without  reference  to  other  theoretical  commitments.  It  seems  very 
unlikely,  to  say  the  least,  that  all  terms  or  expressions  that  make 
unproblematic  sentences  into  disputed  sentences  can  be  treated  as 
logical  constants.  Terms  such  as  the  south-side  operator  which 
apparently  involve  reference  to  inaccessible  regions  of  space-time  seem 
embued  with  theoretical  commitments  that  make  them  significantly 
different  from  the  logical  constants  of  Intuitionist  logic.  Given  the 
foregoing  it  would  appear  that  Dummett  and  Tennant  will  have  to 
approach  the  disputed  sentences  in  much  the  same  way  as  one 
equipped  with  a  moderate  holism  on  both  extra-logical  terms  and  the 
logical  constants.  Indeed,  one  is  hard  pressed  to  see  how  else  the 
meaning  of  theoretical  sentences  could  be  manifested.  Unless  some 
convincing  argument  is  forthcoming  which  shows  that  those  terms  that 80 
make  a  sentence  currently  disputable  ran  be  given  treatment  similar  to 
those  given  to  logical  constants,  they  will  have  to  admit  that  these 
sentences  are  going  to  -be  members  of  'local  holisms'  suspended  in  the 
language. 
We  have  now  reached  the  conclusion  of  this  examination  of  the 
manifestation  argument.  What  has  been  shown  is  that  the  disputed 
sentences  which  are  the  focus  of  the  manifestation  argument  can  be 
given  adequate  treatment  according  to  naturalist  standards  if  one 
accepts  the  viability  of  a  moderately  holistic  view  of  language.  The 
semantic  anti-realists,  while  establishing  the  untenability  of  a 
thoroughgoing  holism,  have  not  provided  any  reason  to  think  that  a 
moderated  holism  is  equally  untenable.  In  fact  we  have  seen  that 
semantic  anti-realists  themselves,  despite  their  fondness  for  molecular 
semantic  theories,  are  forced  to  grant  a  place  to  holistic  principles  in 
their  own  semantic  system.  Consequently  there  seems  to  be  no 
successful  prevention  of  the  realist's  use  of  holistic  principles  to  aid  him 
in  escaping  the  problems  posed  by  the  manifestation  argument. 
Finally,  the  semantic  anti-realists  have  not  provided  an  alternative 
account  of  the  semantics  of  the  disputed  sentences  despite  their 
insistence  that  such  sentences  are  understood.  But  if  Tennant's 
comments  on  the  nature  of  extra-logical  terms  is  anything  to  go  by,  it 
would  seem  clear  that  these  disputed  sentences  will  receive 
substantially  the  same  treatment  from  both  realists  and  anti-realists 
alike.  Both  will  manifest  their  understanding  of  such  sentences  by 
making  use  of  the  speaker's  ability  to  appreciate  the  relations  that 
obtain  between  the  sentence  in  question  and  other  sentences  in  the 
same  local  holism.  Now  since  semantic  anti-realism  is  unable  to  clearly 
better  semantic  realism  in  this  area,  there  is  little  or  no  incentive  for  the 
realist  to  adopt  the  anti-realist  position  with  its  rejection  of  bivalence 
and  all  the  counter-intuitive  problems  that  follow  as  a  consequence. 
Sunvnary  of  the  last  two  Chapters 
Let  us  summarise  briefly  what  conclusions  have  been  reached 
concerning  the  semantic  anti-realist  challenge  to  the  coherence  of 
scientific  realism  and  anti-realism.  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  root  of 
the  challenge  was  that  the  participants  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science 81 
are  both  guilty  of  operating  with  an  incoherent  notion  of  truth. 
Putnam's  argument  against  radical  scepticism  presented  in  the  first 
chapter  of  Reason  Truth  and  History  illustrated  precisely  what 
consequences  befall  us  if  an  epistemically  constrained  notion  of  truth  is 
to  replace  that  held  by  scientific  realists  and  anti-realists.  But  his 
argument,  based  on  a  particular  understanding  of  the  nature  of 
reference,  was  seen  to  be  convincing  only  once  one  has  adopted  an 
epistemically  constrained  notion  of  truth.  It  is  in  the  work  of  Dummett 
and  other  semantic  anti-realists,  however,  that  we  find  the  core 
argument  against  the  notion  of  truth  as  a  possibly  verification 
transcendent  property  of  sentences.  In  this  chapter  we  have  been  at 
pains  to  establish  that  this  argument,  known  as  the  Dummettian 
Reductio,  is  not  compelling.  This  being  the  case,  there  is  no  reason  to 
opt  for  a  notion  of  truth  as  epistemically  constrained,  and  there  is  no 
threat  to  the  coherence  of  scientific  realism  and  anti-realism  as  we 
described  them  in  the  Introduction.  This  brings  to  a  close  the  first  of  the 
obstacles  facing  our  attempt  to  combine  the  virtues  of  scientific  realism 
and  anti-realism  into  one  coherent  position  in  the  realist  dispute  in 
science. 
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'Duth  and  Reality,  edited  by  M.  Platts.  Tennant  responded  in  Analysis  vol.  41  (1981), 
with  "Is  this  a  proof  I  see  before  me?  "  The  same  volume  of  Analysis  contains  McGinn's 
"Reply  to  Tennant".  Alan  Weir  came  to  the  aid  of  McGinn  with  'Truth  Conditions  and 
Truth  Values"  in  Analysis,  vol.  43  (1983),  to  which  Tennant  responded  in  the 
following  volume  with  'Were  those  disproofs  I  saw  before  me?  "  Weir,  undaunted, 
then  came  forward  with  "Reply  to  Tennant".  Analysis,  vol.  45  (1985)  and  Tennant,  not 
to  be  outdone,  replied  with  'Weir  and  those  'disproofs'  I  saw  before  me"  in  the  same 
volume. Chapter  4 
The  Problem  of  Demarcation 
Having  dealt  with  the  semantic  anti-realist  challenge,  it  now  remains  to 
confront  the  problem  of  demarcation.  Given  the  desire  to  combine 
realist  and  anti-realist  tendencies  into  one  coherent  philosophy  of 
science,  some  mechanism  is  required  by  which  to  distinguish  that  area 
of  discourse  about  which  we  can  take  a  realist  attitude  from  that 
demanding  an  anti-realist  approach.  It  might  be  expected  that  a 
plethora  of  such  mechanisms  would  litter  the  writings  of  either 
scientific  anti-realists  who  are  not  anti-realists  with  respect  to  every 
area  of  discourse,  or  conversely,  scientific  realists  who  are  not  realists 
in  all  areas.  Van  Fraassen  is  a  good  example  of  a  such  a  specimen, 
being  a  scientific  anti-realist  with  semantic  realist  tendencies,  while 
Hartry  Field's  work  includes  an  attempt  to  reconcile  scientific  realism 
with  mathematical  anti-realism.  Unfortunately,  as  we  shall  see  shortly, 
no  satisfactory  solution  to  our  particular  form  of  the  demarcation 
problem  is  to  be  found  in  the  literature.  It  is  true  that  some  have 
provided  a  reasonable  demarcation  mechanism  that  allows  one  to 
distinguish  one  area  of  discourse  from  another.  Hartry  Field,  for 
example,  is  arguably  successful  in  his  attempt  to  distinguish  the 
entities  of  mathematics  from  those  of  the  natural  sciences,  permitting 
an  anti-realist  reading  of  the  former  and  a  realist  reading  of  the  latter. 
However,  our  problem  is  made  more  delicate  by  the  fact  that  we  are 
looking  to  make  a  similar  distinction  within  what  has  hitherto  been 
considered  one  area  of  discourse,  i.  e.,  the  natural  sciences.  However, 
discussions  in  the  philosophy  of  language  provide  a  hint  as  to  how  one 
might  hope  to  unravel  this  particular  problem.  But  before  I  proceed  to 
outline  and  discuss  my  proposed  solution  it  will  be  useful  to  consider 
how  others  have  treated  the  demarcation  problem  in  the  past.  This 
survey  will  underline  the  merits  of  the  solution  I  will  bring  forward  in 
the  following  chapters  by  highlighting  the  pitfalls  past  demarcation 
mechanisms  have  been  unable  to  avoid,  as  well  as  their  respective 
strengths.  The  viability  of  my  solution  will  be  more  in  evidence  when 
these  past  successes  and  failures  are  clearly  before  us. 
Realism  and  Bivalence 
The  most  recent  mechanism  by  means  of  which  to  distinguish  those 84 
areas  of  discourse  fit  for  realist  interpretation  from  those  requiring  an 
anti-realist  attitude  has  come  from  the  reflections  of  semantic  anti- 
realists  like  Dummett  and  Tennant.  It  has  been  argued  that  one's 
stance  in  the  realist  dispute  with  respect  to  a  given  area  of  discourse 
ought  to  be  determined  by  whether  or  not  the  principle  of  bivalence  is 
appropriately  applied  to  the  sentences  of  that  area  of  discourse.  If  the 
principle  of  bivalence  holds  for  the  sentences  in  question,  then  one  can 
opt  for  a  realist  interpretation:  if  not,  anti-realism  is  the  only  option. 
There  is  clearly  something  to  this  demarcation  mechanism.  If  the 
sentences  of  a  given  discourse  are  neither  true  nor  false,  then  they 
cannot  be  considered  to  be  stating  anything  about  extra-linguistic 
reality.  Usually  a  sentence  to  which  the  principle  of  bivalence  does  not 
apply  is  one  which  fails  to  refer  to  anything  actually  in  eidstence  -  this 
is  the  traditional  positions  vis  d  vis  future  contingents,  and  arguably  the 
proper  interpretation  of  sentences  like  "The  King  of  France  is  bald",  and 
also  of  sentences  in  works  of  fiction.  So  a  precondition  of  a  discourse 
being  a  candidate  for  a  realist  interpretation  is  that  it  contain  sentences 
that  accurately  or  inaccurately  track  real  facts  about  some  aspect  of 
extra-linguistic  reality.  But  a  question  remains:  how  do  we  determine  if 
there  are  such  extra-linguistic  facts  to  track  at  all?  how  do  we 
determine  when  we  are  justified  in  thinking  that  the  principle  of 
bivalence  applies? 
The  semantic  anti-realist  suggestion,  well  known  to  us  from  the 
preceding  chapter,  is  that  semantic  considerations  are  sufficient  to 
determine  whether  the  principle  of  bivalence  applies  to  a  sentence  or 
not.  If  a  sentence's  truth  conditions  are  verification  transcendent,  then, 
by  the  rules  of  Intuitionist  logic,  we  are  not  warranted  to  assume  that 
the  principle  of  bivalence  can  safely  be  applied  to  this  sentence.  Now 
we  have  already  gone  to  some  lengths  to  demonstrate  that  the 
Manifestation  argument  used  to  support  semantic  anti-realism  is  not 
compelling.  tonsequently  we  must  say  that  semantic  considerations  of 
this  type  do  not  determine  whether  the  principle  of  bivalence  applies  to 
a  given  sentence  or  not. 
But  there  is  a  further  complication  to  consider.  It  Is  clear  that  if  the 
principle  of  bivalence  does  not  apply  to  given  discourse,  then  a  realist 
interpretation  of  that  discourse  is  impossible.  But  we  are  not 85 
committed  to  saying  that  any  discourse 
, 
to  which  the  principle  of 
bivalence  applies  is  automatically  accorded  a  realist  interpretation.  A 
realist  interpretation  of  a  scientific  theory  demands  more  than  that 
theory  being  either  true  or  false.  Indeed,  there  must  be  facts  which  the 
theory  tracks;  but  in  addition  to  this,  the  theory  must  actually  be  true. 
Scientific  realism,  as  described  in  the  Introduction,  involves  the  belief 
that  realistically  interpreted  theories  are  true  representations  of  some 
aspect  of  extra-linguistic  reality. 
Now  we  have  found  no  reason  as  yet  to  assume  that  the  principle  of 
bivalence  does  not  apply  to  scientific  discourse.  In  fact  the  bivalence 
principle  is  more  telling  in  those  areas  of  discourse  where  it  is  unclear 
that  there  are  extra-linguistic  facts  to  track;  for  instance,  it  is  unclear 
that  there  are  moral  or  modal  facts,  mathematical  or  comic  facts.  But 
there  is  little  doubt  that  there  is  an  external  world,  and  that  scientific 
theories  are  in  some  sense  'about'  this  world.  And  since  the 
applicability  of  bivalence  it  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  of  a  realist 
interpretation  of  a  scientific  theory  in  any  case,  our  operating 
assumption  will  be  that  the  principle  of  bivalence  does  apply  to  all 
scientific  statements,  unless  some  over-riding  consideration  presents 
itself.  This  is  in  line  with  our  commitment  to  semantic  realism.  We 
will  assume,  then,  that  all  sentences  purporting  to  be  about  some 
aspect  of  extra-linguistic  reality  are,  a)  really'about  some  aspect  of 
extra-linguistic  reality,  and  hence  true  or  false,  or,  b)  presuppose  other 
sentences  which  are  themselves  true  or  false.  As  an  example  of  a 
sentence  of  type  b)  -  the  question  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  famous 
sentence  'The  King  of  France  is  bald"  presupposes  the  truth  of  a  prior 
sentence,  namely'There  is  a  King  of  France".  Likewise  all  statements 
describing  theoretical  entities  presuppose  that  sentences  to  the  effect 
that  these  entities  actually  exist  are  true.  Our  problem  in  the  realist 
dispute  in  science,  then,  is  not  to  distinguish  between  theories  to  which 
the  principle  of  bivalence  applies  from  those  to  which  it  does  not,  but  to 
distinguish  between  those  scientiflc  theories  which  can  be  considered  to 
be  true  representations  o  extra-linguistic  realityfrom  those  which  are  at  )f 
best  empirically  adequate.  With  these  operating  assumptions  in  mind 
let  us  move  on  to  consider  other  demarcation  mechanisms. Super  vs.  Sublunary  Worlds 
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Perhaps  the  earliest  demarcation  mechanism  in  the  history  of  science 
can  be  found  in  the  work  of  Aristotle  and  the  medieval  scholastics  who 
adopted  his  cosmology.  In  Aristotelian  science  a  division  was 
recognised  between  areas  of  the  cosmos  about  which  humans  can  have 
scientific  knowledge  and  those  areas  which  were  thought  to  be  beyond 
our  epistemic  capabilities.  This  distinction  coincides  with  the  familiar 
demarcation  between  the  sublunary  and  superlunary  worlds.  Because 
it  was  believed  that  the  heavenly  bodies  were  composed  of  a  fifth 
element  thought  to  be  radically  different  in  nature  from  those 
encountered  in  sublunary  objects,  it  was  held  that  humans  could  not 
form  adequate  judgements  concerning  these  objects.  Having  no  direct 
experience  of  this  fifth  element  which  was  thought  to  be  divine,  and 
thinking  that  no  analogies  could  be  drawn  between  sublunary  elements 
and  the  superlunary  element  given  the  divinity  of  the  latter,  our  human 
intellect  was  thought  incapable  of  forming  judgements  adequate  to  the 
nature  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  Now  it  is  evident  that  in  order  for  this 
distinction  between  divine  and  profane  sections  of  the  cosmos  to  be 
intelligible,  let  alone  acceptable,  much  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  theory  needs  to  be  understood  and  accepted.  Obviously 
such  a  mechanism  is  unacceptable  today,  as  it  has  been  ever  since 
Galileo  was  able  to  establish  that  the  lunar  surface,  being  rough  and 
uneven,  betrays  its  terrestrial  and  profane  nature.  1 
Ratio  Sufficiens  and  Cognitive  Conunand 
Odd  as  it  may  seem,  dividing  the  cosmos  into  two  separate  spheres  as 
the  Aristotelians  did  may  not  be  as  ludicrous  as  it  first  appears.  One 
might  make  the  case  that  this  division  of  the  cosmos  into  radically 
dissimilar  areas  was  used  to  explain  certain  facts  that  had  been 
established  in  Greek  astronomy.  It  was  a  common  place  among  ancient 
Greek  astronomers  and  those  who  followed  in  this  tradition,  as  Duhem 
and  Blumenburg  and  other  historians  of  science  have  pointed  out,  that 
the  phenomena  of  the  skies  could  be  saved  by  different  and  inconsistent 
astronomical  hypotheses.  To  this  situation  we  must  add  the  fact  that 
the  other  sciences,  especially  the  natural  sciences,  had  not  reached  a 
similarly  advanced  stage  of  development  as  had  astronomy.  The 87 
significance  of  this  delayed  development  was  that  the  Greeks  had  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  other  natural  sciences  would  in  the  course 
of  their  development  eventually  encounter  this  same  under 
determination  problem  that  had  been  recognised  in  astronomy.  In  such 
circumstances  under  determination  could  reasonably  be  thought  to  be 
the  particular  characteristic  of  astronomical  hypotheses.  The  under 
determination  of  astronomical  theory  was,  therefore,  a  reason  to  see 
astronomy  as  dealing  with  a  distinct  area  of  the  cosmos,  one  not 
entirely  amenable  to  human  investigation.  Against  such  a  background 
it  is  easier  to  imagine  how  a  metaphysics  supporting  the  distinction 
between  the  sublunary  and  superlunary  worlds  would  have  a  ring  of 
plausibility  (assuming,  of  course,  that  one  is  operating  with  a  version  of 
semantic  realism). 
It  should  also  be  pointed  out  in  the  interests  of  historical  accuracy  that 
the  theory  that  the  heavenly  bodies  were  indeed  composed  of  a  fifth 
element  not  found  in  the  sublunary  world  was  not  accepted  by  all 
medieval  scholastics.  Interestingly  enough  this  did  not  stop  those  who 
rejected  the  idea  of  a  fifth  element  from  continuing  to  view  astronomical 
theories  anti-realistically.  Indeed  it  was  the  acknowledged  under 
determination  of  astronomical  hypotheses  that  remained  the  principle 
reason  for  viewing  astronomical  hypotheses  anti-realistically.  Such  was 
the  view  of  Aquinas,  who  was  led  to  consider  another  demarcation 
mechanism  entirely  unrelated  to  the  question  concerning  the  possibility 
of  a  fifth  distinctly  heavenly  substance  but  wholly  occupied  with  the 
problem  of  under  determination.  Aquinas  maintained  that  scientific 
knowledge  is  achieved  when  one  has  produced  a  'sufficient  proof  or 
ratio  sufficiens.  2  The  peculiarity  of  such  a  proof  is  that  it  claims  to 
establish  not  only  that  such-and-such  is  the  case,  but  why  such-and- 
such  is  the  case.  In  other  words,  iot  is  claimed  that  such  a  proof 
proports  gives  a  sufficient  explanation  of  a  given  phenomenon  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  another  explanation.  This  is 
entirely  in  keeping  with  the  Aristotelian  view  of  knowledge  as  presented 
in  the  Posterior  Analytics,  an  Issue  to  which  we  will  return  in  the  later 
sections  of  this  work.  The  crux  of  this  position  is  that  one  can  claim  to 
have  scientific  knowledge  of  a  particular  object  or  phenomenon  (which 
can  be  interpreted  realistically)  when  there  is  no  possibility  of  an 
alternative  theory  saving  the  phenomenon  in  question.  It  is  easy  to  see 
the  connection  between  this  mechanism  and  the  problem  posed  by  the 88 
under  determination  of  astronomical  hypotheses:  that  area  of  discourse 
will  be  viewed  realistically  which  is  not  subject  to  the  problem  posed  by 
the  under  determination  of  theory  by  data.  One  might  gloss  this  by 
stating  that  that  area  of  discourse  will  be  viewed  realistically  about 
which  ultimately  there  can  be  no  rational  disagreement.  Once  a  ratio 
sufficiens  has  been  produced  all  discussion  concerning  the  conclusion 
of  that  proof  ceases.  Now  the  hypotheses  of  astronomy  conspicuously 
fail  to  meet  this  requirement  precisely  because  astronomical  hypotheses 
are  underdetermined;  hence  a  choice  of  hypotheses  is  open  to 
astronomers.  Such  is  not  the  case  where  a  ratio  sufficiens  is  available. 
Aquinas  makes  this  very  clear  in  question  32  of  the  Summa  Meologiae: 
...  an  astronomical  argument  about  eccentrics  and  epicyclic 
motions  is  put  forward  on  the  ground  that  by  this  hypothesis 
one  can  show  how  celestial  movements  appear  as  they  do  to 
observatiqn.  Such  an  argument  is  not  fully  conclusive,  since 
an  explanation  might  be  possible  even  on  another 
hypothesis.  3 
and  in  his  commentary  on  Aristotle's  On  the  Heavens: 
Although  these  suppositions  save  the  appearances,  we  are 
nevertheless  not  obliged  to  say  that  these  suppositions  are 
true,  because  perhaps  there  is  some  other  way  men  have  not 
yet  grasped  by  which  the  things  which  appear  as  to  the  stars 
are  saved.  4 
This  demarcation  mechanism  is  intuitively  attractive,  but  it  has  two 
serious  difficulties.  The  first  criticism  one  must  consider  is  that  on  this 
scheme  almost  nothing  achieved  in  the  natural  sciences  will  count  as 
knowledge  that  can  be  interpreted  realistically.  Such  explanations  may 
simply  not  be  attainable  in  the  natural  sciences.  This  problem  is  one 
that  will  occupy  us  later  when  we  consider  Aquinas'  philosophy  of 
science  in  detail.  For  now  let  us  just  make  a  mental  note  of  this 
difficulty,  namely  that  perhaps  Aquinas  has  given  too  much  away  to  the 
anti-realists.  But  it  is  clear  that  Aquinas  was  not  worried  about  this 
particular  difficulty,  which  brings  to  our  attention  the  second  difficulty 
with  this  mechanism.  Aquinas  did  not  consider  his  standard  of 89 
scientific  knowledge  to  be  dangerously  high  because  he  thought  that 
such  proofs  had  already  been  found  in  the  natural  sciences.  He 
believed,  for  example,  that  the  proofs  called  upon  to  prove  the  uniform 
velocity  of  the  heavenly  bodies  to  be  sufficient5.  When  such  proofs  are 
considered  by  non-Aristotelians,  however,  the  problem  is  all  too  clear: 
What  one  considers  to  be  a  ratio  sufficiens  depends  entirely  on  one's 
conceptual  framework  of  beliefs  and  intellectual  practices  -  one's 
paradigm,  to  use  Kuhn's  terminology.  Inevitably  a  ratio  sufficiens  is 
found  acceptable  from  within  a  conceptual  framework  already  in  place. 
Once  the  conceptual  framework  is  challenged,  however,  as  has 
happened  in  the  case  of  Aristotelian  metaphysics  and  physics,  the  proof 
is  likely  to  lose  the  status  as  a  bearer  of  knowledge.  Of  course  this  is 
not  something  peculiar  to  medieval  science:  all  proofs  or  explanations 
which  rely  on  one's  acceptance  of  a  highly  theoretical  conceptual 
scheme  are  subject  to  this  difficulty.  Nevertheless,  Aquinas  has 
identified  an  attractive  characteristic  of  realist  discourse,  namely,  the 
impossibility  of  rational  disagreement  within  it.  This  is  a  feature  of 
realist  discourse  picked  up  and  discussed  by  Crispin  Wright  in  Truth 
and  Objectivity.  6 
Although  far  removed  from  Aquinas  in  time  and  intellectual 
temperament,  Crispin  Wright  has  also  undertaken  the  task  of 
distinguishing  realist  from  anti-realist  discourse.  The  interest  of  his 
work  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  is  not  concerned  primarily  with  any 
particular  areas  of  discourse,  as  is  a  Hartry  Field,  but  with  the 
theoretical  problems  the  attempt  to  draw  this  distinction  poses.  In 
particular  it  is  his  discussion  of  'Cognitive  Command'  that  is  of  interest 
to  us  since  it  is  presented  as  a  potential  demarcation  mechanism.  He 
writes: 
f 
one  might  wonder  whether.  ..  all  roads  to  realism  have  to  go 
through  Cognitive  Command  -  whether  it  is  a  necessary 
feature  of  any  discourse  about  which  the  basic  anti-realist 
view  is  to  be  exceeded,  and  is  hence  implicated  in  any 
sufficient  case  for  going  beyond  that  view....  If  it  is,  then  of 
course  it  becomes  a  point  of  great  strategic  importance  for  the 
opponent  of  realism:  show  that  a  discourse  lacks  Cognitive 
Conunand  and  you  blow  away  with  one  stoke  all  conceivable 
fomis  of  realist  resistance  (my  emphasis).  7 
Such  a  mechanism  is  just  the  sort  of  thing  we  are  looking  for.  It  is 90 
therefore  crucial  that  the  meaning  of  the  term  'Cognitive  Command'  be 
examined.  Wright  provides  the  following  formal  account  of  this  key 
idea: 
A  discourse  exhibits  Cognitive  Command  if  and  only  if  it  is  a 
priori  that  differences  of  opinion  arising  within  it  can  be 
satisfactorily  explained  only  P  terms  of  "divergent  input",  that 
is,  the  disputants  working  on  different  data  (hence  ignorance 
or  errod,  or  "unsuitable  conditions"  (resulting  in  inferential 
error,  or  slips  due  to  inattention,  or  oversight  of  data,  etc.  ),  or 
"malfunction"  (e.  g.  prejudicial  assessment  of  data,  upwards  or 
downwards,  or  dognw4  or  failings  in  other  categories  already 
listed).  8 
The  gist  of  this  position  seems  to  be  that  that  area  of  discourse  exhibits 
Cognitive  Command,  and  hence  is  at  least  in  the  running  for  a  realist 
interpretation,  when  it  is  not  possible  for  disagreements  in  this  area  to 
be  considered  justified  or  fully  rational.  9  In  other  words,  if  two 
disputants  differ  with  respect  to  some  sentence  in  this  area  of 
discourse,  at  least  one  of  the  two  must  be  manifestibly  mistaken,  and 
the  mistake  must  be  of  the  sort  Wright  enumerated.  Once  the  mistake 
has  been  identified  it  is  then  'irrational'  not  to  abandon  the  position  to 
which  the  mistake  led.  Wright  glosses  this  definition  Is  by  saying  that 
disagreement  in  an  area  exhibiting  Cognitive  Command  'involves 
something  worth  describing  as  a  cognitive  shortcoming.  '10 
It  is  important  to  recognise  that  there  are  two  distinct  types  of  mistake 
that  Wright  appeals  to  in  his  definition  of  Cognitive  Command.  There 
are  errors  due  to  what  he  calls  'divergent  input,  and  those  due  to 
'malfunction'.  The  first  sort  of  error  stems  from  a  failure  to  gather  the 
appropriate  sensory  data  relevant  to  a  particular  problem.  This  can  be 
due  to  either  malfunction  of  the  requisite  senses  or  to  failure  to  employ 
otherwise  sound  senses  effectively.  The  second,  and  arguably  more 
interesting  sort  of  error  are  those  relating  to  the  interpretation  or 
'assessment'  of  received  data  conducted  under  the  influence  of  certain 
prejudices  or  dogma.  It  is  in  this  area  that  the  central  role  played  by 
the  accepted  standards  of  rationality  employed  by  the  intellectual 
community  becomes  evident. 
This  reliance  on  standards  of  rationality,  which  are  pressed  into  service 
to  determine  whether  a  disagreement  is  rational  or  not,  ought  to  give  us 91 
pause.  As  noted  above,  disagreements  can  stem  from  two  sources. 
Those  due  to  sensory  failure  are  no  cause  for  concern.  Clearly  if 
someone  overlooks  relevant  data,  due  to  sensory  malfunction  or 
inattention,  then  their  opinion  on  the  matter  at  hand  will  be  easily 
discounted  as  due  to  a  cognitive  shortcoming.  But  more  importantly, 
the  person  in  error  cannot  fail  to  appreciate  this  fact  once  the  source  of 
the  error  has  been  identified  and  pointed  out.  The  same  sanguine 
approach,  however,  cannot  be  taken  so  quickly  when  the  error  is  of  the 
second  sort.  If  the  er-ror  is  due  to  a  failure  on  the  part  of  one  of  the 
disputants  to  follow  accepted  intellectual  practices,  particularly 
interpretative  practices,  one  Is  faced  with  a  situation  where  the  charge 
of  irrationality  and  erTor  may  with  equal  justice  be  levied  by  each 
disputant  against  the  other.  Indeed,  whenever  a  paradigm  of  the  sort 
Kuhn  describes  is  removed  and  replaced  by  another,  charges  of 
irrationality  abound  until  the  new  paradigm  is  sufficiently  established, 
by  which  time  a  new  standard  of  rational  behaviour  has  replaced  the 
old.  One  has  only  to  recall  the  reception  of  the  Copernican  hypothesis 
by  some  astronomers  and  scientists  of  the  day.  Over  fifty  years  after  its 
introduction  many  still  felt  comfortable  rejecting  the  idea  of  a  moving 
earth  as  patently  absurd.  It  was  still  termed  a  'tremendous  paradox' 
and  'an  obvious  piece  of  folly'  by  Domenico  Berti  in  his  address  to  the 
Holy  Office  as  late  as  1615-11  The  point  to  underline  is  that  by  the 
standards  of  the  day  such  a  view  of  the  Copernican  hypothesis  was 
considered  fully  J  ustified  and  fully  rational.  12 
Once  the  historical  nature  of  standards  of  rationality  is  fully  appreciated 
a  modification  of  Wright's  conception  of  Cognitive  Command  is  required. 
For  where  Wright  saw  two  distinct  types  of  error,  'we  have  seen  that 
errors  of  'malfunction'  come  in  two  guises.  Cognitive  Command  as 
outlined  by  Wright  in  the  end  reduces  to  three  factors:  a  discourse 
exhibits  Cognitive  Command  if  disagreements  In  this  area  are  due  either 
to  divergent  input  or  inattention,  to  inferential  malfunction,  or  to  the 
failure  of  one  of  the  disputants  to  follow  the  interpretative  standards  of 
the  intellectual  community  of  which  he  was  a  member.  This  version  of 
Cognitive  Command  must  be  modified;  indeed,  the  last  of  these  criteria 
must  be  dropped.  Now  if  we  accept  that  standards  of  rationality  are  not 
fixed,  and  hence  no  sure  indicator  by  which  to  distinguish  knowledge 
from  received  opinion,  the  range  of  discourses  likely  to  be  candidates  for 
our  modified  version  of  Cognitive  Command  is  greatly  reduced.  In  fact 92 
we  are  led  to  conclude  that  a  discourse  in  the  natural  sciences 
displaying  modified  Cognitive  Command  is  likely  to  be  of  a  very  low 
order  of  theoretical  abstraction,  perhaps  never  rising  above  the  level  of 
observation  sentences.  (We  should  also  point  out  that  Wright's  version 
of  Cognitive  Command  must  be  altered  in  another  way  given  our 
rejection  of  the  first  demarcation  mechanism.  Wright's  distinction  is 
used  to  separate  those  sentences  which  are  apt  for  a  truth  value  from 
those  that  are  not;  while  our  modified  version  of  Cognitive  Command  is 
used  to  distinguish  between  sentences  with  a  determinate  truth  value 
from  those  that  do  not.  )  Such  a  conclusion  seems  to  be  in  close 
agreement  with  those  philosophers  of  science  of  the  20th  century  who 
have  employed  the  most  familiar  of  demarcation  mechanisms:  the 
distinction  between  the  observable  and  the  unobservable,  between 
observation  and  theory. 
Me  Meory/Observation  Dichotomy 
The  demarcation  most  often  drawn  in  20th  century  philosophy  of 
science  is  the  well  known  logical  positivist  distinction  between 
observation  sentences  and  terms  and  their  theoretical  counterparts. 
Such  a  distinction  also  coincides  with  the  view  that  it  is  possible  to 
separate  a  scientific  theory  into  two  component  parts:  that  part  which  is 
confined  to  mere  description  of  the  phenomena  being  studied,  and  that 
part  containing  the  explanatory  models  and  principles  used  to  give  order 
and  intelligibility  to  the  phenomena  described.  The  hope  of  those  at 
pains  to  draw  such  a  distinction  is  to  strip  away  the  effects  of  theory 
and  to  produce  the  primordial,  pristine  theory-free  observation  language 
the  ontology  of  which  everyone  must  accept. 
If  such  a  distinction  could  be  drawn  we  would  certainly  have  a  possible 
means  of  demarcation.  But  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  note  the 
difficulties  (if  not  the  impossibility)  of  drawing  this  distinction  in 
practice,  given  that  observation  is  arguably  always  theory-laden. 
Duhem  writes  that  this  distinction 
becomes  infinitely  delicate  and  thorny  when  it  comes  to  a 
scientific  fact  or  law.  In  fact,  the  proposition  which 
formulates  this  fact  or  law  is  generally  an  intimate  mixture  of 
experimental  observation  endowed  with  objective  import  and theoretical  inteTpretatiort,  a  mere  symbol  devoid  of  any 
objective  sense.  It  will  be  necessary  ...  to  dissociate  this 
mixture  in  order  to  obtain  as  pure  as  possible  the  first  of  the 
two  elements  forming  it;  in  that  element,  indeed  in  that 
observational  element  alone,  can  his  system  find  confirmation 
or  run  into  contradiction  (my  emphasis).  13 
93 
Nevertheless,  Duhem  was  still  confident  the  distinction  could  be  drawn. 
All  that  was  required  was  an  intimate  familiarity  with  scientific 
theories.  14  However,  Duhem  has  very  little  to  offer  in  the  way  of  an 
objective  demarcation  mechanism.  In  fact  his  suggestion  amounts  to 
little  more  than  the  claim  that  'One  develops  a  knack  for  such  things'. 
He  writes: 
Very  often  in  the  report  of  a  physical  experiment,  the  real  and 
objective  matter  and  the  merely  theoretical  and  symbolic  form 
interpenetrate  each  other  in  so  intimate  and  complicated  a 
manner  that  the  geometric  mind  with  its  clear  and  rigorous 
procedures,  too  simple  and  inflexible  however,  to  be 
penetrating,  may  not  suffice  to  separate  them.  There  we  need 
the  insinuating  and  looser  methods  of  the  subtle  mind  with 
finesse;  it  alone,  by  slipping  in  between  this  matter  and  form, 
can  distinguish  them;  it  alone  can  surmise  that  the  latter  Is 
an  artificial  construction  created  of  whole  cloth  by  theory  and 
without  any  value  for  the  metaphysician,  whereas  the  former, 
rich  in  objective  truth,  is  suited  to  instruct  the  cosmologist.  15 
Although  Duhem  has  succeeded  in  clearly  and  almost  poetically 
expressing  the  difficulty  of  drawing  this  distinction,  complete  with  the 
Frenchman's  required  allusion  to  Pascal,  we  are  still  left  without  any 
indication  of  how  one  might  come  by  this  'subtle  mind  with  finesse'. 
Duhem's  comment  is  less  than  satisfactory: 
Now,  the  subtle  mind  here,  as  everywhere  else,  is  sharpened 
by  long  practice;  it  is  by  profound  and  detailed  study  of  theory 
that  one  will  obtain  that  sort  of  flair  thanks  to  which  one  will 
discern  in  a  physical  experiment  what  is  theoretical  symbol, 
and  thanks  to  which  one  will  be  able  to  separate  this  form,  of 
no  philosophical  value,  from  the  genuine  empirical  teaching 
which  the  philosopher  should  take  into  account.  16 
This  is  all  very  inspiring  and  high  minded.  But  when  embroiled  in  a 
heated  debate  concerning  the  ontological  status  of  some  controversial 
entity,  the  disputing  parties  are,  hardly  likely  to  give  way  on  the  grounds 94 
that  the  opposition  has  'flair',  or  a  certain  knack  for  this  sort  of 
question.  But  let  us  accept  for  the  moment  that  the  distinction  Duhern 
and  others  want  to  draw  between  observation  and  theory,  between 
description  and  explanation,  between  reality  and  man-made 
constructions,  is  one  that,  if  successfully  drawn,  could  serve  as  an 
effective  demarcation  mechanism.  Hence,  we  have  an  interesting 
distinction  but  so  far  no  means  of  employing  it. 
Me  Passive  Anatomist  and  the  Active  Butcher 
Gavin  Ardley  in  his  work,  Aquinas  and  Kant.  *  77ie  Foundations  of  the 
Modern  Sciences,  17  attempts  to  give  a  more  precise  account  concerning 
the  separation  of  theory  and  observation  sentences.  Ardley  is  keen  to 
develop  the  idea  that  there  is  a  fundamental  qualitative  distinction 
between  the  scientific  method  of  the  Aristotelian  Scholastics  and  that  of 
the  modems.  Without  going  into  the  details  and  motivations  of  Ardley's 
account  of  the  sciences  we  can  still  extract  the  crux  of  his  position. 
Ardley  argues  that  the  sciences  as  practised  by  the  medieval  scholastics 
produced  knowledge  of  the  sort  one  can  interpret  realistically,  whereas 
modern  science,  physics  in  particular,  produces  theoretical  constructs 
which  serve  as  instruments  of  prediction  and  control  of  events  in 
nature.  He  uses  a  metaphor  to  characterise  the  two  approaches,  a 
metaphor  which  also  sheds  light  on  the  theory/observation  dichotomy. 
The  Scholastics  he  likens  to  anatomists,  whose  work  requires  that  they 
discover  and  lay  bear  the  internal  workings  of  organisms.  The  work  of 
the  anatomist  is  entirely  passive,  says  Ardley,  in  that  they  simply  reveal 
the  structures  that  are  to  be  found  in  nature.  Modem  scientists,  by 
contrast,  are  likened  to  butchers.  The  work  of  the  butcher  is  to  reduce 
the  carcasses  of  the  various  animals  to  useful,  manageable  portions 
that  fit  the  needs  of  their  human  consumers.  The  point  that  Ardley 
wants  to  make  is  that  butchers  actively  impose  their  own  order  and 
divisions  onto  nature  rather  that  passively  laying  bear  the  structure 
that  nature  has  seen  fit  to  produce  herself.  Ardley  writes: 
The  anatomist  fuids  his  structure,  the  butcher  makes  his. 
The  one  pursuit  is  of  the  real,  that  of  which,  we  may  say,  God 
is  the  fashioner  or  creator.  In  the  other  case  man  himself  is 
the  fashioner  or  creator,  or  rather  the  re-creator.  ...  The 
anatomist  proceeds  by  recognition  of  what  is  objectively  there, using  the  senses  with  which  he  has  been  endowed.  The 
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activity  of  the  butcher  on  the  other  hand  is  directed 
subjectively,  and  is  literally,  as  well  as  metaphorically,  the 
procedure  of  the  Procrustean  bed.  18 
The  main  point  that  Ardley  draws  from  the  distinction  between  a 
passive  and  active  approach  to  nature  is  that  only  sciences  of  the 
former  persuasion  can  be  said  to  have  any  ontological  significance.  In 
other  words,  only  the  ontologies  of  the  'passive'  sciences  are  subject  to 
realist  interpretation.  The  objects  created  by  an  active  procrustean 
methodology  Ardley  likens  to  'artefacts'  which  are  in  no  way  a  part  of 
the  real  world  as  it  is  in  itself.  The  following  passage  conveys  the 
flavour  of  Ardley's  thought: 
We  find  that  man's  relation  to  Nature  has  a  dual  character. 
Sometimes  he  is  content  to  accept  and  enjoy  Nature  as  it  is. 
Sometimes,  on  the  other  hand,  he  does  not  embrace  Nature  as 
it  is,  but  instead  he  creates  for  himself  an  artificial  structure 
having  contact  with  Nature  at  certain  points,  but  being  for  the 
most  part  a  sort  of  shadowy  parallel,  or  substitute,  for  Nature. 
The  first  is  the  reahn  of  the  real,  the  second  of  the  categorical. 
These  categorical  systems  are  partly  the  creation  of  individual 
men,  and  in  part  they  are  the  manifestations  of  society.  They 
are  among  the  most  characteristic  possessions  of  civilised 
man,  and  their  influence  is  all  pervasive.  Their  dominion 
ranges  from  modern  physics  at  the  one  extreme  to  language 
and  law  at  the  other.  1-9 
To  pick  up  the  thread  at  it  was  left  by  Duhem,  Ardley  seems  to  be 
suggesting  that  theory-free  observation  sentences  can  be  distinguished 
from  theoretical  sentences  by  appealing  to  the  mode  of  human 
behaviour  that  brought  these  sentences  into  being.  If  one  is  entirely 
passive  in  one's  approach  to  nature,  if  one  allows  nature  to  imprint 
itself  on  an  inactive,  inert  mind,  then  one  discovers  what  is  ob  ectively 
there.  If  one  approaches  nature  actively  (either  in  the  lense  of  imposing 
a  structure  on  phenomena,  as,  for  example,  when  one  insists  on 
employing  a  particular  conceptual  model  during  one's  study,  or  when 
one  approaches  Nature  only  with  an  eye  to  how  it  can  be  bent  to  human 
needs)  one  produces  'artefacts',  or  'categorical'  sentences  which  have  no 
ontological  or  objective  import. 96 
Such  an  apparently  simple,  straightforward  position  does  do  justice  to 
our  intuitions  regarding  the  theory/observation  dichotomy. 
Observation  sentences  are  accorded  a  privileged  position  in  the  sciences 
precisely  because  they  have  been  taken  to  be  the  result  of  nature 
impinging  on  our  sense  organs,  a  process  in  which  we  are  thought  to  be 
entirely  passive.  The  reason  for  the  relative  distrust  of  theoretical 
sentences  is  that  they  are  the  product  of  our  attempts  to  interpret 
observable  phenomena,  a  process  in  which  we  are  active.  But  while  this 
metaphor  explains  why  we  have  considered  the  theory/observation 
dichotomy  to  be  important,  it  does  not  go  any  way  to  helping  us  draw 
the  distinction  in  question.  The  first  concern  is  to  determine  how  one 
knows  when  one's  appreciation  of  Nature  is  entirely  passive.  How  does 
one  know  when  one's  observations  are  not  guided  by  our  theories? 
Ardley  gives  no  indication  how  this  might  be  established.  The  only 
suggestion  he  offers  is  blatantly  the  product  of  professional  bias.  We 
are  approaching  a  purely  passive  view  of  Nature,  Ardley  suggests,  the 
closer  we  get  to  Aristotelianism.  He  writes: 
...  it  is  no  doubt  true  to  say  that  biological,  geological  and 
other  such  sciences  are  substantially  descriptive  and  real,  and 
in  fact  'Aristotelian'.  while  as  we  move  away  towards  modern 
physics  we  enter  more  and  more  Procrustean,  and 
consequently  autonomous  and  'non-Aristotelian'  realms.  20 
The  difficulty  the  Ardley  ignores  entirely  is  the  matter  of  the  passivity  of 
Aristotelianism.  It  is  just  assumed  that  an  Aristotelian  ontology  is  a 
Opassive'  one.  After  our  discussions  of  Aristotle's  fifth  element  the 
problematic  nature  of  such  a  claim  is  only  too  obvious.  Simply 
appealing  to  an  Aristotelian  ontology  without  further  argument  is  quite 
unacceptable  as  a  means  of  establishing  when  one  has  achieved  a 
passive  appreciation  of  Nature. 
But  there  is  a  far  more  serious  objection  to  be  raised  against  Ardley's 
suggestion,  namely,  the  charge  that  an  entirely  passive  approach  to 
nature  is  impossible.  In  more  modem  terms,  Ardley  has  completely 
ignored  the  debate  concerning  the  very  possibility  of  a  theory-free 
observation  language,  a  possibility  that  strikes  many  as  very  remote 
indeed.  Ardley  simply  assumes  that  one's  theoretical  commitments  and 
conceptual  scheme  do  not  in  any  way  inhibit  one  from  passively 
experiencing  Nature  when  one  so  chooses.  Ardley  seems  to  think  that 97 
one  can  shed  at  will  the  conceptual  framework  one  has  adopted  and  get 
an  immediate  grasp  of  the  real.  The  point  at  issue,  however,  is  whether 
it  is  not  the  case  that  at  all  times  one's  experience  of  Nature  is 
conditioned  by  the  'categorical'  structures  that  Ardley  claims  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  'real'.  Whether  there  is  a  theory-free  observation 
language  is  a  problem  to  which  I  will  return  shortly,  for  it  is  central  to 
the  centre  of  the  problem  of  demarcation.  But  it  is  clear  that  it  cannot 
be  solved  by  a  simple,  straightforward  appeal  to  his  passive/active 
principle,  or  an  appeal  to  Aristotelianism. 
Dispensibility  vs.  Indispensibilihj 
A  third  author  whose  work  touches  on  the  demarcation  problem  is 
Hartry  Field.  He  is  one  of  three  authors  I  will  consider  who  wish  to 
draw  the  reality/construct  distinction  but  do  not  employ  the  traditional 
observable/non-observable  distinction  to  further  this  end.  In  his  book, 
Science  Without  Numbers:  A  Defence  of  Nominalism,  21  Field  argues  for 
an  anti-realist  position  with  respect  to  mathematics  despite  his  realist 
stance  in  the  natural  sciences.  Although  we  are  not  here  concerned 
with  the  realist  dispute  in  mathematics,  the  method  by  which  Field 
attempts  to  establish  his  mathematical  anti-realism  is  of  interest  to  us. 
It  is  by  drawing  attention  to  the  difference  between  the  properties  of 
scientific  entities  and  those  of  mathematics  that  Field  hopes  to  establish 
that  the  terms  of  mathematics  have  no  extra-linguistic  referents. 
Field's  most  well-known  opponents  in  this  particular  debate  are  guine 
and  Putnam.  They  have  insisted  upon  the  objective  reality  of  numbers 
and  other  mathematical  constructions  on  the  grounds  that  scientists 
quantify  over  such  entities  in  the  process  of  making  their  calculations 
within  the  scientific  theories  themselves.  More  precisely,  it  is  on  the 
grounds  that  scientists  could  not  do  without  quantifying  over  numbers 
and  the  entities  of  mathematics  in  the  course  of  their  own  strictly 
scientific  work  that  Quine  and  Putnam  conclude  that  a  realist  stance  in 
science  necessitates  a  realist  stance  in  mathematics.  On  the  other 
hand,  Field  contends,  pace  Quine  and  Putnam,  that  science  can  be 
conducted  in  a  realist  manner  without  the  scientists  being  forced  to 
adopt  a  similar  stance  with  respect  to  mathematics.  This  conclusion 
rests  on  Field's  argument  that  mathematics  has  two  peculiar  properties 98 
which  serve  to  qualitatively  distinguish  it  from  the  natural  sciences. 
First,  unlike  scientific  theories,  mathematical  systems  as  a  whole  are 
conservative  relative  to  any  scientific  theory  to  which  they  might  be 
added;  this  leads  to  the  second  difference,  namely,  that  unlike  the, 
entities  of  the  natural  sciences,  mathematical  entities  are  theoretically 
dispensable.  It  is  worth  our  while  to  familiarise  ourselves  with  Field's 
strategy  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  these  properties  might  be  of  use 
in  our  particular  demarcation  problem  within  the  natural  sciences 
themselves. 
The  key  argument  in  the  realist  dispute  in  mathematics  that  Field 
thinks  he  must  counter  is  the  'indispensability'  argument  from  Quine 
and  Putnam,  the  latter  arguing  from  the  theoretical  indispensability  of 
an  entity  to  its  actual  eidstence.  'Ibis  inference  from  indispensability  to 
reality  is  one  that  Field  explicitly  accepts.  22  His  strategy,  then,  is  to 
grant  the  inference  from  indispensability  to  reality,  but  to  deny 
theoretical  indispensability  to  mathematical  entities.  The  dispensability 
of  mathematical  entities  is  then  argued  for  on  the  grounds  that 
mathematical  systems  as  a  whole  are  essentially  conservative  when 
added  to  a  scientific  theory  N,  whereas  the  addition  of  more  scientific 
theoretical  commitments  to  N  is  not.  These  differences  are  enough, 
says  Field,  to  establish  the  qualitatively  distinct  nature  of  mathematical 
and  scientific  discourse. 
What  Field  means  by  'conservativeness'  is  the  following:  If  any  scientific 
theory  N  in  conjunction  with  a  system  S  will  yield  no  more  observation 
sentences  or  predictions  than  one  could  generate  from  N  on  its  own, 
then  system  S  is  conservative  relative  to  N.  Field's  claim  is  that  all 
mathematical  systems  are  conservative  in  precisely  this  sense. 
Mathematical  systems,  Field  concludes,  are  merely  convenient 
intellectual  tools  that  permit  one  to  draw  out  the  consequences  of  N 
more  quickly  and  easily  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.  But  the 
situation  is  altogether  different  if  what  one  adds  to  N  is  additional 
scientific  theory.  In  this  case  the  conjunction  of  N  and  the  additional 
theoretical  commitments  yields  more  (or  at  least  a  different  set  of) 
observation  statements  and  predictions  than  one  could  derive  from  N 
alone.  Much  of  Field's  time  is  then  spent  in  demonstrating  that 
mathematics  is  indeed  conservative  in  this  way.  He  tries  to  show  this 
by  stripping  certain  scientific  theories  of  their  mathematical  garb  and 99 
showing  that  the  set  of  observation  sentences  derivable  from  the  theory 
is  unaffected. 
It  is  not  my  intention  to  pass  judgement  on  the  success  or  failure  of 
Field's  project,  this  being  both  unnecessary  for  our  present  purposes  as 
well  as  beyond  my  all  too  limited  abilities  in  mathematics.  What 
concerns  us  here  is  whether  there  is  anything  we  can  learn  from  Field's 
mechanism  of  demarcation.  A  little  reflection  will  show,  however,  that  it 
will  not  suffice  for  our  purposes  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science.  One 
can  agree  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the  conservative  (or  non- 
conservative)  nature  of  a  theory  and  the  Dispensibility  (or 
Indispensibility)  of  the  entities  named  in  that  theory,  without  accepting 
that  an  entity's  Dispensibility  (or  Indispensibility)  is  a  guarantee  of  the 
non-ex:  istence  (or  existence)  of  the  entity  in  question.  It  is  not  obvious 
that  a  dispensable  term  necessarily  has  no  extra-linguistic  referent,  nor 
that  an  indispensable  term  necessarily  has  an  extra-linguistic  referent. 
There  is  indeed  an  intuitive  plausibility  to  the  Indispensibility/reality 
principle.  If  scientists  can  ultimately  do  without  mathematics,  is  it  not 
because  mathematics  as  applied  to  the  natural  sciences  is  simply  a  tool 
for  the  organisation  of  phenomena,  whose  terms  are  merely  useful 
constructs  rather  than  names  for  extra-linguistic  'entities'?  And  if  we 
cannot  do  without  a  theoretical  term  from  the  sciences,  is  this  not  good 
reason  to  think  it  is  because  this  term  has  an  extra-lingtiistic  referent? 
And  yet  the  fact  that  a  term  is  deemed  dispensable  may  tell  us  more 
about  a  thinker's  metaphysical  commitments  than  anything  else. 
Indeed  we  have  had  occasion  to  note  in  the  Introduction  the  work,  of 
certain  modem  analytic  philosophers  of  logic  who  have  attempted  to 
dispense  with  terms  for  all  manner  of  three  dimensional  enduring 
objects  (thing-concepts)  by  reinterpreting  them  as  mere  concatenations 
of  sensible  properties  with  no  underlying  substance  to  unify  them. 
Indeed  there  is  nothing  to  stop  us  from  attempting  to  do  away  with 
much  more  than  mathematics.  But  unless  we  are  forced  to  accept  a 
thoroughgoing  phenomenalism,  we  must  suspect  that  Dispensibility  is 
as  likely  to  be  an  indication  of  what  a  thinker  is  willing  to  do  without  as 
it  is  a  sign  of  what  constitutes  reality.  Moreover,  if  we  have  decided  that 
neither  extreme  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science  is  likely  to  be 
satisfactory,  we  must  reject  any  demarcation  mechanism  that  leads  to 
one  extreme  or  the  other. 100 
As  for  a  term's  Indispensibility,  we  must  be  alive  to  the  fact  that  the 
theoretical  indispensability  of  an  entity  is  as  much  a  function  of  the 
state  of  our  theoretical  development  as  it  is  an  indication  of  the 
ontological  status  of  the  entity  in  question.  If  a  term  x  is  deemed 
indispensable  to  a  particular  theory  N,  all  we  may  be  able  to  conclude  is 
that,  at  present,  we  know  of  no  other  way  of  generating  the  set  of 
observation  sentences  to  which  we  are  committed  by  the  acceptance  of 
N.  What  this  means  Is  that  at  any  moment  in  the  history  of  science  we 
may  be  working  with  entities  that  are  indispensable  pro  tempore  without 
there  being  any  guarantee  that  the  entities  we  have  postulated  actually 
e2dst.  This  point  becomes  patently  clear  after  the  briefest  of  studies  in 
the  history  of  science,  which  is  littered  with  discarded  entities  once 
thought  indispensable.  We  must  conclude,  therefore,  that  the' 
dispensable/indispensible  criterion  which  has  animated  the  realist 
dispute  in  mathematics  will  not  serve  as  an  appropriate  demarcation 
mechanism  within  the  natural  sciences  themselves. 
Causal  Efficacy 
Nancy  Cartwright  has  forwarded  another  demarcation  mechanism  in 
How  the  Laws  of  Physics  Lie,  23  based  on  the  distinction  between 
entities  assigned  a  causal  role  in  explanations  and  those  introduced  as 
heuristic  devices.  Such  a  distinction  does  justice  to  our  pre-theoretical 
intuition  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  between  terms  for 
unobservable  entities  like  'force'  as  applied  in  mechanics,  and  'virus'  as 
employed  in  pathology.  The  former  concept  arguably  is  a  heuristic 
device  introduced  to  aid  our  understanding  of  certain  abstract  relations, 
while  the  latter,  being  assigned  a  clear  causal  role,  is  taken  as  naming  a 
real  entity.  We  cannot,  of  course,  do  justice  to  her  whole  account  here, 
but  again  this  is  not  necessary  for  our  purposes.  1  -will,  therefore,  limit 
my  remarks  to  those  aspects  which  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the 
demarcation  problem. 
Cartwright  begins  her  discussion  of  the  realist  dispute  in  science  by 
distinguishing  two  types  of  scientific  law.  According  to  Cartwright, 
there  are  phenomenological  laws,  the  principle  characteristics  of  which 
are  their  descriptive  nature,  and  their  applicability  to  particular  events 101 
and  processes,  and  theoretical  laws,  by  which  she  seems  to  mean  rather 
general  abstract  equations  which  are  not  about  'any  particular 
happenings  in  any  particular  circumstances'.  24  These  theoretical  laws, 
she  claims,  differ  from  the  phenomenological  laws  in  two  interesting 
ways.  First  of  all,  they  are  given  an  explanatory  role  rather  than  being 
confined  to  mere  description.  Secondly,  Cartwright  argues  that  these 
laws  when  applied  to  individual  particular  events  and  circumstances 
prove  to  be  woefully  inadequate  and  can  only  be  saved  by  extensive  use 
of  ceteris  paribus  clauses. 
At  first  sight  Cartwright's  distinction  between  descriptive  and 
explanatory  laws  seems  to  be  a  rough  correlate  of  the 
theory/observation  dichotomy.  But  Cartwright's  originality  lies  in  that 
her  distinction  in  no  way  depends  upon  the  observable/unobservable 
distinction  that  positivists  and  instrumentalists  have  employed  in  the 
past.  In  fact  in  her  introduction  to  this  work  Cartwright  explicitly  states 
more  than  once  that  she  rejects  this  distinction  altogether.  This  brings 
us  to  the  most  interesting  feature  of  her  approach  to  the  realist  dispute, 
namely,  her  attitude  vis  A  vis  scientific  entities. 
The  objective  reality  of  an  entity,  Cartwright  claims,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  its  being  observable  or  not  (a  point  with  which  our  anti-realist  is  in 
complete  agreement).  The  entities  of  physics,  she  argues,  are  simply 
not  the  sorts  of  things  one  can  observe.  This  necessitates  the  finding  of 
another  mechanism  by  which  to  determine  the  ontological  status  of  a 
given  entity.  Cartwright  thinks  she  has  found  such  a  mechanism  in  the 
role  an  entity  plays  in  an  causal  explanation.  By  employing  this 
criterion  Cartwright  feels  she  can  justify  a  realist  stance  vis  a  vis  certain 
unobservable  entities,  causal  processes,  as  well  as  the  set  of 
phenomenological  laws,  while  remaining  an  staunch  anti-realist  with 
respect  to  theoretical  laws,  which  seem  to  encompass  both  highly 
abstract  equations  and  theoretical  models.  Just  how  she  does  this  is,  of 
course,  a  matter  of  some  interest  to  us.  In  particular  it  is  her  realism 
concerning  theoretical  entities  that  is  most  important.  (Just  how 
Cartwright  is  able  to  be  a  realist  about  theoretical  entities  and  an  anti- 
realist  about  theoretical  laws  is  a  problem,  but  not  one  that  will  occupy 
us  here.  As  Van  Fraassen  has  pointed  out,  this  is  a  particularly  thorny 
problem  given  that  theoretical  laws  are  statements  about  the  properties 
of  theoretical  entities.  However,  I  am  not  concerned  with  the  general 102 
viability  of  Cartwright's  account,  only  with  that  of  her  criterion  for 
deter-mining  the  ontological  status  of  an  entity.  ) 
As  said  above,  Cartwright  distances  herself  from  positivists  and 
instrumentalists  who,  she  feels,  lay  too  much  emphasis  on  the 
observable/  unobservable  distinction.  What  strikes  Cartwright  as  more 
important  is  not  whether  an  entity  can  be  observed  or  not,  but  whether 
an  entity  is  a  component  of  an  accepted  causal  explanation.  She  writes: 
Suppose  we  describe  the  concrete  causal  process  by  which  a 
phenomenon  is  brought  about.  That  kind  of  explanation 
succeeds  only  if  the  process  described  actually  occurs.  To  the 
extent  that  we  find  the  causal  explanation  acceptable,  we 
must  believe  in  the  causes  described.  25 
Let  us  leave  aside  the  question  of  whether  an  explanation  can  'succeed' 
or  be  'acceptable'  without  being  true  and  grant,  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  that  a  true  causal  explanation  requires  that  we  be  realists 
about  the  entities  referred  to  in  the  explanation.  With  this  granted, 
Cartwright  has  no  qualms  about  accepting  the  objective  reality  of  the 
most  speculative  and  theoretical  entities  of  the  new  physics,  provided 
they  meet  this  criterion: 
We  can  believe  in  the  unexpected  entities  of  quantum 
electrodynamics  if  we  can  give  them  concrete  causal  roles;  and 
the  rationality  of  that  belief  will  depend  on  what  experimental 
evidence  supports  the  exact  details  of  those  causal  claims.  26 
With  this  criterion  in  hand  Cartwright  is  ready  to  defend  her  realist 
stance  vis  a  vis  theoretical  entities.  However,  there  is  a  further 
requirement  which  brings  to  light  the  inherent  difficulty  of  this 
mechanism.  She  writes: 
Causal  reasoning  provides  good  grounds  for  our  beliefs  in 
theoretical  entities.  Given  our  general  knowledge  about  what 
kinds  of  conditions  and  happenings  are  possible  in  the 
circumstances,  we  reason  backwards  from  the  detailed 
structure  of  the  effects  to  exactly  what  characteristics  the 
causes  must  have  in  order  to  bring  them  about....  But  it  is 
right  only  if  we  are  very  careful  about  what  makes  a  cause 
'likely'.  We  must  have  reason  to  think  that  this  cause,  and  no 
other,  is  the  only  practical  possibility,  and  it  should  take  a  good 
deal  of  critical  experience  to  convince  us  o  this  (my  )f emphasisi  27  103 
This  causal  reasoning  is  reminiscent  ý  of  the  inference  to  the  best 
explanation  in  that  an  explanation  is  given  the  nod  insofar  as  it  is 
deemed  to  be  the  most  'likely'.  But  Cartwright,  following  Van  Fraassen, 
explicitly  rejects  this  form  of  argumentation  when  she  says  that 
explanatory  power  is  no  guarantee  of  truth.  28  If  we  are  to  take 
Cartwright  at  her  word  we  are  led  to  conclude  that  what  we  have  here  is 
not  so  much  an  appeal  to  the  validity  of  this  mode  of  inference,  but  a 
return  to  Aquinas'  desire  for  a  ratio  sufflciens.  Cartwright's  language 
betrays  her  hope  of  side-stepping  the  under  determination  problem  by 
finding  explanations  so  conclusive  as  to  effectively  eliminate  all  practical 
possibility  of  alternative  accounts  being  forwarded.  Once  such  an 
account  is  found  (not  just  to  'best,  but  the  only  likely  account),  one 
would  be  free  to  say  that  any  and  all  entities  referred  to  in  such  an 
explanation  demands  an  realist  interpretation. 
The  problem  with  this  mechanism  is  that  it  suffers  from  all  those 
difficulties  that  beset  Aquinas'  ratio  sufficiens.  This  standard  of 
knowledge  is  simply  too  high  because  alternative  explanations  always 
exist;  hence  too  much  is  given  away  to  the  anti-realist.  One  might 
argue,  however,  that  it  is  not  always  the  case  that  other  'likely' 
explanations  are  ready  to  hand.  Two  points  need  making  here.  First, 
the  absence  of  available  alternatives  does  not  argue  in  favour  of  the 
impossibility  of  alternatives  being  found;  nor  does  it  establish  the  truth 
of  the  one  available  explanation,  although  it  does  suggest  that  it  ought 
to  be  the  one  adopted  for  the  practical  purposes  of  research.  Second, 
all  sufficient  explanations  are  relative  to  an  historical  conceptual 
framework.  In  other  words,  what  appears  'likely'  is  not.  fixed,  one's 
notions  of  'likelihood'  and  'possibility'  depending  as  they  it  do  on  the 
state  of  one's  theoretical  development  and  the  conceptual  framework 
being  employed. 
I  am  in  sympathy  with  Cartwright's  distrust  of  theoretical  laws  which 
are  pressed  into  service  as  explanatory  principles,  since  I  am  suspicious 
of  all  explanatory  components  of  any  scientific  theory.  Consequently  it 
is  not  surprising  that  Cartwright's  faith  in  the  reliability  of  causal 
explanations  as  decisive  method  of  deciding  ontological  questions  seems 
to  me  open  to  serious  objections.  This  is  not  to  insist,  however,  that 104 
everything  that  objectively  exists  must  be  observable,  or  found  in  the 
purely  descriptive  component  of  a  scientific  theory;  Cartwright  is  corTect 
in  abandoning  this  idea.  I  am  merely  stating  that  it  is  not  safe  to 
assume  that  an  entity  that  has  been  assigned  a  role  to  play  in  a  causal 
explanation  need  exist. 
Physical  Operations 
In  Bridgeman's  The  Logic  of  Modem  Physics,  29  we  find  yet  another 
mechanism  for  distinguishing  the  realist  area  of  discourse  from  that 
requiring  an  anti-realist  attitude.  In  chapter  two  of  this  work 
Bridgeman  proposes  a  rule  that  would  allow  one  to  distinguish  real 
things  from  logical  constructs.  He  writes  there  are  in  fact  two  sorts  of 
constructs: 
...  those  to  which  no  physical  operations  correspond  other 
than  those  which  enter  the  definition  of  the  construct,  and 
those  which  admit  of  other  operations,  or  which  could  be 
defined  in  several  alternative  ways  in  terms  of  physically 
distinct  operations.  This  difference  in  character  of  constructs 
may  be  expected  to  correspond  to  essential  physical 
differences  and.  ..  are  much  likely  to  be  overlooked  in  the 
thinking  of  physicists.  30 
Bridgeman  insists  upon  the  importance  of  maintaining  this  distinction. 
He  writes: 
The  moral  of  all  this  is  that  constructs  are  the  most  useful 
and  even  unavoidable  things,  but  that  they  may  have  a  great 
many  dangers,  and  that  a  careful  critique  may  be  necessary  to 
avoid  reading  into  them  implications  which  may  most 
profoundly  affect  our  physical  outlook  and  course  of  action.  31 
That  Bridgeman  is  entirely  correct  concerning  the  importance  of 
examining  our  constructs  with  an  eye  to  determining  what  physical 
entities  if  any  correspond  to  them  I  think  all  will  admit.  But  again  our 
problem  is  to  determine  whether  we  have  here  a  mechanism  that  will 
enable  us  to  carry  out  such  a  critique  of  our  constructs.  Again  I  think 
there  are  grounds  for  reservation.  Bridgeman  was  working  at  a  time 
when  the  scientific  empiricists  were  struggling  to  produce  a  theory  of 105 
meaning  for  terms  for  which  there  was  no  observable  referent. 
Bridgeman  was  trying  to  save  the  meaningfulness  of  a  range  of  useful 
scientific  terms  for  which  no  clear  referent  was  available,  terms  like 
'stress',  'mass',  'atom,  'electric  field',  etc.  Bridgeman  tried  to  define 
such  terms  by  equating  their  meaning  with  the  physical  operations  that 
accompanied  the  term  in  the  theory  in  which  they  were  embedded.  For 
example,  a  ter-in  like  'mass'  would  be  defined  with  reference  to  those 
procedures  employed  to  determine  the  'mass'  of  a  given  object.  Those 
procedures  would  be  the  meaning  of  the  term  'mass',  at.  least  in  that 
instance. 
The  many  difficulties  which  have  been  identified  with  Bridgeman's 
operational  procedure  are  well  documented  and  are  not  strictly  our 
concern.  Our  problem  with  Bridgeman's  demarcation  mechanism 
springs  from  the  limited  range  of  terms  to  which  this  criterion  can  be 
applied.  What  single  physical  operation  could  correspond  to  those 
terms  referring  to  middle-sized,  three  dimensional  enduring  objects? 
Bridgeman's  answer  would  undoubtedly  be  that  no  physical  operations 
are  required  in  order  to  define  such  terms  because  they  have  a  clearly 
observed  reference,  and  hence  a  sufficiently  clear  stimulus  meaning. 
These  terms  are  not  the  sort  of  construct,  if  constructs  they  be,  that 
have  given  scientific  empiricists  semantic  difficulties.  To  seek  to  apply 
the  operational  mechanism  to  such  terms  would  simply  be  misguided. 
The  difficulty  with  such  an  answer  is  that  it  assumes  too  much  theory; 
in  particular,  it  is  already  committed  to  the  'thing-hypothesis'.  The 
positivisticly  inclined  empiilcists  and  phenomenalists  in  both  the 
analytic  and  continental  traditions  have  gone  to  great  lengths  to  rid 
their  thinking  of  anything  that  smacked  of  'metaphysics'.  Thinkers  like 
Mach,  Quine  and  Russell  carry  their  empiricism  to  such  lengths  that 
even  such  everyday  objects  as  tables  and  chairs  are  considered  to  be 
theoretically  constructed  objects.  Our  senses  present  to  us,  as  James 
would  say,  nothing  more  than  a  'blooming,  buzzing  confusion'.  It  is  in 
order  to  deal  with  this  primordial  sensory  confusion  that  we  construct 
what  become  the  three  dimensional  objects  that  endure  through  time 
that  make  up  the  furniture  of  our  ordinary  experience.  These  objects, 
Quine  suggests  in  his  essay  Posits  and  Reality,  32  are  as  theory-laden  as 
molecules  and  atoms.  It  should  be  said  immediately  that  Quine's  point 
is  not  that  we  should  lose  faith  in  the  reality  of  middle  size  dry  goods. 106 
His  point  is  rather  that  if  we  are  comfortable  being  realists  with  respect 
to  tables  and  chairs,  cats  and  dogs,  then  we  should  be  equally 
comfortable  being  realists  about  molecules  and  atoms.  Both  sets  of 
entities  are  human  constructs  that  help  us  to  cope  with  our  field  of 
experience.  The  point  as  far  as  Bridgeman's  operational  mechanism  of 
demarcation  is  concerned  is  that  this  mechanism  will  only  deal  with  a 
limited  range  of  constructs  and  leave  untouched  a  whole  range  of 
constructs  for  which  the  same  question  arises.  Essentially,  Bridgeman 
starts  the  realist  dispute  at  an  excessively  high  level  of  abstraction  in 
our  language,  and  consequently  assumes  too  much  theory.  The  debate 
actually  begins  at  a  much  lower  level,  with  the  thing-hypothesis. 
We  have  now  considered  a  number  of  suggested  demarcation 
mechanisms.  While  there  are  sure  to  others  that  have  been  neglected,  I 
think  this  set  gives  us  a  good  appreciation  of  the  sorts  of  difficulties  we 
face  when  trying  to  combine  realist  and  anti-realist  tendencies  in  a 
single,  coherent  philosophy  of  science.  It  is  time,  then,  to  summarise 
the  lessons  of  this  study  in  preparation  for  the  introduction  of  my 
proposed  solution.  But  these  are  tasks  for  the  next  chapter. 
1  Galileo  Galilei.  Sidereus  Nuncius.  Translated  by  Albert  van  Halden.  Chicago: 
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1989,  p.  11.  Although  Galileo's  work  did  much  to  drive 
home  the  fact  that  the  heavenly  bodies  were  not  in  fact  radically  distinct  in  nature, 
the  idea  of  the  common  nature  of  the  sub  and  superlunary  worlds  did  not  originate 
with  him.  Thorndike  has  pointed  out  that  Alexander  Neckham  in  the  12th  century 
was  well  aware  of  the  mountainous  nature  of  the  lunar  surface.  Far  from  seeing  the 
heavenly  bodies  as  divine,  Neckham  went  so  far  as  to  attribute  to  them  a  sinful 
nature.  See  Thorndike,  A  History  of  Magic  and  Experimental  Science.  London: 
MacMillan  and  Co.  1923,  Vol.  II,  p.  192. 
2  Hans  Blumenburg.  Vie  Genesis  of  the  Copemican  Worl&  Cambridge,  Mass.:  MIT 
Press,  1987,  p.  192. 
3  Sicut  in  astrologia  ponitur  ratio  excentricorum  et  epicyclorum,  ex  hoc  quod  hac 
positione  facta  possunt  salvari  apparentia  sensibilis  circa  motus  coelestes;  non  tamen 
ratio  haec  est  sufficienter  probans,  quia  etiam  forte  alia  positione  facta  salvari 
ossent.  Sununa  Theologiae.  1.  q.  32,  a.  1,  ad  2.  & 
I.  Acet  enim.  talibus  suppositionibus  factis,  apparentia  salvarentur,  non  tamen 
oportet  dicere  has  suppositiones  esse  veras;  quia  fortasse  secundum  aliquam  alium 
modum,  nondum  ab  hominibus  comprehensum,  apparentia  circa  stellas  salvantur. 
Convnentaria  in  libros  Aristotelis  de  caelo  et  mundo,  11,17. 
5  Blumenburg,  p.  192. 
6  Truth  and  Objectivity.  Cambridge,  MA.  Harvard  University  Press,  1992. 
7  Týuth  and  Objectivity,  p.  52. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  52. 
9A  prime  example  of  such  a  discourse  is  arithmetic.  Any  disagreements  in 
arithmetic  are  due  to  one  of  the  disputants  not  appreciating  some  relevant  aspect  of 107 
the  matter  in  question,  be  it  the  meanings  of  terms  or  the  failure  to  follow  certain 
ýiaverning  computational  procedures. 
JL  0  'Duth  and  Objectivity,  p.  52. 
11  Pierre  Duhem.  To  Save  the  Phenomena.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1969,  p.  107. 
12  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  reaction  was  confined  to  those  who  insisted 
on  a  realist  Interpretation  of  astronomical  hypotheses.  The  Copernican  revolution 
was  not  received  in  a  similar  fashion  by  those  who  confined  themselves  as 
astronomers  to  developing  more  accurate  and  convenient  calculi.  To  those  of  this 
school  the  'rationality'  of  the  Copernican  hypothesis  was  not  an  issue. 
13  Pierre  Duhem.  7he  Aim  and  Structure  of  Physical  Vieory.  Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1954. 
14  Ibid.,  p.  292. 
15  Ibid.,  p.  293. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  293. 
17  Gavin  Ardley.  Aquinas  And  Kant:  7he  Foundations  of  the  Modem  Sciences. 
London:  Longmans.  Green  &  Co.  1950. 
18  Ibid..  p.  6. 
19  Ibid.,  p.  12. 
20  Ibid.,  p.  45. 
21  Hartry  Field.  Science  Without  Numbers:  A  Defence  of  Nominalism.  Oxford:  Basil 
Blackwell,  1980. 
22  Field  writes:  'Subatomic  particles  are  theoretically  indispensable.  I  believe  that 
that  is  as  good  an  argument  for  their  existence  as  we  needl'p.  8. 
23  Nancy  Cartwright.  How  the  Laws  ofPhysics  Lte.  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1983. 
24  Ibid.,  p.  9. 
25  Ibid.,  p.  4-5. 
26  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
27  Ibid.,  p.  6. 
28  Ibid.,  p.  4. 
29  Bridgeman.  Ihe  Logic  ofModern  Physics.  New  York:  MacMillan  &  Co..  1927. 
30  Ibid.,  p.  60. 
31  Ibid.,  p.  60. 
32  In  I;  L  Grandy.  Theories  and  Observation  in  Science.  Prentice  Hall,  1973.  Harr6 
makes  a  similar  point  when  he  says  that  the  use  of  thing-concepts  presupposes  a 
whole  series  of  metaphysical  commitments.  See  his  Vie  Philosophies  of  Science, 
Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1972,  p.  20  and  chapter  4. Chapter  5 
Reflections  on  the  Demarcation  Mechanisms 
In  the  last  chapter  our  attention  was  focused  on  the  particular 
shortcomings  of  each  demarcation  mechanism  considered.  Now  I  turn 
to  what  can  be  learnt  from  consideration  of  the  mechanisms  as  a  whole. 
In  particular  I  am  most  concerned  to  isolate  those  features  which  must 
be  incorporated  by  any  viable  demarcation  mechanism.  Once  these 
features  are  identified  we  can  outline  the  nature  of  our  own 
demarcation  mechanism. 
The  principal  lesson  to  be  culled  from  our  brief  study  (apart  from  the 
recognised  precondition  of  the  applicability  of  bivalence)  is  that  point 
upon  which  Aquinas,  Crispin  Wright  and  Nancy  Cartwright  were  all 
agreed.  These  three  authors  all  state,  explicitly  or  otherwise,  that  a 
theory  worthy  of  a  realist  interpretation  must  avoid  the  problem  posed 
by  under  determination.  Although  we  do  not  necessarily  fmd  in  their 
writings  the  language  of  a  Van  Fraassen,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  there  is 
general  agreement  that  so  long  as  a  theory  is  under  determined  the 
most  one  can  claim  for  it  is  'empirical  adequacy'.  One  can  restate  this 
view  in  the  modified  language  of  Wright  by  stipulating  that  any 
discourse  in  the  running  for  a  realist  interpretation  must  display  that 
feature  termed  'Cognitive  Command'.  As  noted  earlier,  the  insistence  on 
'Cognitive  Command'  is  another  way  of  expressing  the  view  that, 
ultimately,  there  ought  to  be  no  room  for  rational,  or  justifiable 
disagreement  about  the  truth  value  of  sentences  in  a  discourse  about 
which  a  realist  interpretation  is  taken.  The  element  of  choice  found  to 
characterise  the  situation  in  which  the  astronomer  finds  himself  vis  A 
vis  astronomical  hypotheses  is  precisely  that  which  Aquinas,  Wright 
and  Cartwright  are  insisting  much  be  avoided  at  all  costs. 
The  next  lesson  to  emerge,  again  from  our  study  of  these  three  authors, 
concerns  the  sorts  of  discourses  likely  to  be  successful  candidates  for 
Cognitive  Command.  We  saw  in  the  case  of  Aquinas,  and  more 
precisely  in  our  study  of  Wright,  that  Cognitive  Command  is  not  readily 
attainable  for  any  discourse  marked  by  a  high  degree  of  theoretical 109 
abstraction.  In  the  language  of  Wright,  disagreements  arise  from  either 
'divergent  input',  or  from  what  I  will  call  'interpretative  malfunction'. 
Now,  as  we  saw,  disagreements  of  the  latter  persuasion  have  the 
unfortunate  quality  of  not  being  readily  resolvable  simply  by  reference 
to  a  common  standard  of  rationality.  This  was  due  precisely  to  the  fact 
that  no  such  common  standard  need  e.,  dst  between  all  disputants.  In 
such  cases  either  party  to  the  dispute  can  uphold  the  rationality  of  his 
position  and  claim  his  opponent  is  in  error,  thereby  creating  an 
argumentative  stalemate.  The  important  implication  of  this  loss  of 
Cognitive  Command  for  such  discourses  is  that  we  must  approach  all 
theory  with  a  high  level  of  suspicion  as  being  unsuitable  candidates  for 
realist  interpretation. 
This  mistrust  of  theory  leads  to  two  important  conclusions.  The  first  is 
obvious:  a  discourse  about  which  a  realist  interpretation  is  possible 
must  be  of  a  low  level  of  theoretical  abstraction.  This  is  a  fundamental 
point  that  cannot  be  forgotten  or  overemphasised.  The  second  bears 
more  directly  on  the  nature  of  the  demarcation  mechanism  we  are 
looking  for.  If  we  are  animated  by  a  mistrust  of  theory  it  is  only 
sensible  to  insist  that  the  acceptability  of  the  demarcation  mechanism 
not  be  determined  by  previously  adopted  theoretical  and  ontological 
commitments  alone.  In  other  words,  it  will  not  do  to  accept  that 
demarcation  mechanism  which  happens  to  make  a  cut  which  suits  our 
theoretical  position.  This  leads  to  the  following  delicate  problem:  if  a 
demarcation  mechanism  is  not  to  be  chosen  in  accordance  with  one's 
theoretical  commitments,  and  we  accept  that  there  is  no  theory-free 
observation  language,  let  alone  a  theory-free  conceptual  scheme,  how  is 
the  choice  of  demarcation  mechanism  to  be  justified?  How  can  our 
choice  of  demarcation  mechanism  ever  be  uncontaminated  by  our 
theoretical  commitments? 
We  will  recall  that  Quine  and  Putnam  maintain  that  objects  are  relative 
to  conceptual  schemes.  Given  this  relativity,  there  is  no  guarantee  that 
objects  recognised  by  those  operating  with  conceptual  scheme  A  will  be 
recognised  by  those  operating  with  conceptual  scheme  B,  and  vis  versa. 
But  what  if  some  objects  are  found  in  all  conceptual  schemes?  Would 
these  objects  not  be  independent  of  any  parochial  conceptual  scheme? 110 
And  would  this  independence  not  justify  our  conferring  upon  these 
objects  a  particular  status  given  that  they  can  take  their  place  in  all 
conceptual  schemes?  And  would  the  demarcation  mechanism  that 
identifies  such  objects,  should  they  e.  -dst,  not  be  supremely  well  suited 
to  our  needs?  Now  I  suggest  that  we  would  be  justified  in  treating  in  a 
realist  fashion  sentences  whose  terms  refer  to  objects  which  are  able  to 
take  their  place  in  all  conceptual  schemes,  and  in  claiming  that  the 
mechanism  by  mean  of  which  we  identify  such  objects  is  free  of 
contamination  by  any  one  parochial  conceptual  scheme. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  formulate  an  idea  of  the  sort  of  discourse  we 
ought  to  be  seeldng  and  the  principal  characteristic  of  the  demarcation 
mechanism  that  will  produce  this  discourse.  What  realists  require  is  a 
particular  conceptual  scheme  which  includes  an  ontology,  the 
properties  of  the  various  entities  of  that  ontology,  and  a  set  of 
intellectual  practices  or  norms  governing  modes  of  inference.  But  what 
will  distinguish  this  conceptual  scheme  from  all  others  is  that  it  will 
limit  itself  to  those  features  common  to  all  conceptual  schemes.  Our 
guiding  question  must  be:  What  are  those  elements  that  all  conceptual 
schemes  must  employ,  and  about  which  there  is  no  rational 
disagreement?  In  other  words,  what  are  those  features  of  conceptual 
schemes  which  enjoy  a  peculiar  form  of  Cognitive  Command?  It  is  this 
species  speciftc  conceptual  scheme  that  realists  must  identify. 
Note  that  I  am  not  seeking  an  'objective'  conceptual  scheme.  We  hope 
in  vain  for  such  a  thing,  as  we  do  for  a  completely  theory-free 
observation  language  or  knowledge  of  things-in-themselves.  We  are 
only  able  to  know  and  represent  in  our  language  entities  and  their 
properties  insofar  as  they  affect  us,  insofar  as  they  impinge  upon  our 
particular  set  of  sensory  organs.  As  members  of  a  particular  species, 
we  come  equipped  with  a  species  specific  sensory  apparatus  which,  in  a 
manner  analogous  to  the  Kantian  categories,  forms  the  framework  of 
our  perceptions  of  the  world  around  us.  This  being  unavoidably  the 
case,  we  cannot  hope  to  be  any  more  objective  than  our  sensory 
apparatus  permits.  But  what  we  can  postulate  is  a  hierarchy  of 
sentences  in  our  language  reflecting  the  degree  of  'theory-ladenness'  of 
each  sentence.  In  the  first  class  we  have  that  set  of  sentences  reporting III 
on  a  purely  uninterpreted  reality,  sentences  that  simply  'tell  it  like  it  is'. 
Strictly  speaking,  this  set  of  sentences  is  empty.  In  the  second  class  we 
have  those  sentences  reporting  on  a  relatively  uninterpreted  reality. 
These  are  the  target  sentences  of  our  species  specific  conceptual 
scheme,  and  those  about  which,  I  will  argue,  a  realist  interpretation  is 
possible.  In  the  third  class  are  those  sentences  reporting  on  a  relatively 
interpreted  reality.  Such  sentences  contain  references  to  objects  found 
only  in  parochial  conceptual  schemes,  and  are  amenable  to  only  an 
anti-realist  interpretation.  Finally,  one  might  postulate  a  set  of 
sentences  with  no  ontological  import.  These  are  sentences  to  which  the 
principle  of  bivalence  does  not  apply. 
It  still  remains  to  discuss  how  these  distinctions  are  to  be  drawn.  It  is 
here  that  I  must  begin  my  comments  on  discussions  in  the  philosophy 
of  language  surrounding  the  problem  of  radical  translation.  I  propose  to 
treat  in  a  realist  fashion  those  sentences  containing  reference  to  objects 
whose  linguistic  signs  cross  translation  determinately.  The  peculiar 
feature  of  such  objects,  I  suggest,  is  that  they  are  independent  of  any 
parochial  conceptual  scheme  because  they  are  able  to  take  their  place 
in  all  conceptual  schemes,  as  demonstrated  by  the  determinate 
translatability  of  their  linguistic  counterpart.  What  the  set  of  such 
objects  amounts  to  is  what  one  might  the  'highest  common 
denominator'  of  possible  ontological  and  conceptual  schemes. 
The  implication  of  this  is  that  all  commitments  to  sentences  containing 
reference  to  objects  whose  linguistic  counterpart  do  not  cross 
translation  determinately  are  immediately  classed  as  relative  to  a  local, 
historical,  parochial  conceptual  scheme.  Commitments  in  this  area, 
which  I  would  suggest  are  inevitable,  and  more  importantly,  not  to  be 
avoided,  inevitably  involve  an  inference  to  the  best  available 
explanation.  But  as  we  noted  in  the  preceding  chapter,  and  in  our 
opening  discussions  of  the  realist  dispute  in  science,  best  explanations 
are  always  'best'  relative  to  an  historical  conceptual  scheme.  This  being 
the  case,  caution  and  modesty  demand  that  an  anti-realist  perspective 
be  taken  vis  a  vis  such  explanations. 
The  remainder  of  this  study  will  be  devoted  to  the  exposition  and 112 
defence  of  this  demarcation  mechanism  based  on  radical  translation. 
In  so  doing  the  connections  with  Aristotelianism,  and,  consequently, 
with  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science,  will  begin  to  emerge.  The  merit  of 
my  demarcation  mechanism  is  that  it  treats  each  conceptual  scheme 
and  each  ontological  claim  with  as  much  impartiality  as  one  can  expect 
because  it  is  in  instances  of  radical  translation  that  our  parochial 
conceptual  scheme  is  of  necessity  laid  to  one  side.  The  'core'  ontology 
that  results  I  will  argue  is  composed  of  what  one  can  term  Aristotelian 
substances.  Our  interest  will  then  turn  to  the  shape  and  character  of 
the  philosophy  of  science  that  confines  itself  to  the  investigation  of  such 
an  ontology.  Such  a  philosophy  is  that  of  Aquinas.  But  before  these 
matters  can  be  explored,  problems  relating  to  Quine's  famous  thesis, 
the  indeterminacy  of  radical  translation,  must  be  treated  in  full. Chapter  6 
On  the  Indeterminacy  of  Radical  Translation 
We  must  begin  our  discussion  of  our  demarcation  mechanism  with  an 
examination  of  the  circumstances  in  which  a  linguist  finds  himself 
when  faced  with  the  challenge  of  translating  a  radically  unfamiliar 
language.  Donald  Davidson  has  argued  that  a  linguist's  ability  to 
successfully  translate  the  speech  of  someone  using  such  a  language 
depends  in  part  upon  his  ability  to  master  a  particular  skill,  namely, 
simultaneously  guessing  what  the  speaker  of  the  target  language 
believes  to  be  true  and  what  his  sentences  mean.  1  The  rationale 
behind  this  statement  is  that  the  linguist  cannot  determine  what  the 
speaker  means  without  knowing  what  he  believes;  and  conversely,  the 
translator  cannot  determine  what  the  speaker  believes  without  knowing 
what  he  means.  It  follows  that  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  translation 
process,  i.  e.,  when  the  linguist  does  not  yet  understand  what  the 
speaker  means  to  convey  by  his  utterances,  the  translator  is  forced  to 
posit  a  number  of  sentences  he  assumes  the  speaker  believes.  Without 
this  initial  attribution  of  beliefs  to  the  speaker  the  translator  cannot 
break  into  the  hermeneutic  circle.  For  the  linguist  begins  his  work  by 
assigning  meanings  to  the  speaker's  utterances  in  such  a  way  as  to 
maintain  as  much  agreement  as  possible  between  the  speaker's 
sentences  and  this  initial  set  of  attributed  beliefs.  He  will  not,  for 
example,  interpret  a  given  utterance  in  such  a  way  as  to  imply  that  the 
speaker  believes  something  patently  false.  Of  course  subsequent 
experience  is  likely  to  demand  that  this  set  of  attributed  beliefs  be 
altered.  Nevertheless,  without  this  initial  attribution  of  beliefs  the 
translation  process  cannot  begin. 
The  matter  of  philosophical  interest  for  us,  however,  is  the  character  of 
this  initial  set  of  attributed  beliefs.  Implementation  of  Davidson's 
principle  of  charity  leads  the  linguist  to  two  general  conclusions  on  this 
matter.  In  the  first  place,  the  linguist  ought  to  attribute  only'plausible' 
beliefs  to  the  speaker.  Davidson  writes  that  the  translator's 
interpretations  of  the  speaker,  his  'acceptable  determinations  of 
meaning',  are  'limited  by  general  psychological  principles  upon 
intelligible  ascriptions  of  belief.  2  Secondly,  it  is  assumed  at  the  outset 114 
that  the  speaker's  individually  'plausible'  beliefs  are  organised  into  a 
relatively  coherent  system  or  framework.  Hence  it  is  assumed  both  that 
the  speaker  is  not  given  to  believing  obviously  false  sentences,  and  that 
he  has  some  idea  of  logical  relationships  which  determine  how  the 
framework  of  beliefs  is  to  be  constructed.  But  how  does  the  translator 
decide  what  counts  as  a  'plausible'  belief?  How  does  he  decide  what  set 
of  beliefs  to  call  upon  in  the  initial  stages  of  translation? 
guine  has  much  to  say  on  this  matter.  In  his  Philosophy  of  Logic  he 
writes: 
It  behooves  us,  in  construing  a  strange  language,  to  make  the 
obvious  sentences  go  over  into  English  sentences  that  are  true 
and,  preferably  also  obvious.  3 
Quine  gives,  'It  is  raining',  as  an  example  of  an  obvious  sentence.  Such 
a  sentence  is  thought  to  be  obvious  because,  Quine  says,  everyone  who 
understands  English  will  assent  to  it  in  the  appropriate  circumstances. 
Quine  calls  this  type  of  obvious  sentence  an  'occasion'  sentence,  by 
which  he  means  sentences  to  which  everyone  will  assent  given  the 
proper  occasion  or  circumstances.  Such  sentences  contain  terms  which 
have  what  he  calls  a  clear  'stimulus  meaning'.  It  is  when  the 
appropriate  stimulus  impinges  upon  one's  sensory  apparatus  that  one 
has  the  appropriate  occasion  to  assent  to  sentences  like  'It  is  raining. 
Since  linguists  want  to  attribute  only  'plausible'  beliefs  to  the  target 
language  speaker,  occasion  sentences,  being  not  just  plausible  but 
obvious,  are  ideally  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  translator  trying  to  break 
into  the  hermeneutic  circle. 
Quine  makes  another  interesting  comment  worth  noting  which 
indicates  the  sorts  of  sentences  the  linguist  ought  not  to  employ  in  the 
opening  stages  of  translation.  In  Word  and  Object  Quine  has  this  to  say 
about  theoretical  terms,  in  particular,  those  of  the  sciences: 
terms  of  sysiematic  theoretical  science  have  no  socially 
constant  stimulus  meaning  to  govern  their  use;  [sentences 
containing  such  terms  are]  commonly  useless  in  the  role  of 
occasion  sentence.  4 115 
That  such  sentences  would  be  useless  as  occasion  sentences  is  readily 
understandable.  When  confronted  with  a  strange  language  one  must 
begin  by  learning  the  terms  for  objects  with  clear,  unambiguous 
stimulus  meanings,  objects,  that  is,  which  are  immediately  apparent  to 
both  linguist  and  speaker.  Now  the  reason  simple  occasion  sentences 
containing  terms  referring  to  middle  size  three  dimensional  objects  are 
suited  to  our  linguist's  needs  is  that  they  are  likely  to  be  members  of 
that  set  of  sentences  I  characterised  as  reflecting  our  relatively 
uninterpreted  reality.  Regardless  of  the  differing  theoretical 
commitments  embodied  iii  two  radically  different  conceptual  schemes, 
the  users  of  these  schemes  cannot  fail  to  have  in  common  the  brute 
surroundings  in  which  they  find  themselves.  Stimulus  is  common  to 
all,  if  interpretation  of  that  stimulus  Is  not.  Translation  itself  depends 
for  its  very  possibility  on  there  being  this  relatively  uninterpreted  reality 
which  is  experienced  by  all  in  much  the  same  way.  If  this  common 
ground  did  not  exist  there  would  be  no  way  for  the  translator  to  break 
into  the  hermeneutic  circle.  The  point  of  interest  for  us,  however,  is 
that  this  relationship  can  be  exploited.  We  can  determine  whether  a 
given  sentence  reflects  something  of  this  relatively  uninterpreted  reality  if 
the  sentence  can  serve  as  an  occasion  sentence  in  the  initial  stages  of 
translation.  In  the  interests  of  terminological  convenience  I  will  say  that 
these  sentences  contain  terms  referring  to  object  which  'cross 
translation  determinately'.  And  as  stated  in  the  last  chapter,  I  suggest 
that  such  objects  are  Aristotelian  substances,  or  middle  size,  three 
dimensional  objects  that  exist  in  space  and  through  time. 
But  there  is  a  difficulty  which  threatens  to  complicate  our  relatively 
simple  solution  to  the  demarcation  problem,  however,  viz.,  Quine's 
indeterminacy  of  translation  thesis.  If  Quine  is  correct,  we  have  no 
right  to  claim  that  the  terms  referring  to  the  three  dimensional  objects  I 
have  mentioned  do  indeed  cross  translation  determinately.  (It  is 
important  to  recognise  that  his  obvious  sentence  'It  is  raining'  does  not 
contain  reference  to  a  particular  object  which  is  raining.  )  What  this 
suggests  is  that  despite  the  fact  that  occasion  sentences  containing 
reference  to  three  dimensional  objects  can  be  employed  in  the  early 
stages  of  translation,  a  point  Quine  does  not  dispute,  we  are  in  no 
position  to  claim  that  the  objects  picked  out  by  the  terms  in  our 116 
sentences  correspond  exactly  to  the  objects  picked  out  by  the  target 
sentences.  In  other  words,  we  have  no  grounds  for  claiming  that  the 
three  dimensional  objects  I  referred  to  belong  to  all  conceptual  schemes 
even  though  they  are  indispensable  to  the  process  of  translation  in  the 
initial  stages.  In  fact,  given  the  indeterminacy  of  translation,  the  three 
dimensional  objects  of  our  home  language  may  find  no  place  whatsoever 
in  a  foreign  conceptual  scheme.  What  is  more,  Quine  argues  that  our 
'objectifying  tendency'  may  not  be  'an  invariable  trait  of  human 
nature'.  5  So  It  is  not  just  that  other  conceptual  schemes  might  have  a 
different  set  of  objects;  they  might  not  have  any  three  dimensional 
ob-ects  at  all.  9 
These  claims  are  of  great  importance  to  us,  for  if  objects  themselves  are 
constructs,  as  Quine  suggests,  then  a  realist  interpretation  of  them  will 
have  to  be  forgone.  However,  the  thesis  that  our  objectifying  tendency 
may  be  peculiar  to  our  conceptual  scheme  alone  suffers  a  set  back  if  we 
can  show  that  determinate  translation  is  attainable  in  the  case  of 
occasion  sentences  containing  reference  to  three  dimensional  objects. 
This  is  the  task  of  this  last  study.  We  must  show  that  our  objectifying 
tendency  is  an  invariable  human  trait  by  showing  that  these  objects  do 
cross  translation  determinately,  thereby  establishing  their 
independence  from  any  one  parochial  conceptual  scheme.  But  before 
we  can  proceed  with  this  task  it  is  best  to  start  with  a  thorough 
presentation  of  Quine's  argument  for  the  indeterminacy  of  translation. 
Quine's  argument  for  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  relies  on  certain 
assumptions  to  which  I  have  already  alluded.  Quine  opens  'Speaking  of 
Ob  ects'by  remarking  that  those  operating  with  our  conceptual  scheme:  j 
persist  in  breaking  reality  down  somehow  into  a  multiplicity  of 
identifiable  and  descriminable  objects,  to  be  referred  to  by 
singular  and  general  terms.  6 
To  our  immediate  question,  'Is  this  multiplicity  of  objects  relative  to  a 
particular  conceptual  scheme?  ',  Quine  answers  that  this  'objectiiýring 
pattern'  might  not  be  an  invariable  trait  of  human  nature,  implying  that 
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constructed  and  not  discovered.  Furthermore,  Quine  says  that  when 
we  come  to  translate  a  foreign  language  in  which  a  different  conceptual 
scheme  finds  expression: 
we  are  bound  to  adapt  [this]  alien  pattern  to  our  own  in  the 
very  process  of  understanding  or  translating  alien  sentences.  7 
This  'objectifying  pattern'  is  then  doubly  pernicious.  First  it  leads  us  to 
construct  rather  than  discover  a  set  of  objects  out  of  the  blooming, 
buzzing  confusion;  then  we  are  prevented  from  considering  any  other 
approach  to  reality  because  all  foreign  conceptual  schemes  are 
inevitably  caste  in  the  structures  of  our'mother'  scheme  in  the  process 
of  being  understood. 
Quine's  illustrates  this  procrustean  habit  of  translators  by  highlighting 
the  difficulties  they  encounter  when  faced  with  simple  target  sentences 
like'Gavagai'.  To  take  Quine's  famous  example:  while  at  work  gathering 
what  he  calls  'stimulus  meanings',  a  translator  happens  upon  the  term 
'Gavagai'  which,  Quine  says.  inevitably  promotes  assent  among  the 
target  language  users  when  they  are  in  the  presence  of  rabbits.  The 
translator  then  quite  properly  construes  the  term  'Gavagai'  as  meaning 
'Rabbit',  or,  'Lo,  a  rabbit'  since  all  three  expressions  have  the  same 
stimulus  meaning.  But  it  is  here  that  Quine  enters  with  his  views  on 
our  objectifying  tendencies.  If  the  linguist  equates  'Gavagai'  with  our 
term  Tabbit';  if  he  should  think  that  'rabbit'  determinately  translates 
'Gavagai',  then  he  is  imposing  our  objectifying  pattern  on  the  foreigner 
without  justification. 
Quine's  reason  for  suspecting  that  the  linguist  may  be  guilty  of 
imposing  our  objectifying  pattern  onto  the  target  language  stems  from 
the  alleged  indeterminacy  of  the  stimulus  meaning  of  'Gavagai'.  It  is 
here  that  Quine's  argument  really  begins.  Quine's  argument  Is  that, 
although  for  all  practical  purposes  the  linguist  is  correct  to  translate 
'Gavagai'  by  the  term  'rabbit',  'Gavagai'  is  in  fact  also  stimulus 
equivalent  to  'rabbit  parts',  Tabbithood',  and  even  the  unlikely  'it 
rabbiteth'.  Therefore  Quine  concludes  that  it  is  quite  illegitimate  to 
immediately  assume  that  'rabbit'  is  intended  rather  than  Tabbiteth'  or 118 
any  of  the  other  candidates.  Quine  sums  up  his  worry  in  the  dictum: 
Reference  is  behaviourally  inscrutable.  It  is  necessary  to  recall  that 
Quine  is  a  committed  proponent  of  the  school  of  naturalism  in 
semantics:  a  meaning  must  be  expressible  in,  and  gatherable  from, 
publicly  observable  linguistic  and  bodily  behaviour.  Quine's  claim  is 
that  from  the  speaker's  behaviour,  linguistic  or  otherwise,  the  linguist  is 
unable  to  determinately  decide  whether  the  foreigner  is  referring  to 
rabbits  or  rabbit  parts,  etc. 
The  next  step  in  Quine's  argument  follows  from  the  inscrutability  of 
reference.  In  the  process  of  translating  a  strange  language  the  linguist 
must  make  good  guesses  as  to  what  to  count  as  nouns,  verbs,  particles, 
predicates  etc.  As  already  noted,  the  translator  must  make  the 
intelligent  guess  that  'Gavagai'  is  equivalent  to  'rabbit'  and  not  one  of 
the  other  candidates.  This  guess  work  has  two  consequences.  First, 
what  seems  an  intelligent  guess  will  unavoidably  depend  on  the 
linguist's  own  conceptual  scheme.  The  result  is  that  the  linguist 
inevitably  forces  the  target  language  into  the  grammatical  categories  of 
the  home  language  in  the  very  attempt  to  make  the  target  utterances 
intelligible.  The  second  consequence  is just  as  serious.  Quine  argues 
that  much  of  the  translation  manual  the  linguist  will  produce  is  quite 
arbitrary.  Since  the  linguist  has  only  the  underdetermined  stimulus 
meanings  to  go  on  there  is  inevitably  a  degree  of  creative  interpretation 
involved  in  the  linguist's  work.  This  creativity  on  the  part  of  the  linguist 
means  that  it  is  theoretically  possible  to  have  two  mutually  inconsistent 
tr  anslations  of  the  same  target  language  both  of  which  satisfying  all 
relevant  empirical  constraints. 
Quine  adds  to  his  case  by  isolating  a  contributing  factor  to,  if  not  the 
principle  cause  of,  the  inscrutability  of  reference.  He  states  that  in 
order  for  one  to  be  sure  that  another  language  user  is  actually  referring 
to  a  particular  discrete  object  one  must  be  assured  that  the  language 
user  has  a  competent  grasp  of  what  Quine  calls  'the  apparatus  of 
individuation'  of  the  particular  language  being  employed.  The  terms 
and  grammatical  devices  that  make  up  this  apparatus  of  Individuation 
allow  a  speaker  to  signal  to  an  interlocutor  that  he  is  differentiating 
between  the  various  objects  he  wishes  to  speak  about.  Quine  illustrates 119 
the  importance  of  this  apparatus  by  pointing  out  that  we  cannot 
determine  if  a  child  knows  the  difference  between  terms  for  individual 
things,  mass  terms,  or,  terms  for  properties  or  predicates  until  the  child 
has  mastered  the  apparatus  of  individuation.  Quine  argues  that  a  child 
can  use  terms  like  'mum'.  'water'.  and  'red'  without  knowing  our 
conceptual  scheme  of  'mobile,  enduring  physical  objects'.  It  is  not  until 
the  child  uses  terms  like  'apple'  that  our  uncertainty  can  be  dispelled. 
To  use  the  term  'apple'  correctly  the  child  must  appreciate  the  difference 
between  expressions  like  'that  apple',  'not  that  apple',  'some  apple', 
'these  apples'  etc.,  all  of  which  employ  parts  of  the  apparatus  of 
individuation.  To  achieve  this  mastery  the  child  must  come  to  recognise 
that  the  term  'apple'  refers  to  distinct  individual  objects.  But  the  point 
Quine  continually  insists  upon  is  that  the  apparatus  of  individuation  of 
another  language  is  always  empirically  underdetermined.  Because  the 
linguist  lacks  access  to  this  apparatus  of  the  target  language  Quine 
claims  the  linguist  will  be  unable  to  determine  which  expressions  to 
count  as  predicates  and  which  as  subjects,  or  even  if  the  language 
contains  such  elements.  Consequently,  the  linguist  will  never  be  able  to 
conclusively  determine  whether  the  target  conceptual  scheme  which 
finds  expression  in  the  target  language  includes  three  dimensional 
ob  ects.  This  leads  Quine  to  say:  j 
I  have  urged  that  we  could  know  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
stimulatory  conditions  of  every  possible  act  of  utterance,  in  a 
foreign  language,  and  still  not  know  how  to  determine  what 
objects  the  speaker  of  that  language  believes  in.  8 
Such  then  is  Quine's  argument  for  the  indeterminacy  of  translation. 
But  for  all  the  emphasis  so  far  placed  on  the  possibility  of  significant 
differences  between  conceptual  schemes  (which  no  one  would  deny),  we 
must  remember  that  there  are  common  features  of  our  experience 
which  allow  for  the  possibility  of  translation  in  the  first  place.  And 
inasmuch  as  conceptual  schemes  are  developed  in  order  to  make  our 
experiences  intelligible,  these  common  features  must  become  elements 
of  our  conceptual  scheme;  and  insofar  as  these  experiences 
- 
are 
common,  they  must  figure  in  all  conceptual  schemes  In  one  form  or 
another.  Quine  includes  among  the  common  features  which  allow 
radical  translation  to  get  off  the  ground  simple  sensory  properties  (the 120 
material  of  occasion  sentences).  He  also  includes  the  logical  constants 
of  classical  logic,  and  signs  of  assent  and  dissent.  But  three 
dimensional  objects  are  not  included  in  the  set  of  common  features. 
Once  the  translator  moves  beyond  this  set  of  common  features, 
indeterminacy  sets  in,  increasing  with  the  distance  travelled  from  this 
solid  foundation. 
Those  who  wish  to  maintain  a  realist  position  with  respect  to  middle 
size  three  dimensional  objects  can  agree  that  signs  of  assent  and 
dissent  are  determinately  interpretable.  We  can  also  retain  Quine's 
position  on  most  of  the  logical  constants  of  classical  logic  without 
further  discussion.  What  we  cannot  accept,  of  course,  is  the 
implication  that  three  dimensional  objects  are  not  common  to  all 
conceptual  schemes,  and  hence  not  candidates  for  realist 
interpretation.  This  raises  the  prospect  that  realists  must  content 
themselves  with  what  has  been  called  a  'feature  placing  world'.  For  if 
Quine  is  right  we  must  accept  the  possibility  that  the  world  is  not  made 
up  of  enduring  objects  at  all,  despite  the  fact  that  our  sensory 
apparatus  leads  us  to  believe  otherwise.  Rather  than  containing 
objects,  the  world  may  consist  of  disembodied  features  or  qualities 
which  present  themselves  to  our  senses  but  which  are  not  wedded  to 
any  supporting  object  that  possesses  these  features  or  qualities.  To 
conclude  that  these  features  are  supported  by  objects  is  to  fall  prey  to 
our  parochial  objectifying  tendency. 
In  the  rest  of  this  study  I  will  present  a  series  of  arguments  against 
Quine's  indeterminacy  thesis  and  the  phenomenalism  it  can  be  used  to 
support.  It  is  my  contention  that  taken  together  these  arguments 
constitute  a  formidable  assault  on  the  plausibility  of  the  crucial  theses 
that  our  objectifýririg  pattern  is  not  an  invariable  trait  of  human  nature 
and  that  objects  do  not  cross  translation.  I  will  first  consider 
Strawson's  highly  suggestive  argument  that  identification  and  re 
identification  of  objects  in  language  is  made  possible  by  the  fact  that 
language  users  share  a  common  conceptual  framework  of  space  and 
time.  If  Strawson  is  correct,  possession  of  the  conceptual  framework  of 
space  and  time  is  made  possible  precisely  by  the  recognition  of  the 
presence  of  three  dimensional  objects.  I  will  then  call  upon  Evan's 121 
argument  to  the  effect  that,  pace  Quine,  mastery  of  the  foreign 
apparatus  of  individuation  is  not  a  necessary  condition  of  a  linguist 
Identifying  expressions  playing,  the  role  of  subjects  and  predicates  in  the 
sentences  of  the  target  language.  Evan's  argument  suggests  that  if  the 
target  language  speaker  objectifies  as  we  do,  and  we  have  good  reason 
to  believe  that  he  does,  then  we  will  be  able  to  obtain  behavioural 
evidence  to  this  effect.  Finally,  I  will  consider  Davidson's  Rule  of  Three, 
which  suggests  that  Quine  overlooks  an  important  source  of 
information  upon  which  the  linguist  can  call  when  in  the  initial  stages 
of  translation.  This  argument  has  the  effect  of  mitigating  the 
importance  of  the  fact  that  reference  is  behaviourally  inscrutable  and 
lends  credibility  to  the  suggestion  that  all  humans  not  merely  objectify, 
but  objectify  in  much  the  same  way. 
Strawson  and  the  Space-71me  conceptualframework 
In  his  work  Individuals,  Strawson  outlines  and  develops  a  descriptive 
metaphysics.  9  From  Part  One  in  particular  an  argument  can  be 
extracted  which  serves  to  highlight  the  difficulties  facing  anyone  who 
wishes  to  defend  the  coherence  of  a  feature  placing  world.  Strawson 
draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  certain  linguistic  practices,  in 
particular,  our  ability  to  identify  and  re  identify  objects  in  language,  is 
difficult  to  account  for  in  a  feature  placing  world  since  these  abilities  are 
seen  to  imply  the  existence  of  material  bodies  and  persons. 
Strawson  begins  Part  One  by  listing  the  leading  assumptions  of  our 
conceptual  scheme.  These  assumptions  are  as  follows: 
i)  The  world  contains  contingent  particular  things,  'some  of  which  are 
independent  of  ourselves'.  This  statement  expresses  both  the 
metaphysical  realist  view  of  the  mind-independent  nature  of  the  world, 
and  the  additional  view  that  this  world  consists  of  independently 
existing  things. 
ii)  The  world  has  a  history  of  particular  episodes.  Apart  from  things, 
there  are  also  happenings,  or  events,  in  this  world. 122 
iii)  We  can  talk  about  these  things  and  happenings  in  our  discussions 
with  fellow  language  users.  This  is  to  say  that  in  language  we  are  able 
to  refer  to  things  and  that  our  references  are  clear  to  our  interlocutors. 
In  Strawson's  terminology,  we  can  identify  particulars. 
iv)  This  set  of  three  principles  is  completed  by  the  fourth  and  final 
guiding  assumption,  namely  that  all  language  users  experience  the 
world  in  a  single,  unified  spatio-temporal  framework.  Strawson  does 
not  state  explicitly  that  all  human  beings  experience  the  world  in  this 
way  regardless  of  cultural  background,  but  his  argument  can  be 
universalised  in  this  way,  as  I  will  show. 
Having  acknowledged  his  assent  to  this  set  of  assumptions,  Strawson 
eventually  draws  our  attention  to  a  particular  problem,  namely,  the 
difficulty  of  arguing  in  their  defence.  Indeed,  as  any  student  of  rhetoric 
knows,  the  premises  of  any  successful  argument  must  be  more  certain 
than  the  conclusion  to  which  they  lend  support.  Premises  less  certain 
than  the  conclusion  are  of  no  use  to  the  rhetor  since  the  uncertain 
cannot  be  established  by  further  uncertainties.  But  assumptions  (i)-(iv) 
are  seemingly  as  self-evident  as  one  could  expect.  Consequently,  '  all 
argument  for  them  will  have  a  whiff  of  implausibility,  an  air  of  being 
excessively  contrived.  He  writes  in  acknowledgement  of  this  problem 
that 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  such  beliefs  could  be  argued  for 
except  by  showing  their  consonance  with  the  conceptual 
scheme  which  we  operate,  by  showing  how  they  reflect  the 
structure  of  that  scheme.  10 
The  conceptual  scheme  to  which  Strawson  is  referring  is  the  spatio- 
temporal  framework  of  (W).  On  the  face  of  it  then,  Strawson's  only 
plausible  strategy  is  to  present  a  coherentist  argument  in  support  of 
these  claims.  In  the  course  of  this  argument  Strawson  makes  the 
particularly  interesting  claim  that  (iii)  would  not  be  possible  were  it  not 
for  (M,  i.  e.,  that  our  ability  to  identify  particulars  is  made  possible  by 
the  fact  that  we  all  experience  the  world  in  a  spatio-temporal 
framework.  Just  as  importantly,  Strawson  argues  that  (tv)  would  not  be 
conceivable  without  (i)  and  (ii)  being  true. 
My  intention  is  to  modify  Strawson's  argument  to  suit  the  purposes  we 123 
have  set  ourselves.  The  reader  will  recall  that  I  am  interested  in  proving 
that  our  objectifying  tendency  that  Quine  has  noticed  is  an  invariable 
trait  of  human  experience.  Strawson  provides  the  resources  for  such  an 
argument.  The  modified  argument  I  want  to  forward  is  the  following: 
1)  All  human  beings  capable  of  using  language  inevitably  experience 
the  world  in  a  unified  spatio-temporal  framework. 
2)  In  order  to  operate  with  the  spatio-temporal  framework,  the  language 
user  must  recognise  the  eýdstence  of  what  Strawson  has  termed  'basic 
particulars'.  These  basic  particulars  are  enduring  three  dimensional 
objects  of  which  persons  are  one  t3rpe. 
3)  Given  I  and  2,  all  language  users  recognise  the  eidstence  of  basic 
particulars.  In  other  words,  objectifying  is  an  invariable  trait  of  human 
beings  capable  of  using  language. 
I  will  call  upon  Strawson's  work  to  lend  support  to  premises  1)  and  2) 
from  which  the  desired  conclusion  is  derived. 
The  argument  for  the  first  premise  is  as  follows.  For  a  language  to  be 
useful  language  users  must  be  able  to  express  thoughts  about  elements 
of  their  experience  to  other  language  users.  But  in  order  for  this  to  be 
achieved  language  users  must  be  able  to  identify  and  re  identify 
particular  elements  of  their  experience.  Now  the  successful 
identification  and  re  identification  of  such  elements  referred  to  in 
another's  speech  is  made  possible  by  two  facts:  One,  a  pre-condition  of 
language  itself,  that  the  interlocutors  are  enduring  objects  themselves. 
This,  I  will  argue,  is  a  condition  of  language  being  developed  at  all;  and 
two,  the  interlocutors  share  a  common,  unified  spatio-temporal 
framework.  The  result  is  that  communication  through  language 
demands  that  its  users  employ  a  unified  spatio-temporal  framework. 
This  argument  in  turn  needs  to  be  examined  in  closer  detail.  It  is  here 
that  Strawson's  work  becomes  useful. 
Strawson  takes  as  his  point  of  departure  two  facts  about  our  linguistic 
practice.  First,  he  assumes  that  we  can  successfully  identify 
particulars  in  our  common  discourse.  Second,  he  assumes  that  we  are 
able  to  re  identify  these  particulars  at  a  later  date.  Strawson  gives  as 124 
examples  of  these  two  facts  the  following  sentence  types:  'I  bought  that 
book  today',  and  'That  book  is  the  same  book  I  bought  yesterday'. 
However,  Strawson  recognises  that  these  two  assumptions  are  not 
entirely  unproblematic  given  that  our  field  of  observation  is  limited. 
Since  we  cannot  look  in  all  directions  at  once,  and  given  that  we  must 
occasionally  sleep,  we  must  recognise  that  we  are  unable  to  survey 
everything  at  once  or  at  all  times.  Granted  our  restricted  field  of 
observation  Strawson  realises  that  re  identification  is  a  problem.  How 
do  we  know  that  the  book  before  us  today  is  numerically  identical  to  the 
book  bought  yesterday  and  not  simply  a  qualitatively  similar  facsimile? 
Underlying  this  doubt  is  the  matter  of  whether  there  are  three 
dimensional  objects  that  endure  through  time,  or  whether  all  that  exists 
are  features  qualitatively  similar  but  not  numerically  identical  because 
not  united  to  a  single  supporting  object. 
Sceptics  will  argue  that  we  are  ultimately  unable  to  justify  our  claims  to 
re  identify  particulars.  We  have  no  justification  for  the  claim  the  we  are 
re  identifying  particular  objects  rather  than  identifying  for  the  first  time 
qualitatively  similar  features  which  are  not  united  by  an  underlying  self- 
same  object  This  doubt  serves  to  strengthen  the  case  for  a  feature 
placing  world.  Strawson  is  unable  to  accept  this.  He  states  that  our 
ability  to  use  the  unified  spatio-temporal  framework  Is  dependent  upon 
our  'unquestioning  acceptance  of  particular-re  identification  in  at  least 
some  cases  of  non-continuous  observation'  (my  emphasis).  11  He  then 
states  that  to  not  accept  particular  re  identification  forces  one  to  make 
extensive  revisions  to  a  belief  system  that  seems  very  well  equipped  to 
describe  our  experience.  Strawson's  argument  relies  on  the  hope  that 
the  reader  will  not  be  attracted  to  such  a  prospect  and  win  remain 
content  with  the  highly  successful  conceptual  framework  already  in 
place.  However,  I  feel  that  Strawson  could  have  forwarded  a  stronger 
argument.  He  could  have  said  that  a  condition  of  lanquage  itsel  is  the 
fact  of  particular  re  identification  and  not  mere  qualitative/feature 
identity  in  at  least  some  cases  of  non-continuous  observation.  It  is  not 
that  to  employ  a  unified  spatio-temporal  framework  one  must'go  along'. 
as  it  were,  with  the  belief  in  particular  re  identification;  the  fact  that  one 
is  able  to  use  language  is  enough  to  establish  particular  re  identification 
in  some  cases. 125 
How  is  this  so?  If  we  were  to  abandon  our  commitment  to  enduring 
ob  ects  that  can  be  re  identified,  we  are  faced  with  a  feature  placing 
world.  This  means  that  we  are  forced  to  posit  new  features  (many  of 
which  are  of  apparent  objects  and  people)  each  and  every  time  we  shift 
our  field  of  observation  and  each  and  every  time  we  open  our  eyes  to 
greet  the  morning.  Apart  from  being  highly  revisionary  and  not  in 
accordance  with  our  intuitions,  such  a  situation  would  not  permit  the 
development  of  language.  In  order  for  a  language  to  develop  a  stable 
community  of  potential  language  users  must  be  in  place.  If  there  were 
no  self-same  group  of  people  living  together  over  a  period  of  time, 
language  as  an  activity  would  not  be  possible.  Certainly  no  language  as 
complex  as  ours  or  of  any  usefulness  could  be  developed.  This  is 
because  language  is  essentially  a  communal,  rule  governed  activity.  A 
condition  of  language's  possibility  is  that  over  a  period  of  time  these 
rules  are  agreed  to  and  adopted  as  customary  practice.  But  if  we  must 
posit  a  completely  new  set  of  'feature-objects'  and  'feature-people'  every 
time  our  field  of  observation  changes,  the  necessary  fixing  of  practices 
could  not  occur.  Indeed,  one  can  also  see  that  the  teaching  and 
learning  of  language  would  be  impossible  as  well,  and  our  linguist 
working  at  translating  the  feature-person's  language  would  be  working 
in  vain.  No  language  is  ever  mastered  in  the  space  of  time  available  in  a 
single  span  of 
, 
conscious  attention.  Now  since  it  is  patently  obvious  that 
there  are  competent  speakers  of  highly  complex  languages,  it  would 
seem  impossible  to  maintain  that  we  are  unable  to  re  identify 
particulars.  We  must  at  the  very  least  be  able  to  re  identify  other 
language  users.  Language  demands  that  speakers  have  access  to  the 
same  people  over  and  over  again  to  ensure  that  the  speakers  have  time  to 
develop  a  common  vocabulary  and  ftx  a  set  of  grammatical  rules 
governing  how  meaningful  sentences  are  to  be  constructed.  In  other 
words,  particular  re  identification  at  least  in  the  case  of  people  is  a 
necessary  condition  for  successful  language  use. 
Once  the  necessity  of  re  identification  of  people  has  been  established  we 
can  then  call  upon  Strawson's  argument  concerning  the  conditions 
underlying  the  possibility  of  successful  re  Identification  of  par-ticulars,  in 
language.  To  the  question:  How  is  it  possible  that  a  speaker  can 
identify  and  re  identify  a  particular  element  of  his  experience  in  speech 126 
and  have  his  reference  understood  by  an  interlocutor?  Strawson 
replies:  This  activity  is  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  both  interlocutors 
are  operating  with  the  same  unified  spatio-temporal  framework: 
We  can  make  it  clear  to  each  other  what  or  which  particular 
things  our  discourse  is  about  because  we  can  fit  together  each 
other's  reports  and  stories  into  a  single  picture  of  the  world, 
and  the  framework  of  that  picture  is  a  unitary  spatio-temporal 
framework,  of  one  temporal  and  three  spatial  dimensions. 
Hence,  as  things  are,  particular-identification  in  general  rests 
ultimately  on  the  possibility  of  locating  the  particular  things 
we  speak  of  in  a  single  unified  spatio-temporal  system.  12 
The  basic  elements  of  the  speaker's  experience  about  which  he  is 
talking  are  all  found  in  some  region  of  space  and  time  and  are  related  to 
all  other  elements  in  space  and  time,  including  both  speaker  and 
hearer.  Because  the  hearer  himself  is  found  within  the  same  spatio- 
temporal  framework  as  the  speaker,  they  are  related  to  each  other  and 
to  all  other  elements  in  space  and  time.  The  elements  referred  to  by  the 
speaker  can  then  be  identified  by  the  hearer  once  he  is  advised  of  the 
'co-ordinates'  of  the  element  under  discussion. 
Strawson  is  not  content,  however,  with  showing  that  the  spatio- 
temporal  framework  allows  for  particular  identification  and  re 
identification.  He  wants  to  argue  the  stronger  claim  that  this 
framework  is  necessary  for  any  particular  identification.  Strawson 
hopes  to  establish  this  claim  by  means  of  a  thought  experiment.  At 
issue  is  whether  one  could  identify  particulars  when  operating  with  a 
conceptual  framework  bereft  of  the  concepts  of  space  or  time,  or  both. 
To  investigate  this  problem  Strawson  undertakes  a  study  of  a  No-Space 
world,  a  world  in  which  the  language  users  lack  any  concept  of  space. 
The  question  he  considers  is  whether  such  a  framework  could  allow  the 
user  to  identify  particulars.  13 
In  order  to  get  such  a  framework,  however,  Strawson  argues  that  the 
user  could  not  have  the  full  range  of  senses  enjoyed  by  humans.  In 
fact,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  in  order  to  achieve  a  No-Space 
world  the  user  of  such  a  conceptual  scheme  would  have  to  be  restricted 127 
to  a  world  exclusively  auditory  In  character.  The  rationale  for  this  claim 
is  that  the  other  senses  carry  with  them  an  inevitable  awareness  of 
space.  This  claim  is  harder  to  justify  with  the  senses  of  taste  and  smell, 
but  it  is  clear  enough  for  the  remaining  senses.  Things  seen  are  seen  to 
be  at  a  distance  from  the  seer,  and  things  touched  are  felt  to  be  in  a 
different  location  than  the  toucher,  i.  e.,  not  in  the  same  space  as  the 
toucher  himself  but  outside  the  boundary  of  the  toucher's  body. 
The  questions  that  now  need  to  be  considered  are  the  following.  First, 
in  such  a  No-Space  world  could  the  user  distinguish  between  himself 
and  the  other  particulars  of  which  he  is  aware?  In  Strawson's 
terminology:  "Can  the  conditions  of  a  non-solipsistic  consciousness  be 
fulfilled  for  a  purely  auditory  experience?  "14  Second,  could  the  user  of 
this  conceptual  framework  re  identify  particulars?  Could  the  user 
distinguish  between  qualitative  and  numerical  identity? 
Strawson  answers  both  of  these  questions  in  the  negative.  As  to  the 
first  problem,  it  is  not  clear  that  solipsism  could  be  avoided.  Given  that 
the  user  has  no  conception  of  space  it  is  unclear  where  discrete  entities 
could  be  if  not  within  the  private  experience  of  a  single  individual  user. 
As  to  the  second,  it  seems  improbable  that  the  user  could  re  identify 
particulars  given  the  nature  of  the  experiences  he  is  capable  of  having. 
In  order  for  re  identification  to  be  possible,  the  conceptual  scheme  has 
to  make  intelligible  the  possibility  of  an  "unperceived,  but  existing 
particular".  15  Moreover,  it  must  make  intelligible  the  possibility  of 
particulars  that  are  perceivable  on  some  occasions  but  not  on  others. 
Sounds,  the  only  particulars  that  are  available  in  a  No-Space  world,  do 
not  appear  to  have  the  necessary  characteristics  that  re  identifiable 
particulars  require,  i.  e.,  the  characteristics  that  allow  for  numerical 
identity  to  be  established  as  opposed  to  qualitative  identity.  On  the 
other  hand,  three  dimensional  enduring  objects  that  have  an 
independent  existence  in  space  are  the  sorts  of  things  that  can  be  re 
identified  at  a  later  date  precisely  because  they  can  continue  to  exist 
while  passing  in  and  out  of  our  field  of  experience. 
What  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  this  thought  experiment?  I  would 
submit  that  we  can  conclude  that  the  conceptual  framework  of  space 128 
and  time  is  necessary,  at  the  very  least,  in  the  case  of  the  kinds  of 
identifications  and  re  identifications  that  are  customary  in  normal 
human  experience.  I  would  also  submit  that  in  a  No-Space  world  it  is 
not  readily  apparent  that  one  would  have  a  clear  idea  of  other  people 
besides  the  self  with  whom  it  shares  identical  surroundings.  Indeed 
'surroundings'  has  to  be  taken  analogically  since  surroundings  imply  a 
space  in  which  one  fffids  oneself  But  if  these  conditions  are  not  met, 
namely,  a  community  of  enduring  language  users  (of  at  least  two)  and  a 
shared  surrounding  about  which  to  converse  and  in  which  the  people 
are  located,  it  seems  quite  unlikely  that  if  speech  were  heard  the  user 
could  identify  it  as  the  speech  of  another,  let  alone  what  the  other  might 
be  talldrig  about. 
The  conclusion  to  which  we  are  then  led  is  premise  one:  All  humans 
capable  of  using  language  must  employ  a  single,  unified  spatio-temporal 
framework.  We  must  assume  that  language  users  are  able  to  re  identify 
other  language  users  in  order  for  language  to  be  a  possibility,  i.  e.,  that 
at  least  one  kind  of  enduring  object  exists.  But  the  ability  to  identify 
particulars  referred  to  in  another'  speech,  the  other  sine  qua  non  of 
useful  language,  depends  on  the  interlocutors  sharing  a  common 
spatio-temporal  framework. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  consider  the  second  of  the  premises  in  my 
argument,  namely,  that  in  order  to  operate  with  a  unified  spatio- 
temporal  framework  one  must  have  recognised  the  existence  of 
enduring  three  dimensional  objects,  or  what  Strawson  has  called  'basic 
particulars'.  This  is  Strawson's  most  interesting  thesis  about  the 
relationship  between  assumptions  (i)-(iv),  but  also  the  most  difficult  to 
establish.  One  might  consider  the  possibility  that  what  we  are  faced 
with  is  a  relationship  of  virtuous  circularity,  rather  than  strict  priority. 
In  other  words,  it  might  be  the  case  that  one  cannot  operate  with  a 
unified  spatio-temporal  framework  without  recognising  enduring 
objects,  but  that  there  can  be  no  conception  of  enduring  objects  without 
the  concepts  of  a  connected  space-time  framework.  However,  given  the 
nature  of  this  particular  thesis  one  cannot  expect  a  demonstrative 
argument.  What  can  be  hoped  for  is  a  dialectical  argument,  one  that 
suggests  rather  than  conclusively  establishes  the  thesis  in  question. 129 
Strawson  begins  his  argument  with  the  claim  that  without  ob  ects  there 
would  be  no  identification  of  places.  16  Places,  says  Strawson,  are 
identified  and  defined  'only  by  the  relations  of  things.  17  Such  a 
statement  can  be  interpreted  as  containing  two  distinct  theses  which  we 
would  do  well  to  separate.  The  first  is  a  thesis  concerning  the  nature  of 
space  and  time.  The  second  concerns  the  origins  of  our  awareness  of 
connected  places  and  times.  With  respect  to  the  first  thesis,  Kantians, 
Substantivalists  and  Relativists  find  much  to  discuss,  but  this  matter 
does  not  concern  us  here.  What  concerns  us  is  not  what  space  and 
time  are,  but  rather  how  we  come  by  our  particular  conceptions  of 
them.  This  is  an  entirely  different  matter  about  which  Kantians, 
Substantivalists  and  Relativists  could  in  theory  agree.  On  this  point 
Strawson  has  given  his  story:  we  come  by  our  spatio-temporal 
framework  through  our  experience  of  enduring  three  dimensional 
objects.  It  Is  only  by  experiencing  objects  themselves  extended  in  four 
dimensions,  and  related  to  other  similar  objects,  that  we  come  to 
conceive  of  connected  places  and  times.  Indeed,  Strawson  goes  so  far 
as  to  say  that  it  is  the  objects  themselves  that  constitute  the  framework; 
the  framework  is  not  extraneous  to  the  objects  of  which  we  speak.  18  It 
is  only  objects  that  could  give  the  framework  its  essential 
characteristics,  i.  e.,  extention  in  four  dimensions.  Again,  this  stronger 
thesis  need  not  concern  us. 
The  question  to  be  considered  is  whether  experience  of  such  objects  is 
indeed  a  precondition  of  possessing  a  single,  unified  spatio-temporal 
framework.  It  seems  that  the  only  way  to  argue  for  this  thesis  Is  to 
point  out  how  improbable  it  is  that  one  could  have  a  unified  spatio- 
temporal  framework  without  experience  of  three  dimensional  enduring 
objects.  But  is  experience  of  features  not  enough  to  give  rise  to  the 
concepts  of  space  and  time?  It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that 
experience  of  features  is  enough  to  allow  for  the  recognition  of  places  (a 
place  being  that  contained  within  the  boundaries  of  a  feature)  and  of 
time  (features  change,  or  are  replaced,  which  allows  for  the  recognition 
of  a  succession  of  events).  But  while  experience  of  features  is  enough  to 
give  rise  to  the  concepts  of  space  and  time,  they  are  arguably  not 
sufficient  to  give  rise  to  our  single,  unified  spatio-temporal  framework. 
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many,  unconnected  places  and  times  because  each  new  stretch  of 
consciousness  gives  rise  to  a  new  space-time.  It  is  a  new  space-time 
because  there  is  nothing  in  a  currently  featuring  space-time  to  connect 
it  to  non-current  spaces  and  times  experienced,  or  to  be  experienced,  in 
other  stretches  of  consciousness.  Given  the  nature  of  features,  nothing 
in  one  space-time  can  exist  in,  or  be  carried  over  Into,  another  space- 
time.  The  only  way  one  could  make  sense  of  carrying  something  over 
from  one  space-time  to  another  (thereby  establishing  a  connection 
between  them)  Is  to  say  that  one  has  re  identifled  an  x  that  is  capable  of 
existing  despite  not  being  under  continuous  observation.  But  such  an  x 
could  not  be  an  ephemeral  feature.  Now  in  our  unified  spatio-temporal 
framework  no  conceptual  difficulty  arises  concerning  re  identification. 
Enduring  three  dimensional  objects  are  just  the  sort  of  thing  that  can 
be  carried  from  one  space-time  to  another.  We  are  able  to  posit  objects 
and  events  in  regions  of  space  that  are  somewhere  and  at  some  time 
even  though  they  are  not  presently  featuring  to  us.  This  makes  no 
sense  in  a  feature-placing  world.  In  such  a  world  the  non-featuring  are 
nowhere  and  no  when,  and  in  no  relation  to  the  presently  featuring 
(indeed  they  simply  do  not  exist).  This  discrepancy  is  manifested  in  the 
inability  of  a  person  operating  within  a  feature-placing  world  to  make 
sense  of  questions  like,  'Where  and  when  is  this  raining  in  relation  to 
some  other  raining?  "  There  simply  is  no  connection  between  one 
raining  and  another  unless  both  are  featuring  simultaneously. 
Consequently,  we  can  say  that  the  concepts  of  space  and  time  are 
available  to  those  operating  in  a  feature-placing  world;  but  given  that  re 
identification  is  impossible  in  such  a  framework,  spaces  and  times  will 
not  be  unified  into  one  unified  spatio-temporal  framework.  In  a  feature- 
placing  world  there  will  be  only  local,  unconnected  spaces  and  times. 
Such  then  are  the  arguments  for  the  two  premise  of  my  core  argument. 
If  language  use  depends  on  speakers  having  a  single,  unified  spatio- 
temporal  framework;  and  if  possession  of  such  a  framework  depends  on 
speakers  having  experience  of  three  dimensional  enduring  objects,  then 
it  stands  to  reason  that  all  language  users  have  experience  of  three 
dimensional  enduring  objects.  In  other  words,  we  are  in  a  position  to 
claim  that  if  a  person  manifests  his  linguistic  ability  by  competently 
speaking  an  language,  we  can  assume  that  he  objectifies.  This  being 131 
the  case,  our  hypothetical  linguist  cannot  translate  'Gavagai'  as  'It 
rabbiteth',  or  by  any  other  locution  which  does  not  commit  the  speaker 
to  the  existence  of  enduring  objects. 
But  another  question  remains.  Has  anything  said  so  far  indicate  that 
'Gavagai'  could  not  be  translated  as  'Rabbit  parts'  Instead  of  'Lo,  a 
rabbit'?  There  is  no  exTficit  argument  to  be  had  from  Strawson  on  this 
matter  -  it  simply  was  not  something  he  needed  to  deal  with  in 
Individuals.  Indeed,  he  merely  stipulates  that  basic  particulars  must  be 
material  bodies  which  are  non-private  and  observable.  19  It  would 
appear  that  parts  of  bodies  fit  this  set  of  criteria.  Nevertheless  an 
argument  from  the  nature  of  identification  and  re  identification  can  be 
forwarded  in  support  of  the  thesis  that  'Gavagai'  ought  not  to  be 
translated  as  'Rabbit  parts'.  Though  relying  on  a  reworking  of  Wiggins' 
assumptions  concerning  the  nature  of  individuation,  this  argument 
nevertheless  turns  on  a  Strawsonian  distinction  between  those 
particulars  that  are  'basic'  to  our  conceptual  scheme  and  those  which 
are  not.  Given  the  nature  of  this  argument  we  would  do  well  to  include 
it  this  section  on  Strawson  despite  the  fact  that  he  has  been  used 
primarily  to  counter  the  claims  made  in  favour  of  a  feature-placing 
world. 
In  Part  I,  Chapter  Three  of  Individuals  Strawson  introduces  a  distinction 
between  classes  of  particulars  that  are  'basic'  and  classes  of  particulars 
that  are  not  'basic'.  A  'basic'  particular  is  defined  as  a  particular  to 
which  one  can  refer  without  making  identifying  references  to  other 
part4culars;  conversely,  a  non-basic  particular  is  one  to  which  one 
cannot  refer  without  making  identifying  reference  to  other  particulars. 
Strawson  argues  that  material  bodies  are  'basic'  in  this  sense,  while 
reference  to  particulars  like  events,  processes,  states  and  conditions  (as 
well  as  theoretical  entities)  requires  identifying  references  to  material 
bodies.  This  accords  well  with  our  intuitions,  in  that  events  or 
processes  are  events  or  processes  of  material  things.  as  are  states  and 
conditions.  It  is  not  clear  how  one  could  identify  a  process,  say,  without 
Identifying  the  material  body  undergoing  that  process.  Now  the  point  to 
draw  from  this  distinction  is  the  following:  if  one  can  show  that  an 132 
identifying  reference  to  a  particular  x  cannot  be  made  without  an 
identifying  reference  being  made  to  another  particular  y,  then 
recognition  on  the  part  of  the  speaker  of  particular  x  proves  that  he  also 
recognises  y.  We  can  also  push  a  stronger  claim;  we  can  say  that  it  Is  a 
necessary  condition  of  the  identification  of  a  non-basic  particular  that 
the  interlocutors  can  identify  the  requisite  basic  particular.  To  stick 
with  our  example,  if  one  cannot  identify  a  material  body  y,  one  will  not 
be  able  to  identify  any  process  x  which  body  y  may  undergo. 
With  this  relationship  between  basic  and  non-basic  particulars  in  place 
we  can  now  move  on  to  consider  the  relationship  that  obtains  between 
wholes  (in  our  case,  rabbits)  and  their  parts.  I  will  argue  that  wholes 
are  basic  with  respect  to  their  parts,  and  not  just  to  the  events, 
processes,  states  and  conditions  they  undergo. 
My  argument  rests  on  three  claims  about  the  nature  of  individuation 
which  Wiggins  has  defended  at  great  length  in  his  Sameness  and 
Substance.  20  First,  one  cannot  make  an  identifying  reference  to  x 
without  'singling  out'  the  intended  object  from  all  other  objects  in  the 
spatio-temporal  framework  of  the  interlocutors.  I  take  this  to  be 
uncontrovercial  since  this  is  precisely  what  one  does  when  making  an 
identifying  reference.  Second,  Wiggins  argues  that  one  cannot  single 
out  x  without  singling  it  out  as  something.  2  Now  it  might  be  argued 
that  ýes  spatio-temporal  co-ordinates  alone  are  enough  to  single  x  out 
from  all  other  things.  x  would  be  'that  object  at  the  specified  spatio- 
temporal  co-ordinates'.  However  this  may  be,  Ys  spatio-temporal  co- 
ordinates  will  not  be  enough  re  identify  Y_  To  track  x  in  the  spatio- 
temporal  framework  i.  e.,  to  re  identify  x  at  different  spatio-temporal  co- 
ordinates,  one  must  know  what  x  is  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  all 
other  similar  and  dissimilar  things  which  take  their  place  in  the  unified 
spatio-temporal  framework.  Spatio-temporal  co-ordinates  are  not 
enough  to  re  identify  an  x  because  ; es  spatio-temporal  co-ordinates 
change  as  x  moves  through  space  and  time.  Consequently,  to  be  able  to 
say  that  x  is  the  same  x  as  encountered  on  a  previous  occasion  one 
must  be  able  to  answer  the  question,  the  same  what?  For  if  x  is 
identical  to  y,  they  are  identical  In  virtue  of  what  x  and  y  are.  To  use  a 
construction  of  Wiggins,  to  say  that  x--y  one  must  be  able  to  say  that  x 133 
is  the  same  s  as  y,  where  s  is  a  sortal  concept  whose  extention  includes 
x  and  y. 
The  third  assumption  about  the  nature  of  identifying  references  is  the 
following:  x  can  be  taken  to  fall  under  a  sortal.  concept  g  if  it  performs 
the  operations,  functions,  or  constitutive  activities  associated  with  that 
sort  of  thing  g.  22  So  x  must  have  all  the  observable  properties  of  a  g,  in 
addition  to  acting  like  a  g,  or  fulfilling  the  role  of  a  g.  If  an  x  fails  to 
meet  these  requirements,  x  cannot  be  identified  as  a  g. 
With  these  assumptions  in  place  we  can  now  move  on  to  consider  the 
relationship  that  obtains  between  wholes  and  their  parts.  The  key  point 
is  the  following:  the  constitutive  activity,  function,  or  operation  of  what 
we  would  call  parts  of  a  whole  are  not  intelligible  without  reference  to 
the  whole  of  which  the  part  is  a  part.  The  activities  or  operations  of 
hands,  paws,  legs,  heads,  livers,  etc.,  are  not  separable  either 
intellectually  or  physically  from  the  whole  of  which  they  are  a  part.  This 
remains  the  case  even  if  parts  are  interchangeable  between  various 
wholes.  The  function  of  a  leg,  for  example,  cannot  be  described  without 
reference  to  a  body  which  employs  it  for  transportation  purposes;  and 
the  same  can  be  said  of  all  body  parts.  This  has  led  some  to  say  that  a 
finger,  for  example,  which  has  been  severed  from  a  hand  is  no  longer  a 
finger  except  in  an  equivocal  sense.  The  rationale  for  this  claim  is  that 
an  organ  or  limb  not  joined  to  a  body  no  longer  performs  its  proper 
operations.  23 
Now,  if  to  re  identify  a  particular  x  we  must  identify  it  as  an  s;  and  if  to 
identify  an  x  as  an  s  we  must  recognise  x  as  performing  the  operations 
of  an  s;  then,  if  the  operations  of  an  s  cannot  be  made  intelligible 
without  reference  to  something  else,  then  this  something  else  must  be 
basic  to  the  re  identification  of  x.  It  Is  my  belief  that  parts  are  just  this 
sort  of  particular.  Whole  material  bodies  are  basic  with  respect  to  their 
parts  because  the  latter  are  intelligible  (and  thus  identifiable  as  such 
and  so)  only  when  related  to  the  whole  of  which  they  are  a  part.  And 
this  is  because  to  recognise  the  function  of  a  leg  or  hand  one  must  see  It 
as  a  part  of  a  whole.  Now  if  this  is  the  case,  it  is  not  possible  to  re 
identify  body  parts  without  re  identifying  whole  bodies.  And  if  this  is 134 
the  case,  then  the  question  cannot  arise  concerning  the  possibility  of 
one  possessing  a  unified  spatio-temporal  framework  while  re  identifying 
only  body  parts.  Consequently,  even  if  there  were  target  language 
speakers  who,  for  some  reason  or  another,  deemed  it  convenient  to 
work  with  an  ontology  of  body  parts  rather  than  whole  material  bodies, 
they  would  still  have  to  go  via  wholes  to  get  to  the  parts  they  wish  to 
focus  on.  This  being  the  case,  we  can  say  that  our  hypothetical  linguist 
ought  to  translate  'Gavagai'  as  'Lo,  a  rabbit'  rather  than  'Rabbit  parts, 
unless  some  further  considerations  lead  him  to  think  the  target 
language  speaker  is  in  fact  restricting  his  attention  on  a  particular 
occasion  to  a  body  part  rather  than  the  rabbit  as  a  whole.  But  there 
can  be  no  question  that  any  ontology  including  body  parts  will  of 
necessity  also  include  the  wholes  of  which  these  parts  are  parts.  With 
this  we  can  close  our  examination  of  the  question  concerning  whether 
all  language  users  objectify  in  much  the  same  way  we  do. 
Evans  and  the  Apparatus  ofIndividuation 
If  Strawson  gives  us  reason  to  believe  that  all  language  users  objectify, 
then  Evans  provides  an  argument  to  suggest  that  a  linguist  can  obtain 
behavioural  evidence  to  this  effect.  Evans  begins  his  argument  against 
the  indeterminacy  of  translation  by  noting  the  importance  Quine  has 
placed  on  the  linguist's  alleged  need  for  determinate  access  to  the 
apparatus  of  individuation  of  the  target  language  in  order  to  identify  the 
grammatical  role  played  by  particular  linguistic  expressions  in  target 
sentences.  24  Quine  claims  that  the  linguist  is  unable  to  determine  if  a 
term  plays  the  grammatical  role  of  a  noun  or  predicate  unless  he  has  a 
mastery  of  the  target  language's  apparatus  of  individuation.  He  also 
states  that  the  linguist  cannot  identify  a  term  as  a  predicate  unless  the 
term  'interacts'  with  this  illusive  apparatus.  So  in  cases  where  a 
linguist  is  presented  with  simple  one  word  sentences  like  'Gavagai' 
(which  contains  no  elements  of  this  apparatus)  translation  is 
indeterminate  because  'rabbit'.  'rabbit  parts',  'rabbiteth',  and 
Tabbithood'  are  all  stimulus  equivalent.  But  the  linguist  fairs  no  better 
when  he  is  presented  with  complex  sentences  of  the  form,  'A  G  is  F  or 
'Some  G  is  F  or  This  G  is  F,  where  elements  of  the  apparatus  are 135 
present.  The  linguist  will  still  be  unable  to  determine  the  grammatical 
function  of  the  terms  'G'  and  V  because  the  apparatus  of  individuation 
remains  empirically  indeterminate. 
Evans'  argument  against  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  thesis 
amounts  to  a  denial  of  the  claim  that  an  expression  can  only  be  taken 
to  count  as  a  predicate  if  it  'interacts'  with  the  apparatus  of 
individuation,  i.  e.  if  it  enters  into  sentences  of  the  sort  'Some  G  is  F. 
Evans  argues  that,  if  Quine  were  right,  the  only  reason  a  linguist  would 
have  for  introducing  predicates  into  his  translation  manual  of  the  target 
language  would  be  to  explain  an  expression's  interaction  with  the 
apparatus  of  individuation.  Evans'  strategy  is  to  demonstrate  that  there 
are  other  reasons  for  introducing  predicates  into  one's  translation 
manual  (and  along  with  predicates,  nouns  who  take  those  predicates). 
If  Evans  can  provide  this  additional  motivation  we  may  come  to  see  that 
certain  expressions  must  be  interpreted  as  containing  reference  to 
objects  and  their  properties  and  not  merely  to  features  in  the  sensory 
field  despite  the  linguist's  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  target  language's 
apparatus  of  individuation. 
Evans'  thesis  is  that  in  some  cases  a  linguist  will  be  forced  to  translate 
'Gavagai'  by  'rabbit'  and  not  by  one  of  the  other  candidates.  He 
supports  this  view  by  showing  that  to  give  the  semantics  of  certain 
expressions  not  containing  any  elements  of  the  apparatus  of 
individuation  the  linguist  must  treat  them  as  containing  terms  playing 
the  role  of  predicates  and  objects.  In  other  words,  Evans  wants  to  show 
that  an  expression  can  be  Identified  as  a  predicate  without  that 
expression  interacting  with  the  apparatus  of  individuation.  If  this  can 
be  done  Quine's  argument  for  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  is 
refuted.  at  least  insofar  as  occasion  sentences  are  concerned,  because 
the  necessity  of  having  determinate  access  to  the  foreign  apparatus  of 
individuation  in  order  to  identify  predicates  in  the  target  sentences  has 
been  overcome. 
Evans'  argument  rests  on  the  claim  that  the  real  reason  for  a  linguist  to 
introduce  predicates  and  objects  into  one's  translation  manual  of  the 
target  language  is  to  explain  the  truth  conditions  of  compound 136 
sentences.  Evans  agrees  that  simple  one  word  sentences  with  no 
structure,  sentences  like  'Gavagai',  are  indeed  indeterminate,  and  for 
the  reasons  Quine  has  given.  Yet  in  order  for  a  language  to  function  as 
an  adequate  instrument  of  communication  it  must  incorporate 
compound  expressions  and  negation,  i.  e.,  speakers  must  be  able  to  say 
something  about  aspects  of  their  experience,  as  well  as  deny  something 
about  aspects  of  their  experience.  In  other  words,  any  language  that 
will  allow  for  communication  must  be  capable  of  predication.  Evan's 
crucial  point,  however,  is  that  when  faced  with  a  language  containing 
only  compound  expressions  and  negation  (and  lacking  any  apparatus  of 
individuation),  the  linguist  must  posit  objects  in  order  to  give  the 
semantics  of  both  a  particular  linguist  disposition  and  of  some  of  these 
compound  expressions. 
Evans  argues  that  the  linguist  must  introduce  objects  into  his 
translation  manual  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  foreign  language  user 
will  be  taken  to  recognise  the  existence  of  ob  ects  in  order  to  explain  his  j 
disposition  "to  withhold  contrary  predicates  of  the  things  identified.  "25 
As  Evans  writes,  an  object  is  a  thing  limited  by  a  fixed  boundary  that 
traces  the  limit  of  the  object's  extension  in  space.  That  such 
boundaries  are  recognised  by  the  target  language  user  is  detectable  in 
the  speaker's  refusal  to  admit  simultaneous  predication  of  contradictory 
predicates  within  the  area  traced  by  the  boundary.  Three  dimensional 
objects  are  precisely  those  things  that  are  incapable  of  taking 
contradictory  predicates  at  the  same  time.  However  the  recognition  of 
fixed  boundaries  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  a  feature  placing  world. 
Disembodied  features  and  qualities  would  be  subject  to  fluidity,  merging 
and  melding  one  with  the  other  precisely  because  they  lack  fixed 
boundaries.  In  order  to  get  relative  stability  in  one's  field  of  experience, 
one  must  posit  bodies  that  have  fixed  boundaries.  That  the  target 
language  user  displays  this  tendency  to  withhold  contrary  predicates 
within  boundaries  is  then  good  grounds  for  believing  that  he  does  so 
because  he  is  speaking  of  objects. 
The  second  reason  for  introducing  objects  into  the  translation  manual 
is  to  explain  the  differences  in  truth  conditions  between  various 
compound  expressions.  Simply  put,  the  stimulus  meanings,  truth 137 
conditions,  and  the  conditions  of  assent  and  dissent  of  the  expression 
'white  rabbit'  are  not  identical  to  those  of  'white  rabbit  parts'  or  'white 
rabbiteth'  etc.  In  order  to  account  for  these  differences  the  linguist 
must  assume  that  some  of  these  expressions  contain  reference  to 
objects,  some  to  parts  of  objects,  and  so  on.  The  point  Evans  is 
emphasising  is  simple  enough:  compound  sentences  have  truth 
conditions  sensitive  to  the  identity  conditions  of  the  expression's  subject 
term.  This  sensitivity  of  predication  to  the  identity  conditions  of  the 
subject  term  allows  the  linguist  to  discriminate  between  expressions 
like  'white  rabbit'  and  'white  rabbit  parts'.  Consequently,  if  the 
language  being  translated  is  complex  enough  to  contain  such 
compound  expressions  and  negation,  then  the  degree  of  indeterminacy 
in  the  translation  will  not  be  as  high  as  Quine  suggests  It  will  be.  In 
particular,  it  will  be  clear  that  if  the  language  contains  references  to 
objects  and  their  properties  the  linguist  will  be  able  to  obtain 
behavioural  evidence  to  this  effect  despite  the  fact  that  an  apparatus  of 
individuation  may  be  lacking  altogether. 
The  conclusion  of  Evans'  argument  is  that  while  a  language  containing 
only  simple  one  word  sentences  remains  indeterminately  translatable, 
any  language  complex  enough  to  accommodate  predication  will  be 
translatable  with  a  greater  degree  of  determinacy  that  Quine  would  have 
us  believe.  But  most  importantly  for  our  purposes,  we  can  conclude 
that  if  a  foreign  language  speaker  does  objectify  (and  we  have  argued 
that  he  must);  and  if  his  sentences  do  contain  references  to  objects  and 
their  properties,  then  we  can  obtain  behavioural  evidence  to  this  effect 
by  concentrating  on  the  truth  conditions  of  compound  expressions. 
Davidson  and  77-te  Rule  o  Three  )f 
I  turn  now  to  one  last  argument  which  lends  additional  support  to  the 
preceding  two.  In  this  argument  no  attention  is  paid  to  the 
technicalities  surrounding  access  to  the  apparatus  of  individuation  in 
the  remote  language.  Instead  attention  is  brought  to  bear  on  the  matter 
of  what  evidence  the  translation  manual  is  based  upon.  Quine's 
definition  of  radical  translation  makes  it  very  clear  what  sort  of  evidence he  thinks  the  linguist  has  to  work  with.  Radical  translation  involves: 
translation  from  a  remote  Iffiguage  on  behavioural  evidence, 
unaided  by  prior  dictionaries.  6 
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Quine's  point  has  been  all  along  that  the  linguistic  and  bodily  behaviour 
of  the  target  language  speaker  is  not  enough  to  allow  the  linguist  to  fix 
translation  determinately.  Now  we  have  already  seen  that  Evans  has 
given  us  good  reason  to  think  that  translation  will  not  be  indeterminate 
at  least  with  respect  to  objects.  But  the  argument  with  which  we  are 
now  concerned  provides  yet  another  reason  to  question  Quine's 
conclusions  by  identifying  other  factors  the  linguist  ought  to  consider 
besides  the  linguistic  and  bodily  behaviour  of  the  speaker.  Davidson 
has  argued  that  radical  translation  is  possible  only  because  the  linguist 
and  target  language  speaker  have  some  common  experiences  and 
concepts  from  which  to  work.  Now  most  of  these  common  experiences 
derive  from  their  common  exposure  to  external  stimuli;  but  insofar  as 
both  linguist  and  target  language  user  are  human  beings,  they  also 
bring  something  in  common  to  the  external  stimuli.  This  additional 
consideration  allows  the  linguist  to  further  reduce  the  indeterTninacy  of 
his  translation  by  allowing  him  to  exploit  what  has  been  called  The  Rule 
of  Three  . 
The  Rule  of  Three  is  a  calculus  of  sorts  which  allows  one  to  make 
inferences  about  one  unknown  variable  given  information  about  the 
other  two  variables  in  the  equation.  The  variables  in  this  equation  are 
the  beliefs,  desires  and  capacities  of  a  complex  agent.  The  rule  is 
simply  a  statement  concerning  the  relationships  that  have  been  noticed 
to  obtain  between  these  variables.  The  rule  of  three  states  that  when 
something  is  known  of  any  two  of  this  set  of  three  elements  of  an 
organism  it  is  possible  to  infer  something  about  the  third  when 
presented  with  a  particular  action  performed  by  the  organism. 
An  example  will  help  to  clarify  this  principle.  Imagine  the  following 
scenario:  a  psychologist  is  studying  the  behaviour  of  gorillas  and  to  this 
end  has  contrived  a  way  of  isolating  the  various  elements  required  to 
explain  a  particular  gorilla's  behaviour.  The  psychologist  has  placed  a 139 
gorillian  delicacy  in  a  locked  transparent  container  (a  wire  cage  would 
do)  in  the  proximity  of  a  gorilla.  In  addition,  the  key  to  the  container  is 
placed  near  by,  in  close  proximity  to  the  gorilla  and  the  container.  Let 
us  now  imagine  a  series  of  possibilities.  First,  let  us  imagine  that  the 
psychologist  knows  the  gorilla  is  physically  capable  of  manipulating  the 
key  successfully,  i.  e.,  that  the  gorilla  has  the  dexterity  to  perform  the 
action  of  unlocking  the  cage.  In  addition  assume  that  the  gorilla  has 
manifested  its  desire  for  the  food  stuff.  The  psychologist  is  now  in  the 
position  to  determine  something  about  what  the  gorilla  knows.  If  the 
gorilla's  desire  for  the  food  is  frustrated,  then,  all  things  being  equal,  the 
psychologist  can  infer  that  the  gorilla  does  not  know  how  to  employ  the 
key.  The  psychologist  reasons  that  if  the  gorilla  is  able  to  use  the  key 
and  wants  the  delicacy,  then  all  that  is  preventing  the  gorilla  from 
attaining  his  desire  is  the  lack  of  knowledge  concerning  the  usefulness 
of  keys.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  gorilla  uses  the  key  and  achieves  his 
aim,  one  can  conclude  that  the  gorilla  knows  how  to  use  a  key. 
Imagine  now  that  it  is  again  clear  the  gorilla  desires  the  food  stuff  and 
that  it  understands  that  the  key  can  be  used  to  open  the  cage  (he 
manifests  this  knowledge  by  repeatedly  attempting  to  use  the  key  to 
open  the  cage).  The  psychologist  is  now  in  a  position  to  infer  something 
about  the  gorilla's  capacities.  If  the  gorilla's  desires  are  frustrated  one 
can  infer  that  this  gorilla  as  yet  lacks  the  dexterity  to  manipulate  the 
key  successfully.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  succeeds  then  it  is  perfectly 
obvious  that  he  has  this  particular  capacity. 
Finally,  imagine  that  the  psychologist  knows  the  gorilla  understands  the 
usefulness  of  the  key  and  that  it  is  capable  of  using  it  to  open  the  cage. 
Imagine  now  that  the  gorilla  does  not  act  to  attain  the  delicacy.  The 
psychologist  can  then  safely  infer  that  the  gorilla  does  not  at  present 
desire  the  food.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  does  make  an  effort  to  attain 
the  food  one  can  safely  assume  the  gorilla  is  motivated  by  the 
appropriate  desire.  It  is  worth  noting  that  little  can  be  inferred  about 
an  organism's  desires,  its  capacities  or  its  beliefs  from  its  behaviour 
alone.  It  is  only  when  something  concerning  two  of  the  three  elements 
is  known  that  something  can  be  safely  inferred  about  the  third. 140 
The  relation  of  this  principle  to  the  problem  of  radical  translation  is  not 
far  to  seek.  When  faced  with  the  brute  behaviour  of  an  agent  the 
Interpreter  of  that  behaviour  is  not  confined  to  that  behaviour  alone. 
The  rule  of  three  can  be  employed  in  the  interpretation  process  when 
something  of  two  of  the  three  elements  is  known.  When  a  linguist 
undertakes  to  translate  a  remote  language  he  Is  attempting  to  interpret 
the  linguistic  behaviour  of  the  target  language  speaker.  In  so  doing  the 
linguist  must  address  himself  to  the  question  of  what  his  interlocutor 
believes  because  it  is  quite  impossible  to  determine  what  a  speaker 
means  without  knowing  what  he  believes,  and  vice  versa. 
Consequently,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  early  stages  of  translation  the 
linguist  must  posit  a  set  of  beliefs  he  attributes  to  the  speaker  in  order 
to  break  into  the  hermeneutic  circle.  The  matter  of  what  this  set  of 
beliefs  ought  to  be  is  then  of  singular  importance  and  any  guidelines  in 
this  matter  ought  not  to  be  ignored.  Quine's  advice  to  the  linguist  is  to 
'save  the  obvious':  the  linguist  ought  not  to  interpret  the  speaker's 
sentences  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  them  express  obviously  false 
beliefs.  What  the  rule  of  three  suggests  is  that  the  linguist  has  an 
additional  factor  to  consider:  the  beliefs  attributed  to  the  speaker  ought 
not  to  conflict  with  his  capacities  and  desires,  insofar  as  they  are 
known.  The  linguist  must  take  into  account  the  truth  conditions  of 
expression;  but  the  translation  manual  must  also  be  psychologically 
plausible,  i.  e.,  consistent  with  the  desires  and  capacities  of  the  target 
language  speaker.  Now  it  might  be  impossible  to  fix  the  speaker's 
desires  and  capacities  without  reference  to  his  beliefs;  but  it  Is  not 
necessary  that  this  be  achieved.  The  point  is  not  that  desires  and 
capacities  are  more  easily  fixed  that  beliefs.  The  point  is  that  they  are 
an  additional  factor  to  be  considered  by  the  linguist  when  he  chooses 
the  set  of  beliefs  to  attribute  to  the  target  language  speaker. 
Davidson  has  picked  up  on  the  inter  relatedness  of  meaning,  belief, 
desire  and  capacity  and  has  suggested  that  if  the  linguist  can  form  an 
adequate  idea  of  the  speaker's  general  capabilities,  wants  and  desires, 
then  he  will  be  in  a  better  position  to  interpret  the  speaker's  utterances 
more  precisely.  Of  Quine's  contention  that  the  possibility  exists  of 
obtaining  two  translation  manuals  that  are  empirically  adequate  yet 
inconsistent  Davidson  has  this  to  say: 141 
There  are  often  cases,  I  believe  with  Quine,  when  the  totality 
of  relevant  evidence  in  a  person's  behaviour  is  equally  well 
handled  by  each  of  two  theories  of  truth,  provided  we  make 
compensating  adjustments  in  our  theory  of  his  beliefs  and 
other  attitudes,  and  yet  where  on  one  theory  a  particular 
sentence  is  interpreted  in  one  way  as  to  make  it  true,  and  on 
the  other  not.  27 
This  would  appear  to  be  in  complete  agreement  with  Quine's 
indeterminacy  of  translation  thesis.  However,  as  Davidson  continues  he 
suggests  that  this  indeterminacy  can  be  overcome: 
What  permits  us  to  choose  among  various  languages  for  a 
speaker  is  the  fact  that  the  evidence  -  attitudes  or  actions 
directed  to  sentences  or  utterances  -  bears  not  only  on  the 
interpretation  of  speech  but  also  on  the  attribution  of  beliefs, 
wants,  and  intentions  (and  not  doubt  other  attitudes).  The 
evidence  allows  us  a  choice  among  languages  because  we  can 
balance  any  given  choice  by  an  appropriate  choice  of  beliefs 
and  attitudes.  This  suggests  one  more  way  we  could  relativise 
a  theory  of  truth  or  reference:  given  certain  assumptions  about 
the  nature  of  belief  and  other  attitudes,  we  could  show  that, 
once  we  have  decided  what  a  person's  attitudes  are,  the  choice 
of  a  language  is  no  longer  up  for  grabs.  Given  a 
comprehensive  account  of  beliefs,  desires,  intention  and  the 
like,  it  is  an  empirical  question  what  language  a  person 
speaks  (my  emphasi.  ýi  28 
Davidson's  point  is  clear.  When  the  linguist  consults  behavioural 
evidence  alone  translation  remains  indeterminate,  as  Quine  maintains. 
This  is  because  one  cannot  infer  anything  about  a  person's  beliefs  and 
desires  from  behavioural  evidence  alone.  But  once  the  rule  of  three  is 
brought  to  bear  on  the  matter  this  indeterminacy  is  reduced.  Once 
some  idea  is  obtained  of  the  speaker's  general  attitudes  the  range  of 
beliefs  now  attributable  to  him  is  restricted. 
However,  Davidson  has  also  isolated  a  problem  this  method  faces.  if 
the  linguist  is  able  to  square  all  the  speaker's  behaviour  with  a  set  of 
attributed  beliefs  it  could  still  be  contested  that  the  speaker  need  not 
holds  those  beliefs  if  we  attribute  to  him  a  perverse  set  of  goals.  We 142 
then  are  faced  with  a  familiar  problem:  instead  of  worrying  about  what 
constitutes  an  obvious  belief.  the  linguist  is  faced  with  the  problem  of 
determining  what  goals  and  desires  can  be  safely  attributed  to  the 
speaker. 
But  do  we  not  have  a  good  Idea  as  to  at  least  some  of  the  goals  and 
capacities  of  the  target  language  speaker?  Given  that  the  speaker  Is  an 
organism  of  the  same  species  as  ourselves  it  seems  reasonable  to 
assume  that  his  goals.  desires  and  capacities  at  a  basic  level  must 
needs  be  similar  to  our  own.  Indeed  how  could  this  not  be  the  case? 
Are  we  to  think  that  somehow  our  basic  bodily  needs  for  food  and 
shelter  are  not  shared  by  the  speaker?  Are  we  to  think  the  speaker 
does  not  share  our  need  for  a  community  in  which  to  live?  And  given 
these  basic  bodily  needs  and  the  need  for  co-operation  with  others  like 
ourselves  to  meet  those  needs,  are  we  to  think  that  somehow  this 
community's  need  and  use  of  language  is  radically  different  from  our 
own?  If  we  answer  these  question  in  the  negative.  then  our  choice  of 
translation  manual  ought  to  reflect  this,  more  specifically,  we  ought  to 
choose  a  translation  manual  which  makes  the  target  language  speakers 
intell4gible  to  us  as  human  beings.  Now  if  the  target  language  speakees 
goals  are  unavoidably  similar  to  ours  at  a  fundamental  level:  and  if  he 
shares  the  species  specific  capacities  of  sensory  perception,  rationality, 
language  use.  etc.,  then  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  his  beliefs  at  a 
basic  level  arc  bound  to  be  similar  to  our  own.  At  the  very  least  the 
range  of  attributable  beliefs  will  be  restricted.  For  example.  it  is  hardly 
credible  that  the  remote  language  speaker  does  not  operate  with  an 
ontology  of  whole.  three  dimensional  objects  given  that  (a)  he  is  himself 
such  an  object  who  (b)  requires  such  objects  to  feed  and  clothe  himself, 
and  (c)  given  that  he  spends  his  time  In  the  company  of  language  users 
who  are  objects  themselves. 
I  say  beliefs  'at  a  basic  level'  must  be  similar.  meaning  beliefs  at  a  low 
level  of  theoretical  abstraction.  For  Davidson  is  quite  right  to  say  that 
beyond  a  point  there  Is  no  deciding.  even  in  principle.  between 
the  view  that  the  Other  has  used  words  as  we  do  but  has  more 
or  less  weird  beliefs,  and  the  view  that  we  have  translated  him 
wrong  (my  emphasts).  29 143 
7be  crucial  point.  however,  Is  that  this  Is  true  only  beyond  a  certain 
point.  As  Davidson  says.  the  linguist  might  well  have  cause  for  concern 
if  he  were  to  translate  a  target  sentence  as  'All  these  rabbits  are 
reincarnated  men.  '  Indeed  such  a  sentence  could  certainly  not  be  used 
as  an  occasion  sentence  since  it  is  anything  but  obvious.  Such  a 
sentence,  if  accurately  translated,  Is  really  a  theoretical  statement  about 
rabbits  and  the  cycle  of  birth  and  death,  and  is  therefore  not  a  likely 
candidate  for  Cognitive  Command.  But  the  fact  that  the  statement  is 
about  rabbits  and  not  rabbit  parts  or  rabbithood  is  most  likely  not  a 
matter  of  serious  contention.  For  however  odd  the  belief  that  rabbits 
are  reincarnated  men  may  be,  It  certainly  is  not  as  implausible  as  the 
belief  that  men  can  be  reincarnated  as  particular  rabbits  parts. 
Putnam  raises  two  points  against  this  use  of  the  rule  of  three  to  fix  ever 
more  determinately  the  linguist's  translation  of  a  remote  language.  He 
says  in  Meaning  and  the  Moral  Sciences  that  the  linguist's  reliance  on 
the  common  desires  and  capacities  of  linguist  and  speaker  is  based  on 
two  false  assumptions.  First  Putnam  claims  that  the  linguist  is 
assuming  that  the  speakees  account  of  his  own  interests  and  behaviour 
is  the  correct  one  to  use  when  fixing  translation.  Putnam's  contention 
is  that  the  speaker's  own  account  is  worth  considering  but  that  it  Is  not 
always  the  correct  one  to  choose.  30 
Ibis  point  can  be  admitted  without  damage  to  the  particular  thesis  I 
wish  to  uphold.  I  am  interested  in  maintaining  a  realist  interpretation 
of  three  dimensional  objects.  Consequently  I  have  been  at  pains  to 
establish  that  translation  is  detemiinate  enough  to  allow  whole  middle 
size  objects  to  cross  translation  without  Indeterminacy.  There  Is  no 
need  as  far  as  my  thesis  is  concerned  for  translation  to  be  determinate 
from  occasion  sentences  through  to  the  most  speculative  theoretical 
sentences.  Consequently  I  can  grant  that  the  linguist  must  be  careful 
as  to  what  interests  he  uses  to  ftx  translation;  but  I  maintain  that  the 
interests  needed  to  supply  the  determinacy  of  translation  required  for 
MY  Purposes  is  not  such  as  to  demand  extensive  guess  work  as  to  the 
Private  interests  of  the  speaker.  The  Interests  the  linguist  can  safely 
use  are  those  sufficient  to  our  needs.  These  are  the  species  specific 
interests  the  linguist  has  access  to  by  virtue  of  being  a  member  of  the 144 
same  species. 
Putnam's  second  argument  is  more  to  the  purpose.  He  claims  there  is 
no  objective,  non-interest  relative  description  of  the  speaker's  interests 
that  can  be  safely  used  by  the  linguist  to  fix  translation.  More  precisely, 
Putnam  contends  that  there  is  no  true  'psychological  description'  of  the 
speaker  that  will  include  the  account  of  his  interests.  31  When  faced 
with  the  sorts  of  situations  Putnam  brings  forward  (which  defy  easy 
interpretation  with  reference  to  set  of  objective  interests  alone)  one  is 
inclined  to  grant  Putnam  his  point.  Clearly  when  asked  to  explain  with 
reference  to  an  objective  set  of  interests  precisely  why  a  Professor  X  is 
found  'stark  naked  in  the  girl's  dormitory'  (one  of  Putnam's  colourful 
examples)  it  is  easy  to  see  why  the  linguist  will  feel  he  lacks  the 
resources.  But  again  I  return  to  the  same  point  made  above.  Putnam 
is  right  that  the  complete  set  of  interests  that  motivate  the  speaker  is 
not  attainable.  But  it  is  incorrect  to  suggest  that  there  is  not  a  species 
specific  set  of  interests  the  speaker  will  share  regardless  of  his  personal, 
individual  psychological  makeup  that  can  be  used  to  lessen  the 
indeterminacy  of  simple  occasion  sentences.  Again,  that  is  all  I  require. 
There  is  a  final  point  to  be  made  concerning  the  rule  of  three  and  our 
objectifying  tendency.  This  tendency  is,  I  would  suggest,  more  likely  to 
be  a  function  of  our  sensory  apparatus  than  a  product  of  a  particular 
grammar.  It  seems  more  probable  that  language  users  created  single 
and  general  terms  in  order  to  cope  with  the  world  as  it  appeared  to 
them.  It  is  less  plausible  that  they  would  have  created  terms  and  then 
proceeded  to  find  a  match  for  them  in  the  blooming,  buzzing  confusion. 
It  seems  more  than  reasonable  to  assume  that  language  was  developed 
to  allow  early  humans  to  cope  with  a  pre-existing  condition,  rather  than 
assuming  that  language  fixed  how  we  approach  the  world  of  experience. 
If  this  is  so,  then  our  objectifying  tendency  is  a  product  of  a  particular 
capacity,  one  that  is  shared  by  all  members  of  our  species  since  it  flows 
from  a  species  specific  sensory  apparatus. 145 
Summary 
Before  ending  this  study  on  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  a  brief 
summary  will  not  go  amiss.  The  main  concern  of  our  study  was  to 
determine  whether  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  thesis  posed  a 
significant  threat  to  the  form  of  realism  suggested  by  our  adopted 
demarcation  mechanism.  In  particular  our  attention  was  focused  on 
the  question  of  whether  nouns  referring  to  whole,  middle  size  three 
dimensional  objects  cross  translation  determinately.  The  results  of  our 
study  suggest  that  they  do. 
We  saw  that  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  our  objectiýring 
pattem  is  not  parochial  but  species  wide.  Any  useful  language 
demands  that  interlocutors  share  a  unified  spatio-temporal  framework. 
But  possession  of  such  a  framework  requires  familiarity  with  whole, 
enduring  three  dimensional  objects. 
We  then  saw  that  evidence  of  the  objectifying  habits  of  the  speaker's  of 
remote  languages  is  detectable  in  the  linguistic  and  bodily  behaviour  of 
these  speakers  despite  the  linguist's  inability  to  determinately  translate 
the  language's  apparatus  of  individuation.  Consequently  it  appears 
that  if  and  when  a  target  language  speaker  does  refer  to  objects  the 
linguist  will  be  able  to  gather  evidence  to  this  effect. 
Finally,  we  saw  that  the  degree  of  indeterminacy  diminishes  even 
further  as  the  linguist  becomes  aware  of  the  speaker's  desires  and 
capacities.  Given  that  the  linguist  and  speaker  share  certain 
unavoidable  desires,  goals  and  capacities  the  range  of  likely  beliefs 
attributable  to  the  speaker  is  significantly  lessened.  Now  when  one 
considers  the  force  of  these  arguments  simultaneously  it  becomes 
impossible  not  to  conclude  that  human  beings  invariably  objectify,  and 
objectify  in  much  the  same  way.  In  the  end  there  is  little  or  no  reason 
to  assume  that  nouns  referring  to  whole,  middle  size  three  dimensional 
objects  do  not  cross  translation  determinately. 
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Chapter  1 
An  Introduction  to  Aquinas  and  the  philosophy  of  science 
I  stated  in  the  Preface  that  it  is  with  the  results  of  Part  I  in  mind  that 
Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science  can  be  seen  to  be  of  more  than  just 
historical  interest.  1  Why  this  is  so  will  be  unclear  as  of  yet  to  anyone 
without  some  knowledge  of  Scholasticism  and  Aquinas  in  particular. 
My  intention  in  this  chapter  is  to  confront  this  basic  problem  head-on 
by  stating  in  the  most  general  terms  how  a  study  of  Aquinas'  philosophy 
of  science  can  be  useful  in  our  search  for  a  solution  to  our  realist 
dispute  before  descending  into  the  details  of  his  work.  This 
accomplished,  I  then  want  to  consider  an  aspect  of  our  realist  dispute 
which  has  not  received  the  attention  it  deserves  in  modem  discussions 
(although  it  is  hinted  at  in  various  places).  In  so  doing  I  hope  to  present 
our  problem  in  a  new  light,  a  light  which  serves  to  clarify  why  it  is  that 
Aquinas  qua  theologian  should  have  something  to  contribute  to  our 
debate.  For  I  will  argue  that  it  is  as  philosopher  and  as  theologian  that 
Aquinas  needs  to  be  considered. 
Why  Study  Aquinas? 
The  suggestion  that  at  the  end  of  the  20th  c.  we  have  something  to 
learn  from  Scholastic  science  is  likely,  at  first  blush,  to  provoke  ridicule 
and  derision.  It  ought  to  be  stressed  immediately,  however,  that  I  have 
no  desire  to  resurrect  old  theories.  Nevertheless,  there  is  much  yet  to 
learn  from  the  Scholastics,  especially  for  philosophers  of  science. 
Wallace  has  drawn  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  while  the  actual 
theories  of  the  Scholastic  natural  scientists  have  little  more  than 
historical  interest  and  are  certainly  no  longer  relevant  to  the 
practitioners  of  modern  science,  their  philosophico-scientific  concerns 
remain  relevant: 
It  is  perhaps  noteworthy  that  most  of  the  problems  of  natural 
philosophy,  and  particularly  those  formulated  by  Aristotle, 
still  resist  definitive  solution  in  the  present  day.  and  in  the main  they  have  passed  into  the  related  discipline  known  as 
the  philosophy  of  science,  where  realists  and  nominalists  (now 




With  this  in  mind  we  ought  to  be  open  to  the  possibility  that  the 
Scholastics'  treatment  of  these  issues,  long  since  lost  to  main-stream 
philosophical  tradition,  may  inspire  us  to  see  these  issues  in  new  ways. 
The  initial  motivation  behind  returning  to  the  Scholastics  for  aid  in  our 
dispute  flows  directly  from  the  conclusions  drawn  in  Part  One, 
particularly  those  concerning  the  problem  of  demarcation.  Upon 
reflection  it  becomes  apparent  that  terms  capable  of  crossing 
translation  determinately,  terms  capable  of  taking  their  place  in 
occasion  sentences,  are  terms  for  those  objects  which  constitute  the 
'basic'  ontology  of  Aristotelian  metaphysics.  Following  Harrd,  we  can 
contrast  Aristotelian  'individuals'  with  those  of  Parmenides  and 
Heraclitus.  Parmenides  is  known  principally  as  the  Presocratic  who 
held  that  change  is  an  illusion,  that  what  is  ultimately  real  is 
permanent  and  unchanging,  never  coming  into  being  or  passing  away. 
These  theoretical  commitments  force  one  to  see  apparent  change  as  the 
mere  rearrangement  of  changeless  individuals.  This  is  consistent  with 
the  view  that  ordinary  objects  are  just  temporary  collections  of 
permanent  atoms  which  will  eventually  enter  into  other  combinations  to 
form  other  equally  temporary  objects.  Heraclitus,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
thought  to  have  held  that  there  are  no  enduring  objects,  that 
individuals  are  ephemeral,  existing  only  momentarily.  Such  a  view  is 
consistent  with  a  thorough-going  phenomenalism.  Aristotelian 
individuals,  however,  are  created,  endure  for  awhile,  undergoing  some 
changes  without  loss  of  identity,  and  ultimately  are  destroyed.  Now,  as 
Harr&  points  out,  "Science  has  assumed  that,  though  the  given 
individuals  in  the  world  are  Aristotelian,  ultimate  individuals  are  either 
Parmenidean  (atomism)  or  Heraclitean  (phenomenalism).  -3  But  what 
we  find  in  Aristotle  is  an  understanding  of  the  scientific  enterprise  as  a 
whole,  methodology  and  interpretative  rules  included,  which  confines 
itself,  for  the  most  part,  to  precisely  this  'given'  set  of  individuals.  Now, 
since  we  have  conferred  a  particular  status  on  precisely  these  objects,  it 
is  of  some  interest  to  us  to  see  how  Aristotle  deals  with  them  without 149 
appealing  to  either  Pannenidean  or  Heraclitean  principles.  And  given  the 
results  of  Part  I  we  can  say  that  such  an  enterprise  has  the  potential  to 
produce  scientific  statements  which  are  candidates  for  a  realist 
interpretation. 
A  further  attraction  of  Aristotelianism  is  that  science,  or  what  he  calls 
natural  philosophy,  finds  its  place  within  an  over-arching  philosophical 
framework  which  includes  metaphysics,  mathematics  and  the 
'intermediary  sciences',  as  well  as  Ethics  and  Politics.  In  this 
framework  the  methodological  divide  between  the  "hard"  natural 
sciences  and  the  "soft"  social  sciences,  while  not  being  removed,  is 
rendered  more  intelligible,  as  is  the  distinction  between  natural  science 
and  metaphysics.  Although  Aristotle  insists  on  drawing  hard  and  fast 
distinctions  between  the  various  disciplines,  this  is  done  with  the 
intention  of  ultimately  uniting  them  within  one  system.  The  operating 
assumption  Is  that  human  knowledge  can  be  unified  and  inclusive  in 
the  sense  that  each  particular  discipline  is  seen  to  add  something  of 
value  to  our  sum  of  knowledge,  and  each  can  be  assigned  its 
appropriate  place  within  a  complete  philosophical  system.  But  It  is 
important  not  to  forget  that  Aristotle  insists  upon  the  clear  recognition 
of  the  diversity  of  subject  matter  treated  by  the  various  disciplines.  This 
recognition  is  accompanied  by  the  equally  important  realisation  that  the 
diversity  of  subject  matter  must  be  matched  by  a  corresponding 
diversity  of  methodology  and  interpretative  approacti.  There  is  no  one 
scientific  method  to  be  applied  in  all  disciplines,  as  there  is  no  one 
interpretative  approach  to  be  applied  to  all  of  science's  products.  The 
object  of  study  in  each  discipline  must  be  carefully  identified  and 
treated  in  a  manner  fitting  its  nature  and  our  epistemological 
capabilities.  This  methodological  and  interpretative  pluralism  allows  for 
the  recognition  of  the  unity  of  our  knowledge  without  effacing  important 
distinctions. 
The  fact  that  Aquinas  is  acknowledged  to  be  one  of  the  great 
commentators  on  Aristotle  would  be  enough  to  justify  devoting  attention 
to  him.  But  Aquinas  does  more  than  just  repeat  the  teachings  of  the 
Peripatetic.  As  well  as  clarifying  and  developing  Aristotelian  ideas,  he 
employs  Aristotle's  metaphysics,  epistemology  and  philosophy  of  science 150 
in  his  work  as  a  theologian,  particularly  in  his  investigations  concerning 
the  nature  of  our  knowledge  of  God  and  the  other  immaterial 
substances.  It  is  this  work  in  particular,  rarely  studied  by  modern 
philosophers,  that  makes  Aquinas  of  special  importance  to  us.  As  said 
above,  in  Aristotle  we  find  a  philosophical  system  which  deals  with  a 
basic  ontology  remarkably  similar  to  that  set  of  entities  the  terms  for 
which  cross  translation  determinately.  What  we  find  in  Aquinas  is  an 
acceptance  of  Aristotle's  philosophical  framework  and  basic  ontology 
plus  an  additional  emphasis  on  a  set  of  entities  which  are  significantly 
different  from  those  included  in  the  basic  Aristotelian  ontology.  The 
point  of  interest  for  us  is  that  these  entities  are  of  such  a  nature  that 
knowledge  of  them  cannot  be  attained  through  the  normal  investigative 
procedures  sanctioned  by  Aristotle  and  accepted  by  Aquinas.  The 
addition  of  this  set  of  entities  to  the  basic  ontology,  combined  with 
acceptance  of  Aristotle's  epistemology,  forces  Aquinas  to  consider 
carefully  what  he  can  say  about  these  entities  and  how  these 
statements  are  to  be  interpreted.  Now  it  is  my  contention  that  we  have 
something  to  learn  from  Aquinas'  careful  assessment  of  our  knowledge 
of  God  and  the  other  immaterial  substances.  In  particular  I  suggest 
that  this  assessment  provides  an  instructive  model  for  the  treatment  of 
science's  theoretical  entities  the  terms  for  which  do  not  cross  translation 
determinately.  Aquinas,  as  we  have  learned  from  Chdnu's  classic 
work4,  wanted  to  treat  of  God  in  theology  as  a  natural  scientist  would 
treat  of  an  entity  in  his  particular  domain;  in  other  words,  to  investigate 
the  nature  of  God  as  the  natural  scientist  would  investigate  any 
scientific  entity  within  the  Aristotelian  framework.  'Meology,  with 
Aquinas,  was  to  become  a  science  of  God;  for  us,  philosophy  of  science 
is  to  become,  at  least  in  part,  theology.  Moreover,  in  Aquinas  we  find  a 
model  of  how  to  proceed  in  a  world  characterised  explicitly  by  a 
demarcation  between  claims  of  Reason  and  claims  of  Faith.  This 
demarcation  is  analogical  to  the  demarcation  I  wish  to  draw  between 
realist  and  anti-realist  domains  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science.  Again 
it  has  to  be  emphasised  at  this  point  that  this  is  a  very  general 
perspective  of  the  importance  of  Aquinas  for  our  dispute.  The  details 
and  proper  understanding  of  Aquinas  and  his  import  for  us  is  what  will 
occupy  us  for  the  remainder  of  this  study. 151 
7heology  and  the  Sciences 
But  before  proceeding  with  our  investigation  of  Aquinas  a  few  words  on 
the  relationship  of  theology  to  the  sciences  will  not  go  amiss.  Inevitably 
some  will  question  the  propriety  of  admitting  a  theologian  to  our  realist 
dispute  in  science.  What  has  theology  to  do  with  these  matters?  it  will 
be  asked.  But  a  look  at  the  history  of  our  dispute,  and  the  nature  of  the 
sciences  themselves  reveals  that  theological  issues  are  not  as  alien  to 
our  concerns  as  one  might  suppose,  and  that  theological  intuitions  have 
coloured  our  arguments  since  its  inception.  Indeed,  there  are  a  number 
of  significant  points  of  contact  between  the  sciences,  the  realist  dispute 
in  science,  and  theological  matters.  These  points  of  contact,  brought  to 
light  by  historical  studies,  are  usually  passed  over  or  Ignored  in  our 
debates.  Now  we  cannot  enter  into  a  detailed  historical  study  here.  in 
fact  we  can  do  little  more  than  wave  at  various  works  where  these 
points  are  discussed;  but  it  is  worth  while  to  mention  some  of  these 
findings  if  only  to  establish  the  plausibility  of  two  points:  a)  that 
theology  has  a  greater  affinity  with  science  than  one  might  expect,  and 
b)  that  often  the  arguments  employed  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science 
have  been  motivated  by,  or  exploit,  pre-philosophical,  and  certainly  pre- 
scientific,  intuitions. 
That  science  and  religion  in  general  are  linked  in  popular  culture  need 
not  be  insisted  upon.  Until  quite  recently  this  relationship  has  usually 
been  taken  to  be  a  hostile  one.  But  seeping  into  popular  culture  is  the 
idea  that  there  are  similarities  between  recent  developments  in  physics 
and  certain  eastern  religious  traditions.  There  are  also  scholarly  works 
which  focus  on  similar  connections.  5  However,  such  links  between 
science  and  religion,  or  science  and  theology.  do  not  concern  us  here.  I 
am  not  wanting  to  argue  that,  in  some  sense,  science  and  religion  are 
saying  the  same  thing.  This  view  suggests  that  science  and  religion 
consist  of  two  entirely  separate  ways  of  being  in  the  world  which 
happen,  quite  co-incidentally,  to  agree  on  certain  matters.  The 
connections  between  science  and  theology  of  concern  to  us,  however,  lie 
at  a  more  fundamental  level:  some  studies  in  the  history  of  science 
suggest  that  there  are  pre-philosophical  intuitions  and  assumptions,  as 152 
well  as  patterns  of  thought,  at  work  in  theological  contexts  which  are 
also  at  work  in  our  local  realist  dispute.  In  effect,  assumptions  which 
originated  in  a  theological  context  have  been  transposed  Into  other 
areas,  in  particular  into  the  philosophy  of  science,  where  they  receive 
treatment  in  a  manner  befitting  the  new  home  discipline. 
Our  suspicion  that  such  a  transposition  has  occurred  is  aroused 
initially  by  comments  found  in  the  works  of  purely  secular  authors  of 
the  20th  c.  For*  example,  what  are  we  to  make  of  the  tendency  of 
certain  authors  to  use  overtly  theological  terminology  or  illustrations  to 
describe  the  respective  positions  outlined  and  compared  in  the  realist 
dispute  in  science?  Consider,  for  example,  Quine's  use  of  the  terms 
"sectarian"  and  "ecumenical"  to  describe  attitudes  or  positions  taken  in 
response  to  the  possibility  of  being  faced  with  two  empirically  equivalent 
but  mutually  incompatible  theories.  Quine  writes: 
One  possible  attitude  to  adopt  towards  the  two  theories  is  a 
sectarian  one,  as  I  have  called  it:  treat  the  rival  theory...  by 
rejecting  all  the  contexts  of  its  alien  terms.  We  can  no  longer 
excuse  this  unequal  treatment  of  the  two  theories  on  the 
ground  that  our  own  is  more  elegant,  but  still  we  can  plead 
that  we  have  no  higher  access  to  truth  than  our  evolving 
theory,  however  fallible.  ...  The  opposing  attitude  is  the 
ecumenical  one,  which  would  count  both  theories  true.  Its 
appeal  is  empiricism:  reluctance  to  discriminate  invidiously 
between  empirically  equivalent  and  equally  economical 
theories.  6 
Quine  also  states  that  in  recent  years  he  has  "vacillated"  between 
'sectarianism'  and  'ecumenicalism'.  Now  the  fact  that  Quine  uses  these 
terms  in  no  way  proves  that  there  is  a  bonafide  theological  component 
to  our  dispute.  It  is  most  likely  that  Quine  uses  these  terms  in  an 
analogical  sense  simply  because  they  are  useful  heuristically. 
Nonetheless,  it  is  at  least  curious  that  these  terms  should  be  so  fittingly 
applied  to  positions  in  our  debate,  and  on  a  matter  of  critical 
importance  to  us,  viz.,  the  under  determination  of  theory  by  data.  But 
there  is  good  reason  why  these  terms  are  useful.  It  is  important  to 
recognise  that  the  alternatives  Quine  has  noted  are,  characterised  by  a 
fundamental  difference  in  attitude.  The  attitudes  adopted  by  boýh 153 
parties  are  not,  apparently,  a  matter  of  discussion,  or  so  it  would  seem 
from  Quine's  presentation  of  the  matter.  The  attitudes  are  noted,  listed 
and  described;  but  Quine  makes  no  effort  to  legislate  which  attitude 
ought  to  be  adopted.  But,  of  course,  no  such  discussion  is  possible  for 
Quine:  when  presented  with  two  equally  elegant,  economical  and 
empirically  adequate  theories,  there  are  no  fully  rational  criteria  left  to 
which  he  can  appeal.  Both  sectarianism  and  ecumenicalism  have 
something  to  recommend  them  (hence  the  possibility  of  vacillation);  but 
their  respective  virtues  are  not  decidable  by  appeals  to  pure  reason,  or 
to  some  other  standard  recognised  by  both  camps.  It  would  seem  then 
that  parties  on  both  sides  of  the  dispute  are  characterised  by  an 
apparently  brute  attitude  which  governs  how  they  proceed  in  our  local 
debate.  Now  I  want  to  suggest  that  these  apparently  brute  attitudes 
have  a  history,  a  history  we  would  do  well  to  bear  in  mind. 
Another  author  who  makes  use  of  theological  terminology  is  Nancy 
Cartwright.  In  How  the  Laws  o  Physics  Lie,  7  she  candidly  admits  that  )f 
the  differences  between  her  position  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science  and 
that  of  the  opposition  are  consistent  with  two  differing  views  of  the 
nature  of  God.  Consider  the  following  lines: 
Pierre  Duhem  distinguished  two  kinds  of  thinkers:  the  deep 
but  narrow  minds  of  the  French,  and  the  broad  but  shallow 
minds  of  the  English.  The  French  mind  sees  things  in  an 
elegant,  unified  way.  It  takes  Newton's  three  laws  of  motion 
and  turns  them  into  the  beautiful,  abstract  mathematics  of 
Lagrangian  mechanics.  The  English  mind.  says  Duhem,  is  an 
exact  contrast.  It  engineers  bits  of  gears,  and  pulleys,  and 
keeps  the  strings  from  tangling  up.  It  holds  a  thousand 
different  details  all  at  once,  without  imposing  much  abstract 
order  or  organisation.  Me  difference  between  the  realist  and 
me  is  almost  theological.  The  realist  thinks  that  the  creator  of 
the  universe  worked  like  a  French  mathematician.  But  I  think 
that  God  has  the  untidy  mind  of  the  English.  [My  italics]  8 
Again  Cartwright  is  speaking  metaphorically  and  using  such  language 
for  its  heuristic  value  alone.  However,  the  points  made  in  Quine's  case 
apply  equally  well  to  Cartwright.  The  theological  distinction  she  draws 
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there  is  no  attempt  to  argue  for  or  against  the  French  or  English  mind 
sets,  or  the  two  corresponding  views  of  God.  This  is  important.  While 
no  one  would  suggest  that  Cartwright  began  with  a  particular  view  of 
God  and  then  imposed  it  consciously  on  her  work  in  the  philosophy  of 
science,  it  seems  not  unreasonable  to  ask  If  the  intuitions  and  Ideas 
accompanying  this  view  of  God  (but  now  dissociated  from  it)  have  not 
coloured  her  philosophy  of  science  and  pre-determined  which  positions 
and  arguments  she  will  find  acceptable.  I  hasten  to  add,  however,  that 
in  this  regard  Cartwright  is  probably  no  different  from  any  other  party 
to  our  dispute.  Her  candour  alone  singles  her  out  for  such  treatment. 
But  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  references  to  theology  in  20th  c. 
philosophy  of  science  are  found  in  Kuhn's  Me  Structure  of  Scientiftc 
Revolutions.  9  We  are  all  now  familiar  with  the  notion  of  paradigm  shifts 
and  how  these  can  be  likened  to  the  religious  experience  of  'conversion', 
at  least  insofar  as  there  seems  to  be  a  degree  of  'irrationality'  involved  in 
the  rejection  of  one  paradigm  and  the  adoption  of  another.  Lakatos  has 
taken  Kuhn  very  seriously  on  this  matter;  so  seriously  in  fact,  that  he 
feels  it  necessary  to  discuss  in  detail  whether  scientific  change  is  really 
not  a  kind  of  religious  change.  10  Whether  science  is  "reason  or 
religion"  is  not  something  we  have  to  determine  at  this  moment:  at  this 
juncture  it  is  more  important  that  it  be  recognised  that  the  similarities 
between  scientific  and  religious  modes  of  thought  brought  to  light  by 
Kuhn  cannot  be  dismissed  as  easily  as  some  might  like. 
However,  to  my  mind,  Kuhn's  most  interesting  reference  to  theology  has 
little  to  do  with  the  psychology  of  paradigm  shifts.  It  is  during  his 
discussion  of  the  role  of  authority  within  the  scientific  community,  in 
particular  the  role  of  authoritative  text  books  in  the  training  of  science 
students,  that  the  more  revealing  link  between  science  and  theology  is 
made.  He  writes: 
Both  scientists  and  laymen  take  much  of  their  image  of 
creative  scientific  activity  from  an  authoritative  source  that 
systematically  disguises  -  partly  for  important  functional 
reasons  -  the  existence  and  significance  of  scientific 
revolutions.  Only  when  the  nature  of  that  authority  is 
recognised  and  analysed  can  one  hope  to  make  historical example  fully  effective.  Furthermore,  though  the  point  can  be 
fully  developed  only  in  my  concluding  section,  the  analysis 
now  required  will  begin  to  indicate  one  of  the  aspects  of 
scientific  work  that  most  clearly  distinguishes  it  from  every 
other  creative  pursuit  except  perhaps  theology.  11  [my  Italics] 
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Kuhn  makes  good  his  promise  in  a  later  chapter  where  the  nature  of 
this  'aspect'  is  brought  out  explicitly.  While  explaining  why  science  is 
the  one  enterprise  which  seems  to  make  'progress',  he  leans  heavily  on 
the  fact  that  normal  science  is  carried  out  by  a  community  of  scientists 
all  committed  to  a  single  paradigm  and  to  the  resolution  of  a  particular 
set  of  problems.  'Progress'  is  then  defined  by  reference  to  this  shared 
project.  In  this  stage  of  science  the  "first  principles"  of  the  paradigm  are 
assumed  to  be  stable,  and  attention  is  focused  on  the  "most  esoteric  of 
the  phenomena  that  concern  it,,.  12  Solutions  to  these  esoteric  problems 
are  then  made  known  to  others  from  the  same  scientific  community. 
Kuhn's  point  is  that  scientific  practice  has  a  tendency  to  discourage 
examination  of  the  paradigm's  first  principles,  and  that  scientific 
education  re-enforces  this  by  not  bringing  to  light,  not  to  say  actively 
obscuring,  the  fact  that  other  paradigms  have  been  on  offer  in  the 
development  of  the  particular  science  in  question.  There  is  good  reason 
for  such  a  pedagogical  approach.  Pointing  out  the  existence  of  other 
paradigms  tends  to  draw  attention  away  from  the  puzzle-solving  activity 
of  normal  science  and  to  refocus  it  again  on  first  principles  to  the 
detriment  of  progress.  Against  this  background  Kuhn  then  writes: 
Without  wishing  to  defend  the  excessive  lengths  to  which  this 
type  of  education  has  occasionally  been  carried,  one  cannot 
help  but  notice  that  in  general  it  has  been  immensely  effective. 
Of  course,  it  is  a  narrow  and  rigid  education,  probably  more 
so  than  any  other  except  perhaps  in  orthodox  theology.  13  [my 
italics] 
This  is  curious  indeed.  Here  we  have  the  most  highly  prized  aspect  of 
the  scientific  enterprise,  its  undeniable  progress,  explained,  if  only 
partially,  in  terms  of  a  pedagogical  philosophy  shared  by  orthodox 
theological  institutions. 
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practice  of  science  and  theology.  These  similarities  are  particularly 
striking  if  one  has  some  familiarity  with  Kuhn's  notion  of  normal 
science  and  the  rudiments  of  theological  practice.  In  particular  one 
notices  similarities  between  the  thought  processes  of  a  scientist  engaged 
in  normal  science  and  those,  for  example,  of  the  Jewish  theologians 
working  within  the  Midrashic  tradition.  14  A  few  words  on  this 
theological  tradition  will  suffice  to  bring  out  these  similarities. 
According  to  Emil  Fackenheim,  Midrashic  theology  has  one  basic 
purpose  and  four  essential  elements  of  actual  practice.  The  raison 
d'C,  tre  of  Midrashic  theology  is  to  resist  the  "dissipation  of  the  root 
experiences  of  Judaism"  (what  one  might  refer  to  as  Judaism's  'first 
principles'),  and  to  actively  preserve  the  traditions  that  have  arisen  from 
them  in  the  Jewish  community.  This  essentially  conservative  agenda  is 
not  unlike  that  of  the  practitioners  of  normal  science  who  are 
professionally  coTrunitted  to  a  particular  paradigm. 
The  four  elements  of  the  actual  day  to  day  practice  are  also  revealing.  If 
one  may  be  permitted  to  adapt  Kuhn's  terminology,  one  might  say  that 
"normal  theology"  begins  with: 
i)  Reflection  on  the  root  experiences  of  the  Jewish  people  (experiences 
that  become  the  foundations  of  the  Jewish  world  picture  or  paradigm). 
ii)  This  reflection  leads  to  an  awareness  of  two  types  of  contradiction.  a) 
contradictions  within  the  set  of  experiences  and  interpretation  of  their 
meaning,  and  b)  contradictions  from  without,  i.  e.,  ensuing  Jewish 
history  may  contain  events  that  seem  to  contradict  the  traditional 
understanding  of  the  root  experiences. 
iii)  Nevertheless  there  is  a  refusal  to  abandon  those  experiences  despite 
the  (apparent  or  real)  contradictions,  combined  with  an  effort  to 
eliminate  them  through  greater  understanding  of  the  tradition. 
iv)  There  is  a  final  acceptance  of  these  contradictions  and  an  ensuing 
interpretation  of  the  implications  of  a  contradictory  framework. 
Each  one  of  these  elements  has  its  parallel  in  the  practice  of  normal 157 
science:  there  is  the  initial  acceptance  of  a  theoretical  paradigm  upon 
which  the  adherent  bases  his  thought;  the  adherent  then  discovers,  or 
has  pointed  out  to  him,  the  'apparent'  contradictions  between  the 
theory  and  experience,  which  are  identified  as  "puzzles";  the  adherents 
then  attempt  to  find  explanations  for  these  contradictions,  but 
explanations  which  are  consistent  with  the  first  principles  of  the 
accepted  paradigm;  finally,  even  if  the  adherents  are  unable  to  solve  the 
puzzles,  there  is  no  immediate  rejection  of  the  paradigm  unless  a 
satisfying  alternative  is  ready  to  hand  (and  even  then  many  of  the 
established  scientists  will  resist  the  paradigm  shift).  The  structural 
similarities  at  this  level  between  the  practice  of  normal  science  and 
theology  are  quite  unmistakable. 
If  we  set  aside  the  philosophy  of  science  for  a  moment  and  concentrate 
rather  on  the  history  of  science,  the  importance  of  the  relationship 
between  theology  and  the  realist  dispute  in  science  becomes 
unmistakable.  Most  historians  of  science  now  recognise  that  science  is 
not  a  self-contained,  autonomous  discipline,  but  that  scientific  activity 
both  affects  and  is  affected  by  the  rest  of  the  contemporary  cultural 
situation.  Moreover,  some  go  so  far  as  to  state  explicitly  that  theological 
commitments  in  particular  affect  the  attitudes  scientists  have  held 
regarding  their  work,  as  well  as  the  content  of  the  theories  themselves. 
Before  looking  at  some  specific  cases,  it  is  worth  asking  why  this  might 
be  the  case. 
Part  of  the  answer  might  be  that  theology  and  the  sciences  were,  and 
perhaps  still  are,  different  ways  of  coping  with  the  same  human  needs, 
and  consequently  difficult  to  distinguish  in  the  early  days  of  the 
development  of  science.  Consider  what  Epicurus  has  to  say  about  the 
root  causes  of  our  interest  in  the  sciences,  and  how  often  these  same 
causes  are  used  to  explain  the  origins  of  religious  belief.  He  writes: 
If  we  had  never  been  molested  by  alarms  at  celestial  and 
atmospheric  phenomena,  nor  by  the  misgivings  that  death 
somehow  affects  us,  nor  by  neglect  of  the  proper  limits  of  pain 
and  desires,  we  should  have  had  no  need  to  study  natural 
sciences.  15 
and It  would  be  impossible  to  banish  fear  on  matters  of  the  highest 
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importance,  if  a  man  did  not  know  the  nature  of  the  whole 
universe,  but  lived  in  dread  of  what  the  legends  tell  us.  16 
Dales  also  emphasises  the  common  roots  of  science  and  religion  his 
preface  to  The  Scientific  Achievement  of  the  Middle  Ages.  He  begins  his 
history  with  the  observation  that  mythology,  magic,  theology,  and 
science  are  all  born  of  the  same  human  desires: 
Men  have  tried  an  interesting  variety  of  ways  of  dealing  with 
the  perceived  or  "natural"  world  in  which  they  find  themselves. 
They  have  imagined  it  as  governed  by  hostile  or  benevolent 
whimsical  forces,  which  they  have  tried  to  bribe  or  propitiate. 
They  have  explained  it  in  terms  of  elaborate  mythologies. 
They  have  tried  to  plumb  its  mysteries  by  interpreting  the 
flights  of  birds,  innards  of  beasts,  positions  of  the  stars,  or 
delirious  mutterings  of  divinely  inspired  persons.  They  have 
tried  to  control  it  through  the  arts  of  magic  and  made  It  serve 
man's  needs.  Or,  every  now  and  then,  they  have  sought  to 
understand  it  according  to  the  categories  of  human  reason.  17 
What  is  interesting  about  this  passage  is  the  recognition  of  the  two 
principle  desires  that  motivate  scientific  activity,  viz.,  understanding 
and  control  of  nature.  But  it  also  suggests  that  what  is  peculiar  about 
science  is  simply  the  manner  in  which  these  practical  needs  and  desires 
are  satisfied.  With  this  in  mind  it  is  not  entirely  surprising  that 
Thorndike's  historical  studies  have  revealed  that  experimental  science 
as  we  know  it  is  in  fact  a  continuation  of  the  sorts  of  activities  that 
occupied  magicians  in  their  pursuit  of  knowledge  and  control  of 
nature.  18 
But  it  is  in  Hooykaas  that  we  find  an  explicit  connection  between 
theology  and  science.  He  writes:  "What  people  thought  about  God  (or 
the  gods)  influenced  their  conception  of  nature,  and  this  in  turn 
influenced  their  method  of  investigating  nature,  that  is  their  science.  "  19 
Following  the  lead  of  Foster,  Hooykaas  finds  at  least  a  partial 
explanation  for  the  difference  between  pre  and  post  revolutionary 
science  in  the  fact  that  the  theological  commitments  of  the  leading 
scientists  had  changed.  20  Both  argue  that  the  mechanistic  world  view 
which  characterises  the  new  science  is  more  consistent  with  Biblical 159 
notions  of  God  than  the  'organic'  world  view  of  the  Scholastics,  which 
had  still  to  fully  emancipate  Itself  from  pagan  theology.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  in  this  regard  that  Boyle,  Hooke  and  Newton  are  often  refer-red 
to  as  the  English  'Christian  Virtuosi'.  And  consider  Whitehead's 
assertion  that  the  very  possibility  of  science  is  itself  a  product  of 
theology.  In  Science  and  the  Modem  World  we  read: 
The  faith  in  the  possibility  of  science,  generated  antecedently 
to  the  development  of  modem  scientific  activity,  is  an 
unconscious  derivative  from  medieval  theology.  21 
This  general  point  is  also  supported  by  William  Dampier,  who  writes  In 
A  History  of  Science  and  Its  Relations  with  Philosophy  and  Religion  that 
the  Scholastic's  assumption, 
that  God  and  the  world  are  understandable  by  man  implanted 
in  the  best  minds  of  Western  Europe  belief  in  the  regularity 
and  uniformity  of  nature,  without  which  scientific  research 
would  never  be  attempted.  22 
It  is  the  belief  in  a  rational  and  benevolent  God  in  particular  that 
provides  the  assumptions  that  allow  for  the  possibility  of  science.  The 
insistence  on  the  uniformity  of  nature  (that  in  similar  circumstances 
similar  effects  will  be  observed)  and  on  the  principle  of  parsimony 
(simplicity  and  elegance)  is  perfectly  understandable  when  one  is 
operating  on.  the  assumption  that  the  world  is  the  product  of  a  rational 
creator,  and  that  the  world  bears  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of 
its  maker.  It  is  also  worth  remarking  that  once  these  principles  are 
removed  from  their  theological  context  they  become  merely  practical 
rules  of  thumb,  justified  on  grounds  of  convenience,  past  success,  or 
aesthetic  judgements.  When  this  theological  framework  is  set  aside  we 
lose  the  warrant  to  assume  there  is  any  correspondence  between  our 
desire  for  order  and  simplicity  and  there  actually  being  order  and 
simplicity  in  the  structure  of  the  world  itself. 
However,  medieval  theology  not  only  provides  some  critical  assumptions 
that  make  scientific  activity  possible,  it  also  explains  why  such  an 
activity  is  valuable  in  and  of  itself  above  and  beyond  its  ability  to  meet 160 
certain  needs.  The  investigation  of  nature  becomes  a  worthwhile 
activity  in  Its  own  right  because  nature  is  God's  handiwork.  23  To  study 
nature  was  to  come  to  know  God  through  his  creation. 
However,  the  impact  of  theological  matters  on  science  is  not  confined  to 
the  provision  of  certain  key  assumptions  that  allow  for  the  possibility  of 
science.  Edward  Grant  and  Hans  Blumenberg  have  traced  the 
influence  of  certain  theological  ideas  and  events  upon  the  very  self- 
understanding  of  the  contemporary  scientific  community.  Both 
historians  focus  in  particular  on  the  effects  of  the  condemnation  of 
1277,  which  they  consider  to  be  of  singular  importance  for  the  later 
development  of  science.  This  is  not  the  time  or  place  to  go  into  the 
details  of  this  event  or  of  the  other  similar  condemnations;  what  I  wish 
to  focus  on  is  the  impact  of  this  event  on  the  development  of  the 
philosophy  of  science,  and  the  recognition  that  its  causes  were  extra- 
scientific.  The  particular  extra-scientific  matter  in  question  in  this 
instance  was  the  desire  to  protect  the  theological  commitment  to  the 
omnipotence  of  the  Christian  God. 
In  order  to  appreciate  the  impact  of  the  condemnations  on  the 
philosophy  of  science  some  historical  background  is  required.  For  most 
of  the  early  Middle  Ages  only  a  few  of  Aristotle's  logical  works  were 
available  in  the  Latin  west,  by  far  the  greater  part  of  his  corpus  being 
for  all  intents  and  purposes  unknown.  The  same  can  be  said  of  Plato, 
the  7Ymaeus  being  the  only  dialogue  known  to  the  Church  Fathers  and 
early  Scholastics,  though  they  did  know  some  works  of  Plotinus  and 
other  Neo-Platonists.  Consequently,  for  over  700  hundred  years 
Intellectuals  in  the  west  had  access  to  only  fragments  of  various  authors 
from  various  philosophical  traditions,  as  well  as  a  number  of 
commentaries  and  encyclopaedias  whose  authors  tried  to  preserve  the 
knowledge  of  classical  antiquity,  often  with  little  success.  Since  there 
was  no  one  systematic  and  comprehensive  philosophical  system 
available,  intellectuals  were  largely  free  to  carry  on  their  theological 
studies  in  isolation  from  the  potentially  overwhelming  influence  of  the 
Greeks.  When  Aristotle's  entire  corpus  was  made  available,  however, 
theologians  and  philosophers  for  the  first  time  had  to  react  to  a  most 
impressive  philosophical  system  incorporating  theology,  metaphysics, 161 
the  natural  sciences  as  well  as  politics  and  ethics.  The  grandeur  of  this 
philosophical  edifice  could  hardly  fail  to  impress.  Gradually,  as 
scholars  slowly  came  to  understand  and  appreciate  his  work,  Aristotle 
became  the  authority  on  all  matters  philosophical  and  scientific. 
However,  as  Aristotle's  influence  grew,  a  group  of  extreme  Aristotelians, 
the  so-called  Latin-Averroeists,  started  to  challenge  the  authority  of  the 
Church  in  the  name  of  the  Peripatetic.  This  conflict  was  perhaps 
Inevitable  since  Aristotle  did  hold  certain  beliefs  about  the  world  that 
contradicted  well-established  theological  doctrine.  The  conflicts  arose 
primarily  from  Aristotle's  natural  philosophy.  Since  he  claimed  that 
certain  actions  or  events  are  physically  impossible  (for  instance,  that  a 
vacuum  could  be  found  in  nature),  commentators  took  him  to  be 
implying  that  there  are  limitations  on  what  the  Christian  God  can  do 
(for  instance,  it  was  implied  that  God  cannot  move  the  universe  with 
rectilinear  motion  since  a  vacuum  would  result).  As  the  challenges 
became  more  frequent  and  more  insistent  (and  more  insulting), 
eventually  the  patience  of  the  Church  authorities  was  broken.  A 
condemnation  of  219  theologically  problematic  propositions  thought  to 
be  held  by  Aristotelians  was  issued,  thereby  prohibiting  the  teaching  of 
these  propositions  on  pain  of  excommunication. 
The  implications  of  this  condemnation  for  scientific  thought  were 
enormous.  One  immediate  consequence  was  that  natural  scientists 
received  encouragement  to  openly  question  The  Philosopher  and  reject 
his  teachings  if  they  were  found  to  be  in  error  (either  doctrinally  or 
empirically).  If  Aristotle  was  wrong  on  such  important  doctrinal 
questions  (for  example,  his  insistence  on  the  eternity  of  the  world),  then 
it  is  easier  to  think  he  might  be  wrong  on  other  matters.  This  is  the 
feature  of  the  condemnation  that  most  impresses  Duhem  who  sees  in 
this  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  Aristotle's  overwhelming  authority  and 
the  start  of  serious  scientific  investigations  in  dynamics  which  he 
thought  produced  ideas  that  were  eventually  perfected  by  Galileo  and 
Newton.  Another  effect,  more  important  for  our  purposes,  was  that 
Aristotelian  natural  philosophers  were  discouraged  from  attributing  a 
strong  realist  reading  to  the  theories  they  developed.  They  tended  to 
remain  content  with  'saving  the  phenomena'.  not  claiming  to  have  found 162 
any  literally  true  theories.  Some  will  say  that  this  position  was  a 
cynical  ploy  adopted  in  order  to  avoid  conflict  with  the  authorities.  It  Is 
probably  fair  to  say  that  this  under-estimates  the  respect  for  the 
Church  still  current  among  most  natural  philosophers  of  the  day. 
Grant's  view  of  the  matter  is  more  convincing.  He  concludes  his 
Physical  Science  in  the  Middle  Ages  by  stating  that  the  most  significant 
impact  of  the  condemnations  was  that  they  led  directly  to  the  extreme 
anti-realist  tendencies  of  the  late  Scholastic  scientists.  As  we  shall  see, 
anti-realist  tendencies  were  already  present  in  the  thought  of  the  day. 
But  up  until  the  death  of  Aquinas  shortly  before  the  condemnation,  the 
only  science  to  be  treated  consistently  in  an  anti-realist  manner  was 
astronomy.  After  1277,  anti-realist  tendencies  spread  to  all  areas  of 
science,  engulfing  both  the  super  and  sub  lunar  worlds.  The 
Scholastics  already  had  a  tendency  to  doubt  the  validity  of  physical 
explanations;  but  at  the  same  time  they  did  not  expect  to  find  a  more 
reasonable  or  satisfying  physical  theory  than  that  provided  by  Aristotle. 
Consequently,  the  condemnation  of  1277,  in  providing  theological 
grounds  for  rejecting  some  of  Aristotle's  key  theses,  re-enforced  a  pre- 
existent  tendency  to  play  down  what  science  could  achieve.  Grant 
writes: 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  condemnation  of  1277,  with  its 
emphasis  on  God's  absolute  power,  their  objective  was  to 
demonstrate  that  alternatives  to  a  variety  of  Aristotelian 
physical  explanations  were  not  only  logically  possible  but  in 
some  cases  even  as  plausible  as  Aristotle's  ....  The 
condemnations  of  1277  and  the  philosophical  and  theological 
consequences  that  flowed  from  it  in  the  fourteenth  century 
created  an  unusual  intellectual  climate  in  science  and 
philosophy.  No  longer  was  it  widely  believed  that  certainty 
could  be  acquired  about  causes  and  laws  of  nature.  It  was 
now  a  matter  of  choosing  the  most  probable  of  a  number  of 
alternatives....  A  sophisticated  positivistic  attitude  developed 
in  which  many  of  the  fourteenth  century  Mertonians  and 
Parisians,  who  contributed  most  to  fourteenth  century 
thought,  abandoned  hope  of  acquiring  true  knowledge  of  the 
physical  world.  24 
In  Grant's  view  the  most  fundamental  distinction  between  late 163 
Scholastic  and  Modem  science  is  the  former's  decision  to  limit  itself  to 
saving  the  appearances  and  not  aspiring  to  knowledge  of  the  natural 
world.  He  also  argues  that  it  was  only  when  this  attitude  was  set  aside 
that  new  developments  in  science  were  likely  to  arise.  And  it  is 
Copernicus  himself  who  provides  this  change  of  attitude.  The 
important  feature  of  Copernicus'  work  was  not  his  heliocentric  system 
per  se,  but  the  manner  in  which  he  interpreted  his  new  theory.  Grant 
writes: 
A  vast  gulf  separates  the  attitude  of  Copernicus  from  that  of 
his  fourteenth  century  predecessors.  For  Copernicus  "saving 
the  phenomena"  was  not  a  matter  of  convenience,  but  truth; 
for  Buridan  and  Oresme,  it  was  not  a  matter  of  truth,  but 
convenience.  25 
Copernicus  was  a  realist,  and  this,  more  than  anything  else,  was  what 
caught  people's  imagination,  including  the  likes  of  Galileo  and  Kepler.  26 
But  as  is  made  clear  in  the  work  of  Blumenberg,  this  shift  from 
scientific  anti-realism  to  scientific  realism  was  itse!  f  justifled  on 
theological  grounds.  It  is  to  this  that  I  now  turn. 
Grant  is  correct  to  identify  Copernicus'  realism  as  being  the  most 
inspiring  aspect  of  his  work.  He  is  less  accurate  in  his  suggestion  that 
Copernicus'  realism  was  simply  "naive",  and  "the  stuff  of  error,  [and] 
fantasy  ...  -.  27  Grant's  assertion  would  be  correct  if  all  that  were 
involved  in  Copernicus'  shift  to  scientific  realism  was  a  failure  to 
understand  that  one  cannot  infer  that  one's  theory  is  true  on  the 
grounds  that  it  adequately  saves  the  appearances.  Grant  suggests  that 
this  is  precisely  what  Copernicus  did:  he  implies  that  Copernicus'  shift 
to  realism  was  motivated  by  the  mistaken  belief  that  only  true 
hypotheses  can  save  the  phenomena.  28  'Ibis  is  indeed  naive,  especially 
if  it  were  to  be  asserted  with  no  further  supporting  argumentation.  To 
Blumenberg  goes  the  credit,  however,  of  unearthing  the  arguments  and 
intuitions  that  would  make  Copernicus'  ostensibly  naive  view  plausible. 
The  point  of  interest  for  us,  however,  is  that  these  arguments  and 
intuitions  are  ostensibly  theological  in  nature. 
In  his  monumental  study  of  the  Copernican  revolution29  Blumenberg 164 
seeks  to  isolate  the  factors  that  brought  about  the  conditions  under 
which  Copernicus'  heliocentric,  theory,  and  realist  reading  thereof,  could 
be  taken  seriously  by  the  scientific  community.  In  the  course  of  this 
work  Blumenberg  traces  the  influence  of  cosmologico-theological  ideas 
on  the  attitudes  of  astronomers  from  the  ancient  Greeks  to  Copernicus. 
What  he  finds  is  a  direct  connection  between  one's  views  on  the 
epistemological  capabilities  of  human  beings  and  one's  views  on,  in 
Blumenberg's  terminology,  "the  quality  of  the  world  for  man".  More 
precisely,  Blumenberg  shows  that  in  the  past  one's  realism  or  anti- 
realism  in  astronomy  has  been  a  function  of  one's  understanding  of  the 
relationship  that  obtains  between  human  beings  and  the  Cosmos. 
Blumenberg  identifies  three  schools  of  thought  on  this  particular 
relationship,  each  with  a  corresponding  epistemology.  First,  there  is 
what  Blumenberg  calls  'anthropocentricism',  characterised  by  the  view 
that  the  world  has  actually  been  made  for  us.  On  this  view  the  Cosmos 
would  be  incomplete  if  human  beings  did  not  exist  since  humanity  is 
the  focus  of  all  creation.  Second,  there  is  what  Blumenberg  calls 
'theocentrism',  the  view  that  human  beings  are  an  integral  part  of  the 
Cosmos,  but  that  we  are  not  the  focus  of,  or  the  reason  for,  creation  as 
a  whole.  On  this  view,  if  the  cosmos  is  for  anything,  it  is  for  God;  and 
our  activities  are  governed  by  our  duties  to  the  creator  and  our  assigned 
role  in  creation.  Finally,  there  is  the  most  pessimistic  view  that  human 
beings  are  an  'animal  supervacuunf,  with  no  intrinsic  relationship  to  the 
cosmos,  our  presence  or  absence  being  of  no  significance  to  the  Cosmos 
at  all.  This  is  usually  associated  with  various  forms  of  Gnosticism,  each 
varying  in  the  degree  of  malevolence  we  ought  to  expect  from  the 
creator. 
Now  if  one  adopts  an  anthropocentric  theology,  and  one  imbibes  the 
confidence  such  a  view  provides,  then,  argues  Blumenberg,  there  is  a 
tendency  to  think  that  our  cognitive  capabilities  are  such  that  we  can 
come  to  know  the  entire  Cosmos,  including  the  heavens.  Naturally,  if 
the  Cosmos  is  there  for  us,  then  it  makes  sense  that  we  should  be  able 
to  know  it  and  enjoy  it  in  its  entirety.  What  is  important  for  us, 
however,  is  that  Copernicus  relies  on  precisely  this  view  in  the  preface 
to  De  Revolutionibus.  30  Copernicus'  main  point  in  his  preface  is  that  he 165 
was  driven  to  consider  revolutionary  possibilities  in  astronomy  because 
of  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  his  discipline  in  his  day.  He  writes: 
...  I  was  impelled  to  think  out  another  way  of  calculating  the 
motions  of  the  spheres  of  the  universe  by  nothing  else  than 
the  realisation  that  the  mathematicians  themselves  are 
inconsistent  in  investigating  them.  31 
Copernicus'  contemporaries  were  in  fact  using  a  number  of  different 
hypotheses  in  order  to  predict  the  motions  of  the  Sun,  Moon  and  five 
wandering  stars,  hypotheses  which  could  not  be  unified  into  any 
realistically  interpretable  system  of  astronomy.  But  it  is  Copernicus' 
reaction  to  this  situation  that  is  most  revealing.  He  goes  on  to  say: 
'Iberefore  on  long  pondering  this  uncertainty  of  mathematical 
traditions  on  the  deduction  of  the  motions  of  the  system  of  the 
spheres,  I  began  to  feel  disgust  that  no  more  certain  theory  of 
the  motions  of  the  mechanism  of  the  universe,  which  has  been 
established  for  us  (propter  nos)  by  the  best  and  most 
systematic  craftsman  of  all,  was  agreed  by  the  philosophers, 
who  otherwise  theorised  so  minutely  with  the  most  careful 
attention  to  the  details  of  this  system.  32  [my  italics] 
Blumenberg  sees  this  appeal  to  the  anthropocentric  formula  as  an 
attempt, 
to  present  astronomy's  failure,  in  spite  of  painstaking 
investigations,  up  to  his  time,  as  something  by  no  means  God 
given  and  unavoidable,  but  rather  as  a  scandal  that  is  vividly 
felt  as  such.  33 
However,  if  one  thinks  that  we  are  simply  a  valuable  part  of  the 
Cosmos,  but  that  the  Cosmos  is  for  some  other  entity,  viz.,  the  creator, 
then  the  corresponding  assumption  with  regard  to  our  cognitive 
capabilities  is  more  moderate:  we  can  know  something  of  the  Cosmos, 
precisely  that  which  we  need  to  know  in  order  to  fulfil  our  role  in  the 
order  of  things;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  think  (in  fact  it  is  impious  to 
think)  that  the  Cosmos  in  its  entirety  should  be  amenable  to  our  limited 
faculties  -  there  is  no  need  for  us  to  possess  such  knowledge  in  order 166 
that  the  Cosmos  should  fulfil  the  desires  of  the  creator.  This  is  the 
natural  position  of  the  Scholastics,  which  was  re-enforced  by  the 
condemnation  of  1277. 
The  final  alternative  is  that  human  beings  are  in  fact  entirely 
superfluous,  and  that  we  are  here  only  by  mistake  or  deception  (as  with 
the  Gnostics).  In  this  circumstance  there  is  no  guarantee  that  we  can 
know  anything  at  all,  especially  if  the  Gods  are  malevolent  (consider 
Descartes'  Evil  Demon).  Given  this  scenario,  survival,  rather  than 
knowledge  for  its  own  sake,  is  at  a  premium.  In  this  framework  what 
one  strives  for  primarily  is  control  of  nature  -  knowledge  of  it  being 
desirable  only  insofar  as  it  allows  us  to  keep  nature  at  bay,  or  to  totally 
master  it.  Blumenberg  sees  this  attitude  as  being  that  which 
characterises  modernity  most  closely34  (one  can  certainly  hear  the 
echoes  of  Bacon). 
Ultimately  what  Blumenberg  sees  in  the  Copernican  revolution  is  a 
clash  of  the  theocentric  and  anthropocentric  world  pictures,  each 
characterised  most  fundamentally  by  their  assumed  "quality  of  the 
world  for  man"  and  the  accompanying  degree  of  confidence  each  view 
entails.  We  have  just  to  read  the  texts  of  the  representatives  of  the 
various  schools  to  sense  the  difference  in  tone  and  intent  between  them. 
If  we  read  Copernicus'  opening  paragraphs  of  Book  One  of  De 
Revolutionibus  it  is  impossible  to  mistake  his  conviction  that  despite 
obvious  difficulties  astronomical  knowledge  is  ultimately  within  reach  of 
human  efforts.  Consider  now  these  lines  from  Maimonides'  A  Guide  to 
the  Perplexed,  which  capture  quite  beautifully  the  essential  elements  of 
the  theocentric  position.  Continuing  a  discussion  of  how  to  reconcile 
Aristotle's  physics  with  Ptolemy's  Almagestý  he  writes: 
I  have  already  explained  to  you  by  word  of  mouth  that  all  this 
does  not  affect  the  astronomer.  For  his  purpose  is  not  to  tell 
us  in  which  way  the  spheres  truly  are,  but  to  posit  an 
astronomical  system  in  which  it  would  be  possible  for  the 
motions  to  be  circular  and  unifonn  and  to  correspond  to  what 
is  apprehended  through  sight,  regardless  of  whether  or  not 
things  are  thus  in  fact... 167 
He  explains  why  this  is  the  proper  attitude  for  the  astronomer  to  adopt 
in  these  terms: 
All  that  Aristotle  states  about  that  which  is  beneath  the 
sphere  of  the  moon  is  in  accordance  with  reasoning;  these  are 
things  that  have  a  known  cause,  that  follow  one  upon  the 
other,  and  concerning  which  it  is  clear  and  manifest  at  what 
points  wisdom  and  natural  providence  are  effective.  However, 
regarding  all  that  is  in  the  heavens,  man  grasps  nothing  but  a 
small  measure  of  what  is  mathematical;  and  you  know  what  is 
in  it.  I  shall  accordingly  say  in  the  manner  of  poetical 
preciousness  (Ps.  115:  16):  Me  heavens  are  the  heavens  of  the 
Lord,  but  the  earth  hath  He  given  to  the  sons  of  merL  I  mean 
thereby  that  the  deity  alone  fully  knows  the  true  reality,  the 
nature,  the  substance,  the  form,  the  motions,  and  the  cause  of 
the  heavens.  But  he  has  enabled  man  to  have  knowledge  of 
what  is  beneath  the  heavens,  for  that  is  his  world  and  his 
dwelling-place  in  which  he  has  been  placed  and  of  which  he  is 
apart.  This  is  the  truth  ....  Let  us  then  stop  at  a  point  that 
is  within  our  capacity  .... 
35 
What  is  most  striking  about  these  two  world  views  is  the  connection 
between  theological  theses  and  the  realist  dispute  in  science,  between 
the  degree  of  confidence  these  theses  inspire  and  the  corresponding 
estimation  of  our  epistemological  capabilities:  the  greater  our 
significance  to  the  Cosmos,  the  greater  our  powers. 
Is  it  entirely  unreasonable  to  suspect  that  similar  differences  in 
fundamental  attitude  vis  OL  vis  the  world  and  man's  cognitive  abilities 
might  still  colour  the  realist  dispute  in  science  in  the  20th  century?  As 
Ian  Hacking  has  said  in  Representing  and  Intervening,  scientific  realism 
and  scientific  anti-realism  are  schools  of  thought  more  correctly 
characterised  by  differences  in  general  attitude  than  by  particular 
points  of  doctrine.  Certainly  no  one  would  claim  that  parties  to  this 
dispute  are  closet  theologians  masquerading  as  philosophers.  Such  a 
claim  would  miss  the  point.  Our  presentiments  about  the  quality  of  the 
world  for  man  remain  forever  present  even  if  they  are  not  given 
theological  garb.  The  theological  garb,  in  this  case  at  least,  Is  not 
ultimately  what  is  important.  What  is  important  about  the  theological 
connections  disclosed  by  Blumenberg  is  that  they  point  to  something 168 
behind  our  arguments,  to  something  that  has  not  been  discussed 
openly,  namely,  the  personal  comple.  -,  don  of  the  individual  thinkers  in 
our  debate.  This  might  explain  why  so  often  debates  in  this  area  are 
peppered  with  ad  hominem  remarks  and  highly  emotive  language.  36 
I  hope  it  is  now  at  least  plausible  to  assume  that  the  connections 
between  theology  and  science  are  closer  than  is  commonly  assumed, 
and  that  the  influence  of  theology  has  been  felt  in  the  sciences.  We 
have  detected  traces  of  the  influence  of  theological  ideas  in  the  work  of 
Quine  and  Cartwright,  and  gone  on  to  identify  a  number  of  important 
connections  between  the  scientific  enterprise,  the  understanding  of  that 
enterprise,  and  theological  matters.  Epicurus,  Dales  and  Thomdike 
have  pointed  out  the  similar  origins  of  theology  and  science.  Whitehead 
and  Dampier  have  suggested  that  medieval  theology  in  particular 
provided  the  assumptions  necessary  to  make  the  modem  scientific 
enterprise  conceivable.  Foster  and  Hooykaas  have  argued  that  the 
difference  between  pre  and  post  revolutionary  science  is  in  large 
measure  due  to  the  changes  in  the  prevailing  theological  commitments 
of  the  scientists  themselves.  Grant  and  Blumenberg  have  shown  that 
theological  commitments  have  affected  the  realist  dispute  in  science  at 
crucial  moments  in  the  history  of  science.  And  Kuhn  has  highlighted 
similarities  in  the  role  of  authority  in  'normal'  scientific  and  theological 
practice;  *a  similarly  conservative  agenda:  and  the  psychological 
similarity  between  paradigm  shifts  and  conversion  experiences.  Now 
given  these  points  of  contact  between  theology  and  the  sciences,  it  is 
perhaps  not  unreasonable  to  suggest  that  a  theologian  might  have 
something  to  bring  to  our  realist  dispute  in  science. 
1  This  should  not  be  taken  as  a  suggestion  that  historical  factors  are  unimportant  in 
philosophical  discussions;  precisely  the  reverse  is  the  case,  as  I  hope  will  become 
apparent  in  the  course  of  this  chapter.  The  point  is  that  Aquinas'  significance  is  not 
confmed  to  historical  matters  alone. 
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The  Divisions  of  the  Speculative  Sciences 
Le  'principe-commencement'  de  la  philosophie  thomiste  n'est 
autre  en  effet  que  la  perception  sensible  des  6tres  concrets 
actuellement  existants.  Tout  Hdifice  d'un  savoir  de  t3rpe 
thomiste,  de  la  plus  humble  des  sciences  jusqu'd  la 
m6taphysique,  repose  donc  sur  cette  experience  e--dstentielle 
fondamentale,  dont  la  connaissance  humaine  ne  cessera 
jamais  d'inventorier  de  plus  en  plus  compliAement  le 
contenu.  I 
In  two  these  sentences  Etienne  Gilson  has  drawn  the  basic  outlines  of 
the  Aristotelio-Thomist  scientific  project.  Beginning  from  the  sensory 
perception  of  concrete  individuals,  Aquinas  fashions  all  the  speculative 
sciences  from  physics  to  metaphysics.  Such  a  system  is  of  special 
interest  to  us  precisely  because  its  starting  point  coincides  with  the 
conclusions  reached  in  Part  I:  the  terms  which  cross  translation 
determinately  are  terms  referring  to  concrete  individuals.  It  is  of 
particular  interest,  therefore,  to  see  how  Aquinas  and  Aristotle 
construct  a  science  from  these  humble  beginnings,  beginnings  which 
are  a  part  of  what  I  have  been  calling  a  'species-specific  conceptual 
scheme'.  In  this  chapter  I  will  examine  how  the  various  sciences  are 
carved  out  of  the  sensory  data  and  distinguished  from  each  other.  In 
the  following  chapter  I  will  discuss  the  cognitive  status  Aquinas  assigns 
to  each  of  the  particular  sciences,  with  emphasis  on  natural  science 
and  theology.  These  two  tasks  completed,  we  will  be  in  a  position  to 
return  to  our  original  realist  dispute  in  science  armed  with  the 
intellectual  apparatus  of  Aquinas.  Parallels  and  analogies  can  then  be 
. 
found  between  our  theoretical  sciences  and  the  Thomist  edifice.  In  so 
doing  our  modem  theories  are  cast  in  a  different,  and  I  will  argue, 
revealing  light. 
Science  of  the  Natural  World  in  Ancient  Greek  Philosophy 
When  faced  with  the  task  of  understanding  any  philosophical  system  it 
is  vital  that  one  be  familiar  with  the  intellectual  context  in  which  it  was 
born.  In  particular  one  needs  to  know  the  specific  set  of  problems  to 172 
which  the  given  system  is  a  response.  Now  in  the  case  of  Aquinas  it  is 
clear  that  he  inherited  his  scientific  problems  from  Aristotle.  But 
Aristotle's  scientific  work  Is  itself  intelligible  only  when  seen  as  a 
continuation  of  the  efforts  of  the  Presocratics.  Fortunately  the  relevant 
features  of  this  intellectual  background  are  generally  well  known,  and 
can  be  painted  with  a  minimum  of  brush  strokes.  I  will  confirie  myself 
then  to  the  briefest  of  summaries  of  the  problems  Aristotle  inherited 
from  his  predecessors,  touching  only  those  points  needed  to 
contextualise  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science. 
It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  ancient  Greeks  philosophers  were  the  first 
to  abandon  mythical  or  magical  theories  of  nature  in  order  to  develop 
descriptions  of  the  natural  world  'according  to  the  categories  of  human 
reason'.  2  From  the  earliest  attempts  of  the  Presocratics  at  rational 
description  of  nature  two  distinct  but  fundamentally  related  problems 
arose.  In  fact  one  could  say  these  problems  are  two  aspects  of  the  same 
difficulty.  What  most  impressed  the  Ionians  about  the  world  in  which 
they  found  themselves  was  that  everything  it  contained  appeared  to  be 
in  constant  change.  This  lack  of  stability,  the  constant  process  of 
coming  to  be  and  passing  away,  was  the  chief  characteristic  of 
everything  in  the  Ionian  realm  of  experience.  In  fact  nature  itself  came 
to  be  defined  at  least  in  part  in  terms  of  change,  as  is  made  clear  in 
Aristotle's  Physics.  3  The  metaphysical  difficulty  raised  by  change  was 
the  need  to  explain  how  a  single  object  could  be  in  constant  change  and 
yet  remain  in  some  real  sense  the  same  thing.  The  same  could  apply  to 
the  world  as  a  whole;  the  endlessly  repeating  cycles  observed  at  all 
levels  of  the  natural  world,  in  the  stars,  in  the  seasons,  in  the  life  cycles 
of  plants  and  animals,  suggest  the  world  as  a  whole  is  eternal  and 
ageless,  yet  always  in  the  process  of  renewing  itself.  The  early  lonians 
approached  this  problem  by  positing  a  basic  element,  be  it  water,  air, 
fire,  the  unbounded,  etc.,  from  which  everything  in  the  natural  world  is 
somehow  derived.  In  so  doing  the  lonians  could  begin  to  see  each 
concrete  individual  and  process  in  the  world  as  a  modification  of  a  basic 
element  which  itself  is  eternal  and  abiding  beneath  all  apparent 
changes. 
By  stating  the  metaphysical  aspect  of  the  problem  of  change  as  we  have 173 
done  we  ý  have  already  hinted  at  the  related  difficulty.  The 
accompanying  difficulty  was  the  epistemological  matter  of 
understanding  how  knowledge  of  the  natural  world  is  possible  at  all 
when  it  is  in  constant  change.  4  The  problem  is  that  knowledge  claims 
in  the  strict  sense  were  expected  to  embody  eternal  and  necessary 
truths;  but  the  stability  required  of  a  knowledge  claim  appears 
incompatible  with  a  constantly  changing  world.  A  statement  which  is 
true  only  here  and  now,  or  at  some  other  specific  time  and  location,  did 
not  qualify  as  scientific  knowledge  for  the  Greeks  any  more  than  it  does 
today.  Scientists  of  all  ages  want  to  isolate  the  unchanging  aspects  of 
nature,  those  aspects  of  things  and  processes  that  must  be  true  in  all 
places  and  at  all  times.  But  if  the  natural  world  is  in  constant  change  it 
becomes  problematic  as  to  whether  it  is  ever  possible  to  say  anything 
about  it  that  is  always  and  necessarily  true.  However,  the  solution  to 
the  metaphysical  problem  of  change  could  be  applied  with  equal 
success  to  its  epistemological  counterpart:  posit  an  eternal,  abiding 
element  underlying  change  and  make  it  the  focus  of  investigations. 
Although  the  individual  modifications  of  the  basic  element  are 
ephemeral  and  in  constant  change,  the  basic  element  itself  endures 
beneath  these  changes.  Moreover,  one  could  imagine  a  set  of  fixed  laws 
governing  the  changes  this  element  could  undergo.  The  stability  of  the 
element  and  the  fixed  nature  of  the  laws  governing  its  processes  are 
precisely  the  sorts  of  things  about  which  true  statements  could  be 
formed.  We  see  then  that  the  metaphysical  and  epistemological 
problems  are  really  components  of  the  same  difficulty:  Understanding  a 
world  in  constant  change  according  to  the  categories  of  human  reason. 
Both  aspects  of  the  problem  of  change  can  be  dealt  with  by  focusing  on 
the  stable,  abiding  features  or  components  of  a  changing  world. 
But  despite  the  positing  of  an  underlying  basic  element  and  the  possible 
co-operation  of  metaphysics  and  epistemology,  there  was  no  unanimous 
agreement  among  the  Presocratics  that  their  efforts  to  understand  the 
natural  world  were  bound  to  be  successful.  In  fact  the  essential  co- 
operation  of  metaphysics  and  epistemology  was  scuttled  on  two  well 
known  occasions,  and  in  each  case  the  result  was  the  same,  namely, 
that  natural  science  could  not  be  pursued  with  profit.  Heraclitus  was 
interpreted  to  be  making  the  metaphysical  claim  that  there  is  no 174 
stability  anywhere  in  nature  for  the  scientist  to  fix  upon.  Given  this 
assumption,  one  is  irresistibly  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  Wisdom  lies 
in  recognising  the  futility  of  the  scientific  project.  Now,  as  is  made  clear 
in  Kirk,  Raven  and  Schofield,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  Heraclitus 
actually  held  this  view.  In  fact  there  is  evidence  that  Heraclitus  thought 
that  there  was  some  degree  of  coherence  underlying  all  changes,  as  is 
clear  from  the  fragment:  'all  things  happen  according  to  the  Logos,.  5 
Indeed  it  is  precisely  this  Logos,  or  'common  plan  or  measure'  that 
escapes  the  attention  of  ordinary  mortals  but  has  been  recognised  by 
Heraclitus.  -  But  whatever  the  actual  views  held  by  Heraclitus,  it  is 
equally  clear  that  his  position  on  change  was  thought  to  imply  the 
impossibility  of  knowledge  of  the  natural  world.  6 
At  the  other  metaphysical  extreme  was  Parmenides,  he  of  the  notorious 
denial  of  the  metaphysical  possibility  of  change.  7  According  to 
Parmenides,  Reason  dictates  that  nature,  or  Being,  is  one,  unified  and 
immutable,  and  it  is  only  the  deception  of  the  senses  that  leads  us  to 
think  that  all  things  are  in  a  state  of  flux.  The  epistemological 
consequence  of  this  position  is  that  any  stable  knowledge  claims  will 
stem  from  a  priori  reasoning  about  how  nature  must  be.  No  profitable 
empirical  investigation  of  nature  is  possible  because  the  senses  do  not 
reveal  nature  as  it  is  but  only  as  it  appears  to  be.  Rather  than  seeking 
to  describe  nature  after  it  has  revealed  some  part  of  itself  to  the 
investigator,  Parmenides  will  prescribe  how  nature  must  be  according  to 
the  dictates  of  Reason  and  ignore  how  nature  reveals  itself  to  us.  It  is 
clear  then  that  the  two  extreme  positions  on  the  metaphysical  problem 
of  change  lead  to  the  same  epistemological  result  although  for  different 
reasons:  no  a  posteriori  knowledge  is  possible  of  the  natural  world,  and 
consequently  natural  science  cannot  be  pursued  with  profit  either 
because  there  is  nothing  in  the  world  to  know  in  the  strict  sense,  or 
because  we  are  not  equipped  to  carry  out  investigation  of  the  world 
because  the  senses  are  unreliable. 
Plato  fully  appreciated  the  force  of  the  uncomfortable  conclusions 
reached  by  Heraclitus  and  Parmenides;  but  rather  than  accept  either's 
metaphysical  position  (the  source  of  the  difficulties)  he  attempted  to 
solve  the  epistemological  problem  by  reconciling  the  two  incompatible 175 
metaphysical  positions  which  led  to  the  epistemological  disasters.  He 
does  this  by  positing  a  world  of  appearance  which  is  subject  to  constant 
change  (the  world  of  Heraclitus)  and  a  world  of  immaterial  and 
immutable  For-ins  (the  world  of 
, 
Parmenides).  The  interesting 
epistemological  result  is  that  while  we  cannot  have  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  world  of  appearance,  theoretically  we  can  have  indirect  knowledge  of 
it  via  the  Forms.  Insofar  as  each  concrete  individual  in  the  world  of 
appearance  is  an  imperfect  copy  of  the  eternal  and  immutable  Forms, 
there  is  a  stable  element  within  the  natural  world  that  can  be  a  source 
of  intelligibility.  In  other  words,  Plato  solves  the  epistemological 
problem  caused  by  the  lack  of  stability  in  the  natural  world  by  finding 
stability  in  another  realm.  to  which  the  world  of  appearance  is  related. 
Plato's  reflections  then  naturally  focus  on  how  knowledge  of  the  Forms 
can  be  attained  (at  least  until  he  comes'to  recognise  the  serious 
difficulties  of  his  position  in  the  Parmenides  and  later  works). 
This  is  the  intellectual  context  in  which  Aristotle  finds  himself,  and  in 
which  his  thought  becomes  intelligible.  Aristotle  is  agreement  with 
Plato  on  at  least  three  fundamental'points.  He  accepts,  a)  that  there  are 
stable  elements  to  be  found  in  the  concrete  individuals  encountered  in 
the  world  of  appearance,  b)  that  the  stability  is  found  in  the  Fonns  of 
concrete  individuals,  and  c)  that  we  can  come  to  know  them,  although 
the  account  of  how  this  is  possible  differs  mdically  from  that  of  Plato. 
Again  this  shift  in  epistemology  is  motivated  by  a  change  in 
metaphysics.  For  Aristotle  cannot  accept  Plato's  metaphysical  position 
which  includes  a  division  between  a  world  of  appearance  and  a  separate 
world  of  reality,  and  the  claim  that  the  Forms  enjoy  an  independent 
existence  apart  from  the  world  of  concrete  individuals.  Aristotle  does 
away  with  Plato's  distinction  between  the  world  of  appearance  and  the 
world  of  Forms  by  locating  the  Forms  within  the  fully  real  world  of 
mutable,  concrete  individuals.  In  effect  Aristotle  is  claiming  that 
stability  can  be  found  in  the  world  which  our  senses  reveal  to  us,  and 
that  this  realm  knowable  at  least  in  part.  Although  It  remains  true  that 
each  individual  is  finite  and  in  constant  change,  there  are  aspects  of 
each  individual,  its  Form  for  instance,  which  are  not  subject  to  the 
conditions  of  each  particular  instantiation  of  the  Form.  For  example, 
Aristotle  can  say  that  what  it  is  to  be  a  human  being  is  etemal  and 176 
stable,  even  though  individual  human  beings  are  finite  and  in  constant 
change.  Hence  the  Aristotelian  project  adopted  by  Aquinas:  isolate  and 
focus  on  the  stable  aspects  of  concrete  individuals  to  the  exclusion  of 
their  accidental,  particular  and  changeable  features.  This  process  of 
isolation  is  called  Abstraction.  We  must  now  consider  this  intellectual 
operation  in  some  detail,  for  it  is  by  means  of  abstraction  that  the 
various  sciences  are  discovered  and  distinguished. 
Me  Intellectual  Operation  ofAbstraction 
We  can  take  the  following  formal  statement  as  a  starting  point  in  our 
investigation  of  the  intellectual  operation  of  abstraction  and  proceed  by 
analysing  its  components:  Abstraction  is  an  operation  of  the  agent 
intellect  by  which  it  produces  an  intelligible  object  proportional  to  the 
intellect.  In  order  to  understand  this  statement  we  must  address 
ourselves  to  four  basic  questions.  First,  we  need  to  know  in  general 
terms  what  it  means  to  abstract  something.  To  this  end  I  will  begin 
with  a  brief  discussion  of  what  I  will  call  the  'focal'  sense  of  abstraction. 
Second,  we  must  be  clear  about  what  constitutes  an  'intelligible  object'. 
This  discussion  will  also  involve  mention  of  the  agent  Intellect  and  its 
role  in  abstraction.  Third,  we  need  to  understand  what  one  abstracts 
fron-L  And  finally,  we  need  to  determine  how  many  kinds  of  abstraction 
the  agent  intellect  is  capable  of  effecting  on  the  data  of  the  senses,  and 
how  these  abstractions  differ. 
Me  Focal  Sense  ofAbstraction 
'Abstraction'  is  a  difficult  term  to  define  in  a  simple,  straightforward, 
and  uncontrovertial  fashion,  as  is  only  too  evident  from  the  extensive 
and  heated  discussions  amongst  Thomists  on  this  matter  following 
Wyser's  critical  edition  of  Questions  5  and  6  of  the  DeThnitate  in  1947- 
8.8  These  discussions  have  been  heated  at  times  because  much  hangs 
on  the  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  understanding  of  these  matters,  as  will 
become  clear  in  due  course.  However,  our  present  difficulty  does  not 
arise  from  the  obscurity  of  this  operation  per  se,  but  rather  from  the 177 
fact  that  the  term  'abstraction'  is  used  by  Aquinas  to  refer  to  a  number 
of  distinct,  but  related,  operations.  Fortunately  there  is  a  general  or 
'focal'  sense  of  abstraction  on  which  the  technical  senses  are  based,  the 
technical  senses  being  refinements  of  the  general  process  of  abstraction. 
A  few  words  on  the  focal  sense  of  abstraction  will  suffice  for  the 
moment.  The  related  technical  senses  will  occupy  us  in  detail  later 
when  we  descend  into  the  particulars  of  Aquinas's  division  of  the 
sciences.  Broadly  speaking  then,  abstraction  occurs  whenever  the 
intellect  isolates  an  aspect  or  feature  of  an  individual  for  consideration 
to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else.  In  most  cases  'to  abstract'  means  to 
consider  separately  particular  aspects  of  an  individual.  Aquinas 
explains: 
...  we  must  note  that  many  things  are  joined  in  [a]  thing,  but 
the  understanding  of  one  of  them  is  not  derived  from  the 
understanding  of  the  other.  Thus  white  and  musical  are 
joined  in  the  same  subject,  nevertheless  the  understanding  of 
one  of  these  is  not  derived  from  an  understanding  of  the  other. 
And  this  one  is  understood  as  abstracted  from  the  other.  9 
To  use  another  of  Aquinas'  examples,  the  intellect  can  consider  the 
colours  of  objects,  and  reach  an  understanding  of  colours,  without 
paying  attention  to  coloured  objects,  or  to  the  situation  in  which  these 
objects  find  themselves.  10  For  example,  we  can  focus  on,  and  come  to 
understand,  the  redness  of  an  apple  without  focusing  on  or 
understanding  the  apple  itself,  or  the  relation  of  the  apple  to  other 
things.  This  is  possible  because  the  set  of  elements  that  would  feature 
in  a  definition  of  colour  does  not  include  statements  about  apples  or 
their  environment.  In  effect,  the  intellect  is  able  to  'disengage'  or 
'separate'  colours  off  from  the  rest  of  the  data  of  sense  experience  and 
study  them  in  their  own  right  to  the  exclusion  of  everything  else.  Such 
an  operation  provides  the  focal  sense  of  'abstraction'. 
Me  Product  ofAbstraction:  Me  Intelligible  Object 
We  can  now  turn  to  the  matter  of  the  product  of  abstraction,  the 
'intelligible  object'.  and  the  mechanism  by  which  it  is  produced.  We  can 178 
approach  these  topics  best  via  Thomist  psychology;  for  in  order  to 
understand  this  operation  of  the  intellect,  we  must  have  some 
familiarity  with  the  faculty  which  performs  it.  Again  I  confine  myself  to 
the  barest  of  essentials,  i.  e.,  those  required  for  understanding  the 
operation  of  abstraction. 
Psychological  studies  generally  are  hampered  by  the  fact  that  its  object 
of  study,  the  'mind',  'soul'  or  'psyche',  is  not  directly  observable. 
Aquinas  emphasises  this  fact  by  pointing  out  that  the  intellect  only 
come  to  be  aware  of  itself  and  its  nature  by  first  becoming  aware  of  its 
activities.  11  Consequently,  Aquinas,  like  everyone  else,  is  forced  to 
study  the  soul  indirectly,  attributing  different  cognitive  'powers'  or 
Icapacities'  to  the  intellect  in  order  to  account  for  its  activities.  His 
methodology  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  ".  .  no  action  belongs  to 
anything  except  through  some  principle  formally  inherent  therein.  .  .- 
12 
This  Is  an  important  methodological  procedure  which  must  be 
recognised  if  one  is  to  appreciate  the  nature  of  Aquinas'  philosophical 
reflections.  Aquinas'  psychology,  epistemology  and  metaphysics  all  take 
the  form  of  what  we  might  call  a  Transcendental  argument.  Aristotle 
and  Aquinas  assume  that  human  beings  are  capable  of  performing 
certain  actions  (because  they  are  seen  to  perform  them).  The  task  of 
philosophical  enquiry  is  then  to  state  what  must  be  the  case  in  order  for 
these  actions  to  be  possible.  Now  the  leading  assumption  behind  the 
philosophical  reflections  of  both  Aristotle  and  Aquinas,  expressed  in 
modern  terminology,  is  that  human  beings  are  capable  of  uttering  true 
statements  about  the  world,  and  that  these  utterances  can  be 
understood  by  other  competent  language  users.  13  Thomist  psychology 
is  then  a  part  of  this  broader  philosophical  project  of  explaining  how 
human  beings  can  utter  such  statements  about  the  world  and  be 
understood  by  others. 
Now  among  the  cognitive  powers  of  the  human  psyche  Aquinas  finds 
the  purely  passive  ability  to  receive  sensory  impressions  from  objects 
outside  the  mind.  Another  power  is  memory.  Another  is  the  psyche's 
active  ability  to  perform  intellectual  operations  on  the  data  received 
through  the  senses.  After  sensory  data  (phantasmata)  have  been 
received  and  subsequently  committed  to  memory,  the  psyche  can 179 
retrieve  these  experiences  to  consciousness  and  subject  them  to  various 
operations,  one  of  which  is  abstraction.  14  The  'power'  of  the  psyche 
which  performs  this  active  operation  is  called  the  agent  intellect.  Now 
the  particular  activity  or  power  referred  to  by  the  term  'agent  intellect' 
which  concerns  us  is  the  psyche's  ability  to  construct  definitions  from 
the  sensory  impressions  retrieved  from  memory.  15  The  construction  of 
definitions  is  part  and  parcel  of  what  Aquinas  calls  'the  first  act  of  the 
intellect',  otherwise  known  as  'simple  apprehension'.  In  the  act  of 
simple  apprehension,  or  the  understanding  of  indivisibles  as  it  is 
sometimes  called,  the  intellect  "apprehendit  essentiarn  uniuscuiusque  rei 
in  seipsd'16,  the  intellect  'grasps',  or  'apprehends',  the  essence  of  a 
thing  in  itself  Of  course,  as  will  become  apparent  later,  Aquinas  does 
not  think  that  in  order  to  know  the  essence  of  an  object  one  has  simply 
to  clap  eyes  upon  it.  What  he  does  think,  and  this  is  how  we  should 
understand  simple  apprehension,  is  that  in  this  act  the  intellect  is  able 
to  identify  an  object  given  in  sensation  as  being  the  sort  of  thing  it  is.  In 
other  words,  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  the  psyche  is  able  to  begin 
the  process  of  defining  x  by  determining  what  kind  of  thing  x  is.  It  is  in 
this  sense  that  the  intellect  grasps  the  essence  of  x  in  simple 
apprehension.  Consequently  we  can  say  that  the  term  'agent  intellect' 
is  used  to  refer  to  that  power  of  the  psyche  to  identify  and  to  classify  the 
concrete  individuals  it  has  encountered.  As  we  shall  see,  this  ability  to 
identify  an  individual  as  being  of  a  certain  kind  is  a  process  made 
possible  by  the  fact  that  the  agent  intellect  can  abstract.  17  It  is  also 
worth  noting  in  passing  that  simple  apprehension  is  called  the  first  act 
of  the  intellect  because  it  is  the  act  upon  which  all  further  cognitive  acts 
are  based.  The  definitions  made  possible  by  simple  apprehension  and 
abstraction  will  be  used  later  in  the  construction  of  propositions  and 
demonstrations. 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  product  of  abstraction,  to  the  notion  of  an 
'intelligible  object.  I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  Aristotelian 
project  is  characterised  by  the  attempt  to  isolate  and  focus  on  the  stable 
features  of  the  world  of  sensory  experience.  It  is  these  stable  features 
found  within  the  constant  flux  of  the  natural  world  that  are  said  to  be 
strictly  'intelligible'.  Technically  one  can  say  that  an  'intelligible  object' 
is  simply  that  about  which  there  can  be  the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect, 180 
viz.,  that  of  which  the  agent  intellect  is  able  to  construct  a  definition.  18  If 
we  remember  that  knowledge  of  the  world  of  experience  is  made 
problematic  by  the  fact  that  it  is  in  constant  change  we  will  begin  to  see 
why  the  definition  of  a  mutable  individual  is  intelligible  while  strictly 
speaking  the  individual  itself  is  not.  The  attraction  of  a  definition  is 
that  it  captures  what  is  stable  and  enduring  about  the  individual 
deftned.  In  particular,  a  definition  expresses  what  something  is,  Its 
essence  or  nature;  for  what  an  individual  is  remains  constant  even 
though  the  individual  changes.  And  the  essence  of  the  individual 
endures  even  though  each  instantiation  of  it  comes  to  be  and  passes 
out  of  existence.  If  this  were  not  the  case  there  would  not  be  change  in 
the  world  of  experience,  merely  constant  replacement  of  one  sensory 
stimulus  by  another  (a  featýire  placing  world).  Once  in  possession  of  a 
definition  the  intellect  can  then  proceed  to  construct  demonstrations 
using  the  definition  as  the  middle  term  to  unite  a  predicate  to,  or  divide 
it  from,  a  subject  term. 
But  of  what  is  the  intellect  able  to  construct  a  definition?  What 
conditions  need  be  met  before  this  activity  can  take  place?  This 
question  is  best  approached  by  considering  what  cannot  be  defined. 
That  which  cannot  be  defined,  that  which  is  not  strictly  intelligible,  is 
the  absolutely  unique  individual.  This  follows  from  the  nature  of  the 
process  of  understanding  itself.  The  intellect  comes  to  understand  an 
object  or  process  x  by  identifying  its  similarities  and  differences  to  other 
objects  and  processes  encountered  in  the  world  of  sensory  experience. 
The  intellect  understands  x  when  it  can  see  that  x  is  like  a,  b  and  c,  and 
unlike  rn,  n,  and  o;  in  other  words,  when  x  can  be  seen  as  a  member  of 
a  certain  kind,  and  as  such  distinct  from  objects  of  other  kinds.  But 
that  which  fits  into  no  kind  whatsoever  is  strictly  unintelligible.  If  the 
intellect  is  faced  with  an  individual  or  process  x  with  absolutely  no 
similarities  to  anything  encountered  in  its  past  experience,  the  intellect, 
if  it  notices  x  at  all,  will  not  be  able  to  understand  it.  Only  by 
assimilating  it  to  other  objects  will  the  intellect  begin  to  grasp  x.  These 
aspects  of  the  nature  or  process  of  understanding  are  brought  out 
clearly  in  the  nature  of  definitions.  The  intellect  defines  x  by  assigning 
to  xa  genus  and  specific  difference,  -  i.  e.,  it  determines  in  what  way  x  is 
like  other  things,  thereby  fixing  the  genus,  but  different,  thereby  fixing the  species. 
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From  the  foregoing  we  can  determine  that  there  are  two  things  which 
the  intellect  cannot  defme  or  make  intelligible.  As  already  mentioned, 
there  is  that  which  fits  into  no  genus  or  species.  If  the  intellect  can 
form  no  idea  of  what  x  is,  it  is  impossible  for  the  intellect  to  understand 
it.  But  more  importantly  for  our  purposes  is  the  recognition  that  the 
particular  member  of  a  species  (a  concrete  individual)  in  its  concrete 
particularity  is  not  strictly  intelligible  either,  even  though  it  is  clearly 
like  other  things  and  different  from  others.  It  is  clear  why  the  intellect 
cannot  defffie  and  make  intelligible  that  which  fits  into  no  genus  or 
species.  It  is  more  important,  however,  that  we  be  clear  on  why  it  is 
that  the  intellect  cannot  make  intelligible  a  concrete  individual  in  its 
individuality.  The  intellect  is  indeed  able  to  understand  a  concrete 
individual's  general  or  universalisable  features,  its  genus  and  specific 
difference  for  instance,  for  these  features  are  contained  explicitly  or 
implicitly  in  its  definition.  But  there  is  no  definition  of  an  individual 
qua  individual,  for  in  this  case  the  individual  is  absolutely  unique.  As 
Aquinas  says,  there  is  a  definition,  and  therefore  an  understanding  of 
Man;  but  strictly  speaking  there  can  be  no  definition  of  Socrates.  19 
Insofar  as  Socrates  is  a  man,  he  is  intelligible;  insofar  as  he  is  Socrates, 
i.  e.,  this  particular  man,  he  is  not.  Insofar  as  Socrates  has  features 
which  he  shares  with  other  individuals,  like  humanity  for  instance,  he 
is  intelligible  as  a  member  of  a  certain  species  in  a  particular  genus. 
Those  features  which  Socrates  shares  with  no  other  entity,  however, 
those  which  allow  the  intellect  to  distinguish  Socrates  from  everything 
else,  including  other  members  of  the  same  species,  are  those  which 
make  him  an  absolutely  unique  individual  not  amenable  to  definition. 
As  we  read  in  the  Summa  7heologiae,  it  is  proper  for  the  human  intellect 
to  know  individual  existing  things,  but  not  as  individuals.  20 
From  what  does  the  agent  intellect  abstract? 
Again  we  can  take  as  our  point  of  departure  a  simple  formula  and 
proceed  by  analysing  its  contents.  Abstraction  always  begins  with,  and 
proceeds  from,  concrete  individuals  and  their  conditions  of 182 
particularity.  21  Why  it  is  that  the  intellect  needs  to  abstract  from 
particulars  and  their  conditions  of  particularity  Is  clear  enough  from 
our  discussion  of  definitions.  The  concrete  individuals  as  such  is  not 
strictly  intelligible,  and  hence  is  not  strictly  definable  because,  a) 
concrete  individuals  are  subject  to  change  while  definitions  are  stable, 
and  b)  concrete  individuals  are  absolutely  unique  and  definitions  are  of 
universals.  Consequently,  when  abstracting  the  intellect  must  leave  out 
of  consideration  that  aspect  of  an  individual  responsible  for  its 
mutability  and  uniqueness.  But  what  is  responsible  for  an  individual's 
mutability  and  uniqueness?  Why  are  individuals  mutable  and 
absolutely  unique? 
The  Aristotello-Thomist  position  on  this  matter  is  well  known.  What 
makes  one  individual,  a  human  being  for  example,  distinct  from 
another  human  being,  or  one  oak  tree  from  another  oak  tree,  is  the 
parcel  of  matter  that  makes  up  its  body.  Matter  is  the  principle  of 
Individuation.  This  is  a  central  component  of  the  Aristotelian  theory  of 
hylomorphism  which  states  that  particular  individuals  are  a 
combination  of  Substantial  Form  and  Primary  Matter.  The  Substantial 
Form  is  that  component  or  aspect  of  x  that  makes  x  the  kind  of  thing  it 
is;  its  Matter  is  that  component  of  x  that  distinguishes  it  from  others  of 
its  kind  and  makes  it  a  unique  individual.  Consequently,  to  say  that 
abstraction  is  from  concrete  individuals  and  their  conditions  of 
particularity  is  to  say  that  the  agent  intellect  abstracts  from  Matter,  and 
those  aspects  of  an  individual  which  follow  from  its  having  a  private 
parcel  of  Matter.  This  point  cannot  be  over-emphasised  as  it  is 
fundamental  to  Aristotlio-Thomist  scientific  thought:  Matter  is  the 
source  of  unintelligibility  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  is  the  cause  of  both 
change  and  uniqueness  in  the  world  of  experience. 
The  thinldng  behind  the  claim  that  matter  is  the  cause  of  change  need 
not  overly  concern  us  here.  It  is  enough  that  we  recognise  that  this 
association  was  accepted  by  Aristotle  and  Aquinas.  As  for  the  problem 
caused  by  the  unintelligibility  of  unique  individuals,  we  have  seen  why 
It  must  also  be  laid  at  the  door  of  matter,  the  principle  of  individuation. 
So  we  can  say  that  if  x  is  a  material  body  (and  every  thing  encountered 
in  sensation  is  a  material  body  of  some  description  or  an  accident 183 
thereoO  two  epistemological  difficulties  immediately  arise:  x  is  mutable 
and  absolutely  unique.  Consequently,  if  one  is  seeking  to  make  x 
intelligible  one  must  somehow  counteract  the  influence  of  matter.  This 
is  precisely  what  the  agent  intellect  accomplishes  by  abstracting 
intelligible  features  from  material  bodies,  i.  e.,  by  considering  aspects  of 
material  bodies  to  the  exclusion  of  their  materiality.  In  the  process  of 
abstraction  the  abstracted  intelligible  object  is  seen  to  exist  in  some 
sense  apart  from  matter.  How  this  is  so  will  become  clearer  upon 
consideration  of  the  various  kinds  of  abstractable  intelligible  objects 
and  the  two  modes  of  abstraction. 
Different  Abstractions  mean  different  Sciences 
Now  that  we  have  an  understanding  of  the  focal  sense  of  abstraction 
and  of  the  related  concepts  of  intelligible  object  and  agent  intellect,  and 
we  see  how  this  intellectual  apparatus  was  developed  in  response  to 
epistemological  difficulties  encountered  by  the  Presocratics,  we  are 
finally  in  a  position  to  examine  how  Aquinas  puts  these  ideas  to  work  in 
the  divisions  of  the  sciences.  But  as  we  proceed  with  this  new  topic,  it 
is  vital  to  bear  in  mind  that  each  of  the  sciences  deals  with  different 
aspects  of  essentially  the  same  basic  material  -  concrete  individuals 
given  in  sensation.  The  sciences  are  distinguished  according  to  how 
this  common  material  is  dealt  with  by  the  intellect,  under  what  aspect, 
or  from  what  point  of  view.  As  Leroy  has  said,  '.  .  Jes  diverses 
formalitds  dont  Mtre  sensible  est  porteur  ne  se  d6voilent  pas  au  mi-Ime 
regard,  ne  se  manifestent  pas  sous  la  m6me  lumi&re'.  22  As  the  agent 
Intellect  adopts  now  one,  now  another  point  of  view,  it  produces  or 
disengages  a  distinct  types  of  intelligible  object  from  the  realm  of 
sensory  experience.  So  by  distinguishing  the  different  types  of 
abstracted  intelligible  objects,  each  of  which  is  produced  by  a  distinct 
type  of  abstraction  and  point  of  view,  Aquinas  is  able  to  distinguish  one 
science  from  another.  It  is  to  these  types  of  abstraction  that  I  now  turn. 
Aquinas  distinguishes  three  species  of  abstraction,  three,  species  of 
intelligible  object,  and  consequently  three  species  of  speculative  science. 
At  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  I  discussed  what  I  called  the  focal  sense 184 
of  the  term  abstraction.  It  is  now  necessary  to  look  at  the  more  precise 
technical  senses  of  this  term  in  order  to  understand  the  basis  of  the 
distinctions  between  the  sciences. 
The  intelligible  objects  of  the  speculative  sciences  differ  with  respect  to. 
their  ontological  status;  for  y  can  be  abstracted  from  x  either  in  the 
order  of  being,  or  merely  in  the  order  of  the  understanding,  or  in  both  at 
once.  Intelligible  objects  are  then  said  to  differ  according  to  the  degree 
to  which  they  are  abstracted  from  matter.  As  we  shall  see,  some 
intelligible  objects  are  metaphorically  speaking  'closer'  to  matter  than 
others.  This  distinction  focuses  on  the  extent  to  which  matter  is  crucial 
to  the  understanding  of  the  intelligible  objects.  The  details  of  these 
refinements  in  the  meaning  of  abstraction  will  occupy  us  for  the  rest  of 
this  chapter. 
The  best  place  to  start  when  embarking  on  a  detailed  study  of  Aquinas' 
theory  of  abstraction  is  simple  apprehension  and  the  other  acts  of  the 
intellect.  We  have  already  come  across  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  in 
our  discussion  of  the  agent  intellect  and  the  nature  of  definitions.  Now 
we  require  some  familiarity  with  the  remaining  acts  because  all  species 
of  abstraction  are  particular  operations  of  the  intellect  performed  in 
either  the  first  or  the  second  of  its  three  possible  acts.  More 
importantly,  the  act  of  the  intellect  in  which  an  abstraction  is  performed 
determines  the  ontological  status  of  the  intelligible  object,  the  first  of  our 
distinctions.  Again,  the  briefest  sketch  of  these  acts  will  suffice  for  our 
purposes. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  first  cognitive  act  of  the  intellect,  the  act  upon 
which  all  the  remaining  cognitive  acts  depend  (including  the  intellectual 
operations  of  abstraction)  is  called  'simple  apprehension',  (apprehensio 
simpleA.  This  is  the  act  whereby  the  intellect  recognises  and  grasps  the 
nature  or  essence  of  a  concrete  individual.  The  second  act  of  the 
intellect  is  called  'judgement'  (iudiciuný  and  is  characterised  by  the 
processes  of  composition  and  division.  In  Scholastic  terminology  one  is 
said  to  'compose'  when  one  forms  an  affirmative  proposition  by 
predicating  something  of  a  subject  term.  In  this  case  there  Is  a  bringing 
together  of  a  subject  and  a  predicate.  By  contrast,  one  is  said  to  'divide' 185 
when  one  forms  a  negative  proposition  by  separating  or  dividing  a 
predicate  from  a  subject  term.  The  interesting  feature  of  judgements  for 
our  present  purposes  is  that  they  are  used  to  assert  something  about 
the  eidstence  of  the  nominata  of  the  subject  and  predicate  terms.  For 
example,  by  uttering  the  proposition  'Socrates  is  musical'  one  asserts 
that  musicality,  or  more  precisely,  the  property  of  being  musical, 
actually  exists  in  Socrates,  that  musicality  and  Socrates  are  found 
together.  On  the  other  hand,  if  one  says  'Socrates  is  not  Plato,  one  is 
asserting  that  neither  Plato  or  Socrates  exists  in  the  other;  they  exist 
apart,  independent  of,  and  separate  from,  one  another.  Now  the  crucial 
distinction  for  our  purposes  between  the  act  of  judgement  and  simple 
apprehension  is  that  in  the  former  the  intellect  asserts  or  denies 
something  concerning  the  existence  or  state  of  x,  whereas  in  simple 
apprehension  the  intellect  simply  grasps  what  x  is.  We  can  say  that  in 
simple  apprehension  the  intellect  focuses  on  the  nature  of  the  particular 
intelligible  object  under  consideration,  while  in  judgements  the  intellect 
focuses  on  the  mode  of  existence  of  a  particular  intelligible:  it  looks  at 
whether  x  exists  with  or  apart  from  y,  where  x  is  a  subject  term  and  ya 
predicate.  23  The  importance  of  this  distinction  will  emerge  in  due 
course. 
The  third  and  fmal  act  of  the  intellect  is  called  reasoning  (ratiocinatio). 
In  this  act  the  intellect  moves  from  two  or  more  propositions  (now 
serving  as  premises)  to  a  conclusion  by  means  of  an  accepted  rule  of 
inference.  This  particular  act  is  not  of  concern  to  us  insofar  as  we  are 
seeking  to  understand  the  three  species  of  abstraction.  Nevertheless  a 
few  words  on  it  will  not  go  amiss  because  it  is  a  crucial  element  of  the 
cognitive  process  generally.  Only  when  all  three  acts  of  the  intellect  are 
used  in  conjunction  does  scientific  knowledge  to  come  to  eidst  in  the 
knowing  intellect:  simple  apprehension  provides  the  intellect  with  the 
content  of  our  subject  and  predicate  terms  (the  nature  of  those  objects 
picked  out  by  these  terms);  in  judgements  these  terms  are  put  together 
to  form  propositions;  by  reasoning  the  propositions  can  then  be 
combined  to  produce  arguments  and  conclusions.  It  is  towards  the 
production  of  such  conclusions  that  all  the  efforts  of  the  scientist  are 
committed. 186 
With  this  background  in  mind  we  can  make  sense  of,  Aquinas'  initial 
division  of  abstraction  into  two  categories.  He  writes: 
Abstraction  can  occur  in  two  ways.  First,  by  way  of 
composition  and  division,  and  thus  we  may  understand  that 
one  thing  does  not  e.,  dst  in  some  other,  or  that  it  is  separate 
from  it.  Secondly,  by  way  of  simple  and  absolute 
consideration;  and  thus  we  understand  one  thing  without 
consideration  of  another.  24 
We  see  here  that  strictly  speaking  abstraction  can  occur  in  either  the 
first  or  the  second  act  of  the  intellect.  Now  the  crucial  difference 
between  abstractions  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  from  abstractions  in 
the  second  is  that  they  produce  intelligible  objects  of  significantly 
different  ontological  status.  When  abstraction  occurs  in  the  first  act  of 
the  intellect  the  result  is  an  intelligible  abstracted  from  matter  in  the 
understanding  alone,  but  not  in  the  order  of  being.  To  take  an  example 
already  used,  the  intellect  can  isolate  and  consider  the  nature  of  the 
colour  of  an  apple  without  considering  the  material  apple  itself 
(abstraction  in  the  order  of  the  understanding);  but  colours  cannot  exist 
apart  from  coloured  ob  ects  although  they  can  be  understood  without  j 
reference  to  them  (colours  cannot  be  separated  from  material  objects  in 
the  order  of  being).  Now,  if  abstraction  occurs  in  the  second  act  of  the 
intellect,  the  result  is  an  intelligible  object  abstracted  from  matter  in  the 
order  of  the  understanding  and  in  the  order  of  being.  Such  an  object 
can  actually  exist  apart  from  matter.  Just  what  sort  of  things  these 
intelligible  objects  are  will  be  discussed  when  we  come  to  consider  the 
science  of  metaphysics. 
But  despite  this  important  ontological  difference  between  the  intelligible 
objects  of  abstractions  in  the  first  and  second  act,  there  is  an  equally 
important  sense  in  which  abstractions  in  the  first  and  second  act  are 
fundamentally  alike.  All  intelligible  objects  abstracted  by  the  agent 
intellect,  regardless  of  ontological  status,  are  intelligible  precisely 
because  they  have  been  abstracted  from  the  particularising  conditions 
of  matter.  However,  there  are  degrees  of  distance,  so  to  speak,  at  which 
the  intelligibles  are  found  from  these  particularising  conditions.  Some 
intelligible  objects  cannot  be  understood  without  some  reference  to 187 
matter,  nor  can  they  exist  without  matter.  Some  can  be  uilderstood 
without  reference  to  matter,  but  they  cannot  exist  without  matter  to 
support  them.  Finally,  some  intelligible  objects  can  be  understood 
without  reference  to  matter,  nor  do  they  depend  on  matter  for  their 
existence.  As  we  move  from  the  first  intelligibles  to  the  last  we  are 
moving  further  and  further  from  the  particuIarising  conditions  of 
matter.  These  levels  are  called  the  three  degrees  of  abstraction.  At 
each  degree  there  is  a  particular  kind  of  intelligible  object,  and  for  each 
kind  of  intelligible  there  is  a  distinct  science.  We  can  now  consider  the 
nature  of  each  species  of  abstraction  and  its  corresponding  intelligible 
ob  ect.  j 
First  Degree  ofAbstraction:  Me  Natural  Sciences 
The  first  degree  of  abstraction  occurs  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  In 
the  act  of  simple  apprehension  the  intellect  focuses  on  the  nature  of  the 
objects  given  in  sensation;  and  the  intelligible  object  abstracted  in  this 
case  is  the  nature  or  essence  of  the  concrete  individual  as  a  whole 
which  is  then  expressed  in  a  definition.  It  would  be  easy  to  assume  that 
this  operation  abstracts  the  substantial  form  of  the  individual.  This 
would  be  a  mistake,  however.  For  the  substantial  form  of  x  is  that 
component  of  x  which  makes  x  the  kind  of  thing  it  is,  and  as  such  does 
not  include  matter  -  for  matter  only  makes  xa  particular  instantiation 
of  a  kind,  it  does  not  determine  what  kind  of  thing  x  is.  But  if  x  is  a 
material  body,  as  would  be  the  case  if  x  is  a  human  being,  or  dog  or  oak 
tree,  then  it  would  be  incorrect  to  say  that  its  nature  is  entirely  free  of 
matter.  For  to  be  a  human  being,  or  a  dog  or  oak  tree,  is  to  be  a 
material  body  of  a  particular  sort.  To  mark  this  distinction  clearly  we 
can  use  the  Latin  terms  forma  totius  and  forma  partis,  and  use  human 
beings  as  an  example  to  see  how  these  terms  are  applied.  The  forma 
totius  is  the  nature  or  essence  of  a  human  being  as  expressed  in  a 
definition.  Human  beings,  in  Thomist  philosophy,  are  defined  as  a 
composite  whole  made  up  of  a  rational  soul  and  material  body.  The 
forma  partis,  or  substantial  form  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  part  of  a 
human  being  that  makes  it  specifically  human,  i.  e.,  its  rational  soul. 
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definition  of  human  being.  Consequently  we  must  say  that  in  the  first 
degree  of  abstraction  the  intellect  abstracts  the  whole  nature  of  the 
individual  under  consideration,  i.  e.  its  forma  totius,  not  its  substantial 
form  orforma  partis.  This  first  degree  of  abstraction  is  known  therefore 
as  abstractio  totius  because  it  abstracts  or  disengages'the  nature  of  the 
entire  object  given  in  sensation. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  the  definition  of  human  being,  its  forma  totius, 
includes  matter.  But  if  intelligible  objects  are  to  be  abstracted  from 
matter  how  is  it  that  matter  remains  an  essential  component  of  the 
intelligible  object?  To  explain  how  this  problem  arises  and  how  Aquinas 
deals  with  it  let  us  return  to  the  case  of  human  beings  and  examine 
how  the  intellect  approaches  this  object.  After  the  intellect  has  had 
sensory  experience  of  a  number  of  individual  human  beings  the  agent 
intellect  abstracts  from  these  experiences  the  essential  features  of  the 
species.  That  is  to  say,  it  leaves  out  of  consideration  the  accidental 
features  of  Socrates  or  Plato  that,  while  making  them  Socrates  or  Plato, 
are  nevertheless  not  included  in  the  definition  of  human  beings  qua 
members  of  the  species.  Such  features  include  height  and  weight,  hair, 
skin  and  eye  colour,  dates  of  birth  and  death  and  other  details  of 
personal  history,  etc.  These  extraneous,  or  accidental  features  are 
grounded  in  the  fact  that  each  individual  has  its  own  parcel  of  matter  in 
which  the  form  of  humanity  has  been  instantiated.  Consequently  the 
intellect  must  abstract  from  precisely  this  matter.  However,  the 
complication  arises  that  human  beings  are  essentially  material  entities, 
albeit  with  a  distinct  form,  viz.,  a  rational  soul.  So  if  the  intellect  is  to 
properly  understand  human  beings,  its  definition  of  human  being  must 
include  some  reference  to  matter.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  saying  that 
in  the  first  degree  of  abstraction  the  intellect  disengages  an  Intelligible 
object  that  cannot  be  understood  without  reference  to  matter.  It  is  of 
the  essence  of  being  human  to  be  a  material  body  of  a  sort.  A  non- 
material  human  being  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  and  corresponds  to 
nothing  in  the  world. 
To  cope  with  this  situation  Aquinas  is  obliged  to  introduce  distinctions 
in  the  concept  of  matter.  He  calls  that  matter  which  is  responsible  for 
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individual  sensible  matter  'individual'  because  each  human  being  has 
its  own  parcel  of  matter;  'sensible'  because  the  matter  of  each  human 
being  is  given  in  sensation.  This  distinction  is  pressed  into  service  in 
the  following  manner.  Socrates  and  Plato  each  have  their  own  body, 
and  hence  have  this  or  that  particular  parcel  of  matter.  But  human 
beings,  while  necessarily  having  flesh  and  bones,  do  not  have  Socrates 
or  Plato's  flesh  and  bones.  So  Aquinas  says  that  the  definition  of 
human  beings  (and  of-other  natural  kinds)  includes  reference  to  what 
he  calls  common  sensible  matter  'common'  because  humans  have  flesh 
and  bones  in  general,  but  not  any  specific  flesh  or  bones;  'sensible' 
because  flesh  and  bone  are  materials  given  in  sensation.  So  we  must 
make  more  precise  our  understanding  of  abstractio  totius:  in  this  case 
the  intellect  does  not  abstract  from  all  matter,  but  only  from  individual 
sensible  matter.  25  Therefore.  abstractio  totius  is  that  operation  of  the 
agent  intellect  whereby  individual  sensible  matter,  but  not  common 
sensible  matter,  is  left  out  of  consideration  when  the  intellect  turns  its 
attention  to  particular  instantiations  of  natural  kinds.  The  intelligible 
objects  revealed  by  this  type  of  abstraction  are  the  natures  of  material, 
mutable  individuals.  These  are  the  objects  of  natural  philosophy.  They 
are  those  entities  that,  while  abstracted  from  individual  sensible  matter, 
cannot  be  understood  without  common  sensible  matter  being  included 
in  their  definition;  nor  can  such  entities  mist  apart  from  matter. 
Accordingly  Aquinas  says  that  such  intelligible  objects  rise  above  the 
conditions  of  unintelligibility  by  the  lowest  degree  possible. 
Second  Degree  ofAbstraction:  Mathematics 
The  second  degree  of  abstraction  also  occurs  in  the  first  act  of  the 
intellect.  Consequently  the  intelligible  objects  produced  in  this 
abstraction,  like  those  of  abstactio  totius,  will  not  be  separable  from 
concrete  individuals  in  the  order'of  being.  The  difference  between  the 
first  and  second  degree  of  abstraction  is  that  rather  than  focusing  on 
the  essence  or  nature  of  an  object,  the  intellect  focuses  on  one  of  its 
accidental  features.  The  aspect  brought  into  consideration  in  this  case 
are  an  object's  quantifiable,  or  measurable,  features.  All  concrete 
individuals  have  quantifiable  features  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  all  such 190 
objects  are  extended  in  the  three  spatial  dimensions.  These  accidents 
of  quantity  are  abstracted  from  the  other  accidents  of  the  object  found 
in  the  remaining  eight  categories  of  being  (its  relationships  to  other 
objects,  its  location  in  space  and  time,  its  colour,  whether  it  is  hot  or 
cold.  'soft  or  hard,  acting  or  being  acted  upon,  etc.  )  Aristotle  makes 
these  points  in  Book  XIII  of  the  Metaphysics: 
For  just  as  the  universal  propositions  of  mathematics  deal  not 
with  objects  that  exist  separately,  apart  from  extended 
magnitudes  and  from  numbers,  but  with  magnitudes  and 
numbers,  not  however  qua  such  as  to  have  magnitude  or  to  be 
divisible,  clearly  it  is  possible  that  there  should  also  be 
propositions  and  demonstrations  about  sensible  magnitudes, 
not  however,  qua  sensible  but  qua  possessed  of  certain 
definite  qualities....  there  will  be  propositions  and  sciences, 
which  treat  [sensible  magnitudes]  however  not  qua  mobile  but 
only  qua  bodies,  or  again  qua  planes,  or  only  qua  lines,  or  qua 
divisibles,  or  qua  indivisibles  having  position,  or  only  qua 
indivisibles.  26 
The  intelligible  objects  disengaged  in  this  type  of  abstraction  are  known 
as  'sensible  magnitudes',  or  the  'mathematicals',  and  consist  of  points, 
lines,  plains,  figures,  numbers,  and  the  like.  The  technical  term  for  this 
species  of  abstraction  is  abstractio  forinae,  for  in  this  operation  an 
accidental  form  is  abstracted  from  the  individual. 
Now  these  intelligible  objects  are  further  removed  from  matter  than  are 
those  of  the  natural  sciences.  For  such  objects  do  not  depend  on 
sensible  matter,  either  individual  or  common,  for  their  being 
understood.  Unlike  the  objects  of  the  natural  sciences  which  require 
some  reference  to  common  sensible  matter  because  these  objects  are 
essentially  material  entities,  points,  lines,  figures,  etc.,  can  all  be 
defined  without  reference  to  sensible  matter.  For  example,  the 
definition  of  triangle  makes  no  reference  to  what  material  an  actual 
triangle  happens  to  be  instantiated  in,  for  a  triangle  is  a  triangle 
regardless  of  whether  it  is  instantiated  in  wood  or  bronze.  In  fact  no 
strictly  sensible  figure  ever  matches  the  figure  as  described  in  its  formal 
definition.  This  is  because  the  essential  features  of  mathematicals  stem 
from  their  natures  as  extended  in  space.  Yet  Aristotle  and  Aquinas 191 
insist  that  mathematicals  cannot  e2dst  apart  from  matter  since  they  are 
nothing  more  than  accidental  features  of  concrete  individuals 
abstracted  by  the  intellect.  So,  while  mathematicals  can  be  understood 
without  reference  to  sensible  matter,  they  cannot  e-3dst  apart  from 
matter. 
Again,  however,  there  is  a  complication.  Although  mathernaticals  are 
abstracted  entirely  from  sensible  matter,  they  are  not  separable  from 
matter.  There  remains,  therefore,  an  important  connection  between 
mathematicals  and  matter.  The  connection  with  matter  is  found  in  the 
very  essence  of  mathematicals,  their  measurable  extension  in  space. 
This  is  appreciated  most  clearly  when  mathematicals  are  contrasted 
with  immaterial  entities.  Immaterial  entities,  the  angels  for  example, 
are  not  spatially  extended  precisely  because  they  are  entirely 
immaterial.  As  matter  is  the  principle  of  individuation,  it  is  also  the 
principle  of  extension.  Some  matter,  therefore,  is  crucial  to  the  nature 
of  mathernaticals  as  the  source  or  ground  of  their  extension.  Clearly 
this  matter  cannot  be  sensible  matter  since  this  would  imply  that 
matter  like  bronze  or  wood,  flesh  or  bone,  would  have  to  be  included  in 
the  definition  of  figures  like  triangle  and  circle.  Although  all  actual 
figures  will  be  instantiated  in  some  sensible  matter,  this  matter  qua 
sensible  is  irrelevant  to  the  nature  of  figure.  To  meet  this  difficulty 
Aristotle  and  Aquinas  make  use  of  a  further  distinction  in  the  concept  of 
matter.  Aquinas  says  that  mathematicals  are  abstracted  from  sensible 
matter  (both  individual  and  common)  and  from  individual  intelligible 
matter,  but  not  from  conunon  intelligible  matter.  'Intelligible'  matter  can 
be  defiried  as  that  component  of  an  object  that  remains  after  all 
accidental  features  (apart  from  those  of  quantity)  have  been  set  aside. 
After  such  an  operation  what  remains  is  a  three  dimensional  continuum 
in  space.  Intelligible  matter,  therefore,  is  identified  as  the  source  or 
ground  of  an  object's  extension  in  space.  Aquinas  throws  some  light  on 
this  distinction  with  a  brief  comparison  of  sensible  and  intelligible 
matter.  He  writes: 
And  by  sensible  matter  is  meant  such  things  as  bronze  and 
wood,  or  any  changeable  matter,  such  as  fire  and  water  and 
all  things  of  this  sort;  and  singular  sensible  things  are 
individuated  by  such  matter.  But  by  intelligible  matter  is meant  what  exists  in  things  which  are  sensible  but  are  not 
viewed  as  sensible,  as  the  objects  of  mathematics.  For  just  as 
the  form  of  man  exists  in  such  and  such  matter,  which  is  an 
organic  body,  in  a  similar  way  the  form  of  a  circle  or  of  a 
triangle  exists  in  this  matter,  which  is  a  continuum,  whether 
surface  or  solid.  27 
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The  difference  between  the  abstraction  of  the  natural  sciences  and  that 
of  mathematics  is  clearly  seen  to  be  one  of  the  point  of  view  adopted  by 
the  intellect.  28  Mathematicals  exist  in  the  same  sensible  bodies  as  the 
ob  ects  of  the  natural  sciences:  but  the  intellect  notices  them  by 
considering  sensible  bodies  not  qua  sensible,  but  rather  qua  extended 
continua  in  space.  For  this  reason  the  matter  of  the  mathematicals  is 
called  'intelligible'  rather  than  sensible;  not  because  the  ground  of  their 
being  is  not  a  sensible  body,  but  because  the  mathematicals  are 
discovered  when  the  intellect  abstracts  from  the  sensible  aspects  of 
bodies. 
The  further  distinction  between  Individual  and  Common  intelligible 
matter  simply  mirrors  that  found  within  sensible  matter.  Each 
instantiation  of  a  circle,  for  example,  has  its  own  individual  intelligible 
matter.  But  the  definition  of  circle  does  not  depend  on  this  particular 
parcel  of  intelligible  matter,  but  intelligible  matter  In  general:  all  circles 
are  extended  in  space,  but  they  need  not  be  extended  by  any  particular 
parcel  of  intelligible  matter. 
There  remains  a  final  distinction  between  the  objects  of  mathematics 
and  those  of  the  natural  sciences  which  follows  from  the  foregoing.  The 
intelligible  objects  of  mathematics  are  not  subject  change  as  is  the  case 
with  the  ob  ects  of  the  natural  sciences.  This  is  clear  from  a  j 
comparison  between  a  human  being,  for  example,  and  a  circle.  Human 
beings,  unlike  circles  and  other  figures,  are  subject  to  birth,  growth  and 
decay  as  an  essential  feature  of  their  mode  of  existence.  Consequently 
the  definition  of  human  being,  although  stable  in  itself,  actually  defines 
a  nature  subject  to  change.  This  mutability  is  accounted  for  in  the 
Aristotelio-Thomistic  framework  by  the  fact  that  humans  are  essentially 
material  bodies,  matter  being  the  cause  of  change  in  natural  things. 
But  circles  and  figures  are  not  subject  to  such  changes  accept 193 
accidentally  insofar  as  the  mutable  bodies  from  which  they  are 
abstracted  are  subject  to  change  and  decay.  Even  though  a  wooden 
circle  may  pass  out  of  existence  (after  being  burned,  let  us  say)  the 
wooden  circle  has  not  changed  qua  circle,  but  qua  wooden  object.  If 
circles  and  triangles  were  subject  to  change  in  the  same  sense  as 
sensible  bodies,  common  sensible  matter  would  have  to  appear  as  a 
component  of  their  definition.  But  this  is  not  the  case,  as  we  have  seen. 
Consequently  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  can  say  that  the  mathematicals  are 
essentially  immutable  objects.  Such  then  are  the  objects  of 
mathematics  and  the  abstraction  that  produces  them;  they  are  said  to 
rise  above  the  conditions  of  unintelligibility  by  the  second  degree. 
7he  Problem  concerning  Metaphysics:  Its  proper  object  and  mode  of 
abstraction 
Our  first  two  speculative  sciences,  natural  science  and  mathematics, 
have  posed  no  difficulties  of  interpretation.  We  have  identified  their 
proper  intelligible  objects  and  their  proper  mode  of  abstraction.  Things 
are  not  so  straightforward,  however,  in  the  case  of  metaphysics.  It  is 
generally  agreed29  that  its  proper  object  must  be  'separable'  from 
matter  in  both  the  order  of  the  understanding  and  the  order  of  being.  It 
is  this  feature  that  distinguishes  metaphysics  from  the  other  two 
sciences.  Just  what  this  object  is,  however,  is  a  matter  of  some  dispute. 
In  some  passages  of  the  Metaphysics  it  appears  that  Aristotle  is  saying 
the  proper  object  of  this  science  Is  being  qua  being,  or  being-in-general; 
but  other  passages  suggest  that  metaphysics  is  the  study  of  a  particular 
type  of  being.  Indeed,  the  task  of  reconciling  the  contradictory  texts  of 
Books  IV  and  VI  of  the  Metaphysics  has  become  something  of  'an  old 
chess-nut'  in  Aristotelian  scholarship.  Natorp  struggled  with  it  in 
188730;  Jaeger  tried  his  hand  in  19233  1,  Patzig  addressed  the  issue 
again  in  1959,  and  his  work  was  included  in  a  volume  of  essays 
published  in  197932.  And  since  Wyser's  critical  edition  of  Questions  5 
and  6  of  De  Trinitate  Thomists  have  been  re-examining  the  matter  for 
themselves. 
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context  of  interpreting  the  doctrine  of  the  three  degrees  of  abstraction, 
an  approach  not  as  popular  among  Aristotle  scholars  with  no  Thomist 
affiliations.  33  There  is,  however,  good  reason  to  think  that  this  problem 
of  metaphysics  ought  to  be  approached  in  the  Thomist  manner.  The 
Thomist  approach  to  the  problem  has  the  virtue  of  taking  seriously 
Aristotle  and  Aquinas'  insistence  on  the  point  that  the  object  of  a 
science  is,  in  large  part,  determined  by  the  attitude  or  perspective 
adopted  by  the  agent  intellect.  There  is  no  obvious  reason  why  this 
approach  should  be  abandoned  in  the  case  of  metaphysics:  it  is 
consistent  with  Aristotelian  texts,  and  with  the  principles  successfully 
employed  in  the  case  of  the  natural  sciences  and  mathematics. 
Moreover,  by  their  own  admission  the  approaches  of  non-Thomist 
Aristotle  scholars  have  failed  to  do  justice  to  the  various  passages  of  the 
Metaphysics.  Yet  Aquinas'  treatment  of  Aristotle's  metaphysics  appears 
to  offer  a  way  of  reconciling  the  apparently  contradictory  claims  in 
Books  IV  and  VI.  There  is,  however,  another  over-riding  consideration 
that  compels  us  to  adopt  the  Thomist  approach  to  this  problem. 
Although  Aquinas  bases  himself  on  Aristotle,  we  are  actually  engaged  in 
a  study  of  Aquinas,  for  it  is  Aquinas'  use  of  Aristotle  that  is  of  primary 
interest  to  us.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  Thomist  synthesis  of  Aristotle  and 
Christian  theology  that  I  suggest  is  informative  insofar  as  we  are  looking 
for  guidance  in  our  approach  to  the  realist  dispute  in  science. 
Consequently,  in  this  matter  of  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics,  our 
emphasis  must  be  on  Aquinas  rather  than  Aristotle. 
Before  we  begin  our  study  of  Aquinas'  treatment  of  Aristotle's 
metaphysics  we  would  do  well  to  have  the  conflicting  texts  before  us 
and  state  the  problem  arising  from  them.  In  the  Metaphysics,  Book  IV, 
Ch.  1  we  find  the  following  statement: 
There  is  a  certain  science  which  studies  being  as  being  and 
the  attributes  which  necessarily  belong  to  being.  This  science 
is  not  the  same  as  any  of  the  so-called  particular  sciences 
[natural  science  and  mathematics];  for  none  of  the  other 
sciences  attempt  to  study  being  as  being  in  general,  but 
cutting  off  some  part  of  it  they  study  the  accidents  of  this  art 
This,  for  example,  is  what  the  mathematical  sciences  do. 
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Aquinas  comments  on  this  passage  as  follows: 
Now  because  a  science  should  investigate  not  only  its  subject 
but  also  the  proper  accidents  of  its  subject,  he  therefore  says, 
first,  that  there  is  a  science  which  studies  being  as  being,  as 
its  subject,  and  studies  also  "the  attributes  which  necessarily 
belong  to  being,  "  i.  e.,  its  proper  accidents.  He  says  "as  being" 
because  the  other  sciences,  which  deal  with  particular  beings, 
do  indeed  consider  being  (for  all  the  subjects  of  the  sciences 
are  beings),  yet  they  do  not  consider  being  as  being,  but  as 
some  particular  kind  of  being,  for  example,  numbers  or  line  or 
fire  or  the  like.  35 
In  these  passages  both  authors  state  quite  unequivocally  that 
metaphysics  is  distinguished  from  the  other  sciences  by  the  fact  that  it 
does  not  study  any  particular  type  of  being,  as  do  the  natural  sciences 
and  mathematics,  but  rather  being  in  general  and  its  proper  accidents. 
This  view  is  sharply  at  odds  with  passages  in  the  Metaphysics,  Book  VI, 
Ch  1.  There  we  read  that  metaphysics  is  distinguished  from  the  other 
sciences  not  by  studying  being  in  general,  but  by  having  its  own 
particular  area  of  being  to  study: 
For  the  philosophy  of  nature  deals  with  things  which  are 
inseparable  from  matter  but  not  immobile.  And  some 
mathematical  sciences  deal  with  things  which  are  immobile, 
but  presumably  do  e--dst  separately,  but  are  present  as  it  were 
in  matter.  First  philosophy,  however,  deals  with  things  which 
are  both  separate  from  matter  and  immobile.  36 
Aquinas  echoes  this  sentiment  as  well: 
But  the  first  science  deals  with  things  which  are  separable 
from  matter  in  being  and  altogether  immobile.  37 
Consequently  we  are  left  with  an  apparent  contradiction.  On  the  one 
hand  we  have  metaphysics  characterised  as  the  study  of  the  general 
attributes  of  being  qua  being;  on  the  other,  we  have  metaphysics 
characteirlsed  as  the  study  of  a  particular  sort  of  being,  the  eternal 
separate  substances  (God  and  the  Angels).  Some38  have  gone  so  far  as 
to  suggest  that  there  are  in  fact  two  sciences  of  metaphysics  - 
metaphysics  generatis  and  metaphysics  specialis  -  and  to  wonder  if  the 196 
science  can  ever  be  unified.  With  the  problem  clearly  before  us  we  can 
now  move  on  the  consider  how  Aquinas  approaches  it  from  within  the 
discussion  of  the  operation  of  abstraction. 
In  the  case  of  the  first  two  speculative  sciences  we  noted  that  their 
modes  of  abstraction  were  confimed  to,  or  associated  with,  the  first  act 
of  the  intellect.  The  upshot  of  this  classification  is  the  agreement  that 
while  their  intelligible  objects  cannot  exist  apart  from  matter,  they  can 
be  abstracted  from  it  in  various  degrees  in  the  order  of  the 
understanding.  The  next  degree  of  abstraction  possible  then  would 
seem  to  produce  an  object  that  can  be  totally  abstracted  from  sensible 
and  intelligible  matter  in  the  order  of  the  understanding  and  in  the 
order  of  existence.  Such  an  abstraction  is  assigned  to  the  second  act  of 
the  intellect,  and  in  particular  to  negative  judgements  where  predicates 
are  separated  from  subject  terms  in  the  order  of  being  and  not  just  in 
the  order  of  understanding.  It  is  this  added  feature  of  separation  that 
has  led  to  the  difficulties  concerning  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics 
and  how  it  is  obtained. 
Aquinas  makes  it  very  clear  in  q.  5,  a.  3  of  the  De  Trinitate  that  the  mode 
of  abstraction  peculiar  to  metaphysics  ought  properly  to  be  called  a 
'separation'  rather  than  a  third  degree  of  abstraction.  39  Aquinas' 
insistence  on  this  fact  has  brought  into  question  the  correctness  of  the 
traditional  doctrine  of  the  three  degrees  of  abstraction  taught  by 
Cajetan  and  John  of  Saint  Thomas.  Some  have  thought  it  proper  to 
reject  the  teaching  of  these  two  acknowledged  masters40;  others  have 
sought  to  show  that  while  there  is  a  difference  in  terminology  between 
their  teaching  and  the  third  article  of  the  fifth  question,  there  is  no 
significant  disagreement  in  doctrine.  41  It  is  not  our  concern  here  to 
enter  into  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  Cajetan  and  John's  teaching. 
What  concerns  us  is  the  nature  of  the  disengagement  and  the 
corresponding  object,  not  the  terminology  used  to  convey  these  ideas. 
Nonetheless,  Aquinas's  insistence  on  the  term  'separation'  as  opposed 
to  'abstraction'  suggests  that  the  objects  of  metaphysics  actually  exist 
apart  from  matter  in  the  order  of  existence  as  well  as  the  order  of  the 
understanding.  And  such  an  interpretation  fits  well  with  the  fact  that 
Thomist  ontology  does  include  immaterial  separate  substances,  i.  e.  God 197 
and  the  Angels.  Consequently,  upon  a  cursory  inspection  of  q.  5.,  a.  3 
the  reader  can  be  forgiven  for  thinking  that  the  objects  of  this  third 
speculative  science  are  the  immaterial  separate  substances.  Indeed 
many  continue  to  hold  this  view  after  considerable  study  of  the 
matter42,  and  they  have  been  able  to  point  to  texts  in  both  Aristotle  and 
Aquinas  to  support  this  reading.  The  most  significant  perhaps,  besides 
the  passage  quoted  above,  is  Aristotle's  comment  in  the  Metaphysics, 
Book  VI,  Ch  1: 
Therefore,  if  there  is  no  substance  other  than  those  which 
exist  in  the  way  that  natural  substances  do,  the  philosophy  of 
nature  will  be  the  first  science;  but  if  there  is  an  immobile 
substance,  this  philosophy  will  be  prior,  and  the  science 
which  investigates  it  will  be  first  philosophy,  and  will  be 
universal  in  this  way.  43 
Since  it  is  clear  that  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  agree  that  there  is  in  fact  at 
least  one  such  substance,  this  passage  has  been.  taken  as  pro  of  that 
metaphysics  studies  a  particular  type  of  being  and  not  being  in  general. 
No  one  disputes  the  fact  that  for  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  metaphysics  is 
the  first  of  the  speculative  sciences;  but  it  is  first,  on  the  authority  of 
this  text,  because  there  is  an  immobile  substance  which  is  its  particular 
object  of  study.  If  such  a  being  did  not  exist  metaphysics  would  not  be 
the  first  science,  a  status  it  clearly  holds;  moreover,  without  this  entity 
for  metaphysics  to  study  it  Is  not  clear  that  there  would  be  a  need  for  a 
separate  science  of  metaphysics  at  all. 
However,  despite  the  fact  that  there  is  some  textual  basis  for  this  view, 
it  faces  a  number  of  serious  difficulties  which  render  it  unacceptable  as 
it  stands.  The  first  difficulty  is  perhaps  the  most  serious.  Aquinas  says 
quite  explicitly  that  God  and  the  Angels  are  not  ob  ects  arrived  at  by 
any  form  of  abstraction  or  separation.  44  In  fact  it  is  a  crucial  feature  of 
Thomist  theology  that  knowledge  of  the  separate  substances  is  obtained 
in  a  qualified  sense  through  completely  different  means.  45  Moreover,  it 
is  perfectly  clear  why  God  and  the  Angels  could  not  be  achieved  through 
abstraction  or  separation.  Abstraction  in  all  its  forms  is  performed  in 
either  the  first  or  second  act  of  the  intellect.  But  neither  God  nor  the 
Angels  is  ever  subject  to  simple  apprehension.  Being  immaterial  they 198 
are  by  nature  not  given  in  sensation.  Consequently,  they  cannot  be 
abstracted  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  But  this  immediately  rules 
out  the  possibility  that  they  are  abstracted  in  the  second  act  since  the 
second  and  third  acts  of  the  intellect  depend  on  the  completion  of  the 
first.  Aquinas  drives  this  point  home  when  he  says  that 
In  the.  state  of  the  present  life,  in  which  the  soul  Is  united  to  a 
corruptible  body,  it  is  impossible  for  our 
' 
intellect  to 
understand  anything  actually,  except  by  turning  to 
phantasms.  46 
Consequently,  in  order  to  maintain  that  God  and  the  Angels  are  the 
proper  object  of  metaphysics,  one  would,  be  forced  to  claim  either  that 
the  divisions  of  the  sciences  are  not  based  on  the  operations  of 
abstraction  or  separation,  which  is  denied  by  those  holding  this  view,  or 
that  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  have  completely  violated  the  principles  of 
empiricism  to  which  they  are  firmly  committed,  or  that  metaphysics  is 
not  in  fact  a  speculative  science.  I  would  submit  that  there  is  no 
compelling  reason  to  think  any  of  these  claims  is  credible. 
Second,  this  interpretation  of  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  fails  to 
make  sense  of  the  passages  in  Book  IV  of  the  Metaphysics.  As  we  saw, 
Aristotle  and  Aquinas  also  state  that  metaphysics  studies  the  most 
general  features  of  being  qua  being,  and  not  just  a  particular  area  of 
being,  as  is  the  case  with  physics  and  mathematics.  This  interpretation 
simply  ignores  the  problem  we  are  dealing  with  by  not  discussing  the 
conflicting  passages.  47 
Finally,  we  can  point  to  two  significant  and  complementary  passages  in 
Aquinas  which  clearly  imply  that  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  is  not 
God  or  the  Angels.  The  first  is  Aquinas'  Preface  to  his  commentary  on 
Aristotle's  Metaphysics,  the  second  is  guestion  5,  Article  4  of  the  De 
Trinitate.  Both  passages  will  be  examined  in  detail  in  the  next  section. 
Suffice  it  to  say  for  the  moment  that  in  the  preface  to  the  commentary 
on  the  Metaphysics  Aquinas  describes  a  tripartite  division  of  the  science 
of  metaphysics  into  first  philosophy,  metaphysics  proper,  and  theology, 
each  of  which  is  said  to  provide  a  distinct  approach  to  the  central  topic 
of  being  qua  being.  As  will  become  clear  in  the  next  section,  this 199 
passage  makes  it  plain  that  God  and  the  Angels  are  at  the  very  least  not 
the  only  objects  of  the  science  of  metaphysics.  But  when  read  in 
conjunction  with  the  fourth  article  of  the  fifth  question  of  the  De 
Trinitate,  we  will  see  that  even  this  weakened  thesis  is  not  entirely 
appropriate.  In  this  article  Aquinas  makes  a  clear  distinction  between 
how  philosophers  and  theologians  approach  the  study  of  metaphysics,  a 
distinction  which  corresponds  to  the  last  two  divisions  of  the  science  of 
metaphysics  made  in  the  Preface.  This  passage  makes  it  plain  that 
insofar  as  metaphysics  is  done  by  philosophers  its  proper  object  is 
being  qua  being  and  not  God  or  the  Angels. 
But  if  we  are  satisfied  that  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  cannot  be 
God  or  the  Angels,  we  are  still  no  closer  to  answering  our  original 
question.  We  still  need  to  firid  the  proper  object  and  corresponding 
mode  of  abstraction  of  metaphysics.  Only  once  this  is  done  will  we  be 
able  to  unify  the  science  and  clearly  distinguish  It  from  the  others.  But 
far  from  firiding  the  unity  of  metaphysics,  we  now  are  faced  with  the 
prospect  of  metaphysics  being  divided  into  the  three  components  of  first 
philosophy,  metaphysics  p,  roper,  and  theology.  Things  appear  to  have 
taken  a  turn  for  the  worse.  However,  a  close  reading  of  Aquinas  will 
reveal  a)  that  there  is  no  real  difficulty  in  uniting  the  three  branches  of 
metaphysics,  and  b)  that  we  can  find  the  distinct  act  of  the  intellect  by 
which  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  is  obtained  while  doing  justice 
to  the  various  apparently  contradictory  passages.  It  is  also  my 
contention  that  Aquinas'  solution  to  this  problem  is  vital  for  a  proper 
understanding  of  how  his  philosophy  of  science  can  aid  us  in  our  realist 
dispute  in  science. 
Me  Unity  and  Diversity  OfMetaPhYsics 
The  way  out  of  our  present  difficulties  is  to  consider  the  Preface  to 
Aquinas'  commentary  on  Aristotle's  Metaphysics.  This  short  passage  in 
conjunction  with  q.  5,  a.  4  of  De  7Yinitate  provide  the  shape  of  a  solution. 
The  crux  of  the  Preface  is  the  thesis  that  metaphysics  as  a  science  can 
be  divided  into  three  components,  each  of  which  approaches  the  central 
subject  being  qua  being  in  a  different  manner.  That  being  qua  being,  or 200 
being  in  general,  is  the  central  subject  of  metaphysics  is  made  clear  in 
the  following  passage: 
Furthermore,  it  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said  that 
although  this  science  is  concerned  with  the  three  objects 
mentioned,  nevertheless  it  does  not  concern  just  any  one  of 
them  as  its  subject,  but  only  being-in-general.  48 
However,  Aquinas  does  recognise  that  there  is  an  apparent  diversity  of 
intelligible  objects  in  this  one  science;  nevertheless  being-in-general  is 
the  true  subject  of  metaphysics.  What  needs  to  be  clarified  is  how  this 
subject  can  be  treated  in  various  ways. 
Aquinas  opens  his  Preface  by  stating  that  the  highest  science  must 
concern  itself  with  'the  most  intelligible  beings'.  What  'the  most 
intelligible  beings'  actually  are,  of  course,  has  yet  to  be  determined;  he 
is  merely  stipulating  here  what  these  objects  must  be  like  if  they  are  to 
serve  as  the  objects  of  the  highest  science.  Now  as  we  have  progressed 
from  the  natural  sciences  to  mathematics  we  have  travelled  further  and 
further  away  from  the  particuIarising  conditions  of  matter.  So  we  can 
safely  assume  that  the  most  intelligible  beings  will  be  those  at  the 
furthest  remove  from  these  conditions.  If  this  were  not  the  case  there 
would  be  room  for  a  fourth  speculative  science  above  metaphysics  itself. 
But  at  this  point  Aquinas  employs  a  tactic  not  found  in  his  treatment  of 
either  the  natural  sciences  or  mathematics.  He  says  that  'the  most 
intelligible  beings',  whatever  they  are,  can  receive  this  title  according  to 
three  distinct  criteria  or  points  of  view.  An  object  can  be  'the  most 
intelligible',  a)  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  is  that  from  which  the  intellect 
derives  its  certainty;  b)  on  account  of  its  degree  of  universality;  and  c), 
the  criterion  we  are  most  familiar  with,  because  of  its  distance  from  the 
particularising  conditions  of  matter.  The  point  to  emphasise  is  that 
these  distinct  criteria  of  intelligibility  each  provide  a  distinct  perspective 
from  which  to  consider  'the  most  intelligible  beings'.  Aquinas  then 
considers  each  criterion  in  turn  and  assigns  a  proper  object  to  each. 
Thus  when  considering  'the  most  intelligible  beings'  from  the  point  of 
view  of  their  power  to  produce  certainty  in  the  intellect  Aquinas  has  this to  say: 
Clearly,  that  from  which  the  intellect  derives  its  certainty 
seems  to  be  the  more  intelligible  beings.  Consequently,  since 
the  intellect  acquires  certitude  in  science  from  causes,  the 
knowledge  of  causes  seems  to  be  intellectual  in  the  highest 
degree.  It  also  follows  that  the  science  treating  of  first  causes 
seems  to  be  the  supreme  ruler  of  the  others.  49 
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Consequently,  when  'the  most  intelligible  beings'  are  considered  in  this 
light  metaphysics  is  called  Mrst  Philosophy,  and  its  proper  object  is  the 
primary  cause  or  cause  of  aU  things. 
But  when  the  intellect  considers  'the  most  intelligible  beings'  from  the 
point  of  view  of  universality  the  focus  of  metaphysics  changes 
accordingly.  Aquinas  write: 
Second,  'the  most  intelligible  beings'  can  be  understood  by 
comparing  the  intellect  with  the  senses.  Sense  knowledge  is 
of  the  particular,  whereas  the  intellect  seems  to  differ  from  the 
senses  in  that  it  comprehends  universals.  That  science,  then, 
is  supremely  intellectual  that  treats  of  the  most  universal 
principles.  These  are  being  and  the  properties  that 
accompany  being,  such  as  one  and  many,  potency  and  act.  50 
Here  we  fmd  metaphysics  characterised  as  the  study  of  being  qua  being 
and  its  attendant  properties. 
Finally,  one  can  approach  the  most  intelligible  beings  insofar  as  they 
are  at  the  furthest  remove  from  matter: 
Because  a  being  has  the  power  of  intellect  owing  to  Its  freedom 
from  matter,  those  things  must  be  supremely  intelligible  that 
are  most  disengaged  from  matter....  Now  those  things  are 
most  separated  from  matter  that  abstract  not  only  from 
individual  matter  (such  as  natural  forms  understood 
universally,  which  are  the  objects  of  natural  science),  but 
entirely  from  sensible  matter;  and  these  are  separated  from 
matter  not  only  in  thought,  like  the  mathematicals,  but  also  in 
e.  7dstence,  such  as  God  and  the  Intelligences.  Consequently, 
the  science  inquiring  into  these  beings  seems  to  be  most 
intellectual  and  the  director  or  mistress  of  the  rest.  51 202 
Here  we  have  metaphysics  characterised  as  the  study  of  God  and  the 
Angels.  So  far  it  would  seem  that  Aquinas  has  not  helped  his  cause  in 
the  least.  Rather  than  finding  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  he 
seems  to  have  found  a  proper  object  for  three  new  sciences.  And  rather 
than  sticking  to  his  preferred  method  of  division,  i.  e.,  degrees  of 
abstraction,  he  has  introduced  two  new  criteria.  However,  these 
difficulties  can  be  met  by  showing  a)  that  all  three  criteria  in  fact 
produce  three  distinct  perspectives  on  one  and  the  same  intelligible 
object,  and  b),  that  the  criterion  of  abstraction  provides  the  true  subject 
of  this  tripartite  science  which  is  being  qua  being. 
With  these  distinct  approaches  to  the  most  intelligible  objects  in  place, 
Aquinas  proceeds  to  show  how  they  can  all  be  considered  as  presenting 
different  lights  on  the  same  thing,  and  consequently  as  different  aspects 
of  the  same  science.  He  writes: 
Now  this  threefold  consideration  is  not  to  be  attributed  to 
different  sciences  but  to  one.  For  the  abovc-mentioned 
separated  substances  (God  and  the  Intelligences)  are  the 
universal  and  primary  causes  of  being.  What  is  more,  it 
belongs  to  the  same  science  to  investigate  the  proper  causes  of 
any  genus  and  the  genus  itself..  ...  So  it  must  belong  to  the 
same  science  to  investigate  the  separate  substances  and 
being-in-general  (ens  commune),  which  is  the  genus  of  which 
the  above-mentioned  substances  are  the  common  and 
universal  causes.  52 
In  other  words,  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  is  being-in-general  and 
its  attendant  properties.  But  insofar  as  complete  knowledge  of  an 
object  depends  in  part  on  knowledge  of  its  causes,  metaphysics  must 
also  consider  the  separate  substances  in  some  way.  In  first  philosophy 
it  considers  them  as  the  causes  of  the  beings  given  in  sensation;  in 
theology,  they  are  considered  as  beings  in  themselves.  Aquinas  then 
sums  up  his  preface  with  the  following  lines: 
Ibis  science,  then,  is  given  three  names  corresponding  to  the 
three  objects  mentioned  above,  from  which  its  perfection  is 
derived.  It  is  called  divine  science  or  theology  inasmuch  as  it 
treats  of  the  substances  referred  to  above.  It  is  called metaphysics  because  it  considers  being  and  its  attendant 
properties....  And  it  is  called  first  philosophy  inasmuch  as  it 
considers  the  first  causes  of  things.,  53 
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With  metaphysics  unified  in  this  way  we  need  to  consider  the  following 
questions.  First,  how  is  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics,  being  in 
general,  connected  with  the  intellectual  operation  of  abstraction?  And 
second,  what  is  the  epistemological  significance  of  the  fact  that  being- 
in-general  is  gained  through  abstraction  while  the  separate  substances 
as  treated  in  either  first  philosophy  or  theology  are  not?  Let  us  take 
these  in  turn. 
It  is  clear  that  of  the  three  objects  of  metaphysics  only  being-in-general 
can  be  gained  through  a  process  of  abstraction.  The  objects  of  first 
philosophy  and  theology  can  be  ruled  out  for  the  following  reasons.  The 
intellect  comes  to  study  the  first  causes,  or  unmoved  mover,  as  a 
natural  continuation  of  the  study  of  motion  in  physics.  But  the  first 
causes  are  not  abstracted  from  concrete  individuals  because  these 
causes  are  not  sensible.  In  Book  VIII  of  the  Physics  Aristotle  is  led  to 
posit  an  unmoved  first  cause  as  a  means  of  explaining  the  processes  of 
mobile  bodies  noticed  in  physics.  This  process  Is  hardly  similar  to  the 
process  of  abstraction  we  have  been  investigating;  in  fact  we  can 
characterise  this  process  as  an  example  of  the  type  of  thinking  found  in 
the  third  act  of  the  intellect,  namely,  reasoning  from  premises  to  a 
conclusion.  And  as  we  have  seen,  all  forms  of  abstraction  occur  in 
either  the  first  or  second  act  of  the  intellect.  It  is  also  clear  that  God 
and  the  angels  are  not  reached  by  abstractions  in  acts  one  or  two 
because,  as  noted  above,  such  acts  begin  in  sensation,  and  God  and  the 
angels  are  not  sensible  entities.  Consequently  no  process  of  abstraction 
is  involved  in  the  obtaining  of  the  objects  of  either  first  philosophy  or 
theology.  This  result  suits  us  very  well,  for  the  separate  substances  are 
the  cause  of  our  object  of  study,  not  the  ob  ect  of  study  itself.  It  is  j 
fitting,  therefore,  that  they  not  be  obtained  through  abstraction,  for  it  is 
by  a  process  of  abstraction  that  the  proper  object  of  each  science  is 
obtained.  It  remains  to  determine  what  kind  of  abstraction  one  might 
attribute  to  that  branch  of  metaphysics  which  studies  being  in  general. 
And  we  are  encouraged  to  search  for  such  an  abstraction  because 204 
Aquinas  says  that  the  objects  of  this  branch  of  metaphysics  are 
'discovered  by  the  process  of  analysis  as  the  more  universal  is 
discovered  after  the  less  universal',  a  process  reminiscent  of  the 
abstractions  of  natural  science  and  mathematics. 
The  abstraction  peculiar  to  this  branch  of  metaphysics  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  works  of  Aristotle.  In  fact  the  distinction  that  Aquinas 
employs  to  divide  metaphysics  from  the  other  speculative  sciences  is  his 
particular  contribution  to  the  history  of  metaphysics.  54  This  particular 
mode  of  abstraction  occurs  in  the  second  act  whereby  the  intellect 
separates  the  essence  of  x  from  its  act  of  existence,  or  more  precisely, 
Its  act  of  eidstence  from  its  essence.  The  nature  of  this  distinction  Is 
clearer  when  contrasted  with  the  abstractions  of  natural  philosophy  and 
mathematics.  As  said  above,  the  abstractions  of  natural  science  and 
mathematics  occur  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  following  simple 
apprehension.  The  act  of  simple  apprehension  is  that  act  whereby  the 
intellect  grasps  the  nature  of  x.  Now  if  we  had  to  look  for  a  proposition 
the  intellect  could  assent  to  following  simple  apprehension  of  X  such  a 
proposition  would  be,  'x  is  of  such  and  such  a  kind  or  nature.  In  this 
act  the  intellect's  attention  is  focused  entirely  on  the  nature  or  essence 
of  x  and  this  focus  is  manifested  in  the  two  abstractions  that  occur  in 
this  particular  act.  In  the  first  degree  of  abstraction  the  intellect 
disengages  the  nature  of  this  essence  from  the  particular  instantiations 
of  it  (the  abstractio  totius  of  natural  philosophy).  In  the  second  degree  of 
abstraction  the  intellect  disengages  an  accident  of  this  nature,  its  being 
as  subject  to  quantity  (the  abstractioformae  of  mathematics).  Now  what 
distinguishes  metaphysics  from  the  first  two  speculative  sciences  Is  that 
here  the  intellect  focuses  not  on  the  essence  of  x,  or  an  accident  thereof, 
but  on  ; es  act  of  existence,  on  the  fact  that  it  exists.  And  its 
fundamental  point  of  departure  is  not  the  affirmative  judgement,  'x  is 
such  and  so,  but  rather  the  negative  judgement,  'the  essence  of  x  is  not 
its  etxistence'.  (Another  way  to  phrase  this  statement  is  to  say  that 
existence  is  not  part  of  the  essence  or  definition  of  x.  Only  a  self- 
subsistent  or  self-causing  being  would  have  existence  included  in  its 
definition,  for  by  definition  it  would  be  part  of  Its  nature  that  it  exist.  55 
But  since  every  concrete  individual  encountered  in  the  world  of 
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no  concrete  individual  can  be  said  to  possess  its  own  act  of  being,  and 
hence  existence  cannot  be  included  in  its  definition.  )  So  when  the 
intellect  focuses  on  an  object  with  the  perspective  peculiar  to 
metaphysics  it  must: 
depasser  I'ordre  des  essences  materielles,  object  connaturel  de 
la  simple  appr8hension,  et  se  faire  attentive  d  ce  qui  dans  les 
sujets  corporels  offert  d  ses  prises  est  I'acte  des  actes  et  la 
perfection  des  perfections,  I'acte  d'e--dster.  56 
'Ibis  operation  produces  another  intelligible  object,  viz.,  being-in- 
general,  and  those  properties  of  an  individual  that  it  has  in  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  it  e)dsts.  These  properties  are  called  the  Transcendentals. 
They  include  being,  substance,  accident,  actuality,  potentiality,  truth, 
goodness,  unity,  and  form  the  subject  matter  of  metaphysics. 
But  if  the  Transcendentals  are  gained  through  abstraction  in  this  way 
we  are  left  with  an  obvious  question.  In  what  sense  can  the 
Transcendentals  be  said  to  be  strictly  separable?  Surely  we  cannot 
have  an  act  of  eidstence  and  Its  attendant  properties  without  there 
being  some  essence  to  exist  as  the  subject  of  this  act.  In  other  words, 
one  may  be  able  to  abstract.;  es  act  of  existence  from  its  essence  in  the 
order  of  the  understanding,  but  we  are  surely  not  going  to  find  it 
separated  from  its  essence  in  the  order  of  being.  This  would  amount  to 
saying  that  there  could  be  action  and  activity  without  an  actor,  a  verb 
without  a  subject.  Now  it  is  clear  that  the  separate  substances  are 
'separated'  in  a  strict  sense,  they  exist  apart  from  matter  in  the  order  of 
being;  but  we  have  already  seen  that  these  cannot  be  gained  through 
any  process  similar  to  abstraction.  So  we  must  ask  why  Aquinas  insists 
on  calling  this  third  intellectual  operation  a  'separation'  rather  than  a 
third  degree  of  abstraction.  57  The  answer  to  this  question  lies  In 
distinguishing  between  a  strong  and  a  weak  sense  of  separation,  and  on 
the  insistence  that  the  TranscendentaIs  are  not  entities  but  predicables 
(aspects  of  entities). 
As  we  have  said,  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  is  being-in-general. 
Now  it  is  for  precisely  this  reason  that  to  achieve  this  object  the  intellect 
must  abstract  entirely,  in  some  sense,  from  concrete  individuals. 206 
Because  metaphysics  studies  being-in-general,  it  cannot  restrict  itself  to 
studying  material  individuals  alone  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  world 
may  contain  entities  that  are  not  material.  In  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
studies  of  motion  in  physics  have  led  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  to  posit  the 
existence  of  at  least  one  such  entity.  In  order  to  maintain  its  generality, 
then,  metaphysics  must  find  intelligible  objects  that  are  true  of  any 
existing  entity,  material  or  otherwise.  Now  this  is  precisely  the  defming 
feature  of  the  Transcendentals:  they  are  true  of  any  entity  whatsoever 
simply  because  they  accompany  any  x  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  exists. 
The  angels,  for  example,  insofar  as  they  exist,  are  one,  good,  subject  to 
the  distinction  between  potency  and  actuality,  etc..  as  are  all  concrete 
material  individuals.  So  we  can  say  that  the  Transcendentals  are 
'separable'  in  this  weak  sense:  although  the  Transcendentals  are 
discovered  by  analysis  of  material  individuals,  nonetheless  they  can  be 
predicated  without  error  of  non-material  entities  (should  they  exist).  In 
effect,  the  intellect  has  found  some  aspect  of  the  material  world  that  can 
be  'separated'  from  it  and  applied  to  the  immaterial  realm  as  well.  This 
is  possible  because  the  Transcendentals  are  not  entities  in  their  own 
right,  but  aspects  of  all  entities  insofar  as  they  exist.  58 
Now  the  weak  sense  in  which  the  Transcendentals  are  separable  is 
contrasted  with  the  strong  sense  in  which  God  and  the  angels  are 
separate  from  matter.  God  and  the  angels  cannot  exist  in  matter  in  any 
sense  whatsoever  because,  unlike  the  Transcendentals  which  are 
predicables,  they  are  entities  in  their  own  right,  and  immaterial  at  that. 
Aquinas  is  getting  at  this  distinction  when  he  summarises  in  a  dense 
passage  the  distinction  between  God  and  the  angels,  the 
Transcendentals  and  the  mathematicals: 
Something  can  exist  separate  from  matter  and  motion  in  two 
distinct  ways:  First,  because  by  Its  nature  the  thing  that  Is 
called  separate  in  no  way  can  exist  in  matter  and  motion,  as 
God  and  the  angels  are  said  to  be  separate  from  matter  and 
motion.  Second,  because  by  its  nature  it  does  not  exist  in 
matter  and  motion;  but  it  can  exist  without  them,  though  we 
sometimes  find  it  with  them.  In  this  way  being,  substance, 
potency,  and  act  are  separate  from  matter  and  motion, 
because  they  do  not  depend  on  them  for  their  existence, 
unlike  the  objects  of  mathematics,  which  can  only  exist  in 207 
matter,  though  they  can  be  understood  without  sensible 
matter.  59 
So  we  can  say  with  Aquinas  that  God  and  the  angels  are  strongly 
separated  from  matter;  the  Transcendentals  are  weakly  separated  from 
matter  (abstracted  in  the  second  act  of  the  intellect);  the  mathematicals 
are  not  separable  at  all,  but  abstracted  In  the  first  act  of  the  intellect 
(from  sensible  and  individual  intelligible  matter);  and  the  objects  of 
natural  science  are  also  abstracted  in  the  first  act  but  to  a  lower  degree 
(from  individual  sensible  matter). 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  Transcendentals  are  only  weakly  separable, 
they  are  nonetheless  separable  in  a  sense  that  the  intelligible  objects  of 
natural  science  and  mathematics  are  not.  The  abstractions  of  natural 
science  and  mathematics  produce  intelligible  objects  that  express  the 
essence  of  material  individuals,  or  those  features  they  have  by  virtue  of 
being  extended  in  space.  Consequently  it  cannot  be  said  that  these 
objects  could  in  any  way  be  seen  to  apply  to  immaterial  substances;  yet 
those  aspects  of  material  entities  they  have  in  virtue  of  existing,  their 
Transcendental  features,  do  apply  to  immaterial  substances.  So  there 
is  a  sense  in  which  the  objects  of  metaphysics  are  'separable',  and 
hence  distinct  from  the  objects  of  natural  science  and  mathematics.  In 
Thomist  terminology  this  distinction  is  expressed  in  terms  of  dependent 
existence,  rather  than  predication.  As  we  have  seen,  Aquinas  says  the 
objects  of  natural  science  and  mathematics  cannot  exist  without 
matter,  whereas  those  of  metaphysics  can,  this  distinction  being 
signalled  by  saying  the  objects  of  the  first  two  sciences  are  'abstracted' 
while  those  of  metaphysics  are  'separated'.  But  there  Is  no  conflict 
here,  simply  a  difference  in  expression.  For  we  can  say  with  Aquinas 
that  if  there  were  no  material  individuals,  the  objects  of  natural  science 
and  mathematics  would  also  cease  to  exist;  on  the  other  hand  the 
objects  of  metaphysics,  the  Transcendentals,  could  still  exist  as  aspects 
of  immaterial  entities  should  they  continue  to  exist.  Nevertheless  I 
prefer  to  refer  to  this  third  operation  of  the  intellect  as  'abstraction  in 
the  second  act  of  the  intellect',  as  opposed  to  'the  third  degree  of 
abstraction'  or  the  'first  separation'.  To  speak  of  'three  degrees  of 
abstraction'  can  mask  or  obscure  the  fact  that  the  abstraction  of 208 
metaphysics  is  significantly  different  from  that  of  the  natural  sciences 
or  mathematics.  To  speak  of  'separation',  however,  gives  the  misleading 
impression  that  the  operation  of  the  intellect  in  metaphysics  is  quite 
unlike  those  of  natural  science  and  mathematics.  It  also  gives  the 
erroneous  impression  that  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  Is  God  and 
the  Angels.  To  speak  of  two  abstractions  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect 
and  one  abstraction  in  the  second  does  justice  to  the  points  Aquinas 
wishes  to  make  without  being  misleading. 
We  can  now  turn  to  the  second  of  our  questions:  why  is  it  significant 
that  the  proper  object  of  metaphysics  is  gained  via  abstraction  in  the 
second  act  of  the  intellect  while  the  objects  of  first  philosophy  and 
theology  are  not?  The  simple  answer  is  because  of  the  Aristotelian- 
Thomist  commitment  to  empiricism.  If  metaphysics  is  to  be  a 
speculative  science  it  must  be  grounded  in  data  received  in  sensation. 
Because  the  objects  of  first  philosophy  and  theology  are  not  the 
products  of  abstraction,  they  are  not  grounded  in  sensation  in  the  sense 
attributable  to  the  Transcendentals  -  for  the  Transcendentals  are 
discovered  by  analysis  of  objects  given  in  sensation.  Consequently,  the 
branches  of  first  philosophy  and  theology  are  qualitatively  different  from 
the  study  of  Transcendentals.  This  qualitative  distinction  is  clearly 
recognised  by  Aquinas,  and  he  marks  this  difference  by  separating  the 
approach  of  the  philosopher  from  that  of  the  theologian  in  the  study  of 
metaphysics.  It  can  be  said  that  the  philosopher  studies  those 
intelligible  objects  that  are  weakly  separable,  i.  e.,  the  proper  object  of 
metaphysics,  viz.,  being  in  general  and  its  attendant  properties.  And 
since  the  philosopher  posits  a  separate  substance  as  a  necessary 
hypothesis  of  his  physical  studies,  it  can  be  said  that  he  studies  the 
separate  substances  qua  cause  or  principle  of  the  proper  object  of 
metaphysics,  the  act  of  e.  -dstence  of  the  entities  given  in  sensation.  But 
only  the  theologian  studies  the  separate  substances  as  beings  in  their 
own  right.  Aquinas  makes  this  perfectly  clear  in  the  following  terms: 
..  .-  because  these  divine  beings  [the  separate  substances]  are 
the  principles  of  all  things  and  are  complete  natures  in 
themselves,  they  can  be  studied  in  two  ways:  first,  insofar  as 
they  are  the  common  principles  of  all  things,  and  second, 
insofar  as  they  are  beings  in  their  own  right.  But  even  though these  first  principles  are  most  evident  in  themselves,  our 
intellect  regards  them  as  the  eye  of  an  owl  does  the  light  of  the 
sun,  as  the  Metaphysics  says.  We  can  reach  them  by  the  light 
of  natural  reason  only  to  the  extent  that  their  effects  reveal 
them  to  us....  Philosophers,  then,  study  these  divine  beings 
only  insofar  as  they  are  the  principles  of  all  things. 
Consequently,  they  are  the  objects  of  the  science  that 
investigates  what  is  conunon  to  all  beings,  which  has  for  its 
subject  being  as  being.  60 
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In  other  words,  the  philosopher  is  confined  to  the  study  the  empirically 
observable  effects  of  the  separate  substances.  This  is  in  keeping  with 
the  commitment  to  empiricism.  Aquinas  then  states  how  the 
theologians  approach  the  separate  substances: 
There  is,  however,  another  way  of  knowing  beings  of  this  kind, 
not  as  their  effects  reveal  them,  but  as  they  reveal  themselves. 
The  Apostle  mentions  this  way  in  his  Mrst  Epistle  to  the 
Corinthians:  "So  the  things  also  that  are  of  God  no  man 
knoweth,  but  the  Spirit  of  God.  Now  we  have  received  not  the 
spirit  of  this  world,  but  the  Spirit  that  is  of  God,  that  we  may 
understand.,  '61 
There  is  no  mistaking  this  approach  as  that  of  the  philosopher.  And  to 
underline  this  fact  Aquinas  makes  it  explicit: 
Accordingly,  there  are  two  kinds  of  theology.  There  is  one  that 
treats  of  divine  things,  not  as  the  subject  of  the  science  but  as 
the  principles  of  the  subject.  This  is  the  kind  of  theology 
pursued  by  the  philosophers  and  that  is  also  called 
metaphysics.  There  is  another  theology,  however,  that 
investigates  divine  things  for  their  own  sakes  as  the  subject  of 
the  science.  This  is  the  theology  taught  in  Sacred 
Scripture.  62 
This  is  the  reason  for  the  importance  of  tying  the  objects  of  metaphysics 
to  the  intellectual  operation  of  abstraction.  Were  the  intellect  not  able 
to  disengage  being-in-general  and  the  Transcendentals  from  material 
objects  given  in  sensation,  metaphysics  could  not  be  a  science.  As  it  is, 
the  speculative  sciences  must  confine  themselves  to  studying  the  effects 
of  the  separate  substances,  the  material  entities  given  in  sensation. 
Any  study  of  the  separate  substances  themselves  and  any  knowledge 210 
gained  in  such  efforts  must  be  qualitatively  different  from  those  of  the 
speculative  sciences. 
Our  conclusion  then  is  that  metaphysics  Is  in  fact  one  science  in  the 
sense  that  it  has  a  single  proper  object,  being  in  general  and  its 
attendant  properties.  So  we  have  finally  identified  the  three  speculative 
sciences,  their  proper  abstraction,  their  corresponding  proper 
intelligible  objects,  and  shown  how  all  can  be  derived  from  the  initial 
sensory  data  of  material  entities.  But  given  that  knowledge  of  the  proper 
object  of  any  science  depends  in  part  upon  knowledge  of  its  causes,  the 
metaphysician  will  naturally  be  interested  in  the  cause  of  being-In- 
general.  But  the  fact  that  the  cause  of  being-in-general  for  both 
Aristotle  and  Aquinas  is  an  immaterial  entity  introduces  an 
epistemological  rupture  within  this  single  science.  In  this  sense  the 
branches  of  metaphysics  are  qualitatively  different  from  an 
epistemological  point  of  view.  The  consequences  of  this  rupture  will  be 
the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. 
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The  Cognitive  Status  of  Natural  Science  and  Theology 
In  the  last  chapter  our  attention  was  focused  on  the  divisions  of  the 
speculative  sciences.  This  involved  a  prolonged  study  of  how  their 
respective  intelligible  objects  are  derived  from  the  data  of  concrete 
individuals  by  the  intellectual  operation  of  abstraction.  Now  we  are  In  a 
position  to  examine  in  detail  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the 
epistemological  rupture  found  within  the  single  science  of  metaphysics. 
In  particular  we  will  be  interested  in  how  this  rupture  effects  the 
cognitive  status  of  the  theories  developed  in  natural  science  and  that 
branch  of  metaphysics  known  as  theology.  Mathematics  and  the  study 
of  being-in-general  (which  for  convenience  I  will  refer  to  as  'metaphysics 
proper',  as  opposed  to  'first  philosophy'  or  'theology')  are  no  longer 
central  to  our  concerns  and  will  not  be  examined  further.  Mathematics 
and  metaphysics  proper  are,  of  course,  crucial  to  the  proper 
understanding  of  natural  science  and  theology  insofar  as  they  are  a  part 
of  the  intellectual  context  in  which  the  latter  are  found.  And  the  science 
of  metaphysics  proper  has  the  added  significance  of  being  the  source  of 
the  common  principles  used  in  all  of  the  sciences.  However,  neither  of 
these  sciences  is  crucial  to  our  debate  in  the  realist  dispute  in  science 
because  the  intelligible  objects  of  mathematics  and  metaphysics  proper 
differ  only  in  degree  from  those  of  natural  science.  While  there  are 
important  differences  between  them,  the  intelligible  objects  of  natural 
science,  mathematics  and  metaphysics  proper  are  nonetheless  all 
products  of  abstractions  from  concrete  individuals.  Our  interest  in 
theology  stems  from  the  fact  that  its  intelligible  objects  are  not  obtained 
in  this  way.  Consequently,  there  is  a  difference  in  kind  between  the 
objects  of  theology  and  those  of  the  other  sciences.  And  given  that  we 
are  concerned  with  the  realist  dispute  in  science,  as  opposed  to 
mathematics  or  metaphysics,  we  can  proceed  by  considering  the  nature 
and  consequences  of  the  epistemological  rupture  with  reference  to 
natural  science  and  theology  alone. 
77ie  Epistemological  Rupture  in  Metaphysics 
The  epistemological  rupture  noted  in  our  study  of  the  science  of 
metaphysics  has  already  brought  to  our  attention  the  existence  of 
qualitatively  distinct  intelligible  objects  of  study,  viz.,  those  gained  via  a 217 
process  of  abstraction,  and  those  which  are  not.  What  needs  to  be 
established  now  is  that  those  objects  obtained  via  abstraction  enjoy  a 
particular  cognitive  status  and  are  investigated  in  a  manner  radically 
unlike  those  not  obtained  via  abstraction.  We  need  to  know  why 
intelligible  objects  not  reached  through  a  process  of  abstraction  need  to 
be  treated  differently  from  those  that  are.  A  closer  examination  of  the 
notion  of  scientific  knowledge  employed  by  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  as 
defined  in  the  Posterior  Analytics  will  throw  light  on  this  matter. 
Finally,  we  can  consider  some  concrete  examples  of  these  principles  at 
work.  Aquinas'  treatment  of  God,  angels  and  certain  problems  in 
physics  and  cosmology  will  provide  instructive  test  cases  in  this  regard. 
It  is  not  difficult  to  establish  that  the  qualitative  difference  in  intelligible 
objects  noticed  in  our  study  of  the  divisions  of  the  speculative  sciences 
is  accompanied  by  significant  differences  in  methodology  and  cognitive 
status.  We  are  constantly  reminded  throughout  Aristotle's  works  and 
Aquinas'  commentaries  that  different  objects  of  study  require  different 
treatment  and  different  standards  of  proof.  In  De  Caelo  for  example  we 
are  told  that 
perceptible  things  require  perceptible  principles,  eternal 
things  eternal  principles,  corruptible  things  corruptible 
principles;  and,  in  general,  every  subject  matter  principles 
homogeneous  with  itself.  1 
The  need  to  choose  principles  and  methods  appropriate  to  one's  subject 
matter  is  emphasised  by  Aquinas  in  the  De  TYInitate.  He  writes: 
...  they  are  in  error  who  try  to  proceed  in  the  same  way  in 
these  three  parts  of  the  speculative  sciences.  2 
And  in  case  there  could  be  any  misunderstanding  of  the  importance  laid 
on  the  principle  of  methodological  pluralism  we  are  told  in  no  uncertain 
terms  that 
...  it  Is  the  mark  of  an  educated  man  to  look  for  precision  In 
each  class  of  things  just  so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  subject 
admits;  it  is  evidently  equally  foolish  to  accept  probable 
reasoning  from  a  mathematician  and  to  demand  from  a 
rhetorician  scientific  proofs.  3 
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the  nature  of  the  subject  matter  is  exemplified  in  passages  throughout 
Aristotle's  corpus.  One  such  passage  is  worth  considering  closely.  In 
On  Meteorology  Aristotle  begins  a  discussion  concerning  comets  by 
stating  at  the  outset  what  sort  of  proof  is  to  be  expected  in  this 
particular  area.  Aquinas'  commentary  on  this  passage  is  particularly 
revealing  and  can  be  taken  as  a  brief  encapsulation  of  the  nature  and 
consequences  of  the  epistemological  divide  as  manifested  in  the 
speculative  sciences.  Indeed  the  rest  of  this  chapter  can  be  seen  as  an 
extended  exposition  of  this  passage  since  it  contains  in  germ  all  the 
significant  characteristics  of  the  Aristotello-Thomist  approach  to  the 
sciences.  The  following  is  Aquinas'  commentary: 
...  he  [Aristotle]  explains  the  t3rpe  of  certitude  to  be  sought  in 
this  matter  and  says  that  with  respect  to  such  things,  not 
accessible  to  sense  observation,  one  must  not  look  for  a 
certain  and  necessary  demonstration,  as  found  in 
mathematics  and  in  the  phenomena  accessible  to  sense.  It  Is 
enough  to  demonstrate  with  an  argument  and  present  a 
cause,  in  such  a  way  as  to  solve  the  problem  with  some 
possible  solution  from  which  nothing  impossible  follows, 
according  to  what  here  appears  to  sense.  4 
What  is  made  perfectly  clear  from  the  above  passages  is  that  the  first 
order  of  business  when  starting  any  Inquiry  Is  to  determine  what 
principles,  methods  and  expectations  are  appropriate  to  the  object  of 
study.  And  of  particular  interest  to  us  is  the  recognition  of  what  I  will 
call  two  distinct  'realms'  within  the  sciences.  There  is  one  realm 
comprised  of  individuals  accessible  to  sense  observation  about  which 
necessary  demonstrations  are  at  least  theoretically  possible.  And  there 
is  another  realm  comprised  of  individuals  not  accessible  to  sense 
observation  about  which  one  can  only  hope  to  formulate  'possible 
solutions'.  In  the  terminology  of  Part  1,  we  would  say  there  is  a  realm 
about  which  statements  and  theories  can  be  formulated  which  are 
candidates  for  a  realist  interpretation,  and  another  about  which  we  can 
formulate  theories  for  which  we  can  never  legitimately  claim  more  than 
Empirical  Adequacy.  And  rather  than  employing  the  'sensible'/'non- 
sensible'  dichotomy,  we  speak  of  tenns  which  cross  translation 
determinately  and  those  that  do  not.  It  is  worth  noting  that  for  Aristotle 
and  Aquinas  the  difference  between  these  two  realms  in  terms  of  one's 
cognitive  expectations  is  great  enough  that,  strictly  speaking,  the  term 
'science'  cannot  be  used  in  both  realms  without  qualification.  In  fact 219 
there  can  be  'science'  of  those  entities  not  accessible  to  sense 
observation  in  only  a  qualified  sense  (in  the  sense  that  they  too  can  be 
the  object  of  rational  inquiry  of  a  sort)  because  our  theories  of  such 
things  always  fall  short  of  the  certainty  required  of  scientific  knowledge. 
Aquinas  writes: 
...  the  ultimate  end  that  rational  inquiry  ought  to  reach  Is  the 
understanding  of  principles,  in  which  we  resolve  our 
judgements.  And  when  this  takes  place,  It  is  not  called  a 
rational  procedure  or  proof  but  a  demonstration.  Sometimes, 
however,  mtional  inquiry  cannot  arrive  at  the  ultimate  end, 
but  stops  in  the  course  of  the  investigation  Itself,  that  is  to 
say,  when  several  possible  solutions  still  remain  open  to  the 
investigator.  This  happens  when  we  proceed  by  means  of 
probable  arguments,  which  by  their  nature  produce  opinion  or 
belief,  but  not  science.  5 
Given  that  there  are  two  distinct  realms  within  the  Aristotello-Thomist 
framework,  one  accessible  to  sense  observation  and  one  not,  we  now 
need  to  determine  why  this  difference  should  so  decisively  determine 
one's  cognitive  expectations.  We  know  that  the  difference  has 
something  to  do  with  the  operation  of  abstraction;  but  this  is  just  the 
beginning  of  an  answer.  The  complete  answer  to  this  question  lies  in 
the  nature  of  scientific  knowledge  as  understood  by  Aristotle  and 
Aquinas,  and  begins  with  the  recognition  that  the  goal  of  science  is  not 
the  collection  of  facts  about  the  world,  but  the  collection  of  reasoned 
facts.  It  is  an  important  start  to  be  able  to  say  that  something  is  such 
and  so;  but  science  in  the  Aristotelio-lbomist  sense  is  obtained  only 
when  the  investigator  can  explain  why  something  is  such  and  so.  As 
Aristotle  and  Aquinas  repeatedly  say,  science  is  knowledge  per 
causan-L6  One  only  knows  x  scientifically  when  one  knows  the  causes 
of  ; es  necessarily  being  as  it  is.  This  emphasis  on  the  reasoned  fact  as 
the  goal  of  science  is  reflected  in  the  opening  chapter  of  the  second  book 
of  the  Posterior  Analytics  where  Aristotle  lists  the  four  questions  an 
investigator  asks  about  any  given  x.  The  investigator  asks,  i)  an  est?  - 
does  x  exist?,  ii)  quid  est?  -  what  is  X?,  iii)  quid?  -  is  it  the  case  that  y 
can  be  predicated  of  W,  and  iv)  propter  quid?  -  why  does  x  possess 
property  y?  7  When  the  investigator  is  able  to  formulate  answers  to 
these  questions  about  x  (especially  ii  and  iv)  he  can  be  said  to  know  x 
scientifically. 
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fact  for  our  purposes  becomes  clear  when  one  realises  what  is  required 
in  order  to  produce  a  'reasoned  fact.  The  demonstrative  syllogism  is 
the  key  to  Aristotle's  understanding  of  scientific  knowledge  as  presented 
in  the  Posterior  Analytics,  because  the  conclusions  of  such  syllogisms 
are  the  reasoned  facts  which  are  the  goal  of  science.  But  in  order  to  be 
able  to  explain  why  property  y  necessarily  belongs  to  x  (a  demonstration 
propter  quid)  one  needs  to  be  able  to  connect  Y  to  x  via  the  definition  of  x 
in  order  to  show  that  the  nature  of  x  is  such  that  it  cannot  be  without  y. 
Consequently  the  success  of  the  scientific  project  outlined  in  the 
Posterior  Analytics  (which  outlines  what  a  completed  science  will  look 
like)  depends  upon  the  investigator's  ability  to  arrive  at  definitions  of  his 
chosen  intelligible  object.  This  search  for  definitions  is  in  fact  the 
central  activity  of  the  investigator,  especially  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
inquiry.  8  Once  definitions  are  found  one  can  begin  the  process  of 
presenting  one's  conclusions  in  the  form  of  an  axiomatic-deductive 
system  as  outlined  in  the  Posterior  Analytics.  9 
How  definitions  are  obtained  by  the  investigator  cannot  be  studied  in 
full  here.  There  are  certain  criteria  that  a  successful  definition  must 
meet,  and  Aristotle  provides  a  long  series  of  tests  one  can  apply  to 
suggested  definitions.  10  But  there  are  no  illusions  about  the  difficulty 
of  the  task.  In  fact  Aquinas  states  that  a  final  definition  of  intelligible 
objects  of  the  natural  sciences  is  not  achievable  in  most  cases.  11 
Nonetheless,  there  remains  a  significant  epistemological  difference 
between  intelligible  objects  obtained  via  abstraction  from  concrete 
individuals  and  those  which  are  not.  Individuals  accessible  to  sense 
observation  are  those  about  which  the  intellect  can  achieve  at  least  a 
vague  and  rudimentary  understanding  once  some  experience  is  had  of 
them  and  the  operation  of  abstraction  has  been  performed.  From  this 
humble  beginning  the  investigator  can  then  work  towards  a  more 
precise,  scientific  definition  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  entity. 
As  McMahon  writes,  "the  starting  point"  of  any  investigation  "is  a 
general  and  confused  knowledge  which  by  a  process  of  concretion 
approaches  the  particular  and  the  distinct";  and  "it  is  natural  that  we 
have  at  least  a  confused  idea  of  the  meaning  of  a  word  before  we  can 
give  a  strict  definition  of  it.  -12  This  advancement  from  general, 
rudimentary  definitions  to  specific  and  more  sophisticated  ones  is 
reminiscent  of  Putnam's  distinction  between  stereot3Tic  definitions  of 
terms  as  used  and  understood  by  laymen,  and  the  definitions  of  the 221 
same  terms  used  by  experts.  13  The  rudimentary  definitions  of  laymen 
are  not  strictly  speaking  incorrect;  they  simply  do  not  reflect  the 
essence  of  the  intelligible  object  as  completely  and  as  precisely  as  the 
more  strict  definition  of  the  expert.  As  Gilby  writes,  ".  ..  the  knowledge 
of  any  particular  material  being  is  progressive  from  most  general 
Whatnesses'  to  more  and  more  specific  notes  as  experience  uncovers 
new  facets.  .  .  ',  14  The  key  point  for  us  Is  that  each  improvement  on  the 
definition  of  an  intelligible  object  makes  the  definition  more  complete; 
improvements  do  not  lead  to  radically  new  definitions  of  intelligible 
objects  by  over-turning  or  rejecting  key  components  of  a  previous 
definition.  In  this  way  our  knowledge  of  these  intelligible  objects  is 
genuinely  accumulative  or  progressive. 
Although  this  progression  from  rudimentary  deflnitions  to  strict 
scientific  definitions  is  arduous,  it  is  not  impossible  in  principle.  But  as 
will  be  shown  in  detail  below,  what  is  impossible  is  the  attainment  of  a 
ýftnition  of  an  individual  of  which  one  cannot  achieve  even  a  scientiflc  de 
rudimentary  deftnition  to  start  with  by  means  of  abstraction.  Why  this  is 
so  will  be  discussed  presently.  For  the  moment  it  Is  important  that  the 
significance  of  this  point  be  recognised.  Since  individuals  not  accessible 
to  sense  observation  cannot  be  strictly  defined,  they  cannot  be  known 
scientifically  in  the  Aristotello-lbomist  sense.  15  As  will  be  shown 
below,  the  best  we  can  hope  to  achieve  concerning  non-sensible 
individuals  is  a  demonstration  of  their  existence  (answering  the  first 
question:  an  est?  ).  But  since  we  can  never  know  what  x  is  since  we  can 
never  know  its  essence  as  expressed  in  a  strict  definition,  no  propter 
quid  demonstration  can  be  formulated.  The  result  is  that  there  can  be 
no  completed  science  in  the  sense  outlined  in  the  Posterior  Analytics  of 
non-sensible  individuals.  The  upshot  of  this  is  that  such  entities  must 
be  approached  in  a  different  manner  and  with  different  cognitive 
expectations. 
7he  Investigation  of  'Non-Sensible'Individuals 
So  how  one  is  to  proceed  in  an  investigation  of  non-sensible  entities?  In 
all  cases  of  investigation  in  the  speculative  sciences  the  goal  of  the 
Aristotelio-Thomist  is  the  achievement  of  an  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  the  object  of  study.  What  distinguishes  one  realm  from 222 
another  is  the  extent  to  which  the  goal  is  achievable  in  toto.  Now,  in 
accordance  with  his  commitment  to  empiricism,  Aquinas  states  that  the 
intellect  can  come  to  know  something  of  x  in  two  ways  -  either  directly 
through  the  form  of  x  itself,  or  from  a  form  of  something  similar  to  x,  as 
a  cause  is  known  through  the  likeness  of  its  effect.  16  Now  In  the  case 
of  non-sensible  individuals  the  intellect  is  unable  to  know  them  directly 
through  its  form  because  forms  are  known  directly  only  when 
abstracted  by  the  agent  intellect  from  concrete  individuals  accessible  to 
sense  observation.  Consequently,  the  intellect  has  no  alternative  but  to 
infer  the  nature  of  a  non-sensible  individual  from  the  nature  of  its 
sensible  effects.  This  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the 
investigation  of  non-sensible  entities.  This  immediately  raises  the 
question  concerning  the  extent  to  which  the  nature  of  a  non-sensible 
cause  can  be  known  from  its  sensible  effects  alone.  Aquinas' 
considered  opinion  is  that  from  sensible  effects  with  no  sensible  cause, 
one  can  infer  that  a  non-sensible  cause  exists  -  the  operating 
assumptions  being  a)  that  all  effects  have  a  cause,  not  just  ones  for 
which  a  sensible  cause  has  been  found,  and  b)  that  esse  is  not  percipi. 
But,  as  will  be  examined  shortly,  Aquinas  maintains  that  sensible 
effects  do  not  adequately  reveal  the  nature  of  their  non-sensible  causes. 
Such  investigations  are  therefore  incomplete  with  respect  to  the  four 
scientific  questions  identified  in  the  Posterior  Analytics.  Before 
discussing  this  thesis  in  detail  it  would  be  helpful  to  consider  an 
example  from  natural  science  illustrating  how  sensible  effects  can  be 
used  to  demonstrate  that  a  cause  exists.  Then  we  can  focus  our 
attention  on  the  notion  of  the  'adequacy'  of  effect  to  cause,  and  thereby 
illustrate  why  propter  quid  demonstrations  cannot  be  had  of  causes 
from  their  sensible  effects  alone. 
The  first  question  an  investigator  must  ask  when  embarking  on  any 
investigation  is  whether  his  chosen  object  of  study  actually  exists.  17 
The  Aristotelio-Thomist  procedure  is  to  establish  first  that  the 
theoretical  entity  can  be  said  to  exist,  and  only  then  to  begin  to 
investigate  its  nature.  This  insistence  on  the  proper  order  of 
investigation  is  based  on  the  principle  that  only  actual  existing 
individuals  have  a  nature  which  can  be  known.  Chimera,  like  all 
imaginary  entities,  cannot  be  known  in  a  scientific  manner  simply 
because  there  is  no  nature  or  essence  to  come  to  know.  18 
Nevertheless,  the  investigator  must  have  some  idea  of  the  nature  of  the 223 
theoretical  entity  whose  existence  is  in  question  in  order  to  conceive  of 
it  and  postulate  its  existence  at  all.  This  poses  a  problem  of  circularity. 
In  order  to  establish  that  x  has  a  nature  which  can  be  studied  the 
investigator  must  know  that  x  actually  exists:  but  in  order  to  establish 
that  x  exists  he  must  first  know  something  of  x  in  order  to  recognise  an 
actual  x  should  he  come  across  one. 
This  problem  is  easily  over-come.  When  faced  with  the  task  of  proving 
that  thunder  exists  (to  take  a  time  honoured  example)  there  is  no  need 
for  the  investigator  to  know  the  nature  or  essence  of  thunder  as 
expressed  in  a  strict  scientific  definition.  In  fact  nothing  of  thunder's 
essential  nature  need  be  known.  It  is  enough  that  there  be  some 
accident  or  effect  associated  with  thunder.  For  example.  part  of  the 
meaning  of  'thunder'  is  that  it  is  the  cause  of  certain  sensible  effects, 
viz.,  noise  in  the  clouds.  As  Aquinas  says: 
...  there  are  descriptions  of  a  thing  other  than  its  definition. 
They  are  either  descriptions  which  explain  what  the  word 
signifies,  or  descriptions  of  the  thing  itself,  which  differ  from 
the  definition.  They  do  not  signify  what  a  thing  is,  as  the 
definition  does,  but  perhaps  some  accident  of  it.  19 
The  investigator  can  then  use  these  accidents  or  effects  as  the  middle 
term  in  a  demonstrative  syllogism  with  the  conclusion  that  thunder 
exists2O: 
1)  Thunder  is  the  cause  of  noise  in  the  clouds. 
2)  Noise  in  the  clouds  exists 
3)  Thunder  e.  )dsts. 
Such  a  demonstration  provides  an  answer  to  the  question,  'an  est?  '. 
And  we  can  now  say  we  know  that  thunder  exists,  i.  e.,  we  have  a 
demonstration  quia.  The  middle  term  in  this  case,  far  from  being  a 
definition  of  thunder,  expresses  what  Aquinas  calls  the  sign!  ftcatio 
nominis  or  the  nominal  definition  of  entity  whose  existence  is  in 
question.  By  following  this  procedure  the  investigator  can  begin  his 
study  with  only  'accidental'  knowledge  of  thunder's  existence;  yet  he  has 
established  that  thunder  exists  by  noting  the  occurrence  of  particular 
noises  in  the  clouds,  for  his  object  of  study  is  none  other  than  the  cause 
of  noise  in  the  clouds. 224 
Although  the  investigator  can  now  proceed  with  his  Investigation  of 
thunder  confident  that  his  object  of  study  does  exist,  and  hence  has  a 
nature  to  be  known,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  'cause  of  noise  in  the 
clouds'  Is  not  the  definition  of  thunder.  It  still  remains  to  determine 
what  thunder  actually  is  in  Itself  It  then  becomes  a  matter  of  some 
importance  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  nature  of  thunder  can  be 
safely  inferred  from  the  nature  of  its  sensible  effects.  We  can  now 
consider  what  Aquinas  held  to  be  the  case  in  such  matters  by  focusing 
on  the  distinction  between  'adequate'  and  'inadequate'  effects. 
Effects,  says  Aquinas,  can  be  divided  into  two  categories.  There  are 
effects  which  are  'equal'  to,  or  'adequate'  to,  the  power  of  their  cause, 
and  those  which  are  not.  21  The  import  of  this  distinction  is  the 
following:  In  De  Trinitate,  q.  1,  a.  2,  Aquinas  maintains  that  the  essence 
of  a  cause  can  be  known  'completely'  or  'perfectly'  through  those  of  its 
effects  which  are  adequate  to  it.  On  the  other  hand,  when  effects  are 
not  adequate  to  their  cause  nothing  can  be  inferred  regarding  the 
nature  of  the  cause  despite  the  fact  that  its  existence  is  established.  22 
But  this  is  precisely  the  situation  in  which  our  investigator  finds  himself 
once  he  has  established  that  thunder  exists  by  noting  the  existence  of 
an  accident  of  thunder,  viz.,  noise  in  the  clouds.  Accordingly  Aquinas 
can  say  that: 
As  often  as  we  have  accidental  knowledge  that  the  thing 
exists,  we  must  be  in  a  wholly  negative  state  as  regards 
awareness  of  its  essential  nature....  Thus  it  follows  that  the 
degree  of  our  knowledge  of  a  thing's  essential  nature  is 
determined  by  the  sense  in  which  we  are  aware  that  it 
exists.  23 
'Accidental  knowledge'  that  something  exists  gleaned  from  noting  its 
sensible  effects  tells  us  nothing  about  the  essential  nature  of  the  thing 
in  question  because  accidental  effects  are  not  'adequate'  to  their  cause. 
But  what  makes  one  effect  adequate  and  another  inadequate  with 
respect  to  its  cause?  In  q.  45,  a.  7  of  the  Sununa  7heologiae  Aquinas 
states  that  some  effects  reveal  the  nature  of  their  cause  because  they 
actually  reproduce  the  form  of  the  cause,  as  a  child  reproduces  the  form 
of  the  parent,  while  other  effects  can  only  signffy  the  presence  of  a 
cause,  as  smoke  indicates  fire.  24  Again  in  q.  13.  a.  5  Aquinas  speaks  of 
effects  which  'receive  the  similitude  of  the  cause,  'in  its  full  degree'. 
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degree  adequately  reveal  the  nature  of  that  cause  -  otherwise  they  do 
not.  25  This  distinction  is  similar  to  that  drawn  In  De  Generatione  et 
CorTuptione  where  Aquinas  distinguishes  between  pairs  of  causes  and 
effects  which  share  a  common  form  and  pairs  which  do  not,  the 
distinction  being  between  causes  and  effects  which  are  essentially 
related  and  causes  and  effects  related  only  accidentally.  26  With  this 
notion  of  adequacy  in  mind  we  can  see  why  noting  the  existence  of 
noise  in  the  clouds  can  tell  us  that  thunder  exists,  but  not  what 
thunder  is  in  itself.  There  is  no  formal  identity  between  thunder  and 
sound,  and  consequently  sound  cannot  adequately  reveal  the  nature  of 
thunder.  But  we  can  also  see  why  the  sensible  effects  of  a  non-sensible 
cause  will  never  be  adequate  to  their  cause;  for  if  the  effect  itself  is 
sensible  while  its  cause  is  not,  then  cause  and  effect  do  not  share  the 
same  form.  if  x  and  y  have  the  same  form,  i.  e.  are  the  same  sort  of 
thing,  then  both  will  either  be  accessible  to  sense  observation,  or  both 
will  not  be  accessible  to  sense  observation  -  but  it  is  not  possible  that 
one  member  of  a  kind  be  accessible  to  sense  observation  while  another 
of  the  same  kind  is  not.  The  relationship  of  sensibility  to  materiality, 
and  non-sensibility  to  immateriality  is  maintained  throughout  Aquinas' 
commentaries  on  Aristotle's  scientific  works:  if  x  is  material,  then  x  is  in 
principle  accessible  to  sense  observation  (and  vice  versa);  if  x  is 
immaterial,  then  x  is  in  principle  not  accessible  to  sense  observation 
(and  vice  versa).  27  But  there  is  no  natural  kind  some  of  whose 
members  are  corporeal  while  others  are  incorporeal.  Now  if  the  cause 
and  the  effect  do  not  share  the  same  form,  then  the  effect  is  related  to 
the  cause  only  accidentally,  and  can  reveal  nothing  of  the  cause's 
essential  nature. 
This  understanding  of  adequacy  is  at  work  in  Aquinas'  treatment  of  our 
knowledge  of  those  entities  not  accessible  to  sense  observation,  namely, 
God  and  the  angels.  In  the  first  question  of  the  De  THnitate  Aquinas 
deals  with  the  question  concerning  the  extent  to  which  the  human 
intellect-  can  know  God  in  this  life.  This  question  is  raised  in  the 
context  of  a  general  discussion  on  the  Trinity,  and  in  particular  on  the 
matter  of  whether  or  not  the  intellect  can  established  anything  in  this 
area,  or  whether  the  Trinity  must  be  accepted  as  an  article  of  faith. 
Aquinas'  position  in  the  end  is  that  while  the  intellect  can  know  that 
God  exists,  nothing  can  be  known  of  his  nature,  and  a  fortiori  that 
nothing  can  be  known  in  a  scientific  manner  of  the  Trinity.  That  God  is 226 
Three  in  One  remains  an  article  of  faith  which  is  beyond  the  abilities  of 
the  intellect  to  establish  scientifically.  28  Why  Aquinas  Is  driven  to  this 
conclusion  is  explained  in  the  second  article  of  the  flrst  question  where 
he  introduces  the  notion  of  'adequacy'.  Now  Aquinas  maintains  in  this 
article  and  elsewhere  that  none  of  God's  effects  are  'adequate'  to  their 
creator,  and  that  consequently  nothing  can  be  known  of  God's  nature 
by  the  Intellect  in  this  life.  29  Indeed,  the  point  of  departure  of  any 
discussion  of  God's  nature  must  be  that  he  is  radically  other  than  his 
effects.  In  a  sense  his  effects  do  provide  some  negative  indication  of 
what'God  is  like;  for  whatever  God  is,  he  is  not  like  anything  we  know. 
Now  It  is  of  some  considerable  importance  that  we  understand  why 
God's  effects  are  Inadequate  to  reveal  his  nature.  Some  may  be  tempted 
to  argue  that  God's  effects  are  Inadequate  because  of  the  lack  of 
ontological  proportion  which  obtains  between  created  effects  and  the 
Creator.  This  unbridgable  gulf  between  the  ontological  status  of  the 
Creator,  who  exists  necessarily  and  from  all  eternity,  and  all  creatures, 
whose  being  is  dependent  upon  the  Creator,  radically  contingent  and 
finite,  is  surely  enough  to  explain  why  created  effects  are  not  adequate 
to  reveal  the  nature  of  their  cause.  The  ontological  status  of  a  cause 
and  its  effect  might  then  quite  naturally  be  taken  to  be  an  important 
factor  in  determining  whether  an  effect  is  'adequate'  to  its  cause.  In 
particular,  it  might  be  thought  that  while  no  creature  could  ever 
adequately  reflect  the  nature  of  the  Creator,  this  would  not  rule  out  the 
possibility  that  creatures  might  adequately  reflect  the  nature  of  other 
creatures.  It  could  then  be  maintained  that  the  effects  of  non-sensible 
but  created  entities  may  be  adequate  to  their  causes  given  that  the 
ontological  gulf  between  Creator  and  created  does  not  obtain.  'Mis  view 
gains  some  support  from  the  fact  that  Aquinas  clearly  states  that  the 
ontological  gulf  between  the  Creator  and  his  creation  is  greater  than  the 
gulf  existing  between  any  one  created  entity  and  another.  30 
Now  it  is  undeniable  that  the  inadequacy  of  created  effects  with  respect 
to  the  Creator  is  due  to  a  lack  of  ontological  proportion.  However,  this 
is  not  to  say  that  other  non-sensible  but  created  entities  might  be 
completely  knowable  despite  the  fact  that  they  are  not  accessible  to 
sense  observation.  For  even  if  one  were  to  accept  that  ontological 
proportion  of  creature  to  creature  were  a  determining  factor  of 
adequacy,  one  could  still  argue  that  there  remains  a  significant 227 
ontological  gulf  between  the  non-sensible  but  created  entities  and  their 
sensible  effects  given  that  angels  are  wholly  immaterial  while  their 
sensible  effects  will  be  observed  in  and  on  concrete  material  individuals. 
Consequently,  one  could  maintain  that  all  non-sensible  entities 
ontologically  transcend  their  sensible  effects,  not  just  God,  and  that 
therefore  all  sensible  effects  will  be  inadequate  with  respect  to  any  non- 
sensible  entity.  And  this  is  in  fact  what  Aquinas  maintains,  as  is  clear 
from  q.  12,  a.  2  of  the  Summa  7heologiae.  "By  the  likeness  of  a  body  the 
essence  of  an  incorporeal  thing  cannot  be  known.  "  But  given  Aquinas' 
remarks  about  adequate  effects  revealing  the  nature  of  their  cause  by 
reproducing  the  form  of  the  cause,  one  ought  to  say  that  ontological 
proportion  of  cause  and  effect  is  a  necessary  condition  of  adequacy  of 
effect  to  cause;  but  this  now  holds  as  a  matter  of  course  since  causes 
and  effects  which  are  essentially  related  obviously  have  the  same  status 
in  the  hierarchy  of  being.  So  ontological  proportion  is  no  longer  a 
sufficient  condition  given  that  adequacy  requires  the  further  condition 
that  cause  and  effect  be  identical  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  form, 
and  not  merely  that  both  cause  and  effect  be  creatures  (as  the  example 
of  fire  and  smoke  indicates). 
'Ibis  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  'adequate'  is  more  intuitively 
plausible  and  is  in  much  better  accord  with  the  spirit  of  Thomist 
empiricism.  But  it  would  be  well  to  establishes  this  beyond  doubt 
because  of  the  significance  of  the  point  at  issue.  For  if  Aquinas' 
treatment  of  God  Is  to  be  generalisable  in  any  way,  it  must  be  clear  that 
God  is  not  entirely  unique  from  an  epistemological  point  of  view.  For  if 
God's  nature  cannot  be  known  solely  on  the  grounds  that  no  created 
effect  is  adequate  to  an  uncreated  entity,  then  Aquinas'  investigations  in 
natural  theology  would  shed  no  light  on  our  problem  In  the  realist 
dispute  in  science  -  for  we  are  not  concerned  with  investigating  the 
nature  of  an  uncreated  entity.  But  God  is  not  unique  insofar  as  his 
nature  cannot  be  known  via  his  sensible  effects;  for  all  immaterial,  non- 
sensible  entities  have  this  feature  in  common.  Any  entity  which  is  not 
accessible  to  sense  observation  will  pose  a  common  set  of  problems 
from  the  point  of  view  of  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science,  whether  that 
entity  be  God,  the  angels,  or  sub-atomic  particles.  Let  us  take  the  time 
then  to  review  why  the  adequacy  of  an  effect  to  its  cause  cannot  be 
simply  a  function  their  being  ontologically  proportional,  but  rather  a 
function  of  their  formal  identity. 228 
The  first  reason  for  asserting  that  the  adequacy  of  an  effect  to  Its  cause 
depends  upon  the  identity  of  their  forms  rather  than  on  their  being 
merely  ontologically  proportional  is  the  fact  that  in  the  second  article  of 
the  first  question  of  De  Trinitate  Aquinas  says  one  can  know  the  nature 
of  a  cause  'completely'  and  'perfectly'  from  its  effects  if  they  are 
adequate.  Now  it  would  be  particularly  surprising  if  adequacy  were 
merely  a  matter  of  ontological  proportion  given  the  fact  that  Aquinas 
points  out  that  complete  knowledge  of  sensible  concrete  individuals  of 
which  one  has  direct  experience  Is  itself  not  always  attainable.  31  It 
seems  odd  then  to  think  that  one  could  have  perfect  knowledge  of  an 
object  of  which  one  never  has  any  direct  sensory  experience.  The 
relationship  between  sensory  data  and  knowledge  is  made  clear  in 
passages  where  Aristotle  says  explicitly  that  knowledge  of  certain 
sensible  entities  is  difficult  to  come  by  if  few  of  their  accidents  fall  under 
our  senses32.  Aquinas  echoes  this  In  a  passage  from  the  Summa 
Contra  Gentiles: 
...  the  intellect  can  scarcely  reach  perfect  knowledge  of  a 
lower  nature,  even  in  the  case  of  those  natures  whose 
accidents  it  comprehends  perfectly  through  the  sense.  Much 
less  will  the  intellect  arrive  at  comprehending  the  natures  of 
those  things  of  which  we  grasp  few  accidents  by  sense;  and  it 
will  do  so  even  less  in  the  case  of  those  things  whose 
accidents  cannot  be  grasped  by  the  senses,  though  they  may 
be  perceived  through  certain  deficient  effects.  33 
This  passage  states  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  our  level  of  knowledge  of 
an  entity  decreases  as  the  number  of  its  accidents  accessible  to  sense 
observation  decreases,  and  that  our  knowledge  Is  poorest  of  those 
entities  perceived  only  'through  certain  deficient  effects'.  Now  non- 
sensible  entities  are  only  'perceived'  through  their  effects;  consequently 
we  can  expect  our  knowledge  of  them  to  be  anything  but  'complete'. 
And  we  have  already  seen  that: 
The  degree  of  our  knowledge  of  a  thing's  nature  is  determined 
by  the  sense  in  which  we  are  aware  that  it  exists.  34 
In  the  same  place  Aristotle  also  says  that  as  long  as  we  have  only 
accidental  knowledge  that  a  thing  exists,  which  is  precisely  how  we 
know  that  a  non-sensible  cause  exists, we  must  be  in  a  wholly  negative  state  as  regards  awareness  of 
its  essential  nature.  35 
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However,  these  passages  fit  perfectly  with  the  view  that  the  adequacy  of 
an  effect  to  Its  cause  depends  on  the  identity  of  their  forms.  There  is  no 
need  to  make  inferences  concerning  the  form  of  the  parent  from  an 
effect  which  is  essentially  related  (in  this  case  a  child)  because  the 
forms  of  both  are  identical:  to  know  the  form  of  the  one  is  to  know  the 
form  of  the  other. 
A  second  reason  for  denying  that  adequacy  is  a  matter  of  ontological 
proportion  alone  is  that  Aquinas  himself  points  out  that  safely  inferring 
the  nature  of  a  cause  from  its  sensible  effects  alone  is  impossible. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  difficulty  is  precisely  that  causes  and 
effects  need  not  be  essentially  related.  36  When  one  posits  a  cause 
which  is  in  principle  not  accessible  to  sense  observation  in  order  to 
account  for  a  sensible  effect,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  cause  and 
effect  are  related  essentially;  indeed,  the  very  fact  that  one  Is  sensible 
and  other  is  not  is  enough  to  establish  that  the  cause  and  effect  are  not 
essentially,  but  only  accidentally,  related.  Aquinas  also  points  out  in 
Sununa  Theologiae,  q.  32,  a.  1,  that  he  is  fully  aware  of  the  general 
difficulty  we  have  referred  to  as  the  under  determination  of  theory  by 
data.  Since  many  explanations  can  be  formulated  to  account  for  an 
effect  which  are  internally  consistent  and  empirically  adequate.  one  is 
unable  to  determine  with  any  certainty  which  causal  explanation 
holds.  37  These  difficulties  on  their  own  are  enough  to  make  it  evident 
that  the  adequacy  of  effect  to  cause  cannot  be  simply  a  matter  of 
ontological  proportion. 
There  are  two  more  difficulties  worth  mentioning.  At  the  beginning  of 
this  discussion  we  pointed  out  that  if  'adequacy'were  merely  a  matter  of 
ontological  proportionality,  it  would  be  possible  to  assume  that  the 
intellect  could  come  to  know  the  nature  of  angels  in  themselves  (given 
that  the  ontological  gulf  between  Creator  and  creature  does  not  apply). 
However,  as,  is  clear  from  the  De  Trinitate  and  the  Treatise  on  Separate 
Substances,  Aquinas  does  not  think  the  investigation  of  the  nature  of 
angels  is  within  the  purview  of  the  philosopher.  Their  e--dstence  is 
posited  for  theoretical  reasons  (to  account  for  the  movement  of  the 
spheres,  and  to  occupy  a  particular  level  in  the  Great  Chain  of  Being) 230 
and  because  they  are  mentioned  in  the  scriptures.  But  all  reliable 
'knowledge'  concerning  the  nature  of  angels  is  derived  from  the 
scriptures  and  is  the  special  province  of  the  theologian.  38  And  finally 
we  can  ask  why  Aquinas  would  agree  that  theories  regarding  those 
things  not  accessible  to  sense  observation  should  be  limited  to  being 
only  'possible  solutions'.  If  effects  do  adequately  reveal  the  nature  of 
their  causes  if  they  are  ontologically  proportional,  it  would  be 
appropriate  to  assume  that  certainty  in  this  realm  should  be  possible  at 
least  in  principle.  But  this  is  clearly  not  what  either  Aristotle  or 
Aquinas  maintain.  It  is  quite  obvious  how  the  alternative  inter-pretation 
of  adequacy  avoids  these  difficulties  and  fits  nicely  with  the  rest  of  the 
Thomist  commitments.  But  if  an  effect  adequately  reveals  the  nature  of 
its  cause  only  when  the  pair  are  essentially  related,  the  unavoidable 
conclusion  is  that  our  intellect  can  know  nothing  of  the  essential  nature 
of  entities  not  accessible  to  sense  observation. 
So  how  is  one  to  proceed  in  areas  where  one  must  work  only  from 
knowledge  of  effects  to  knowledge  of  their  cause?  What  can  one  hope  to 
accomplish?  From  the  foregoing  discussion  it  is  clear  that  In  such 
situations  our  cognitive  expectations  must  be  severely  limited.  But  one 
can  establish  the  existence  of  theoretical  entities  by  using  their  sensible 
effects  as  the  middle  term  of  demonstrations  quia,  as  we  saw  in  the  case 
of  thunder.  This  approach  is  exemplified  in  Aquinas'  five  proofs  for  the 
existence  of  God.  Although  there  is  much  debate  concerning  the  correct 
manner  in  which  these  proofs  ought  to  be  interpreted,  it  is  not 
controversial  to  say  that  Aquinas  takes  the  signfficatio  nomints  of  God  to 
be  'the  creator  and  sustainer  of  the  world'.  and  that  the  proofs  are 
meant  to  establish  God's  existence  by  drawing  attention  to  the  alleged 
effects  of  such  an  entity  found  in  the  realm  of  experience.  However. 
once  the  existence  of  a  hidden  cause  is  established,  one's  theories  about 
the  nature  of  such  entities  can  be  defended,  but  never  established 
conclusively.  As  stated  in  the  passage  quoted  above  from  the 
Meteorologicorum,  39  one  can  only  hope  to  show  that  one's  theory  is  a 
'possible  solution'  or  explanation  of  the  particular  effects  in  question. 
The  defence  of  one's  theory  concerning  entities  not  accessible  to  sense 
observation  is  then  conducted  on  three  levels.  First,  one  must  show 
that  one's  own  theory  is  not  impossible,  i.  e.,  that  it  is  internally 231 
consistent  and  empirically  adequate.  This  procedure  holds  good  in  both 
the  physical  sciences40  and  in  theological  matters.  41  Conversely,  one 
can  attempt  to  show  that  competing  theories  are  untenable  without 
some  further  modification  either  because  they  are  Internally 
inconsistent  or  because  they  are  not  empirically  adequate.  This  is  often 
the  mode  of  procedure  used  by  Aristotle  to  reject  scientific  theories.  42 
Finally,  one  can  attempt  to  show  that  competing  theories  or  claims  are 
notforced  by  the  available  evidence,  and  consequently  do  not  have  the 
status  of  a  ratio  sufficiens.  Ibis  procedure  is  perhaps  most  clearly 
exemplified  in  Aquinas'  discussion  of  the  arguments  for  and  against  the 
eternity  of  the  world.  In  De  Aeternitate  Mundi  he  shows  that  the  alleged 
proofs  for  the  eternity  of  the  world  put  forward  by  the  Latin  Averroeists 
are  not  conclusive,  while  the  proofs  for  the  creation  of  the  world  in  time 
put  forwarded  by  Bonavenature  are  plainly  unacceptable.  43  The 
advantage  gained  by  this  procedure  Is  that  one  can  chose  to  accept 
one's  own  theory  on  these  matters,  provided  they  meet  the  criteria  of 
internal  consistency  and  empirical  adequacy. 
There  are  a  number  of  serious  errors  which  must  be  assiduously 
avoided,  all  arising  from  the  failure  to  recognise  the  cognitive  standard 
applicable  to  a-theory  or  statement.  First,  one  must  avoid  using 
statements  or  theories  which  are  at  best  empirically  adequate  as 
premises  of  an  argument  the  conclusion  of  which  one  is  claiming  to 
have  established  conclusively.  Aquinas  shows  that  he  is  aware  of  this 
practical  point  when  he  discusses  how  one  is  to  argue  with  secular 
philosophers  or  with  people  of  another  faith.  44  This  is  a  simple  point 
arising  out  of  the  nature  of  argumentation:  one  cannot  use  as  premises 
statements  which  your  interlocutor  does  not  grant,  for  premises  must 
always  be  more  certain  than  the  conclusion  which  follows  from  them. 
In  fact  Aquinas  is  adamant  that  his  fellow  Christians  must  follow  this 
rule  if  they  are  to  avoid  bringing  their  faith  into  disrepute  amongst 
unbelievers.  The  converse  of  this  rule  is  that  one  must  not  accept  a 
theory  or  statement  because  it  Is  empirically  adequate  if  it  is  of  the  sort 
for  which  a  ratio  sufficiens  ought  to  be  expected.  Finally,  one  must  not 
look  for  or  expect  a  ratio  sufficiens  for  all  statements  and  theories.  As 
Aquinas  writes  of  theories  concerning  the  spiritual  substances: 
It  is  idle  to  urge  that  we  may  yet  establish  a  theory  properly 
devoted  to  them  though  hitherto  it  has  not  been  discovered. 
For  so  long  as  we  work  with  the  scientific  principles  accessible to  us,  all  of  which  depend  on  knowledge  acquired  from 
material  phenomena,  complete  spiritual  understanding  is 
bound  to  escape  us.  45 
Aquinas  backs  this  up  with  the  following  remark: 
To  strive  for  an  end  that  cannot  be  secured  is  futile,  and  the 
hope  of  satisfaction  there  is  illusory.  46 
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These  remarks  are  simply  consequences  of  the  principle  of 
methodological  pluralism  stated  at  the  outset  of  this  chapter.  One  must 
recognise  the  nature  of  the  subject  matter  under  discussion  and  adjust 
one's  cognitive  attitude  to  suit  the  occasion.  Failure  to  do  this  is  the 
mark  of  the  uneducated  bungler. 
This  concludes  our  study  of  the  intellectual  apparatus  employed  in 
Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science.  We  have  seen  that  all  the  speculative 
sciences  from  natural  science  (physics)  through  to  metaphysics  proper 
are  derived  from  analysis  of  concrete  material  individuals,  precisely 
those  objects  whose  linguistic  counter-parts  cross  translation 
determinately.  We  have  also  seen  how  a  branch  of  metaphysics 
(theology)  is  epistemically  distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  sciences.  This 
concluding  chapter  has  examined  the  nature  and  consequences  of  this 
epistemological  rupture  for  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science.  We  can  now 
return  to  the  realist  dispute  in  science  and  consider  how  Aquinas' 
intellectual  apparatus  can  help  In  our  attempt  to  reconcile  our  realist 
and  anti-realist  tendencies  by  focusing  on  the  analogies  between  his 
project  and  our  own. 
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namely  deduction  and  induction.  Now,  in  order  to  demonstrate  one  needs  universals 
which  serve  as  definitions  one's  subject  terms.  Induction,  on  the  other  hand, 
requires  sense  experience  of  particulars.  But  one  cannot  grasp  universals  except 
through  induction.  And,  as  already  noted,  induction  is  possible  only  through  sense 
experience  of  particulars.  Consequently,  if  one  does  not  have  direct  sensory 
werience  of  Y_  scientift  knowlege  of  x  is  impossible. 
I  Dicendum  quod  dupliciter  aliqua  res  cognoscitur.  Uno  modo  per  formam 
propriam,  sicut  oculus  videt  lapidem  per  speciem  lapidis.  Allo  modo  per  formam 
alterius  similem.  sibi,  sicut  cognoscitur  causa  per  similitudinem  effectus  et  homo  per 
formam  suae  imaginis.  De  Trinitate,  q.  1  a.  2. 
17  The  question  'what  is  itT  follows  on  from  the  question  'does  it  existT  Quia 
quaestio  quid  est,  sequitur  as  quaestionem  an  est.  Sununa  77ieologiae,  q.  2.  a.  2,  ad  2. 
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'does  it  exist?  '.  is  prior  to  the  question,  'what  is  it?  '  Unde  quaestio,  an  est,  praecedit 
quaestionem,  quid  -est.  In  Posteriorum  AnalyticonHn.  L.  1.1.11.  n.  17.  English 
translation  by  Christopher  Martin. 
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something  that  does  not  eicist  is...  it  is  impossible  to  know  what  [a]  goat-stag  is, 
because  it  is  nothing  in  reality.  Quia  enim  non  entis  non  est  ahqua  quidditas  vel 
essentia,  de  eo  quod  non  est,  nullus  potest  scire  quod  quid  est...  impossible  est  scire 
quod  quid  est  hircocervi,  quia  nihil  est  tale  in  rerum.  natura.  In  Postertorum 
Alialyticorurn,  L.  11,1.  vi,  n.  46  1.  English  translation  by  Christopher  Martin. 
19  Invenitur  autem  aliqua  alla  ratio  rei  praeter  definitionem:  quae  quidem  vel  est  ratio 
expositiva  significationis  nominis,  vel  est  ratio  Ipsius  rei  nominatae.  altera  tamen  a 
definitione,  quia  non  signiflcat  quid  est,  sicut  definitio,  sed  forte  aliquod  accidens.  In 
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nominis  and  a  proper  deflnition  of  X. 
20  When  a  cause  Is  being  proved  by  means  of  its  effect,  we  have  to  use  the  effect  in 
the  place  of  the  definition  of  the  cause,  in  order  to  prove  that  the  cause  exists. 
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deflnitionis  causae,  ad  probandum  causam  esse.  Sununa  77ieologiae,  q.  2.  a.  2.  ad  2. 
English  translation  by  C.  Martin. 
21  Now  effects  are  of  two  kinds.  One  is  equal  to  the  power  of  its  cause.  and  through 
an  effect  of  this  sort  the  power  -  and  consequently  the  essence  -  of  the  cause  is  fully 
known.  The  other  effect  falls  short  of  the  above-mentioned  equality,  and  through 
such  an  effect  the  powers  of  the  agent  cannot  be  fully  grasped  and  consequently 
neither  can  its  essence:  we  only  know  that  the  cause  exists.  Effectus  autem  est 
duplex:  quidam,  qui  adaequatur  virtuti  suae  causae,  et  per  talem  effectum, 
cognoscitur  plenarie  virtus  causae.  et  per  consequens  quiditas  ipsius.  alius  effectus 
est,  qui  deficit  a  praedicta  aequalitate,  et  per  talem,  effectum  non  potest  comprehendi 
virtus  agentis  et  per  consequens  nec  essentia  eius;  sed  cognoscitur  tantum.  de  causa 
uod  est.  De  Trinitate,  q.  1.  a.  2.  English  translation  by  Maurer. 
2See  last  line  of  note  23.  and  De  Trinitate,  q.  6.  a.  4.  ad  2. 
23  Decit  quod  illa  de  quibus  scimus  quia  sunt  per  aliquod  accidens  ipsorum,  nullo 
modo  per  hoc  se  habent  ad  hoc  quod  cognoscamus  de  ipsis  quid  est.  ...  Unde 
manifestum  est  quod  sicut  nos  habemus  ad  cognoscendum.  quia  est  aliquod,  ita  nos 
habemus  ad  cognoscendu  quid  est.  In  Posteriorwn  Analyticorwri,  L.  11,1.  vii,  n.  476. 
English  translation  by  F.  R.  Larcher.  Now  effects  are  of  two  kinds.  One  is  equal  to  the 
power  of  its  cause,  and  through  an  effect  of  this  sort  the  power  -  and  consequently 
the  essence  -  of  the  cause  is  fully  known.  The  other  effect  falls  short  of  the  above- 
mentioned  equality.  and  through  such  an  effect  the  powers  of  the  agent  cannot  be 
fully  grasped  and  consequently  neither  can  its  essence:  we  only  know  that  the  cause 
exists.  Effectus  autem  est  duplex:  quidam,  qui  adaequatur  virtutt  suae  causae,  et  per 
talem,  effectum  cognoscitur  plenarie  virtus  causae.  et  per  consequens  quiditas  Ipsius; 
alius  effectus  est,  qui  deficit  a  praedicta  aequalitate,  et  per  talem  effectum  non  potest 235 
comprehendi  virtus  agentis  et  per  consequens  nec  essentia  elus;  sed  cognoscitur 
tanturn  de  causa  quod  est.  De  Trinitate,  q.  1,  a.  2.  English  translation  by  Maurer. 
24  Dicendum  quod  omnis  effectus  aliqualiter  repraesentat  suam  causam,  sed 
diversimode.  Nam  aliquis  effectus  repraesentat  solam  causalitatern  causae,  non 
autem  formarn  eius,  sicut  fumus  repraesentat  Ignem;  et  talis  repraesentatio  dicitur 
esse  repraesentatio  vestigii;  vestigium  enim  demonstrat  motum  aliculus  transeuntis, 
sed  non  qualis  sit.  Aliquis  autern  effectus  repraesentat  causarn  quantum  ad 
similitudinern  fonnae  eius,  sicut  Ignis  generatus  ignem  generatern...  ;  et  haec  est 
re  raesentatio  imaginis.  Sununa  Theologiae,  q.  45,  a.  7. 
2TQuia  omnis  effectus  non  adaequans  virtutem  causae  agentis  recipit  similitudinern 
agentis,  non  secundum  eamdern  rationem,  sed  deficienter.  Surnma  7heologiae,  q.  13, 
a.  5. 
26  In  his  commentary  on'De  Generation  et  Corruptione  ,  L.  1,1.  xill,  n.  94,  Aquinas 
notes  that  while  every  thing  is  caused  by  something  else,  causes  and  effects  need  not 
be  in  the  same  genus  or  species.  'Mat  which  Is  generated  has  to  be  generated  by 
some  agent  in  act  which  is  either  'homogeneos'  i.  e.,  of  one  form  or  species...  or  else  it 
is  required  at  least  that  something  be  generated  by  something  existing  in  act,  or  by 
the  action  of  something  existing  in  act,  even  though  the  agent  be  not  akin  to  the  thing 
generated  in  genus  or  species,  as  when  something  hard  Is  generated  by  something 
not  hard  -  for  example,  when  milk  is  solidifled  by  fire.  '  Oportet  etiam  quod  Id  quod 
generatur,  generetur  ab  aliquo  agente  ente  in  actu  aut  hornogeneos,  idest  quod  sit 
saltem  unius  generis,  aut  homoideos,  idest  quod  sit  saltem  unius  formae  vel  spectei  .. 
.  aut  oportet  quod  saltem  ab  alIquo  actu  existente,  sive  ab  actione  alicuius  actu 
e.  Nistentis,  aliquod  generetur,  etiam  si  generans  non  sit  simile  generato  in  genere  seu 
specie,  sicut  durum  generatur  a  non  duro,  puta  cum  lac  induratur  per  ignem.  When 
cause  and  effect  share  the  same  form  they  are  related  per  se-,  if  their  forms  are  not 
identical  they  are  only  related  per  accidens.  English  translation  by  Larcher  and 
Conway. 
27  This  point  is  made  clear  in  the  following  passage:  It  is  impossible  for  God  to  be 
seen  by  the  sense  of  sight,  or  by  any  other  sense  or  power  of  the  sensitive  part  of  the 
soul.  For  every  such  power  is  the  act  of  a  corporeal  organ  ....  Now  act  Is 
proportioned  to  the  being  whose  act  it  Is.  Hence  no  power  of  that  kind  can  go  beyond 
corporeal  things.  But  God  is  incorporeal,  as  was  shown  above.  Hence,  He  cannot  be 
seen  by  the  sense  or  the  imagination,  but  only  by  the  intellect.  Dicendum  Quod 
impossibile  est  Deum  videri  sensu  visus,  vel  quocumque  allo  sensu  aut  potentia, 
sensitivae  partis.  Omnis  enim  potentia  huiusmodi  est  actus  corporalis  organi  .... 
Actus  autem  proportionatur  ei  culuc  est  actus.  Unde  nulla  hulusmodi  potentia 
potest  se  extendere  ultra  corporalia.  Deus  autem  incorporeus  est,  ut  supra  ostensum 
est.  Unde  nec  sensu,  nec  imaginatione  videri  potest,  sed  solo  intellectu.  Summa 
Theologiae,  q.  12,  a.  3.  English  translation  by  Pegis. 
28  There  are  some  truths  which  do  not  come  within  the  range  of  these  principles  (i.  e. 
the  power  of  the  agent  intellect)  ... 
like  the  truths  of  the  faith,  which  transcend  the 
faculty  of  reason.  Quaedam  vero  sunt  ad  quae  praedicta  principia  non  se  extendunt, 
sicut  sunt  ea  quae  sunt  fidet.  De  Rinitate,  q.  1,  a.  1.  English  translation  by  Larcher 
and  Conway.  In  fact  to  know  anything  in  this  domain  requires  divine  inspiration: 
The  human  mind  cannot  know  these  without  being  divinely  illumined  by  a  new  light 
supplementing  the  natural  light.  Et  haec  cognoscere  mens  humana  non  potest,  nisi 
divinitus  novo  lumine  illustretur  superaddito  lumini  naturaft.  This  position  Is 
repeated  in  q.  12,  a.  5  of  the  Surnma  Theologiae:  when  any  created  intellect  sees  the 
essence  of  God,  the  essence  of  God  itself  becomes  the  intelligible  form  of  the  intellect. 
Hence  it  Is  necessary  that  some  supernatural  disposition  should  be  added  to  the 
intellect  in  order  that  it  may  be  raised  up  to  such  a  great  height.  Cum  autem  aliquis 
intellectus  creatus  videt  Deum  per  essentiam,  Ipsa  essentia  Dei  fit  forma  intelligibilis 
intellectus.  Unde  oportet  quod  aliqua  dispositio  supernaturalis  ei  superaddatur,  ad 
hoc  quod  elevetur  in  tanturn  sublimitatem.  English  translation  by  Anton  Pegis  in  his 
Introduction  to  St.  77wmas  Aquinas. 
29 
'*. 
by  the  likeness  of  the  inferior  order  of  things,  the  superlor  can  in  no  way  be 
known;  as  by  the  likeness  of  a  body  the  essence  of  an  incorporeal  thing  cannot  be 
known.  Much  less  therefore  can  the  essence  of  God  be  seen  through  any  created 236 
species  whatever.  Per  similitudines  Inferiorts  ordinis  rerum  nullo  modo  superiora 
possunt  cognosci:  sicut  per  speciern  corporis  non  potest  cognosci  essentia,  rei 
incorporeae.  Multo  igitur  minus  per  speciern  creatam  quamcumque  potest  essentia 
Del  videri.  Surnma  Theologiae,  q.  12,  a.  2.  English  translation  by  Pegis. 
30  God  is  more  distant  from  creatures  than  any  creatures  are  from  each  other.  Deus 
plus  distat  a  creaturis  quarn  quaecumque  creaturae  ab  invicem.  Surnma  Theologiae, 
13,  a.  5.  English  translation  by  Pegis. 
See  footnote  note  9. 
32  See  De  Caelo  et  Mundo,  11.1.  iv,  n  332. 
33  Intellectus  vix  per  hulusmodi  exteriora  potest  ad  perfectarn  notitiam,  inferioris 
naturae  pervenire,  etiam  illarum  rerum  quarurn  accidentia  sensu  perfecte 
comprehendit.  Multo  igitur  minus  pertingere  poterit  ad  comprehendendurn  naturas 
illarurn  rerurn  quarum  pauca  accidentia  capimus  sensu;  et  adhuc  minus  illorum 
quorum  accidentia  sensu  capi  non  possunt,  etsi  per  quosdam  deficientes  effectus 
percipiantur.  Sumnia  Contra  Gentiles,  IV,  cap.  1.  n.  3340.  English  translation  by 
Pegis,  Anderson,  Bourke  and  O'Neal,  in  7he  Pocket  Aquinas,  p.  318-319. 
34  Posterior  Analytics,  Book  II,  ch.  8.93a,  27-28.  In  The  Basics  Works  ofAristotle. 
35  Posterior  Analytics,  Book  II,  ch.  8.93a,  24-26.  In  77ie  Basics  Works  ofArtstotle. 
36  See  footnote  note  26. 
37  The  other  [type  of  explanation]  lays  down  an  hypothesis  and  shows  that  the 
observed  effects  are  in  accord  with  the  supposition,  as  when  astronomy  employs  a 
system  of  eccentrics  and  epicycles  to  justify  our  observations  about  the  motions  of 
the  heavenly  bodies.  It  does  not  carry  complete  conviction,  because  other  hypotheses 
might  also  serve.  Alio  modo  induciter  ratio.  non  quae  sufficienter  probet  radicem,  sed 
quae  radici  iam.  positae  ostendat  congruere  consequentes  effectus,  sicut  in  astrologia 
ponitur  ratio  excentricorum  et  epicyclorum  ex  hoc  quod,  hac  positione  facta.  possunt 
salvari  apparentia.  sensiblia  circa  motus  caelestes.  Non  tamen  ratio  haec  est 
sufficienter  probans,  quia  forte  etiam  alia  positione  facta.  salvart  possent.  English 
translation  by  GiIby.  Aquinas  also  writes  that,  "From  an  effect,  which  can  proceed 
from  several  causes,  one  of  them  cannot  be  concluded.  "  Nam  ab  effectu,  qui  a 
pluribus  causis  procedere  potest,  non  potest  una  illarurn  concludi.  In  Posteriorurn 
Analyticorurn,  L.  1,1.  xxift,  n.  199.  English  by  Larcher. 
38  See  footnotes  60  and  61  of  the  previous  chapter  for  the  passages  from  the  De 
71rinitate,  q.  5,  a.  4.  In  the  neatise  on  Separate  Substances  Aquinas  says  he  will 
accept  whatever  the  philosophers  have  said  about  the  angels  which  is  In  agreement 
with  the  scriptures.  Aquinas  is  forced  to  rely  on  the  scriptures  because  it  is 
impossible  for  the  unaided  intellect  to  study  the  nature  of  angels  directly  for  itself. 
39  See  footnote  n.  4. 
40  A  good  example  of  this  principle  at  work  in  the  sciences  can  be  found  in  Aristotle's 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  growth.  He  says  that  a  'true'  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  growth  must  'preserve  whatever  belongs  to  the  notion  of  the  thing  in  question  and 
exclude  all  impossibilities'.  Oportet  autem  quod  vera  solutio  salvet  onmia  quae  sunt 
de  ratione  rei,  et  onmia  impossibilia  excludat.  The  discussion  then  opens  with  a  list 
of  all  the  essential  components  of  growth  which  the  solution  must  incorporate,  as 
well  as  a  list  of  'impossible'  consequences  the  solution  must  avoid.  De  Generatione  et 
Corruptione,  L.  1.1.  xv,  n.  104. 
41  In  De  Trinitate,  q.  2,  a.  3,  Aquinas  outlines  how  philosophy  can  be  of  service  to 
theology.  The  most  important  for  our  purposes  is  that  philosophy  can  be  used  to 
refute  assertions  contrary  to  the  faith  by,  a)  showing  the  contrary  assertions  to  be 
false,  or  b)  showing  that  they  lack  necessity.  It  is  understood  that  the  articles  of  faith 
cannot  be  established  conclusively;  the  best  one  can  hope  for  it  to  show  that  one's 
osition  is  not  impossible. 
2A  good  example  of  this  procedure  can  be  found  in  Aristotle's  discussion  of  the 
appearance  of  the  Milky  Way.  Some  held  that  the  bright  milky  appearance  Is  caused 
by  the  star's  own  light  which  we  can  see  from  the  earth  because  the  earth's  shadow 
blocks  out  the  sun's  light  which  would  otherwise  render  the  star's  light  imperceptible. 
This  theory  is  rejected  in  the  following  manner:  'If  the  cause  of  the  milky  brightness' 
visibility  were  the  earth's  shadow  blotting  out  the  stars,  then  as  the  sun  moved,  the 
milky  brightness  would  also  have  to  shift.  But  this  is  not  seen  to  happen.  because  it 237 
always  appears  in  the  same  place  and  In  the  same  stars  ....  Consequently  the 
aforesaid  theory  is  false.  '  Si  igitur  occultatio  stellarum  per  umbram  terrae  esset 
causa  apparitionis  lacteae  claritatis,  oporteret,  moto  sole,  transferri  et  lactearn 
claritatem.  Sed  hoc  non  videtur  fierl,  quia  semper  apparet  in  eodem  loco  et  In  eisdem 
stellis,  ut  dictum  est.  Falsa  est  Igitur  praedicta  opinio.  Meteorologicorum,  L.  1.1.  xit, 
n.  8  1.  English  translation  by  Larcher  and  Conway. 
43  In  De  Aeternitate  Mundi  Aquinas  poses  two  questions:  a)  have  the  philosophers 
really  proved  the  thesis  that  the  world  Is  eternal?  and  b)  have  the  theologians  really 
proved  with  certainty  that  the  universe  had  a  beginning  in  time?  Aquinas  concludes, 
first,  that  there  are  no  proofs  of  the  eternity  of  the  world.  simply  suasive  arguments, 
and  second,  that  reason  can  prove  that  the  world  is  created,  but  not  that  it  is  created 
in  time.  He  states  that  an  eternal,  yet  created,  universe  is  not  a  logical  contradiction. 
44  Sacred  Scriptures,  since  it  has  no  science  above  itself,  disputes  argumentatively 
with  one  who  denies  its  principles  only  if  the  opponent  admits  some  at  least  of  the 
truths  obtained  through  divine  revelation.  Thus,  we  can  argue  with  heretics  from 
texts  in  Holy  Scripture,  and  against  those  who  deny  one  article  of  faith  we  can  argue 
from  another.  If  our  opponent  believes  nothing  of  divine  revelation,  there  is  no  longer 
any  means  of  proving  the  articles  of  faith  by  argument.  but  only  of  answering  his 
objections  -  if  he  has  any  -  against  faith.  Unde  sacra  Scriptura,  cum  non  habeat 
superiorem,  disputat  cum  negante  sua  principia,  argumentando  quidem  si 
adversarius  aliquid  concedat  eorum  quae  per  divinam  revelationern  habentur;  sicut 
per  auctoritates  sacrae  doctrinae  disputamus  conta  haereticos.  et  per  unum 
articulum  conta.  negantes  alium.  Si  vero  adversartus  nihil  credat  eorum  quae 
divinitus  revelantur,  non  remanet  amplius  via  ad  probandurn  articulos  fldei  per 
rationem,  sed  ad  solvendurn  rationes,  si  quas  inducit,  conta  fidem.  Surnma 
TheolOgiae,  q.  1,  a.  8.  English  translation  by  Pegis. 
45  St  autem  dicatur  quod  est  possibile  esse  aliquarn  talem  speculativarn  scientiam 
quamvis  adhuc  non  sit  inventa,  hoc  nihil  est:  Quia  non  est  possibile  per  aliqua 
principia  nobis  nota  ad  intelligendas  substantias  praedictas  devenire.  Omnia  enim 
propria  principia.  cuiuscumque  scientiae  dependent  ex  principits  primis 
indemonstrabilibus  per  se  notis,  quorum  congitionern  a  sensibilibus  accipimus. 
Surnnia  Contra  Gentiles,  111,  cap.  41,  n.  2190.  English  translation  by  Thomas  Gilby 
and  found  in  St.  77wmas  Aquinas:  Philosophical  Texts.  London:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1951. 
46  Vanum.  enim  est  quod  est  ad  flnem  quem  non  potest  consequi.  Sunima  Contra 
Gentiles,  III.  cap.  44,  n.  2213.  English  translation  by  Gilby. Part  III 
Illustrations  and  Conclusions 
In  Part  Il  we  were  faced  with  two  particular  tasks.  First,  it  was 
necessary  to  familiarise  ourselves  with  the  Aristotello-Thomistic 
scientific  project  in  general,  and  with  the  divisions  of  the  speculative 
sciences  in  particular  (our  interest  in  this  project  being  the  direct  result 
of  the  investigations  carried  out  in  Part  I).  We  then  went  on  to  consider 
the  cognitive  status  of  natural  science  and  theology.  Now,  in  the  third 
and  concluding  part  of  this  study,  we  return  to  the  realist  dispute  in 
science  armed  with  the  intellectual  apparatus  of  Aquinas. 
The  similarities  between  his  intellectual  project  and  our  own  have  lead 
us  to  think  that  Aquinas'  philosophy  of  science  will  be  of  interest  to  us. 
His  desire  to  reconcile  two  distinct  and  apparently  contradictory 
intellectual  and  religious  traditions,  each  seen  to  be  offering  something 
of  value,  mirrors  our  attempt  to  synthesise  realist  and  anti-realist  views 
in  the  philosophy  of  science.  His  methodological  pluralism,  and  his 
willingness  to  match  his  cognitive  expectations  to  his  subject  matter 
also  matches  our  willingness  to  confine  our  truth-talk  to  specific 
theories  while  recognising  that  other  theories  are  'merely'  empirically 
adequate.  Just  as  important,  we  found  that  we  share  a  common 
demarcation  of  realms.  Our  distinction  between  objects  whose 
linguistic  counter-part  crosses  translation  determinately  and  those  that 
do  not  tracks  his  distinction  between  material/sensible  and 
immaterial/non-sensible  substances.  Moreover,  Aquinas  does  not  think 
that  theologians  are  simply  'playing  a  different  language  game'  from 
scientists,  each  having  their  own  incommensurable  rules  and  standards 
to  govern  their  work.  Aquinas  wanted  to  make  theology  into  a  strict 
Aristotelian  science,  and  consequently,  as  a  theologian,  he  was  bound 
by  the  rules  of  scientific  procedure.  Consequently  his  theology  and 
natural  science  are  seen  as  parts  of  a  over-arching  intellectual  project, 
not  as  distinct  and  incommensurable  language  games.  Finally,  what  we 
fi.  rid  in  Aquinas  is  a  picture  of  what  a  realistically  interpretable  theory 
might  look  like,  as  well  as  a  method  for  the  treatment  of  theories  and 
entities  not  amenable  to  realist  interpretation. 239 
It  is  the  application  of  Aquinas'  intellectual  system  which  is  now  our 
primary  concern.  Given  the  amount  of  space  with  which  we  have  to 
work,  we  will  apply  the  apparatus  to  only  two  modern  scientific  theories 
by  way  of  illustration.  Then  we  can  review  the  list  of  difficulties 
encountered  by  scientific  realism  and  anti-realism  discussed  in  the 
Introduction  to  Part  I  to  see  whether  our  synthesis  of  the  two 
interpretative  traditions  is  able  to  cope  with  these  difficulties. 
Applications 
The  first  lesson  of  Part  II  is  that  modem  scientific  theories  often  contain 
statements  an  Aristotelian  would  consider  as  belonging  to  distinct 
speculative  sciences.  Indeed,  one  schooled  in  Aristotelian  science 
cannot  help  but  notice  that  modern  science  ignores,  or  blurs,  the 
distinctions  recognised  by  Aquinas  between  physics,  metaphysics  and 
theology.  What  I  propose  is  that  we  use  the  divisions  of  the  speculative 
sciences  found  in  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  as  a  grid  or  map  on  which  to 
place  the  various  theories  developed  by  modem  science.  In  so  doing  we 
regain  our  sensitivity  to  the  cognitively  distinct  components  of  modern 
scientific  theories. 
The  following  Tables  will  make  our  points  easier  to  appreciate.  The  first 
table  sums  up  the  material  of  Part  IL  while  the  Table  of  the  Sciences, 
their  intelligible  objects,  cognitive  status,  and  the  relation  that  obtains 
between  those  objects  gained  via  abstraction  and  whose  linguistic 
counter-part  cross  translation,  will  serve  as  a  standard  against  which 
modern  theories  can  be  viewed.  The  important  point  to  note  is  that 
terms  occurring  in  modern  scientific  theories  referring  to  entities 
requiring  anti-realist  treatment  are  grouped  with  the  terms  'God'  and 
'Angels'.  The  essential  features  to  note  are  the  following:  An  anti-realist 
approach  is  adopted  vis  &  vis  any  sentence  containing  categorematic 
terms  referring  to  individuals  whose  linguistic  counter-part  does  not 
cross  translation  determinately.  Conversely,  sentences  taken 
realistically  are  those  whose  categorematic  terms  refer  to  individuals 
whose  linguistic  counter-part  does  cross  translation  determinately. 
This  difference  with  respect  to  translation  has  cognitive  significance 240 
precisely  because  categorematic  terms  not  crossing  translation  refer  to 
intelligible  objects  not  gained  via  abstraction.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
realist  approach  can  be  adopted  vis  d  vis  those  sentences  containing 
categorematic  terms  which  cross  translation  because  such  terms  refer 
to  individuals  upon  which  the  operation  of  abstraction  can  be 
performed.  Here  we  have  a  dove-tailing  of  a  modern,  linguistic  criterion 
with  a  classical  epistemological  theory.  Moreover,  when  we  look  at  two 
modern  scientific  theories  we  will  also  see  that  realistically  interpretable 
theories  are  those  which  provide  not  only  the  'that'  (quid),  but  also  the 
'how'  or  'why'  (propter  quicO;  anti-realist  theories,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
restricted  to  accurately  presenting  the  'that'. 
Name 
First  Degree: 
(Abstractio  totius) 
Second  Degree: 
(Abstractiofonnae) 
Third  Degree: 
(First  abstraction 
in  the  second  act 
of  the  intellect) 
The  Three  Degrees  of  Abstraction 
Type  of  Matter  Intell4gible  Object  Science 
Sensible  Individual 
matter 
-The  Universal  is 
abstracted  from 
the  Particular 
-Common  Sensible 
matter  & 
Individual 
Intelligible  matter 
-All  matter 
-The  act  of  e)dsting 
is  abstracted  from 
the  essence  of  the 
concrete 
individual. 
-Natural  Kinds: 
Individuals  of  specific 
kinds  in  matter  and 
motion  -  Elements,  Plants 
and  Animals 
-Mathematicals: 
Quantiflable  aspects  of 
Concrete  Individuals  - 
Points,  Lines,  Planes, 
Figures  and  Numbers 
-Transcendentals:  Those 
features  all  e2dsting 
things  have  in  virtue  of 
the  fact  that  they  e.  -dst  - 
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Let  us  now  apply  this  grid  to  two  well  known  scientific  theories: 
Darwin's  theory  of  Natural  Selection,  and  Newton's  Laws  of  Motion  and 
Gravity.  The  theory  of  natural  selection  will  serve  as  our  paradigm  case 
of  a  realistically  interpretable  theory,  the  reason  being  that  no 
categorematic  terms  in  his  theory  refer  to  enti 
, 
ties  above  the  dividing  line 
between  theology  and  the  other  speculative  sciences.  Darwin's  theory  is 242 
about  the  nature  of  certain  kinds  of  individuals  accessible  to  sense 
observation,  'and  the  processes  these  individuals  undergo.  The 
descriptive  component  of  the  theory  is  limited  to  an  account  of  the 
biological  structures  of  plants  and  animals.  The  explanatory 
component  of  the  theory,  the  process  of  natural  selection,  explains  how 
these  particular  structures  have  descended  from  the  previous 
generations.  Modifying  Calvinl,  we  can  state  the  six  essentials  of  'a 
Darwinian  process'  to  be  the  following: 
1)  Ontologically  the  Darwinian  is  committed  to  the  existence  of  certain 
kinds  of  individuals,  viz.,  biological  organisms,  and  the  organic  and 
non-organic  elements  found  in  their  environment.  Further-more,  the 
biological  organisms  are  of  a  particular  nature,  kind,  or  species.  (We 
need  not  discuss  at  this  point  whether  Aristotelian  natural  kinds  match 
up  precisely  with  Darwinian  species,  or  whether  modern  biology  is 
superficially  or  profoundly  Aristotelian.  What  is  important  is  that  both 
Aristotle  and  Darwin  are  dealing  with  the  same  kinds  of  individuals 
encountered  in  the  realm  of  the  Real  accessible  to  sense  experience,  and 
both  would  agree  that  these  individuals  are  members  of  some  class  of 
things.  This  is  enough  for  our  present  purposes.  Moreover,  I  ought  to 
repeat,  I  am  not  interested  in  defending  any  particular  theories;  I  merely 
want  to  interpret  what  has  been  put  forward  -  by  scientists  for  our 
consideration.  ) 
2)  These  individuals  are  capable  of  reproducing,  or  bringing  into  being, 
other  individuals  of  the  same  kind  or  species. 
3)  While  all  individuals  resemble  those  that  brought  them  into  being 
insofar  as  they  are  of  the  same  species,  no  two  individuals  are  identical. 
Individuals  are  variations  on  the  basic  biological  structure  of  natural 
kinds.  Nonetheless,  deviations  from  the  basic  structure  are  passed 
from  'parents'  to  'offspring'. 
4)  'Ibe-  variations  compete  for  a  limited  set  of  resources  (food,  shelter, 
mates,  etc.  ). 
5)  The  relative  success  of  a  variation  is  influenced  by  a  multi-faceted 243 
environment.  7bose  variations  best  suited  to  the  prevailing  conditions 
tend  to  have  more  offspring  than  those  which  are  less  well  adapted. 
6)  7be  process  has  a'loop'.  The  next  gener-ation,  or  reproductions  of  the 
original  biological  structure.  is  based  on  which  variations  of  the  last 
generation  survived  to  maturity. 
Now  I  would  argue  that  no  ostensibly  referential  term  in  this  theory 
refers  to  an  individual  whose  linguistic  counter-part  falls  to  cross 
translation  determinately.  Terms  like  'cow,  'chicken'.  'chimpanzee', 
'baobab'.  1:  )eetle'.  etc.  can  all  serve  in  the  occasion  sentences  of  our 
Intrepid  anthropologist;  and  each  refers  to  a  group  of  individuals  upon 
which  the  pmcess  of  intellectual  abstraction  can  be  performed.  The 
essential  component  of  Darwin's  theory  is  his  account  of  how  the 
individuals  named  by  such  terms  interact  with  each  other  and  their 
environmenL  and  the  consequences  of  these  relationships  on  the 
natural  history  of  the  particular  species.  'Natural  selection'  is,  of 
course,  not  an  individual,  but  a,  short  hand  way  of  referring  to  the 
competition  of  organic  individuals  for  limited  resources.  So  Darwin's 
theory  states  certain  facts.  that  organisms  of  various  kinds  exist,  and 
that  the  biological  structure  of  these  kinds  changes  over  time,  as  well  as 
explaining  the  mechanisni.  the  'how'or  'why',  by  which  the  above  facts 
come  about:  this  particular  variation  of  a  species  flourishes  in  such  and 
such  an  area  because  it  is  particularly  well  adapted  to  the  conditions 
found  here.  The  less  well  adapted  variations  of  the  species  were  not  as 
successful  in  repmducing  individuals  like  themselves.  This 
interpretation  of  Darwin's  theory  does  not  suffer  from  the  fact  that  other 
factors  might  also  play  a  part  in  the  natural  history  of  species.  Stephen 
Gould.  and  those  championing  'lottery  bioloZe.  suggests  that  luck  has 
as  much  to  do  with  which  species  avoid  extinction  as  the  forces  of 
natural  selection.  But  this  is  an  addition  to  Darwin's  theory.  not  a 
refutation  of  it. 
Compare  this  theory  with  that  of  Newton's  Laws  of  Motion  and  Gravity. 
Newton  states  that: 
1)  A  body  not  acted  on  by  a  force  continues  in  a  state  of  rest,  or uniform  motion  in  a  straight  line. 
2)  Force  equals  mass  times  acceleration. 
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3)  To  every  actionforce  there  is  an  equal  and  opposite  reactionforce. 
4)  Between  any  two  bodies  there  is  a  force  of  attraction  proportional 
to  the  product  of  their  masses  divided  by  the  distance  between  them 
squared. 
'Me  highlighted  terms  are  incapable  of  serving  in  occasion  sentences  in 
the  opening  stages  of  the  our  anthropologist's  efforts  at  radical 
translaUon.  as  Quine's  remarks  about  theoretical  terms  would  lead  us 
to  expecL  As  such  they  find  themselves  above  the  dividing  line  between 
theology  and  the  other  speculative  science.  The  meanings  of  the  terms 
'force'  and  'mass'  are  fixed  by  the  equation  presented  in  (2) 
('acceleration'  we  can  allow  as  a  quantifiable  feature  df  bodies  in  motion) 
and  the  meaning  of  'force  of  attraction'  is  fixed  by  the  formula  presented 
in  (4).  None  will  cross  tz-anslation  determinately;  these  are  terms  for 
theoretical  constructs  which  serve  as  tools  in  the  derivation  of 
observation  sentences  from  other  observation  sentences.  Ibis 
assessment  is  also  bom  out  by  the  history  of  our  understanding  of 
gravitation.  While  everyone  agrees  that  material  bodies  tend  to  move 
towards  each  other.  and  that  this  movement  can  be  described 
mathematically  very  accurately,  there  is  little  agreement  on  the  matter 
of  how  this  movement  Is  produced.  The  Aristotelian  notion  that 
concrete  particulars  have  an  inherent  tendency  to  move  to  their  natural 
place  in  the  cosmos  has  long  since  been  abandoned;  but  Newton's  Idea 
of  action  at  a  distance  brought  about  by  a  force  of  attr-action  is  no  less 
mysterious.  as  was  pointed  out  by  many  of  his  contemporaries.  Many 
regarded  his  theory  as  'a  lapse  into  old  heresies  which  had  attributed 
something  like  occult  properties  to  mattee.  2  Newton  himself  is  unclear 
on  just  what  he  makes  of  this  notion  of  gravitation.  Butterfield  gives 
the  following  account  of  this  confusion: 
[Newtonj  denied  that  he  had  committed  himself  to  any 
explanation  of  gravity,  or  to  anything  more  than  a mathematical  description  of  the  relations  which  had  been 
found  to  e.,  dst  between  bodies  of  matter.  At  one  moment, 
however.  he  seemed  privately  to  favour  the  view  that  the  cause 
of  gravity  was  in  the  ether  (which  became  less  dense  at  or  near 
the  earth.  and  least  dense  of  all  at  or  near  the  sun),  gravity 
representing  the  tendency  of  all  bodies  to  move  to  the  place 
where  the  ether  was  rarer.  At  another  time  he  seemed  to 
think  that  this  gravitation  of  his  represented  an  effect  that  had 
to  be  produced  by  God  throughout  the  whole  of  space  - 
something  that  made  the  existence  of  God  logically  necessary. 
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But  those  who  favoured  an  anti-realist  reading  of  the  theory,  dismissed 
the  concern  over  the  cause  of  gravitation  as  unimportant.  Consider 
these  lines  fmm  Didemt's  EncyclQp6die' 
11  est  facile  de  juger  comblen  sont  injustes  ceux  des 
philosophes  modemes  qui  se  d6clarent  hautement  contre  le 
principe  de  I'attraction.  sans  apporter  d'autres  ralsons,  sinon, 
qu'Lls  ne  concolvent  pas  comment  un  corps  peut  agir  sur  un 
autre  qui  en  est  Ooign6  .... 
Rien  n'est  plus  sage  et  plus 
conforme  A  la  vrale  philosophic,  que  de  suspendre  notre 
jugement  sur  la  nature  de  la  force  qui  prodult  ces  effets. 
Paz'tout  oft  fl  ya  un  effet.  nous  pouvons  conclure  qu'iI  ya  une 
cause.  soit  que  nous  la  voyons  ou  que  nous  ne  la  voyions  pas. 
Mats  quand  la  cause  est  inconnue,  nous  pouvons  considdrer 
simplemcnt  1'effet  sans  avoir  itgard  d  la  cause.  ...  Les 
ph6nonw)-nes  de  I'attraction  sont  la  maffiý-re  des  recherches 
physiques:  et  en  cettc  qualit&  ils  doivcnt  faire  partie  d'un 
syst6me  de  physique  :  mais  la  cause  de  ces  ph&nom&nes  West 
du  ressort  du  physicien.  que  quand  elle  est  sensible,  c'est  d 
dire  quand  elle  parait  elle-m6me  1'effet  de  quelque  cause  plus 
rclcv6e....  Ainsi  nous  pouvons  supposer  autant  de  cause 
d'attraction  qu'il  nous  plaira,  sans  que  cela  puisse  nuire  aux 
effets.  4 
Subsequent  developments  in  the  theory  of  gravitation  include  reference 
to  'force  fields'.  'gravitational  waves'.  or  stresses'  radiating  out  from 
bodies  and  influencing  other  bodies  through  this  medium.  But  this  is 
no  place  for  an  examination  of  the  various  theories  of  gravity  on  offer. 
7be  significant  point  for  us  is  that  'gravity.  as  understood  by  Newton,  is 
not  a  term  which  can  serve  in  an  occasion  sentence,  and  hence  must  be 
placed  above  the  dividing  line  between  theology  and  the  other 246 
speculative  sciences.  The  evidence  from  the  history  of  science  Is  called 
on  simply  to  point  out  the  fact  that  this  history  is  consistent  with  our 
view  that  'gravity'  is  a  theoretical  construct  which  must  be  interpreted 
anti-reallstically.  But  this  is  not  to  say  that  gravity  does  not  exist.  We 
are  only  committed  to  saying  that  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of 
gravity  Is  bound  to  elude  us.  And  this  brings  out  a  further  distinction 
between  the  theories  of  Newton  and  Darwin.  While  Newton's  theory  of 
motion  and  gravity  is  able  to  account  for  the  facts  on  the  ground,  unlike 
Darwin's  theory.  it  is  unable  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  cause;  in  the 
terminology  we  have  been  employing,  Newton  provides  the  'that'  (quia) 
but  not  the  `why'  or  'how'  (propter  quicO.  It  is  in  this  regard  that 
Newton's  theory  of  Gravitation  is  comparable  to  Aquinas'  treatment  of 
the  nature  of  God. 
There  is  Insufficient  space  to  allow  us  to  consider  other  theories  in  any 
detail.  Nevertheless.  it  is  worth  our  while  to  list  a  number  of  terms 
commonly  used  in  modem  theories  which  will  have  to  be  given  an  anti- 
realist  reading  according  to  our  stated  position.  All  sentences 
containing  the  terms  'atom'  (and  sub-atomic  parts);  'space';  'time';  'rays' 
or  'radiation'  (gamma  rays.  x-rays,  visible  light.  infrared,  radio  waves), 
'force  fields'  (mechanical,  clectro-magnetic,  gravitational);  'heat;  'energy' 
must  be  treated  anti-realistically.  Again  it  must  be  insisted  upon  that 
our  version  of  anti-realism  does  not  deny  that  such  things  exist, 
anymore  than  Aquinas  would  say  that  God  does  not  exist.  But  more  of 
this  shortly. 
Me  Problenm  ofPart  I  Revisited 
Let  us  now  return  to  the  set  of  problems  identilled  in  the  Introduction  to 
this  work.  We  will  recall  that  scientific  realism  and  scientific  anti- 
realism  each  faced  a  set  of  objections  when  taken  in  isolation.  Now  we 
must  see  how  our  synthesised  position  fairs  with  regard  to  these 
Particular  problems. The  Problem  of  Consistent  Interpretation 
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It  was  argued  against  the  naive  realist  that  a  consistent  realist 
interpretation  of  all  scientilic  theories  was  difficult  if  not  Impossible  to 
provide.  7bis  problem  dissolves  as  soon  as  naive  realism  is  abandoned 
In  favour  of  moderate  realism.  7be  moderate  realist  insists  only  that 
some  of  the  terms  in  scientific  theories  are  candidates  for  realist 
interpretation.  while  others  require  an  anti-realist  approach.  The 
problem  is  then  one  of  identification:  Which  theories  are  we  to  take 
realistically?  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  some  of  the  pressing 
contradictions  between  scientific  theories,  for  example,  on  the  nature  of 
time  in  Quantum  mechanics  and  Relativity.  concern  terms  which  must 
be  taken  anti-reallstically  according  to  us.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
endeavour  to  overcome  this  contradiction,  i.  e.,  to  proceed  as  though 
'time'  were  to  be  taken  realistically,  is  not  worth  pursuing.  7be 
heuristic  value  of  such  an  attempt  could  be  enormous. 
DeTuifng  7heoretical  Tenns 
It  will  be  recalled  that  the  particular  difficulty  here  was  to  give  a 
semantic  account  of  theoretical  terms  consistent  with  a  realist 
interpretation.  NVe  stated  at  the  outset  that  the  semantics  of  theoretical 
terms  pose  a  problem  only  in  this  sense.  But  if  one  is  no  longer  a 
realist  about  aU  theoretical  terms,  the  tension  dissolves.  We  can  use 
any  semantic  theory  which  seems  appropriate  in  the  given 
circumstances,  and  adopt  the  appropriate  interpretative  approach 
without  contradicting  ourselves. 
Me  Blurring  of  the  Theory/ObsenxWort  DichotomY 
Ibis  is  a  problem  shared  by  both  the  scientific  realist  and  anti-realist. 
We  have  accepted  that  there  Is  no  absolutely  theory-free  observation 
language.  But  what  our  Miomistic  anti-realist  has  done  is  shift  the 
focus  away  from  the  now  unserviceable  theory/observation  dichotomy, 
onto  the  distinction  between  a  spccies-speciflc  conceptual  scheme  and 248 
local.  or  parochial.  conceptual  schemes.  All  conceptual  schemes  are 
human  constructs;  but  our  lbomistic  anti-realist  argues  that  some 
aspects  of  our  conceptual  schemes  enjoy  a  particular  status,  viz.,  they 
are  found  in  all  conceptual  schemes.  This  distinction  Is  able  to  do  the 
work  hitherto  performed  by  the  theory/observation  dichotomy.  without 
falling  prey  to  the  weakness  of  the  latter.  So  while  we  can  agree  that  all 
observation  is  theory-laden,  we  do  not  need  to  accept  that  all 
observations  are  equally  'subjective'.  Indeed  the  virtue  of  having  a 
species  specific  conceptual  scheme  Is  precisely  that  undue  or  excessive 
subjectivism.  irrationalism  or  relativism  is  avoided  without  exposing 
oneself  to  the  charge  of  unwarranted  and  pernicious  dogmatism. 
Truth-talk  and  the  Under  Detennination  of77teory  by  Data 
Naive  scientific  realism  states  that  the  aim  of  science  is  the  discovery  of 
the  One  True  theory  of  the  Real.  But  we  saw  in  the  Intmduction  that  we 
have  good  reason  to  believe  that  we  cannot  verify  or  falsify  any  given 
theory.  Consequently,  even  if  we  were  to  stumble  across  the  One  True 
theory  we  would  not  be  able  to  recognise  it  as  such  (although  it  Is  likely 
that  we  could  recognise  its  heuristic  value).  Now  given  that  the  aim  of 
the  scientific  realist  is  unattainable,  it  is  prudent  that  we  alter  our 
understanding  of  the  sclentific  project.  Ibis  is  what  has  been  done  by 
our  moderate  realist.  or  Tbomistic  anti-realist.  who  is  striving  to  attain 
a  more  complete  inventory  of  the  Real  as  it  presents  itse!  f  to  us.  Our 
realist  insists  only  that  some  terms  in  our  theories  actually  refer  to 
extra-linguistic  entities  which  are  cognitively  accessible  to  us,  and  that 
we  can  form  true  statements  about  these.  Concerning  all  other  terms 
an  anti-realist  approach  is  necessary.  Our  realist  does  not  say, 
however.  that  he  has  ovcr-come  the  logical  difficulties  posed  by 
Induction  or  the  logic  of  verification  or  falsiflcation.  He  states  simply 
that  the  cidstence  of  some  entities  does  not  require  demonstration  via 
inference  from  cffects.  Of  these  a  realist  attitude  can  be  taken,  because 
it  is  the  manner  in  which  we  know  that  something  exists  which 
determines  the  interpretative  stance  to  be  adopted,  not  whether  we  can 
or  cannot  verify  or  falsify  a  theory. Me  Results  ofHistorical  Research 
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The  naive  realist  could  adopt  various  positions  on  the  nature  of 
scientific  development.  most  of  which  have  taken  a  serious  drubbing  at 
the  hands  of  historical  researchers.  In  particular  It  has  been  suggested 
that  scientific  development  Is  'revolutionary'  as  opposed  to  'evolutionary 
and  'accumulative',  and  that  there  is  an  clement  of  subjectivity  in  the 
abandoning  of  one  theory  in  favour  of  another.  These  results  do  not 
surprise  or  embarrass  our  synthetic  position,  but  we  must  qualify  what 
we  say  In  the  following  manner.  Admittedly  there  is  no  reason  to 
assume  that  science  is  progressing  towards,  or  converging  upon,  the 
One  True  theory  of  the  Real.  Our  moderate  realist  must  accept  that 
there  is  no  scientific  progress  In  this  sense.  But  there  is  an  undeniable 
increase  in  our  knowledge  of  the  world  accessible  to  sense  experience. 
Indeed.  this  is  prrdsely  what  our  moderate  realist,  or  Thomistic  anti- 
realist.  is  striving  to  attain.  And  it  Is  vital  that  we  recognise  that  theory 
has  an  indispensable  part  to  play  in  this  process.  As  stated  earlier.  the 
best  scientiflc  theories  are  heuristic  devices  as  well  as  tools  for  the 
derivation  of  observation  sentences  from  other  observation  sentences. 
7beir  heuristic  value  Iles  in  the  fact  that  they  can  lead  the  scientist  to 
notice  much  which  has  hitherto  been  unobserved,  but  which  Is  not  in 
itself  unobscr%-able. 
7bere  is  an  important  consequence  of  this  which  we  cannot  ignore.  If 
the  Tbomistic  anti-realist  accepts  that  the  goal  of  the  scientific 
enterprise  is  precisely  the  more  and  more  complete  inventory  of  the  Real 
as  it  presents  itself  to  us,  then  there  can  be  a  fully  rational  motivation 
for  choosing  one  theory  over  another  even  !f  both  are  taken  anti- 
reaUstically,  viz..  Its  heuristic  value.  I  would  argue  that  it  was  perfectly 
rational  for  the  scientific  community  to  back  Newton  rather  than 
Descartes.  despite  the  fact  that  Descartes'  theories  were  never  refuted 
by  experiment.  and  despite  the  fact  that  we  are  anti-realists  with 
respect  to  Newtonian  mechanics.  As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  demise 
of  Cartesian  science  was  brought  about.  at  least  in  part,  by  its  failure  to 
lead  researchers  to  any  interesting  discoveries,  Le.,  it  was  not 
heuristically  powcrful.  5  Now.  given  our  understanding  of  the  scientific 
enterprise.  this  is  as  good  a  reason  for  abandoning  a  theory  as  one 
could  ask  for.  Consequently.  Lakatos'  wonY6  that  we  are  faced  with  a 250 
stark  choice  between  Poppees  'cavalier'  Methodological  Falsiflcationism 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Irrationalism  on  the  other,  is  not  entirely  well 
founded.  One  can  have  a  fully  rational  motivation  for  setting  aside  one 
theory  in  favour  of  another  despite  the  fact  that  we  can  never 
conclusively  verify  or  falsify  a  given  theory. 
77w  Uffmate  Objection 
We  saw  that  it  is  difficult  for  the  anti-realist  to  explain  how  a  theory 
which  is  not  taken  to  be  true  can  at  the  same  time  serve  as  a  tool  in  the 
derivation  of  observation  sentences  from  other  observation  sentences. 
An  answer  to  this  question  can  be  provided  by  our  Thomistic  anti- 
realist.  The  7bomistic  anti-realist  does  not  deny  that  terms  for 
theoretical  entities  refer  to  something  real.  In  the  same  way  that 
Aquinas  would  clearly  not  deny  that  the  term  'God'  refers  to  some  real 
entity.  we  too  need  not  deny  that  'force  field',  for  example,  refers  to 
something  real.  Since  theoretical  terms  are  taken  to  refer  to  the  cause 
of  certain  observable  phenomena  (this  being  part  of  the  signification  of 
such  terms).  and  insofar  as  we  are  willing  to  state  that  all  effects  have  a 
cause.  or  set  of  causes.  we  can  quite  consistently  say  that  the  causes 
referred  to  by  the  theoretical  terms  exist.  But  what  our  Thomistic  anti- 
realist  denies  is  that  we  can  ever  establish  anything  about  the  essential 
nature  of  these  causes.  Consequently,  the  nature  we  assign  to  our 
theoretical  entities  cannot  be  taken  as  a  literal  description  of  the  nature 
of  the  cause  in  itself.  But  what  successful  theories  do  get  right  is  the 
fact  that  there  is  something,  or  somethings,  whichfu!  fll  the  role  of  the 
entity  referred  to  by  the  theoretical  term  as  used  in  the  successful 
theory.  Ibis  is  why  the  theory  can  serve  as  a  useful  tool  for  the 
derivation  of  observation  sentences  from  other  observation  sentences. 
It  Is  In  this  sense  that  we  can  say  that  the  entities  referred  to  by 
theoretical  term  exist.  but  that  we  do  not  know  what  they  are.  Such  a 
reading  of  theories  allows  our  7bomistic  anti-realist  to  account  for  two 
clearly  recognised  facts  in  the  history  of  science:  first,  that  many 
theories  are  developed.  enjoy  their  time  under  the  sun,  and  then  leave 
the  scene;  and  second.  that  despite  their  eventual  passing,  they  are 
nevertheless  often  highly  useful,  both  as  instruments  of  prediction  and 251 
as  heuristic  devices.  7bey  are  useful  because  they  in  fact  latch  on  to 
something  real;  they  come  and  go  because  they  cannot  establish  the 
nature  of  the  Real  they  have  latched  onto. 
Summary 
Let  us  sum  up  what  we  have  accomplished  in  this  study.  It  seems  that 
we  have  done  justice  to  the  best  aspects  of  both  scientific  realism  and 
scientific  anti-realism  while  avoiding  their  respective  weaknesses. 
Indeed.  each  position  has  provided  the  corrective  needed  by  the  other. 
In  this  sense  at  least  we  have  been  well  guided  by  Aristotle  who  taught 
that  it  Is  not  probable  that  the  views  held  by  many  eminent  persons 
'should  be  entirely  mistaken.  .  ..  but  rather  that  they  should  be  right  in 
at  least  some  one  respect  or  even  in  most  respects'.  7  And  we  have 
succeeded  in  assigning  each  interpretative  attitude  its  proper  domain 
without  being  driven  Into  irrationalism  or  dogmatism.  This  is  of  no 
small  moment  considering  the  point  of  departure  of  this  study.  We 
began  by  noting  the  fact  that  the  natural  sciences  have  had,  and 
continue  to  have.  a  considerable  influence  on  the  wider  social  and 
intellectual  community,  despite  the  fact  (or  because  of  the  fact?  )  that 
the  majority  of  our  contemporaries  are  scientifically  illiterate  (and 
philosophically  illiterate  about  science).  Tbankfully,  modern  science  is 
here  to  stay;  yet  it  is  precisely  because  of  its  extraordinary  success  in 
certain  fields  that  we  are  always  open  to  the  danger  Montaigne  spotted 
long  ago:  that  what  ought  to  be  a  highly  prized  cultural  and  intellectual 
achievement  should  become  an  object  of  reverence  and  adoration.  8  But 
if  'bowing  at  the  alter  of  science'  is  uncalled  for,  so  too  is  the  unqualified 
condemnation  and  disparagement  of  our  scientific  heritage. 
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